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 Abstract 
This work addresses the ‘what next?’ question for moral discourse, which concerns 
the best choice of action given the truth of the moral error theory. The moral error 
theory comprises two claims: (i) that moral discourse is used assertorically, and (ii) 
that moral assertions systematically fail to state truths. The upshot of the moral error 
theory is that nothing is really right or wrong—indeed, that the very idea of things 
being right or wrong is fundamentally mistaken. And yet, I argue, there are strong ar-
guments in favour of moral error theory. With such far-reaching implications, we’d 
do well to have some guidance regarding what we ought to do upon coming to be-
lieve that the moral error theory is true.  
In the first part of this work, I evaluate the answers to the ‘what next?’ question 
that have been proposed in the current literature. These include a systematic revision 
of our moral concepts (revisionism), preserving moral language in the spirit of a use-
ful fiction (fictionalism), ridding ourselves of moral discourse entirely (abolitionism), 
and making do with our current erroneous moral discourse (conservationism). I ar-
gue that none of the first three proposals offer us an entirely satisfactory answer to 
the ‘what next?’ question. Conservationism is the most promising solution still on the 
table.  
However, conservationism is yet to be fully developed. In the second part of this 
work, I develop and motivate my own version of conservationism, and show that it 
is the most attractive response to the ‘what next?’ question; one that is capable of se-
curing the many desirable practical goods that our moral practices provide. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Error theories and the ‘what next? question 
In his On the Plurality of Worlds, David Lewis recommends that we adopt a “simple 
maxim of honesty” when constructing our philosophical theories: “never put for-
ward a…theory that you yourself cannot believe in your least philosophical and most 
commonsensical moments” (1986, p.135). It is safe to say that not everyone has tak-
en Lewis’s suggestion to heart. Philosophers have told us that contrary to what we 
believe, there are no beliefs (Churchland 1981)—or any philosophers for that matter 
(Unger 1979)! They have also denied the existence of colours (Boghossian & Vel-
leman 1989), numbers (Field 1980), sexual perversion (Priest 1997), emotions (Grif-
fiths 1997), and even moral facts (Mackie 1977, Joyce 2001, Olson 2014).  
Assuming, as these philosophers do, that the sentences that figure in our talk of 
numbers, colours, and the like purport to be stating truths, this means that we ought 
to be error theorists about these discourses. Roughly, to be an error theorist about a 
discourse is to hold that certain sentences of that discourse which seem to be clearly 
aiming at truth are incapable of achieving it; that is, the world is just not the right way 
for basic assertions made within that discourse to come out true. The error theorist 
about colour discourse, for example, takes sentences like ‘roses are red’ and ‘violets 
are blue’ to be stating purported truths. But she also holds that such sentences can-
not be true because, strictly speaking, there are no colours. 
Of course, error theories are not merely the province of philosophers. As Richard 
Joyce and Simon Kirchin observe, 
There is nothing terribly complicated, esoteric, or unfamiliar in the idea of 
taking the error theoretic stance towards a problematic subject matter...It is 
the attitude that sensible persons take towards phlogiston, astrology, the 
Loch Ness monster, and the existence of reliable causal relations between 
severed rabbits’ feet and episodes of good luck. (2010, pp.x-xi) 
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Nonetheless, one is apt to encounter many surprising error theories within philo-
sophical circles; 1 for philosophers often deny the existence of objects, properties, or 
relations that are quite familiar to us. Unlike error theories regarding astrology and 
lucky rabbits’ feet, error theories targeted at colours, beliefs, and moral facts are 
bound to strike us as controversial—at least on first appearances. Our talk of colours 
doesn’t seem remotely on a par with talk of astrology. Using the stars to predict one’s 
fortune seems wrongheaded in a way that taking apples to be red is not. 
As such, philosophers have had much to say about whether we should opt for er-
ror theories in familiar discursive domains. Frank Jackson, for example, advises that 
we “work on the general presumption that the folk are not badly confused”, and 
takes this to count against an error theory about colour discourse (1998a, p.103). Pe-
ter van Inwagen cautions that subscribing to an error theory carries the threat of a 
more global kind of scepticism. Anyone “…who denies what practically everyone be-
lieves is…”, he warns, “…adopting a position according to which the human capaci-
ty for knowing the truth about things is radically defective” (1990, p.103, emphasis in 
original). 
Yet comparatively little has been said about just what ought to be done in the 
event that we do subscribe to an error theory of some form or other. Should an error 
theory of some kind turn out to be plausible, then what ought we to do with the er-
roneous discourse? This is the ‘what next?’ question (WNQ) that follows our belief 
in an error theory; it is the question regarding what we ought to do with a discourse 
if we take an error theory regarding that discourse to be true.2  
The focus of this thesis will be the WNQ that accompanies a moral error theory in 
particular. Just as error theorists about colour deny that anything is really red or blue, 
moral error theorists deny that anything is really right or wrong (Mackie 1977, Joyce 
 
1 This is not to suggest that one is not apt to encounter many surprising error theories outside phil-
osophical circles. Error theories about King Arthur, phlogiston, and anthropogenic global warming, 
for instance, have all been raised and contested, but not primarily by philosophers. Thanks to Daniel 
Nolan for pointing this out. 
2 WNQs are traditionally formulated as questions regarding what we ought to do with an erroneous 
discourse. But for reasons to be discussed later on (§2.1), it is controversial whether the WNQ that 
shall form our primary focus—the WNQ for moral discourse—can be a normative question. I will 
argue that it can. 
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2001, Olson 2014). According to them, moral discourse is guilty of a systematic er-
ror, and so, no moral claims can be true.3 For the philosophical purposes of this the-
sis, the moral error theory is assumed rather than defended. I take as my starting 
point the assumption that the moral error theory is true (and moreover, that we believe 
it is true,) and provide an answer to the WNQ that follows.4 (I will specify who ‘we’ 
are in §2.2.) As I will suggest, a proper investigation of this question can deliver some 
important lessons regarding how we should proceed when attempting to answer 
analogous WNQs in other discursive domains.  
In this work, I will evaluate the solutions that have been proposed in response to 
the WNQ for moral discourse in particular. These include: 
Abolitionism: ridding ourselves of moral discourse entirely. 
Revisionism: revising our moral concepts and/or how we use moral language. 
Fictionalism: preserving moral language in the form of a useful fiction. 
Conservationism: making do with our current, erroneous moral discourse.5 
None of the first three proposals, I shall argue, offer us a fitting solution to the 
WNQ for moral discourse; some are likely to be infeasible, others unstable, and if 
enacted, all are likely to result in the loss of the many desirable practical goods that 
our erroneous moral discourse provides. To my mind, conservationism is the most 
promising option, but it is yet to be properly developed. In the final part of the work, 
I will develop my own brand of conservationism, which is well-motivated, feasible, 
and (I argue) has the best chance of securing the benefits of our error-ridden moral 
discourse. 
My purpose in this introduction will be to familiarise the reader with error theo-
ries and the sorts of answers that are proposed in response to the WNQs that often 
accompany them. I do so to provide the reader with a sense of the problem that the 
thesis addresses. A more detailed discussion of moral error theory is the task of the 
 
3 More specifically, a proper subset of these claims cannot be true. I will get to this clarification short-
ly. 
4 Although I am concerned with a situation in which this conjunction holds—one in which (i) the 
moral error theory is true, and (ii) we believe that it is true—I will often frame the WNQ only in terms 
of ones of these conjuncts for ease of expression. 
5 Conservationism sometimes goes under the name ‘inconsistent nihilism’. See Pigden (1991), and 
Nolan, Restall, and West (2005, p.314). 
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first chapter. Clarifying the WNQ for moral discourse and motivating the project of 
addressing it is a job for the second. 
I begin here by offering a characterisation of error theories more generally (I). Af-
ter discussing more familiar error theories (e.g., witches, dragons), I explain the sorts 
of considerations that motivate error theories within philosophy (II). Following that, 
I outline the kinds of answers that are usually offered in response to WNQs (III). 
These proposals shall be considered when we later move on to evaluate different an-
swers to the WNQ for moral discourse. I conclude with a blueprint of the remainder 
of the thesis (IV). 
§I. ERROR THEORIES  
Error theories are typically directed at a target discourse (cf. Miller 2010). A dis-
course, as I shall understand it, is a domain of talk and thought that is structured 
around a particular set of concepts and associated beliefs. Witch discourse, for ex-
ample, is structured around concepts such as <witch>, <evil>, and <magic>.6 For 
the folk of the 16th century, this discourse also involved a characteristic set of beliefs; 
the belief that witches consorted with the devil, the belief that they had magical pow-
ers, and the belief that they used such powers to further nefarious ends. 
When a particular discourse centrally involves reference to properties, objects, or 
relations that (we believe) fail to exist, then we will likely be error theorists about that 
discourse. (There is a distinction to be made between error theorists who think that 
the relevant properties, objects, or relations do not in fact exist and those who think 
that they couldn’t possibly exist—a matter to which I will return in IIb.) Presumably, 
most of us are error theorists about dragon discourse and witch discourse. For nei-
ther enormous, fire-breathing lizards that fly nor women with magical powers who 
consort with the devil have a place in our critically considered ontology. Accordingly, 
dragon discourse and witch discourse—both of which centrally make reference to 
such creatures—are error-ridden discourses.  
 
6 In what follows, I shall use <x> to refer to the concept of x, and ‘x’ to refer to the term. 
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Although it is tempting to characterise an error theorist as one who holds that 
none of the sentences of a particular discourse are true, it is more accurate to under-
stand her to be targeting only a relevant subset of the sentences of that discourse. An 
error theorist about dragon discourse, for instance, would likely allow that some of 
its negative (‘there are no dragons’), second-order (‘dragon discourse is erroneous’), 
trivial (‘all dragons are dragons’) sentences could be true; for the assertion of such 
sentences does not commit the speaker to the existence of dragons. She could also 
allow that some of the non-atomic sentences of dragon discourse are true. The sen-
tence ‘either there are dragons or the Eiffel Tower is in Paris’ for example, is true in 
virtue of the truth of its second conjunct.  
Thus, we can, to begin with, take an error theorist about a discourse D to be one 
who denies that a proper subset of the sentences of D—hereafter, the ‘D-sentences’ of 
D —are true.7 These D-sentences include the positive, atomic, first-order, and non-
trivial sentences of D, and exclude at least some of its negative, non-atomic, second-
order, and trivial sentences. Among the D-sentences of dragon discourse, for exam-
ple, would be ‘there are many dragons in England’, and ‘a dragon stole my treasure’. 
These are the kinds of sentences that the error theorist is targeting when she claims 
that none of the D-sentences of her target discourse are true.8 
Moreover, we should note that to be an error theorist about a discourse D is not 
only to claim that none of its D-sentences are true. It is more accurate to say of the 
error theorist that she takes the D-sentences of her target discourse to be somehow 
aiming at truth but systematically failing to secure it. A crowd cheering ‘boo’ and ‘hoo-
rah!’ at a football game, for example, would be failing to state truths with their 
cheers. But that wouldn’t license an error theory about football supporter discourse; 
for the chants of football fans aren’t in the market for truth. 
In order to advance an error theory about a particular discursive domain then, it is 
important that the sentences of the target discourse be truth-apt; they must be the 
 
7 Whether the error theorist holds that all of the D-sentences of D are false is another matter. She 
might prefer to characterise them as neither true nor false (Joyce 2001, pp.6-9).  
8 There are some technical complications here. (See Sinnott-Armstrong 2006, pp.33-7 for discus-
sion.) One such complication concerns the validity of particular inferences made within the discourse. 
Moral error theorists, for instance, may want to deny the validity of the inference from something’s 
not being morally wrong to its being morally permissible. (See Pigden 2007, Olson 2011a.)  
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sorts of things that can be true or false. Error theorists typically take the sentences of 
their target discourse to be declarative sentences that express propositions. And they 
take the utterances of such sentences to be assertions—speech-acts that put forward 
propositions to be considered as true. When I say ‘there is a dragon on my doorstep’, 
the error theorist about dragon discourse takes me to be asserting something about 
the world rather than say, make-believing that there is a dragon on my doorstep. But 
she holds that a relevant subset of these assertions (those that involve uttering D-
sentences—hereafter, ‘D-assertions’) fail to state truths.  
Following (and slightly paraphrasing) Joyce (2001, p.9) then, we can say that to be 
an error theorist about a discourse D is to claim that: 
1. The discourse is used assertorically, and 
2. The D-assertions of the discourse systematically fail to state truths  
Thus, to be an error theorist about dragon discourse would be to first understand 
cartographical markings that warn, ‘here be dragons’, complaints to the effect that 
‘there is a dragon wreaking havoc upon our village’, and many other claims of dragon 
discourse to be D-assertions that purport to describe something about the world. 
Secondly, it would be to hold that none of these D-assertions state truths because 
there simply aren’t any dragons. The ‘error’ of dragon discourse thus consists in a 
kind of reference-failure; dragon discourse is error-ridden because something that the 
discourse requires in order to successfully refer does not exist.  
I have spoken of referring terms like ‘dragon’. But error theories certainly aren’t 
restricted to referring expressions. Many are tied to other parts of language. One may 
be an error theorist about adverbs like ‘possibly’ and ‘necessarily’.9 Or one may target 
particular sorts of predicates; ‘red’ and ‘blue’, for example (Boghossian & Velleman 
1989).10 The alleged error of colour discourse may be said to consist in its predicates 
never being literally satisfied (as opposed to its referring terms failing to refer). What-
ever the nature of the expressions in question though, we can take a discourse to be 
error ridden just in case something that that discourse requires in order for (i) its re-
 
9 Quine (1953) arguably comes close. 
10 One might even be an error theorist about the referring terms of a discourse without being an 
error theorist about the discourse in general. Nolan (2014) explores this possibility for moral dis-
course.  
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ferring expressions to successfully refer and/or (ii) its positive predicates to be literal-
ly satisfied does not exist.  
The real philosophical meat lies in specifying just what this ‘something’ is. To this 
end, error theorists typically distinguish between the different kinds of commitments 
that a discourse carries. The error theorists’ central claim is that one or more of the 
core—or, alternatively, the non-negotiable or necessary—commitments of the target dis-
course are not satisfied in (at least) the actual world. They are careful to note, howev-
er, that discourses carry a number of commitments and not all are non-negotiable. 
One commitment of dragon discourse, for example, is that dragons have a fondness 
for treasure. But this commitment seems negotiable. Presumably, we would not con-
tinue to be error theorists about dragon discourse if we were to discover an enor-
mous, magical, fire-breathing lizard in the Australian outback, even if that creature 
had little or no interest in gold.  
Yet discourses also seem to have non-negotiable commitments (Joyce 2001, pp.3-4). 
The superstitious folk of the 16th century not only believed that there were witches. 
They also thought that witches had a number of important properties—properties 
without which a person simply wouldn’t count as a witch. These folk didn’t merely 
believe, for example, that witches destroyed farmers’ crops; it was also important to 
them that a witch be someone who use magical powers to further such pernicious ends. 
If someone were to stir up mayhem in a village by pouring too much pesticide onto 
its maize, we would still be error theorists about witch discourse. To explain this di-
agnosis, we can appeal to the fact that this pesticide-pourer fails to satisfy what seems 
to be a necessary commitment of witch discourse; she is unable to boast any magical 
powers. Were we to use the term ‘witch’ to refer to the pesticide-pourer, then we 
would not be competently partaking in witch discourse.  
These claims regarding non-negotiable commitments set particular standards that 
must be satisfied in order to vindicate the discourse under investigation. To say that a 
fondness for treasure is a negotiable commitment of dragon discourse is to say that in 
order to vindicate dragon discourse, there need not be magical, fire-breathing lizards 
with a fondness for treasure. (A magical, fire-breathing lizard that shuns wealth will 
suffice.) Similarly, to say that the existence of creatures with magical powers is a non-
negotiable commitment of witch discourse is to say that in order to vindicate witch dis-
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course, there must be creatures who, inter alia, have magical powers. If there are no 
such creatures, then witch discourse is an error-ridden discourse.  
We can understand the error theorist’s non-negotiability claim as a semantic or con-
ceptual claim; it concerns the meaning of the terms that figure centrally in the target 
discourse. When error theorists claim that having magical powers is a non-negotiable 
commitment of witch discourse, they mean to say that ridding witch discourse of this 
commitment amounts to changing the subject—it amounts to talking about schwitches 
rather than witches.11  
Spelling out the non-negotiable nature of these commitments in more familiar 
philosophical terminology is far from straightforward. Sometimes the non-
negotiability claim is cashed out in terms of conceptual entailment (Joyce 2008, 
pp.65-6; Kalf 2013, p.925). For example, we might (simplifying somewhat) take the 
applicability conditions for <witch> to be as follows: in order to use <witch> cor-
rectly, one must apply it to something that is both female and has magical powers. If 
we were to take either femaleness or having magical powers out of <witch>, then 
whatever (if anything) we end up referring to simply isn’t a witch. This, we might say, 
is owing to conceptual entailment; the sentence ‘x is a witch’ entails ‘x has magical 
powers’ in virtue of the concept <witch> that is expressed by the term ‘witch’ in the 
sentence ‘x is a witch’.  
An alternative way to explain the nature of a non-negotiable commitment is to 
appeal to the notion of a presupposition (Joyce 2001, pp.8-9; Kalf 2013, p.926). A 
statement S1 presupposes another statement S2 if denying S2 renders the kind of talk 
one is engaged in when uttering statements like S1 somehow inappropriate. A fright-
ened villager’s stating, ‘The witch is going to destroy my crops next!’ (S1), for exam-
ple, seems to presuppose ‘there are witches’ (S2). This is because if we were to deny 
that there are any witches (that is, deny S2), we would render the villager’s talk of 
witches (that is, S1) somehow inappropriate.  
 
11 The schm- prefix is sometimes used to denote a shift in focus away from something real and 
significant and onto something much less interesting and important (as in Dennett 2006). This is how 
I intend for the schm- locution here; few (if any) people are interested in schwitches. But the prefix 
may also be used in a less disparaging way to simply denote a change of subject. 
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An error theory traditionally proceeds in two stages—one conceptual, one onto-
logical (Joyce 2001, p.5). The conceptual stage involves identifying (at least some of) 
the non-negotiable conceptual commitments of the target discourse. As we have 
seen, these commitments provide us with a kind of job description (or partial job de-
scription); they tell us (at least in part) what something in the world would have to be 
like in order for the discourse to be vindicated. During this initial stage, it is common 
to formulate a statement such as the following:  
For every x, x is an F only if Px12  
So, for the term ‘witch’ as it was used by the folk of the 16th century, we may have: 
For every x, x is a witch only if x has magical powers  
Before she can establish her error theory, the error theorist must establish that the 
discourse fails at the second, ontological stage. The ontological stage requires, roughly, 
that we scan the world for what is needed to vindicate the term under investigation: 
Does there exist an x, such that Px? 
Or, in the witch case: 
Does there exist an x, such that x has magical powers? 
If we answer the ontological question in the negative, then we countenance an error 
theory about the relevant discourse—here, an error theory about witch discourse. We 
can therefore take error theories to arise in those instances in which the world fails to 
‘play along’ with us; when we speak of and readily believe that there are particular ob-
jects, properties, or relations, but no such objects, properties, or relations are to be 
found.  
A small clarification is needed before proceeding. I take the strategy outlined 
above to be a very popular way of establishing an error theory—especially within 
philosophy. But I do not wish to rule out other means of doing so. The necessary 
condition(s) identified by an error theorist need not amount to a conceptual or ana-
lytic truth. Someone could it seems, be an error theorist about luminiferous ether 
 
12 Some formulate the error theorist’s conceptual claim as ‘for any x, Fx if and only if Px and Qx 
and Rx’ (e.g. Joyce 2001, p.5). This would be a complete job description. But it is not essential for the 
error theorist to appeal to a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for being an x in order to estab-
lish her error theory. Her conceptual claim need only appeal to a necessary condition (or a number of 
jointly necessary conditions) for being an x. (See Hussain 2004, p.156.) 
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even if they couldn’t point to a semantically necessary condition for being luminifer-
ous ether that they thought wasn’t satisfied.13 This having been noted, I will mostly 
restrict my focus in what follows to error theories which proceed by way of the two-
step strategy outlined above; these will be the most common in the cases under in-
vestigation. 
§II. ERROR THEORIES IN PHILOSOPHY 
The reader will presumably agree that we should be error theorists about dragon dis-
course—along with talk of witches, astrology, and lucky rabbits’ feet. But they are 
perhaps less likely to be persuaded by many of the error theories put forward by phi-
losophers, which target our talk of beliefs, colours, and moral facts (amongst other 
things). However, philosophers are sensible folk. They do not deny the existence of 
these posits of commonsense without good reason. Here, I will explain how error 
theories in philosophy typically proceed, detailing which moves are commonly in-
volved in their conceptual and ontological stages.  
§IIa. The conceptual stage 
As we have seen, the task of the conceptual stage is to provide us with a job descrip-
tion; to tell us what kind of property, object, or relation we are to look for in order to 
determine whether a discourse is error-ridden. In formulating that job description, an 
error theorist usually appeals to the necessary or ‘non-negotiable’ conceptual com-
mitments of the target discourse. Yet we may very well wonder what justifies an error 
theorist’s choice of particular conceptual commitments over others. And we might 
further wonder just whose commitments these are. 
Beginning with the latter issue, most error theorists take the necessary commit-
ments of their target discourse to be the (at least tacit) commitments of the linguistic 
community that employs it. Error theorists about our talk of colours, morality, and 
beliefs, for instance, are usually concerned with the relevant terms as they figure in 
 
13 Thanks to Daniel Nolan for bringing this to my attention. 
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ordinary usage.14 When they deny that there are any colours, what they are usually 
denying is that there are any colours in the sense of ‘colours’ that is used by non-
philosophers as well as philosophers. To borrow Jackson’s (1998a) terminology, the 
error theorist’s conceptual claim is usually intended to capture the underlying con-
ceptual commitments of ‘the folk theory’ of colour. It is not typically intended as a 
claim about some esoteric or unfamiliar understanding of colour.  
Admittedly, identifying the conceptual commitments of the folk is far from 
straightforward. And not all error theorists proceed in the same way. But given that 
their conceptual claim is often presented as an analysis (or partial analysis) of how a 
particular term is used and (at least tacitly) understood within a linguistic community, 
it is common for them to partake in some form of conceptual analysis.15 Conceptual 
analysis typically involves applying the ‘method of possible cases’; we present a num-
ber of (partially specified) possible scenarios, and ask whether the term under inves-
tigation intuitively applies in those scenarios (Jackson 1998a, pp.31–32). Our answers 
allow us to surmise the applicability conditions of the term, which in turn helps us to 
formulate an analysis of it.  
Often, conceptual analysis also involves appealing to a set of ‘platitudes’ or com-
monsense statements to which any competent user of the term would consent (Smith 
1994, Jackson 1998a). Some consider empirical research important here—for in-
stance, studies that test the conceptual intuitions of the linguistic community (Knobe 
& Nichols 2007). Others deny that empirical studies have any meaningful role to play 
(Kauppinen 2007). A more moderate position concedes that empirical research will 
sometimes be relevant for the purposes of conceptual analysis, but denies that it is 
typically required (Jackson 1998a).16 
 
14 Mackie, for example, takes the conceptual claim of his moral error theory to be appealing to 
“the traditional moral concepts of the ordinary man” (1977, p.35, emphasis mine). Boghossian and Vel-
leman’s error theory about colour discourse is similarly concerned with what ordinary people are saying 
when they call “…something red, in an everyday context” (1989, p.100).  
15 The seminal defence of the method of conceptual analysis is found in Jackson’s From Metaphysics 
to Ethics (1998a), though he himself does not use it to establish an error theory of any kind. For other 
defences, see Jackson (1998b), Bealer (1998), and Nolan (2009). For critical discussion, see Laurence 
and Margolis (2003).  
16 Conceptual analysis seems to be more welcome in some philosophical quarters than others. It is 
commonly associated with the so-called ‘Canberra Planning’ methodology for solving location prob-
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The output of these methods is (ideally) an analysis that provides the error theo-
rist with the necessary commitments of her target discourse. These commitments are 
taken to form part of the meaning of the relevant terms, and to reflect how they are 
used within the relevant linguistic community. However, it need not follow that or-
dinary persons are able to articulate such commitments explicitly. A conceptually 
competent user of a discourse will have particular inferential and judgmental disposi-
tions in virtue of which she is best interpreted as taking particular conceptual com-
mitments for granted. But that she has them need not be something that she knows 
(Smith 1994, p.38). A helpful analogy here is grammar (Jackson, Stich & Mason 
2009). Although competent speakers of a language have a mastery of its grammar, 
they need not be able to articulate grammatical rules explicitly. Just as the grammari-
an’s task is to make explicit the rules that are implicit in ordinary speakers’ grammati-
cal know-how, it is the conceptual analyst’s task to make explicit the structure that 
our concepts (often tacitly) have. 
Most error theorists’ conceptual claims are therefore intended to reflect the un-
derlying conceptual commitments of ordinary speakers who make use of the relevant 
discourse. And they often justify their choice of ‘non-negotiable’ commitments by 
conducting conceptual analysis, a process that characteristically involves consulting 
(hopefully common) intuitions and folk platitudes.  It should be noted, however, that 
not all error theorists are interested in the terms of their target discourse as they fig-
ure in ordinary usage. Many error theories are aimed at certain sectors of scientific 
discourse, and so, their proponents are principally concerned with how the relevant 
terms are used within the scientific community. Edouard Machery’s (2009) error the-
ory about concept discourse, for example, targets the psychologist’s notion of a concept 
as a body of knowledge that is stored in long-term memory and used by default in 
higher cognitive processes (e.g., categorisation and inductive reasoning). 
                                                                                                                                     
lems for various phenomena (mental states, colours, and what-have-you); that is (roughly), systematis-
ing commonsense intuitions, building a job description of the phenomenon to be located, and hoping 
that something will satisfy it, or at least come close.  
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§IIb. The ontological stage 
Unlike the conceptual stage, the ontological stage is comparatively straightforward. 
The question ‘are there xs?’ is relatively to the point. It is at least arguably less divi-
sive than ‘what is necessary in order to be an x?’ Yet it isn’t at all clear from what has 
been said so far how exactly the ontological stage proceeds. 
It can proceed in a number of different ways. We might simply scan the world to 
see whether anything in it is capable of satisfying the job description provided by our 
conceptual claim. Alternatively, (and more plausibly), we might consult our best sci-
entific theories: do they suggest that something in the world is capable of satisfying 
the relevant job description—or, do they allow us to make an inference to the best 
explanation that there are such things? Should we turn up empty-handed, then an er-
ror theory looms. 
Of course, error theories need not be established by a posteriori means. We can 
plausibly arrive at error theories about talk of square circles without putting on our 
lab coats. Error theories can also be established using a priori methods; we could, 
from the armchair, simply demonstrate that the terms under investigation (e.g., 
square circles) are incoherent (Joyce & Kirchin 2010, p.xvi).  
Moreover, and relatedly, error theories can differ in the modal strength of their on-
tological claims. The error theorist’s ontological claim may be a contingent one: she 
may simply deny that objects, properties, or relations of kind K exist in our world. An 
error theory about witch discourse plausibly belongs in this category. There are no 
witches in our world. But there are surely some lurking about in other sectors of pos-
sibility space. In some possible worlds, witch discourse succeeds in referring.  
Other error theorists may be more ambitious, and argue that properties, objects of 
relations of kind K could not exist in any world—that their existence is impossible. 
Presumably, we are necessary error theorists about talk of male vixens, and intersect-
ing Euclidian parallel lines; such things are not to be found in any possible world. 
§IIc. Controversy  
Earlier, I claimed that the conclusions of error theories may often strike us as surpris-
ing. By now, I hope to have shown that these conclusions can be reached by employ-
ing transparent and familiar philosophical methodologies—there’s no trick up the 
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error theorist’s sleeve. Still, these methodologies are not free from controversy. Quite 
a few challenges have been raised against the arguments for error theories.  
To begin with, some philosophers deny that the qualities singled out in the error 
theorist’s conceptual claim should be understood as jointly necessary commitments of 
the relevant discourse—that some property, object or relation must satisfy all of 
them if we are to avoid an error theory. Sometimes, the problem here is a local one; 
the adversary disagrees with the particular conceptual claim that the error theorist has 
put forward—that is, with the content of her analysis. Some philosophers, for exam-
ple, reject the moral error theorist’s claim that moral discourse is conceptually com-
mitted to the existence of particular sorts of reasons (e.g., Finlay 2008, Shafer-Landau 
2005).17  
More commonly though, the problem reflects a deep, methodological disagree-
ment with the error theorist; quite a number of philosophers are sceptical about 
claims regarding the non-negotiable commitments of a discourse. This scepticism can 
be cashed out in different ways. Some hold that every conceptual commitment of a 
discourse is negotiable in principle (following Quine (1951)). More moderately, oth-
ers argue that very few commitments of a discourse (far fewer than error theorists 
suppose) are non-negotiable. As such, we need only require that some object, proper-
ty, or relation in the world exhibit most of the qualities listed in the conceptual claim in 
order to avoid an error theory. Error theorists simply ask too much in insisting that 
something must satisfy all of them. Put differently, there need not be anything in the 
world that meets the error theorist’s job description perfectly in order for the discourse 
to be vindicated; often, an imperfect deserver can be given the job, and this will suf-
fice to avoid an error theory (Lewis 1994, pp.415-6; Jackson 1998a, p.35; Braddon-
Mitchell 2003, 2006). Yet another source of scepticism comes from those who deny 
that the discourse in question was assertoric to begin with. Many expressivists about 
moral discourse, for instance, will deny that moral claims were ever in the market for 
truth and falsity. 
Like anything else in philosophy, there are some who are likely to see the error 
theoretic project as misguided from the outset. Some theorists hold that philosophi-
 
17 As we shall see (in chapter 1), the reasons in question are categorical reasons, the force and legiti-
macy of which holds independently of an agent’s unique ends or goals.  
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cal reflection can offer us no good arguments against the existence of certain kinds 
of objects, properties or relations—for that, we need to appeal to scientific consider-
ations (e.g., Horwich 1998, p.88). Others deny that the meaning of a term should be 
understood by appeal to some analysis of it, as the error theorist’s conceptual claim 
seems to suggest (Kripke 1972, Putnam 1975a, Burge 1979). Hostility towards error 
theories can also be rooted in Moorean considerations; we might think that error 
theories amount to a denial of commonsense, and that commonsense claims or 
“Moorean truisms” are “…more certainly truths than any evidence that is brought 
against them” (Armstrong 2006, p.160.) 
I will not attempt to address these positions and the arguments made by their ad-
vocates head-on. As I have indicated, my project assumes that a moral error theory 
succeeds on its own terms. (Though I will draw attention to the considerations in its 
favour in chapter 1.) That said, it’s worth noting that the various lines of resistance 
canvassed above are not always as powerful as they may first appear. Contra Horwich, 
it is highly plausible that philosophical reflection can produce good arguments against 
the existence of certain kinds of objects, properties, or relations. One could, it seems, 
mount a decent defence of an error theory about monotheistic discourse on purely 
logical grounds; by claiming that it is logically impossible for anything to be omnipo-
tent, for instance (Daly & Liggins 2010, p.214). Likewise, Armstrong is right to note 
that we should afford due respect to commonsense. But commonsense surely 
doesn’t have absolute authority in philosophical enquiry (Lewis 1986, p.134). We can, 
after all, be radically mistaken about the nature of the surrounding world; what 
strikes us as obvious is sometimes false. Sometimes, the evidence brought to bear 
against commonsense beliefs can be more powerful than the case in their favour. We 
may even be in a position to offer a ‘debunking explanation’ of these commonsense 
beliefs, which accounts for the widespread error (a point to which I’ll return in chap-
ter 1).18 
Though it is not my foremost intention in this work to defend moral error theory 
against the challenges that have been brought to bear against it, I believe that my ar-
guments do have implications for its acceptability. As I will suggest (in chapter 2), 
 
18 For further discussion, see Daly and Liggins (2010), who also defend error theories against ar-
guments that appeal to norms of charity. 
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hostility towards error theories often derives not merely from doubts concerning 
their methodologies, or worries about their counterintuitive conclusions, but from a 
fear of their practical consequences. Some are concerned with the real-life ramifications 
of adopting a moral error theory. I will propose that we can make some headway in 
assuaging this concern by providing a satisfying answer to the WNQ for moral dis-
course.  
§III. ANSWERING THE WNQ 
The WNQ is the question regarding what we ought to do with an error-ridden dis-
course. It has the following, conditional structure: 
The ‘What Next?’ Question 
If an error theory in a particular discursive domain is true, and moreover, we be-
lieve it is true, then what ought we to do with the error-ridden discourse? 
As I will explain (in chapter 2), we assess any candidate answer to the WNQ by look-
ing at the extent to which it makes for a fitting or appropriate response to the case 
under consideration. This will depend, amongst other things, upon the extent to 
which that answer promotes particular interests, or enables us to achieve certain 
ends.  
Given that the relevant interests and ends are likely to vary depending upon the 
nature of the erroneous discourse, we should expect WNQs in different discursive 
domains to invite different solutions. Sometimes, continuing to make use of an error-
ridden discourse might be the best option available to us. We might, for example, be 
convinced by Buddhist arguments against the existence of an enduring self, but con-
tinue with our personal identity talk in any case because we simply could not make 
do without it. However, in many cases, the recommendation that we persist with an 
erroneous discourse won’t make for sound advice. Once they discovered that there 
were no witches, it was surely a good thing for the superstitious folk of the 16th centu-
ry to cease with their witch discourse, together with the public burning ceremonies 
that talk of witches encouraged. (It was an especially good thing for those who were 
erroneously accused of witchcraft.) 
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Broadly speaking, there are four kinds of answers to the WNQ that follows an er-
ror theory: revisionism, abolitionism, fictionalism, and conservationism.19 As we will 
see, these answers have been proposed in response to the WNQ for moral discourse. 
I shall discuss these proposals in more detail in chapter 2. We can content ourselves 
with a quick preview for now.  
Abolitionists recommend that we cease using the relevant error-ridden discourse. 
The position can be motivated by an appeal to epistemic considerations; perhaps dis-
course D and the ontology to which it is committed must stand or fall together. If 
there are no x’s, then perhaps we ought to stop talking about them, lest we continue 
to believe and assert falsehoods. Abolitionist proposals can also be rooted in practical 
concerns. Their proponents often argue that employing discourse D incurs a great 
number of real-life costs. As such, we would do better not to preserve D in any 
form—revised, fictionalised, or otherwise. Many abolitionists are motivated by both 
sorts of considerations; in the event that a discourse can boast neither truth nor use-
fulness, they think we have doubly good reason to get rid of it. It has been recom-
mended, for example, that we cease to use the term ‘Boche’ on ethical grounds 
(because it licenses unethical inferences) as well as epistemic ones (because its consti-
tutive inference rules are unreliable) (Dummett 1973, p.454). Error theorists who 
take moral discourse to be on-balance harmful have also motivated abolitionism by 
appealing to both practical and epistemic considerations (Hinckfuss 1987; Garner 
1994, 2007; Greene 2002; Burgess 2007; Moeller 2009; Marks 2013a; Ingram 2015). 
A second strategy is revisionism, which consists in somehow modifying the error-
ridden discourse. One means of doing so is to rid the discourse of its problematic 
conceptual commitments. For example, (and simplifying), if there exists no x such 
that Px and Rx and Qx, but there does exist an x such that Px and Rx, then we 
might revise x-discourse such that it is no longer committed to the first conjunction, 
but only to the second. Another kind of revisionist move is to change how the dis-
course is used. We might, for example, refashion our talk of xs such that it consists in 
giving expression to non-cognitive attitudes rather than beliefs. Both moves have 
been explored in response to moral error theory (the former by Lutz (2014), the lat-
 
19 There is another option—‘propagandism’—that I shall mention and set to the side in chapter 2. 
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ter by Köhler and Ridge (2013) and Svoboda (2017)).20 Revisionist proposals align 
with our epistemic preferences. Unlike the D-sentences of discourse D, some of the 
D*-sentences of discourse D* will be true, or won’t be in the market for truth. Either 
way, we won’t be expressing false beliefs with our D*-assertions. Revisionism often 
aligns with our practical interests as well, insofar as the revised, substitute discourse 
confers similar advantages to the original, erroneous discourse.21  
A third proposed answer to the WNQ is fictionalism. Fictionalists think that it is 
(on-balance) in our practical interests to continue to employ an erroneous discourse 
in some form; even if the discourse cannot boast truth, it may nonetheless be far too 
useful to dispense with altogether. Fictionalists don’t, however, recommend that we 
preserve an error-ridden discourse in its current form. (That would be to hold onto 
false beliefs, after all.) Instead, they advise us to preserve the discourse in the form of 
a useful fiction. This typically involves substituting fictive attitudes for our full-
blooded (and false) D-beliefs. On some fictionalist proposals, doing so allows our D-
assertions to be assertions that state truths within a fiction rather than literal truths. 
The fictionalist manoeuvre is a very popular one; it has been explored in response to 
error theories about numbers (Field 1980, Balaguer 2009, Leng 2010), colours 
(Boghossian & Velleman 1989), and possible worlds (Rosen 1990, Brogaard 2006), as 
well as moral error theory (Joyce 2001, 2005; Nolan Restall, and West 2005).22 
Finally, there is the conservationist option. Like fictionalists, conservationists take 
the relevant error-ridden discourse to be incredibly useful. But they part ways from 
 
20 I should note that Köhler & Ridge’s proposal is in fact intended as a response to an error theory 
about all normative claims—not only moral ones. 
21 Of course, given the error theorist’s non-negotiability claim, revisionist proposals effectively 
change the subject. So revisionism might be better thought of as replacement-ism. But this doesn’t pre-
vent us from assessing the proposal. We can still debate the merits and demerits of using schmorality 
rather than morality.  
22 Some fictionalists advise us to adopt non-cognitive attitudes of make-belief towards moral 
propositions (e.g., Joyce 2001). Given this, it might seem that there is not much light between certain 
varieties of fictionalism and certain varieties of revisionism; for both work by removing the aspiration 
to truth from a discourse. Indeed, Joyce characterises his fictionalist proposal as recommending that 
we become non-cognitivists with respect to moral discourse (2001, pp.200-1). My main reason for put-
ting these options into different categories concerns the distinct kinds of non-cognitivist attitudes that 
the fictionalist recommends. As we shall see (chapter 5), there are some interesting properties associ-
ated with attitudes of make-belief in particular. 
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the fictionalist in recommending that we hold onto D in its current, erroneous form. 
This involves continuing to make D-assertions and preserving our false D-beliefs. In-
terestingly, conservationists advise us to believe the error theory about D as well—
though they usually suggest that we only attend to this belief in a specified range of 
contexts (See for example, Olson 2014.) Advocates of such proposals often have 
some story to tell regarding how such doxastic back-and-forth is possible, and why 
our interests are best served by preserving the erroneous discourse in its current 
form rather than revising or fictionalising it. 
§IV. GAME PLAN 
The thesis begins with a chapter devoted to explaining the moral error theory and the 
arguments in support of it. The first task of the chapter will be to identify the distinc-
tive meta-ethical assumptions that underwrite the position. The second will be to of-
fer a condensed history of moral error theory. I then move on to explore Mackie’s 
(1977) seminal articulation of the view, and pry apart his many different arguments 
for it. Following that, I distinguish some important developments of Mackie’s moral 
error theory. One (that of Olson 2011a, 2014) is primarily rooted in concerns having 
to do with the non-naturalness and/or explanatory impotence of moral properties. 
Another (that of Joyce 2001) derives from concerns regarding the special kind of rea-
sons that morality purports to supply. I shall argue that the latter variety of moral er-
ror theory is more plausible, and its success is what shall be assumed for the 
remainder of the work.   
The job for Chapter 2 will be to clarify and motivate the project of providing an 
answer to the WNQ for moral discourse. I begin by explaining what kind of question 
the WNQ for moral discourse is; whether it is (or can be) normative in character, and 
to whom an answer to it is addressed. I then motivate the task of answering the 
WNQ for moral discourse, and outline the answers to this question that are available 
in the current literature. I conclude by pointing towards the philosophical pay-offs of 
the project.  
The remainder of the thesis explores different answers to the WNQ for moral 
discourse. Chapter 3 considers the abolitionist option. After having pinned down the 
variety of moral abolitionism of interest, I examine the case in favour of the aboli-
tionist’s proposal, doing some work to construct the strongest versions of her argu-
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ments. I will argue that these do not support the abolitionist’s central claim that we 
would be better off without morality, and will outline some promising means by 
which we could control for the costs that she brings to our attention. If I am right, 
then the abolitionist’s arguments do not so much support abolitionism as they sup-
port reform. I will further propose that abolitionism is likely to be an infeasible op-
tion going forward; ridding ourselves of morality may very well be something that we 
cannot do.  
Chapter 4 assesses revisionism. Following a discussion of concepts and conceptu-
al change, I distinguish our revisionist from a certain kind of success theorist: the re-
formist. There are important differences between these two projects. But as we shall 
see, there are also some important connections. In the critical discussion, I develop a 
number of arguments against revisionism, all of which are intended to show that her 
‘schmorality’ is likely to be a rather poor stand-in for morality. Some of these prob-
lems are local problems for the revisionist’s proposed schmoralities, which seem un-
likely to be very useful to us. Other problems are more global, and suggest that any 
candidate schmorality is likely to fall short of giving us what we want. I shall argue 
that morality—unlike science—is not plausibly a domain in which concepts can be 
substantially modified and continue to be put to good use. Scientific concepts are far 
more amenable to (fruitful) modification than moral concepts, and this is owing to 
the distinctive functions of scientific discourse. 
Chapter 5 explores the prospects of moral fictionalism. Following an overview of 
fictionalism more generally, I consider two varieties of moral fictionalism. I then 
move on to assess a number of challenges that have been directed against each varie-
ty. In my view, these challenges should only suggest to us that moral fictionalism 
needs to be further refined—not that it ought to be abandoned. The remainder of 
the chapter outlines a more pressing problem for the moral fictionalist. I will argue 
that the fictional attitudes that she intends to substitute for our error-ridden moral 
beliefs are neither a stable enough nor a strong enough basis for securing the many 
practical benefits of our error-ridden moral practices.  
In chapters 6 and 7, I argue that conservationism is the most fitting response to 
the WNQ for moral discourse. The job of chapter 6 is theory-building. Here, I will 
begin by considering the most developed variety of conservationism—that of Olson 
(2014)—and drawing attention to where there is room for improvement. I then take 
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these lessons on board, and develop my own brand of conservationism, which pre-
serves the benefits of Olson’s approach while filling in some important gaps. Among 
my primary tasks will be (i) to motivate taking the conservationist’s attitudes towards 
both first-order moral propositions and the moral error theory to be beliefs, (ii) to 
make sense of the idea that a moral error theorist could attend to her beliefs in moral 
propositions in some contexts and to her belief that the moral error theory is true in 
others, and (iii) to offer a suitable justification for overriding the presumption against 
intentionally cultivating false beliefs. In chapter 7, I switch to the defensive, respond-
ing to some challenges and potential concerns. Among these are problems with tak-
ing attitudes that seem insensitive to evidence to be beliefs, the general disadvantages 
of cultivating false beliefs, objections to pragmatic (as opposed to epistemic) reasons 
for belief, and doubts pertaining to the feasibility of the proposal. I conclude the the-
sis with a summary of the discussion. 
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CHAPTER 1 
(Almost) Everything You’ve Ever Wanted to 
Know About Moral Error Theory  
For the purposes of this thesis, I will be assuming that a moral error theory is true. 
So it’s best to begin by getting clear on what it is exactly that I will be assuming. The 
primary goals of this chapter will be to explore the arguments in favour of moral er-
ror theory, and to specify which variety of the position will form my background as-
sumption for the remainder of this work.   
Moral error theory is a position in meta-ethics, a field of philosophy that is con-
cerned, inter alia, with the nature of moral properties, language, and judgments. My 
first task in this chapter will be to locate the moral error theorist in meta-ethical 
space—to explain the distinctive meta-ethical assumptions that underwrite her posi-
tion (§1.1). Following that, I offer a condensed history of moral error theory (§1.2). 
(Discussing Mackie alone would make for a rather thin historical background.) I will 
also compare and contrast moral error theories within the Mackiean tradition to 
those outside of it. The latter task will help us to better distinguish the moral error 
theories that shall form our focus from other varieties.  
With that background out of the way, I explore Mackie’s (1977) seminal articula-
tion of moral error theory in his Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (§1.3).23 As we shall 
see, Mackie develops a number of arguments in support of the position. For the 
most part, I will restrict my critical focus to what I take to be the most important of 
these: the metaphysical argument from queerness.  
There have been a number of developments of Mackie’s moral error theory. One 
such development—that of Olson (2011a, 2014)—is primarily rooted in concerns 
having to do with the non-naturalness and/or explanatory impotence of moral prop-
 
23 All unattributed citations henceforth to Mackie in this thesis will be to his Ethics (1977). 
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erties. In my view, however, a more philosophically plausible development of Mack-
ie’s error theory is one rooted in concerns having to do with the special kind of rea-
sons that morality purports to supply.24 This is the variety of moral error theory 
articulated and defended by Richard Joyce (2001).25 The task for §1.4 will be to draw 
out the finer lineaments of Joyce’s moral error theory, whose success shall be as-
sumed for the remainder of the work.  
§1.1 MORAL ERROR THEORY IN META-ETHICS 
Before we examine the arguments for moral error theory, it will be useful to first get 
clear on some of the philosophical assumptions that underwrite it. As one might ex-
pect, error theory is not an especially popular position in meta-ethics, and not all of 
the moral error theorist’s foundational assumptions are shared by other philosophers. 
I will therefore begin by locating the moral error theorist in meta-ethical space, dis-
tinguishing her from non-cognitivists and success theorists in particular (§1.1.1). I 
will also explain the different positions that meta-ethicists (error theorists included) 
can occupy regarding the truth-conditions of moral claims (§1.1.2). Introducing these 
distinctions will also be helpful in supplying the reader with some important concep-
tual and terminological background for the remainder of the work. 
§1.1.1 Cognitivism & Non-cognitivism, Success & Error 
As I have noted (§I), error theorists take the speech-acts of their target discourse to 
be assertions that aim at truth but systematically fail to secure it.26 This makes our 
moral error theorist a cognitivist. Cognitivism is a thesis about the kinds of mental atti-
tudes that are involved when we take something to have a particular moral quality, 
 
24 To be sure, Olson appeals to the problematic nature of moral reasons as well. But as we shall 
see, concerns about metaphysical queerness play a far more central role in his case for moral error 
theory than they do in Joyce’s arguments. 
25 All unattributed citations henceforth to Joyce in this thesis will be to his The Myth of Morality 
(2001). 
26 As I will clarify shortly (§1.2.2), the ‘systematically’ qualification is important here; it is needed to 
distinguish the moral error theorists who shall form our focus not only from other kinds of moral er-
ror theorists, but also from certain kinds of success theorists. 
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and the kind of language that is at play when we declare that something has that qual-
ity—when we judge or declare that some action is morally wrong, for example.  
According to the cognitivist, the attitudes involved in our judging something to 
have a particular moral quality (e.g., taking it to be wrong) are beliefs. Since beliefs are 
the sorts of attitudes that are capable of being true or false, moral judgments are 
truth-apt on the cognitivist picture. And since assertions are the sorts of speech-acts 
that give expression to beliefs, moral utterances take the form of assertions.  
 Given the above package of claims, it is natural for cognitivists to take moral 
judgments to be descriptive or representational. When we believe or assert that φ-ing is 
wrong, the cognitivist takes us to be aiming to describe or represent certain features 
of the world. Since describing something involves attributing certain properties to it, 
cognitivists take someone who utters an indicative sentence of the form ‘x is F’ 
(where ‘F’ is a moral predicate) to be asserting that x has the property of being F. To 
assert ‘torturing kittens for fun is wrong’, for example, is to attribute the property of 
wrongness to the act of torturing kittens for fun. The cognitivist takes these predica-
tive moral sentences to express propositions, and so, she takes the truth or falsity of 
our moral assertions to depend upon the truth or falsity of the propositions that they 
express. 
The moral error theorist is far from being a lone cognitivist. (Cognitivism is the 
majority position in meta-ethics (see Bourget & Chalmers 2014 p.476).) But she is the 
only cognitivist who takes moral claims to be systematically false.27 All other cognitiv-
ists are success theorists; they think that at least some moral claims are true. Success the-
ory is thus the complement of error theory with respect to cognitivism.  
 
27 As I suggested in the introduction, there are some complications here. For one thing, a moral er-
ror theorist may want to allow that some negative (‘it is not the case that lying is wrong’) non-atomic 
(‘either lying is wrong or the Eiffel Tower is in Paris’), trivial (‘wrongness is wrongness’) moral propo-
sitions could be true. That is to say, she might want to restrict her claim to (what I earlier called) the 
‘D-sentences’ of moral discourse. She might also want to deny the validity or appropriateness of cer-
tain inference rules (e.g., those that allow one to infer from something’s not being wrong that it is 
permissible). For discussion, see Joyce (pp.6-7), Sinnott-Armstrong (2006, ch.3), Pigden (2007), Joyce 
& Kirchin (2010, p.xii), and Olson (2011a). I will put these complications to the side in what follows. 
For ease of expression, I shall simply speak of our moral beliefs, judgments, or claims being systemati-
cally false, or none of them being true. 
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Like other cognitivists, moral error theorists part ways from non-cognitivists, who 
think the attitudes involved in our taking something to have a particular moral quality 
are non-cognitive; for example, emotions (Ayer 1952), prescriptions or imperatives 
(Hare 1952), acceptances of norms (Gibbard 1990), or fictional attitudes (Kalderon 
2005). Non-cognitivists take moral utterances to be expressions of these attitudes. 
Unlike utterances that give expression to beliefs, these utterances are not in the mar-
ket for truth and falsity. 
This is, admittedly, a simplification of non-cognitivism. Many contemporary non-
cognitivists deny that we must choose between the thesis that moral judgments in-
volve only non-cognitive attitudes and the thesis that they involve only beliefs. In 
Michael Ridge’s (2006) words, one can be ecumenical, and take moral judgments to 
implicate both sorts of attitudes. But a simplified characterisation of non-cognitivism 
will suffice for my purposes. In the interest of getting clear on those distinctions that 
are most relevant for understanding the moral error theory, we can understand non-
cognitivism as I have described it above. 
§1.1.2 The truth-conditions of moral judgments 
Although cognitivists agree that moral judgments are truth-apt, they disagree upon 
which features of the world determine their truth and falsity. They disagree, in other 
words, upon the truth-conditions of moral claims. Geoff Sayre-McCord (1986, p.10) 
offers a helpful taxonomy of the different stances that one might take on the matter:   
Subjectivism 
The truth of moral judgments depends upon facts about some individual. 
Inter-subjectivism  
The truth of moral judgments depends upon facts about some group of individu-
als. 
Objectivism 
The truth of moral judgments is independent of facts about any individual or 
group of individuals. 
Note that the facts about individuals or groups of individuals need not only include 
facts about how those individuals or groups actually are. Lewis’s (1989) variety of sub-
jectivism, for instance, takes moral truths to depend upon what each individual 
would desire to desire under idealised reflection. Similarly, some intersubjectivists 
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understand moral truths to depend upon the standards upon which idealised agents 
would converge (e.g., Scanlon 1998).  
Objectivists take the truth-conditions of moral judgments to be mind-independent. 
That is to say, they take moral truths to hold independently of us—of our whims, 
our desires, and our preferences.28 On this view, moral truths are not made true 
“…by virtue of their ratification from within any given actual or hypothetical per-
spective” (Shafer-Landau 2003, p.15). In meta-ethical circles, objectivists who are 
success theorists are commonly known as moral realists. (This distinction between ob-
jectivists and non-objectivists will later help us to distinguish different types of moral 
error theorists.)  
Our moral error theorist clearly parts ways from the success theorist in denying 
that any of our moral judgments are true. But she can agree with (at least some of) 
them about what it would take for these judgments to secure truth—a moral error the-
orist can certainly take a stance on the truth-conditions of moral claims. For example, 
(and as I will later explain), Mackie seems to concede to the moral realist that in or-
der for our moral judgments to be true, there would have to be particular kinds of 
mind-independent properties. Both parties are therefore objectivists. But Mackie de-
nies that any of these moral judgments are true, and so, he is no realist. 
§1.1.3 Moral error theory in meta-ethics: a summary 
We have now located the moral error theorist in meta-ethical space. Unlike non-
cognitivists, the moral error theorist thinks that the attitudes involved in our taking 
something to have a particular moral quality are beliefs, and that our moral utterances 
are assertions. And although the moral error theorist parts ways from success theo-
rists in denying that any of our moral judgments are true, she can nonetheless agree 
with (at least some of) them regarding what it would take for those judgments to be 
true.  
 
28 Moral realists need not claim that moral facts do not depend upon our attitudes or feelings in any 
respect. Many will want to claim that the wrongness of jabbing a person with a sharp stick can depend 
upon the fact that it caused them to feel pain. (See Shafer-Landau 2003, p.15.) 
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Before proceeding, it’s worth noting that moral error theory does not always sit 
comfortably with meta-ethicists, many of whom are concerned to vindicate moral dis-
course; that is, to vindicate the highly intuitive idea that some things really are morally 
right or wrong. One concern for the error theorist pertains to the practical conse-
quences of denying that this is so. As Joyce points out, there are “…worries about 
what might happen if a moral error theory were to become widely accepted as true” 
(p.231, emphasis in original). One task of this thesis will be to quell such concerns. 
Contrary to what we might fear, life after moral error theory would not be all that 
bad—or so I shall argue. 
It’s also worth noting that widespread resistance to moral error theory among 
moral philosophers shouldn’t necessarily raise doubts about the cogency of the posi-
tion. As Joyce and Kirchin speculate,  
The real explanation for the dearth of real-life moral skeptics plying their 
wares in the philosophical marketplace may be nothing more insidious than 
a natural process of self-filtration: Those who are drawn to moral philoso-
phy sufficiently to publish works on the topic are more likely than not to be 
antecedently hostile towards moral skepticism. By analogy, consider theolo-
gy. One need not believe in God in order to be a capable theologian, but 
how many atheistic theologians does one really expect to find in the profes-
sion? (2010, p.ix) 
Following Joyce and Kirchin, there may be a strong selection bias at work here. One 
should not be so quick to interpret a near-consensus among (what is likely) a highly-
biased sample of philosophers as evidence against the plausibility of moral error the-
ory. 
§1.2 MORAL ERROR THEORY: A GENERAL OVERVIEW 
My primary focus in this thesis will be moral error theories in the Mackiean tradition: 
those which build upon Mackie’s statement of the position in his Ethics. However, 
Mackie was certainly not the first to suspect that not all was well with morality. Nor 
do his arguments represent the only way in which one might go about establishing a 
moral error theory. Here, I briefly consider some possible precursors to Mackie 
(§1.2.1), and explore other roads to moral error theory (§1.2.2). I mention the latter 
largely for comparative purposes; they are not roads that we shall travel. 
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§1.2.1 A selective history 
Philosophers seem to have flirted with the idea of moral error theory long before 
Mackie. Indeed, some take David Hume to have been an early supporter of the posi-
tion (e.g., Olson 2011b, pp.27-30; 2014, ch.1). It is debatable whether moral error 
theorists can confidently claim Hume as one of their own. But many do take him to 
have offered a promising explanation for our widespread error—how it is that we may 
have come to falsely believe that some things really are right and wrong (e.g., Joyce 
2006, pp.123-6; Olson 2011b pp.33-4). The Humean hypothesis, roughly, is that we 
experience moral properties as objective features of the world as a result of ‘project-
ing’ our sentiments outward. When we feel for someone who suffers, for example, 
we project that feeling onto the world and perceive their suffering as something that 
demands our sympathy. And so, we form the relevant moral judgment; it seems to us 
to be a fact of the world that it is morally wrong to cause suffering (see Joyce 2006, 
pp.125-6).  
This Humean hypothesis is commonly thought to be congenial to moral error 
theory. Error theorists are famously met with a Moorean challenge; given the coun-
terintuitive nature of their claim that nothing is really right or wrong, their position 
(the thought goes) must surely be false—something must have gone awry some-
where. (See Huemer 2005, pp.115-7; Armstrong 2006, p.160.) But if the moral error 
theorist can offer a plausible explanation as to how our false moral beliefs have “be-
come established and [are] so resistant to criticism”, then she may have the resources 
to explain away the intuitions that underlie the Moorean challenge (Mackie, p.42; see 
also Joyce, ch.6; Olson 2011a). 
Karl Marx (1848/1977) and Friedrich Nietzche (1887/1994) may also be counted 
among the moral error theorist’s predecessors. Indeed, some (e.g., Pigden 2007) in-
terpret Nietzsche as a moral error theorist cum fictionalist. But it remains debatable 
whether his and Marx’s respective projects do amount to second-order critiques of 
morality. Perhaps these works are better thought of as first-order criticisms of partic-
ular moral belief-systems (Olson 2014, p.16).  
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Another figure worthy of mention here is Gilbert Harman (1977), who develops 
(without ultimately endorsing) an argument from explanatory irrelevance.29 Harman 
claims that moral facts do not seem to feature in the best explanations of our moral 
judgments. In order to explain these judgments, it seems that we need only appeal to 
the relevant natural facts that prompt them (e.g., some children setting fire to a cat), 
together with facts about our moral sensibilities. Since moral facts themselves appear 
to be explanatorily irrelevant, we appear to have no good evidence for their exist-
ence. Harman’s argument from explanatory irrelevance has been reserviced by some 
moral error theorists (e.g., Olson 2014, ch.7; Joyce 2006, ch.6). 
I have been rather brief here, largely for considerations of space. What the above 
discussion should suggest to us, though, is that there has been sympathy for moral 
error theory and related positions for quite some time. Historically, many philoso-
phers have taken seriously the idea that there are no moral facts. So should we. 
§1.2.2 The many roads to error 
Moral error theorists are something of a mixed bag, so it’s best to avoid lumping 
them all together. There are other possible routes to moral error theory aside from 
those that we see in the Mackiean tradition. One such route could proceed on reli-
gious grounds; an error theorist could take moral discourse to presuppose the exist-
ence of a divine being, and then regard a statement of atheism as a statement of 
moral error theory.  
Alternatively, an error theorist might be tempted by the thought that some of our 
moral claims operate upon false metaphysical assumptions about agents and their 
place in the world. Our attributions of moral responsibility, for example, might false-
ly presuppose that we have genuine free will (Pereboom 2001). One might even en-
dorse an error theory that is restricted to the referring terms of morality (Nolan 
2014). A distinctive mark of these latter two possibilities is that they only affect certain 
kinds of moral judgments, leaving others unscathed. In this respect, they crucially dif-
 
29 Harman is no error theorist; for he thinks that there are (relational) moral facts (1977, p.132). 
His aim, as I understand it, is not to establish that evidence for the existence of moral facts is unavail-
able to us—only that it is needed. 
  
30 
fer from the moral error theories that shall form our focus, which attribute a systematic 
error to moral discourse. 
It’s worth pausing to note this feature of the moral error theories that shall be our 
primary concern; for it helps us to distinguish them not only from other varieties of 
moral error theory, but also from positions that can be adopted by success theorists. 
There is a sense in which the committed utilitarian regards the moral judgments of 
her deontologist colleagues as systematically mistaken; she thinks that many of their 
claims about what is right or wrong are false. But the utilitarian still thinks that some 
things are right and wrong. She may even be concerned that her deontologist friends 
are being led morally astray. Our moral error theorist, by contrast, denies that there is 
any such thing as moral rightness or wrongness. The error that she identifies is system-
atic in a far more deep and pervasive sense; it prevents the property of moral right-
ness or wrongness from attaching to anything.30 (See Hussain 2004, pp.158-60.)  
Our moral error theorist is therefore more ambitious than those who restrict their 
target to certain sectors of moral language. But she is less ambitious than others. 
Normative error theorists (e.g., Streumer 2011) deny that any normative claims—and, 
a fortiori, any moral claims—are true. So they adopt a moral error theory by implica-
tion (Joyce & Kirchin 2010, p.xiii). The moral error theorist with whom we shall be 
concerned is different: she “…thinks that there is something especially problematic 
about morality, and does not harbor the same doubts about normativity in general” 
(Joyce & Kirchin 2010, p.xiii; see also Joyce 2014, p.844). (Whether or not a moral 
error theorist can coherently indict moral discourse while leaving the rest of norma-
tive discourse intact is admittedly a contentious issue—one that I shall address in 
§2.1.) 
The above discussion distinguishes moral error theorists in the Mackiean tradition 
from their close cousins. But it’s also worth distinguishing these error theorists from 
moral sceptics. The sceptic doesn’t necessarily think that our moral claims are system-
 
30 I will mostly characterise moral error theory by appealing to so-called thin moral terms such as 
‘good’, ‘bad’, ‘right’, and ‘wrong’. But it’s worth noting that the moral error theory may very well apply 
to thick moral terms (e.g., ‘just’, ‘cruel’) as well. See Joyce (p.176).  
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atically false; she merely claims that we lack moral knowledge.31 Though there are a 
number of different routes to moral scepticism (Sinnott-Armstrong (2006) offers a 
helpful overview), evolutionary debunking arguments have become increasingly pop-
ular in recent years. Debunkers claim, roughly, that we can supply an evolutionary 
explanation of our moral faculties which appeals only to their adaptive utility and 
nowhere to their truth. Given this, they argue that we should be far less confident 
that our moral beliefs are indeed true (Joyce 2006, Street 2006).   
Many moral error theorists take these debunking genealogies to be very friendly to 
their proposal (e.g., Olson 2014, ch.7; Joyce, ch.6). Such genealogies purport to sup-
ply us with an explanation of our moral judgments and practices that nowhere pre-
supposes the existence of any moral facts. Loosely following Harman, some error 
theorists have appealed to this explanation in support of their contention that moral 
facts are explanatorily irrelevant and should be eliminated from our ontology (e.g., 
Olson 2014, p.147; cf. Joyce, p.168). 
§1.3 MORAL FACTS: THEY’RE NOT HERE, THEY’RE QUEER 
Moral error theory arguably first gained traction in contemporary philosophy when 
Mackie articulated the position in his Ethics (1977).32 However, Mackie presented 
quite a number of arguments for moral error theory in his seminal work on the topic, 
and some will be more important for our purposes than others. I will briefly outline 
these arguments, commenting along the way on their relative importance in establish-
ing a moral error theory (§1.3.1). The majority of the discussion will be devoted to 
the metaphysical argument from queerness, which, to my mind, is by far the most 
important among these (§1.3.2).   
Following that, I explore Olson’s (2011a, 2014) development of Mackie’s error 
theory (§1.3.3). Like Mackie, Olson emphasises the problematic kind of queerness that 
 
31 Though not every moral sceptic need be a moral error theorist, we would expect all moral error 
theorists to be moral sceptics. If there are no moral truths, then, presumably, there is no moral 
knowledge either. Some moral error theorists (e.g., Joyce 2006), pursue the sceptical project (largely) 
independently. 
32 Mackie also discussed moral error theory in his ‘A Refutation of Morals’ (1946). But philosophi-
cal discussion of the position was only really ignited following the publication of his Ethics (1977).  
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moral properties would have. On closer inspection, however, these queerness-based 
arguments do not seem to me to be especially plausible (§1.3.4). I will therefore ulti-
mately distance myself from moral error theories which proceed by raising queerness 
concerns, aligning myself instead with Joyce’s development of Mackie’s error theory 
(to be covered in §1.4), which strikes me as more promising.  
§1.3.1 Mackie’s many arguments for moral error theory 
Let’s begin with Mackie’s well-known argument from disagreement. The backbone of this 
argument is the observation that people’s moral values differ (or seem to differ) in 
significant ways—especially among persons who are temporally and spatially distant 
from one another. On that much, philosophers tend to agree.33 What they disagree 
upon is the precise ambition of the argument that follows, together with its role in 
establishing a moral error theory.  
It is common to understand Mackie to be using his initial observation to put for-
ward an inductive argument. (See for example, Brink 1984, p.115; Olson 2014, p.73.) 
“The actual variations in…moral codes”, Mackie tells us, “are more readily explained 
by the hypothesis that they reflect ways of life than by the hypothesis that they ex-
press perceptions, most of them seriously inadequate and badly distorted, of objec-
tive values” (p.37). Thus, Mackie seems to think that there are two competing 
explanations available for moral disagreement. Either (i) moral truths are determined 
by individuals’ attitudes and commitments, and moral disagreement issues from dif-
ferent attitudes and commitments, or (ii) there are objective moral truths, and moral 
disagreement persists because some have failed to obtain knowledge of them. Mackie 
argues that the former explanation is to be preferred: moral disagreement is better 
explained by the hypothesis that moral truths reflect different lifestyle choices than 
by the hypothesis that it issues from differential access to moral truth. (One might 
think that the conclusion of this argument is moral relativism rather than moral error 
 
33 That is to say, they agree that Mackie is claiming to make such an observation. Not everyone 
agrees that moral disagreements do in fact issue from differences in moral values. One might offer a 
“defusing explanation”, which identifies the source of these disagreements in bias, irrationality, or dis-
agreements over non-moral facts. (See Doris and Plakias (2008) for discussion.) I will discuss some of 
these defusing explanations in §3.2.2. 
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theory. But as we shall see, Mackie takes morality to be conceptually non-relative; in 
our earlier terms, he is an objectivist. Given this, he does not view moral relativism as a 
vindication of moral discourse) 
Though the above interpretation is rather common, it is certainly not the only 
one. Others understand Mackie to be putting forward the conceptual claim that ordi-
nary moral discourse is underwritten by the expectation that we will converge upon 
our moral judgments, following suitable argument and reflection (Lillehammer 2014, 
p.97; cf. Streumer 2011). His pointing towards widespread moral disagreement may 
therefore be intended to show that this is an expectation made in vain.  
Mackie’s other arguments for moral error theory include the epistemic argument from 
queerness, and the argument from queer supervenience. The first of these is intended to estab-
lish that given the metaphysically queer character of moral properties, we would re-
quire an equally queer epistemic faculty for detecting them—a faculty that, Mackie 
argues, we have no good reason to attribute to anyone (p.41). The second seeks to 
show that the supervenience relation between non-moral properties and queer moral 
properties would similarly be queer. It is because we operate under the assumption 
that moral properties supervene upon non-moral properties—that there can be no 
difference in the moral features of a person, action, or state of affairs without a non-
moral difference—that we can say of an action that it is wrong because it is an act of 
gratuitous killing. Yet what in the world explains this supervenience relation—“just 
what in the world is signified by this because?” Mackie asks (p.41). He doesn’t think 
that any plausible answer is forthcoming. 
As should be clear, both of these latter arguments are heavily premised upon the 
metaphysical argument from queerness; it is only once Mackie takes himself to have estab-
lished that moral properties themselves are queer that he is in a position to argue that 
this implicates a queer supervenience relation, together with a queer epistemic faculty 
for detecting moral properties. Simply put, the metaphysical argument from queer-
ness is “load bearing” (Joyce & Kirchin 2010, p.xvii). This speaks to the importance 
of the metaphysical argument from queerness, which, to my mind, is the most im-
portant component of Mackie’s case for moral error theory. Not only does Mackie 
himself understand this argument to be “more important” and “certainly more gen-
erally applicable” (p.38), but it also forms the foundation of many of his other argu-
ments.   
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The argument from disagreement, by contrast, has questionable ambitions, and its 
role in establishing moral error theory remains unclear. In particular, it remains un-
clear whether the argument from disagreement is a mere handmaiden to the argu-
ment from queerness (an observation that boosts Mackie’s overall case), a 
complementary point (one that derives from the very same considerations), or an in-
dependent, stand-alone argument. For these reasons, I will confine myself to Mack-
ie’s metaphysical argument from queerness in what follows.  
§1.3.2 Mackie’s metaphysical argument from queerness 
Mackie’s metaphysical argument from queerness can be interpreted in different ways, 
and it has inspired different readings and developments of moral error theory. My 
goal in the remainder of §1.3 will be to explore what I shall call the queerness reading 
and its descendants. This reading takes Mackie at his word, understanding his moral 
error theory to be rooted in the idea that moral properties would be objectionably 
queer. The queerness reading differs in important ways from Richard Joyce’s (2001) 
development of Mackie’s error theory, to which I attend later on (§1.4). 
With those qualifications in mind, we can now turn to Mackie’s metaphysical ar-
gument from queerness. This argument is premised upon the claim that moral prop-
erties, if they were to exist, would have to be objectively prescriptive (exactly what Mackie 
means by ‘objectively prescriptive’ is something that I will discuss in some detail be-
low).34 Mackie takes this to be a non-negotiable conceptual commitment of moral 
discourse. It is, he maintains, “part of what our ordinary statements mean”, and un-
derwrites “the traditional moral concepts of the ordinary man” (p.35).35 His concep-
tual claim is therefore as follows: 
Mackie’s conceptual claim 
Moral discourse is conceptually committed to the existence of objectively prescrip-
tive properties.  
 
34 Mackie seems to be making a broader claim—one that does not only target moral properties, 
but is directed at moral “entities or qualities or relations” more generally (p.38). I speak of properties 
here for ease of expression. 
35 I follow others (e.g., Smith 1994, p.64; Svavarsdóttir 2001, p.145) in thinking that Mackie takes 
non-negotiability to be a matter of conceptual entailment. 
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Mackie denies the existence of such peculiar properties, which he famously dubs 
metaphysically “queer”. This gives us: 
Mackie’s ontological claim 
There are no objectively prescriptive properties.  
Let’s begin by homing in on the conceptual claim. We can start with an initial sketch 
of what it would take for properties to be objective or prescriptive. The notion of 
prescriptivity captures the important sense in which moral properties seem to be “ac-
tion-guiding” (p.23). When some person, action, or state of affairs has some moral 
property, this has action-guiding force; it has important implications for what we do.   
What of objectivity? Mackie understands objectivity in terms of being “part of the 
fabric of the world” (p.15), and “prior to and independent of our choices” (p.30, 
p.43). We might therefore interpret the ‘objective’ component of ‘objective prescrip-
tivity’ as the idea that moral discourse is conceptually committed to the mind-
independence of moral properties. If something had the property of being good, bad, 
right, or wrong, then this would not be made true by facts about the perspectives of 
any (actual or hypothetical) agent or group of agents. 
Taken alone, neither objectivity nor prescriptivity is problematic. Scientific claims 
are presumably objective in the sense that Mackie intends. The number of protons in 
a hydrogen molecule is plausibly “prior to and independent of our choices”. Yet 
there doesn’t seem to be anything metaphysically queer about hydrogen molecules. 
And the rules of backgammon are surely ‘prescriptive’ in that they have implications 
for what we do when playing backgammon. But none of us think that there’s any-
thing metaphysically suspect about board games. According to Mackie, the problem 
arises when these two features are put together—in something’s being objectively pre-
scriptive. 
But what is it for something to be objectively prescriptive? There is some disa-
greement on this issue. Although most agree that Mackie understands objectivity as I 
have characterised it above, it is less clear what the notion of prescriptivity involves. 
And this is likely owing to a lack of clarity on Mackie’s behalf—specifically, his con-
sideration of two very different sorts of ontologies that he thought would be able to 
accommodate objectively prescriptive properties.  
One ontological framework that would be able to admit such metaphysically 
queer properties, Mackie thought, was a Platonic world of forms. In this world, simp-
  
36 
ly coming to know that something participates in the form of goodness (that is, that 
something is good) necessarily motivates any agent to pursue it (roughly, to do what 
is morally required of them).  The second framework that, Mackie suggests, could ac-
commodate objectively prescriptive properties is Samuel Clarke’s envisioned world in 
which “… a situation would have a demand for such-and-such an action somehow 
built into it” (p.40). These are strikingly different examples, and they suggest two 
very different ways in which moral properties could be action-guiding; one concerns 
moral motivation, the other, moral demands (Garner 1990).  
On the motivational reading, the objective prescriptivity of moral properties con-
cerns their purporting to be both mind-independent and intrinsically motivating. Moral 
properties, being motivating in and of themselves, would necessarily motivate any 
agent (with moral knowledge) to act as they morally ought quite independently of 
what they are like. I am going to put this motivational reading the side in what fol-
lows. My first reason for doing so is philosophical; this reading gives rise to an im-
plausible variety of moral error theory. It is easy to disagree with Mackie from the 
start if he thinks that moral discourse is conceptually committed to moral knowledge 
necessarily inducing moral motivation.36 (Moral knowledge is not usually taken to be 
any sort of guarantor of virtuous conduct.) And disagree many have on that basis. 
(See for example, Brink 1984.) As we shall see, these problems do not carry over to 
the competing (and to my mind, superior) reading, which takes Mackie’s talk of pre-
scriptivity to allude to the intrinsically directive nature of moral properties—to the fact 
that they would demand certain actions of us. We can presumably have demands 
thrust upon us even if we are not always motivated to comply with them (Garner 
1990, p.144; see also Joyce, p.30).  
There are also strong exegetical grounds to prefer the directive reading. Mackie 
passes over considerations having to do with moral motivation rather quickly. The 
directive reading, by contrast, is backed up with philosophical argument—namely, 
Mackie’s discussion of categorical imperatives (to which I turn shortly). There is 
 
36 This is not to deny that moral discourse may be conceptually committed to weaker claims per-
taining to the connection between moral judgment in motivation. (More on this in §1.4.3.) For in-
depth discussions of Mackie’s commitments on this score, see Sinnott-Armstrong (2010) and Dreier 
(2010).  
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nothing in this discussion which suggests that the issue with moral properties is their 
claim to intrinsic motivational power. Nowhere does Mackie link categorical impera-
tives with motivational efficacy. That Mackie is primarily concerned with morality’s 
intrinsic demandingness is therefore far more congruent with his discussion of cate-
gorical imperatives than the reading which would have him pushing for controversial 
claims about moral motivation being core conceptual commitments of moral dis-
course.  
Let us therefore devote our attention to what I have called a directive reading of 
prescriptivity. This reading is suggested by Mackie’s appeal to the sort of world that 
Clarke envisages. It is further supported by his discussion of imperatives. Mackie tells 
us that in denying the existence of objectively prescriptive properties, he means to 
deny that any “categorically imperative element is objectively valid” (p.29). Clearly, 
some work needs to be done to unpack this idea. I will begin by attending to the dis-
tinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives.  
Borrowing heavily from Kant, Mackie takes the distinguishing mark of hypothet-
ical imperatives to be that their validity crucially rests upon the recommended ac-
tion’s being a means to the satisfaction of some desire that the addressee has. For 
example, we might take ‘you ought to open the window’ to be a hypothetical imperative 
because there is something of a tacit suffix in place along the lines of ‘…provided 
that you desire to cool down’. If you didn’t desire to cool down (or have some other 
desire that would be served by closing the window), this imperative would not be val-
id. That is to say, the imperative would not legitimately apply to you; it would in 
some sense “evaporate” (Joyce, pp.31-5). The validity of a categorical imperative, by con-
trast, does not depend upon the desires of the addressee. A categorical imperative 
can legitimately apply to an agent independently of whether she has a desire that 
would be served by her compliance.  
Mackie argues that moral imperatives are categorical; whether or not an agent moral-
ly ought to φ does not depend upon whether φ-ing would satisfy any of her desires 
(p.29). On the face of it, that claim seems eminently plausible. Presumably, we don’t 
take the validity of the imperative ‘you morally ought not to torture kittens’, to de-
pend upon what the addressee’s desires are. Moral imperatives seem to legitimately 
apply to us quite independently of what our desires happen to be.  
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However, moral imperatives don’t seem unique in this respect. As Phillipa Foot 
(1972) points out, the imperatives of various institutional systems of rules (e.g., those 
of etiquette) also seem to legitimately apply to us independently of our desires. We 
do not withdraw the imperative ‘you ought not to chew with your mouth open’, for 
example, when the agent has no desire that would be served by closing her mouth 
while scoffing down her food. What then, distinguishes these (presumably) ontologi-
cally respectable categorical imperatives from those that Mackie relegates to the 
queer camp?  
Mackie’s answer is that the categorical imperatives generated by these systems of 
rules are rendered legitimate by institutions. We can explain such standards by appeal-
ing to institutional facts such as publicly recognised rules of conduct. Mackie is keen 
to emphasise that these institutional facts are “…constituted by human thought, be-
haviour, feelings, and attitudes” (p.81). The distinguishing feature of institutional 
rules, then, is that they are explicitly mind-dependent. 
Not so for moral imperatives. According to Mackie, moral imperatives not only 
purport to be “action-directing absolutely, not contingently…upon the agent’s de-
sires” (p.29) (as do other, metaphysically kosher categorical imperatives). They also 
purport to transcend institutional frameworks—to be legitimised by “requirements 
which are simply there, in the nature of things” (p.59). Moral imperatives are there-
fore distinct in purporting to impose objective requirements upon us.  
Thus, Mackie thinks that objectively prescriptive properties entail the existence of 
imperatives that are objectively valid—valid in virtue of facts having nothing at all to do 
with any agent(s). (p.29). If something were morally wrong, then there would be a 
demand upon us not to do it—a demand that legitimately applied to us independent-
ly of any desires that we may have, and independently of any institutions to which we 
might subscribe. Moral properties purport to be intrinsically directive; to be action-
guiding in and of themselves.  
Mackie therefore takes moral properties to be queer because they entail the exist-
ence of demands that are issued by the world itself. He thinks that we have very 
good reason to deny that any such properties exist. Exactly what Mackie’s reasons 
are, however, is open to interpretation. Many take his central claim to be that such 
metaphysically queer properties cannot hope to find a place in our natural world (e.g., 
Kirchin 2010, p.175). Given their objective prescriptivity, moral properties would be 
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unlike any natural property; they would, it seems, have to be non-natural (Copp 2006, 
pp.9-10). A global naturalist, Mackie refuses to countenance the existence of anything 
so spooky.  
(It isn’t altogether clear what these theorists think Mackie takes a natural property 
to be. (Though this can be forgiven, given that the notion is notoriously difficult to 
pin down.) Following a suggestion from Hampton (1998, p.22), we might reasonably 
interpret Mackie as holding that a natural property is any property that is that is 
countenanced by the best available scientific theory of reality, and to be saying that 
moral properties could not be countenanced by such a theory.)  
Alternatively, perhaps Mackie is putting forward an argument from explanatory ir-
relevance.37 He might think that since our best scientific theories “neither recognize 
nor require for explanation any” objectively prescriptive properties, “we are not li-
censed to believe that they exist” (Hampton 1998, pp.21–2). On this latter interpreta-
tion, Mackie’s basic idea is that we should not believe in moral properties because 
they don’t figure in our best account of the world. They are ontologically profligate. 
§1.3.3 Olson’s development  
As we have seen, Mackie is moved to endorse a moral error theory by the thought 
that moral properties would be metaphysically queer. On the interpretation that I fa-
vour, the queerness in question concerns the mind-independent and intrinsically di-
rective character that moral properties would need to have, were they to exist. Jonas 
Olson (2011a, 2014) has recently developed this queerness-based argument for moral 
error theory, arguing that moral facts entail the existence of queer, irreducibly normative 
favouring relations. 
Before we can understand what ‘irreducibly normative favouring relations’ are, we 
need to get clear on the concept of a normative reason. To this end, it will be helpful to 
 
37 Though I cast this as an ‘alternative’ interpretation, one may think there is very little light be-
tween the two. But as Lillehammer suggests, there does at the very least seem to be an intuitive differ-
ence. The claim that “the very idea of objective value offends against both our best theory of the 
universe, and our best theory of how the universe is known” seems stronger than the claim that “there 
is no need to postulate objective moral values in order to explain why we make the moral claims we 
do” (2011, p.59). 
  
40 
first distinguish normative reasons from motivating reasons (Smith 1994, pp.94-98). 
Normative reasons are facts (or true propositions) that justify our acting in particular 
ways.38 (I intend for ‘acting’ to be read broadly to refer to different kinds of respons-
es that an agent can give; e.g., believing certain propositions, or feeling particular 
sorts of emotions.) We speak of normative reasons when we say that there is no rea-
son to panic, or that people generally have good reasons to exercise regularly. Motivat-
ing reasons, by contrast, are facts that explain why we acted, or will act, as we do.39 
Motivating reasons are what we speak of when we say that a criminal fled overseas in 
order to evade the authorities, or that someone chose to visit Australia because there 
are fabulous beaches there. 
Secondly, we should specify not only what a normative reason is not, but what it 
is. A normative reason for φ-ing is, minimally, a consideration that counts in favour 
of φ-ing (Scanlon 1998, p.17). One popular way of cashing this out is to take norma-
tive reasons to be facts that stand in particular kinds of relations to an agent and a 
type of response that she can give.40 For instance, the fact that there is delicious cof-
fee in Melbourne might be a reason for a coffee-lover to choose Melbourne as a fu-
ture holiday destination.  
Finally, and in order to properly understand Olson’s development of moral error 
theory, we need to distinguish (i) the fact that is a reason and (ii) the property of be-
ing a reason. In the above example, the fact that there is delicious coffee in Mel-
bourne is the fact that is the reason. So far, so good—nothing mysterious. Where the 
mystery comes in, Olson thinks, is in trying to tie down the property of being a reason. In 
the scenario above, we have (a) a person who loves coffee, (b) the fact that there is 
delicious coffee in Melbourne, and (c) the option of choosing Melbourne as a future 
 
38 Whether or not facts differ from true propositions, and whether, if they do, reasons are to be 
identified with one or the other, is an issue that I put to the side here. (See Alvarez (2010, pp.151–8) 
for discussion.) I will sometimes refer to these facts or true propositions as ‘considerations’. 
39 Some think that motivating reasons are properly thought of as mental states—for example, be-
lief-desire pairs (e.g., Davidson 1963, p.687). But there are good theoretical reasons to understand 
them to be facts. (See Dancy 2000, Alvarez 2010, McDowell 2013.) 
40 To my knowledge, this triadic understanding is the most popular way to make sense of norma-
tive reasons. But it is not mandatory. Some may hold that there could be normative reasons that aren’t 
connected in any way to any agent. (See Schroeder (2007a) for discussion.) Others—most notably, 
contrastivists—may think of reasons as four-place relations. (See Sinnott-Armstrong 2008.)  
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holiday destination. But then there seems to emerge from (a), (b), and (c) this proper-
ty of being a reason—this property of ‘counting-in-favour-of’. (The fact that there is 
delicious coffee in Melbourne ‘counts in favour of’’ the coffee lover choosing Mel-
bourne as a holiday destination.) Olson (2011a, 2014) finds this counting-in-favour-
of relation mysterious. If our reasons language cannot do away with it—if, that is, 
our talk of reasons cannot be spelled out in wholly naturalistic, non-normative 
terms—then he thinks we should deny that any reasons exist.   
Fortunately, eschewing the counting-in-favour-of relation is sometimes possible. 
Olson thinks that this can be achieved for hypothetical reasons, which can be reduced to 
empirical facts about agents’ desires and (actual or believed) means of bringing about 
their satisfaction (2011a, p.78). A hypothetical reasons-claim such as ‘a has a reason 
to visit Melbourne’, for example, can be reduced to the claim that visiting Melbourne 
will or is likely to satisfy some of a’s desires—a desire to sample the world’s best cof-
fee, say. 
We can also do away with this “queer” counting-in-favour-of relation when we 
speak of our reasons to act in accordance with institutional systems of rules. Olson 
regards these reasons-claims as metaphysically innocent. The claim that a chess player 
has a reason not to move her rook diagonally, for example, can be reduced to facts 
about her engagement in the relevant rule-governed activity (2011a, p.65). 
Importantly, Olson doesn’t merely think that in these cases, the fact that is the 
reason is reducible. (Presumably, most of us agree with that—chess pieces aren’t on-
tologically fundamental.) Olson thinks that the property of being a reason is reducible, 
where reduction is achieved by eschewing the understanding of the property of being 
a reason in terms of a counting-in-favour-of relation. In order for any claim to the 
effect that a has a reason to φ to be true, that claim must be reducible to empirical 
facts. And he thinks that both hypothetical and institutional reasons-claims satisfy 
this constraint.  
However, Olson argues that the same is not true of moral reasons-claims. We take 
the fact that torturing kittens is morally wrong to provide a reason to anyone to re-
frain from doing so, quite independently of their desires or their participation in any 
rule-governed activities. Moral facts therefore entail facts about categorical reasons. But 
since categorical reasons depend upon neither an agent’s desires nor her engagement 
in any rule-governed activities, moral reasons-claims leave the property of being a 
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reason unreduced; we are left with an irreducibly normative reasons-relation. Olson’s 
conceptual claim, then, is as follows (2014, pp.123-4): 
Olson’s conceptual claim                                                                                       
Moral facts entail that there are facts that favour certain actions, where the favour-
ing relation is irreducibly normative. 
Olson therefore takes moral discourse to be committed to the existence of irreduci-
ble normativity. And this, he thinks, is a problem; for irreducibly normativity is 
“queer” and “metaphysically mysterious” (2014, pp.135-6). Since moral facts entail 
facts about queer counting-in-favour-of relations, we should take moral facts to be 
queer as well.  
Unfortunately, Olson doesn’t say much to illuminate what he means by “queer”. 
He does characterise a queer fact as one that is “ontologically suspicious” (2014, 
p.84). But that doesn’t exactly help. My impression is that Olson takes moral facts to 
be ontologically profligate. (See Morton & Sampson (2014) for a similar diagnosis.) 
This is suggested by his discussion of the slipperiness of the term ‘queerness’: 
Neutrinos, aardvarks, and impressionist paintings may strike us as prima facie 
queer, but when we reflect on how they fit into the natural order of things it 
is unlikely that we will continue to view them as queer. On reflection, we re-
alize that they are actually parts of the best explanations of some of our ob-
servations and beliefs. (2014, p.87)  
These remarks suggest that Olson understands queerness in terms of explanatory irrele-
vance; queer facts or relations are those facts or relations that do not figure in our best 
account of the world.   
This interpretation gains further plausibility once we reflect upon the role that 
evolutionary accounts of our moral beliefs and practices play in Olson’s development 
of moral error theory. Olson explains the presupposition of irreducible normativity 
in moral language and practice by appealing to the popular idea that it was important 
for helping societies to survive and reproduce. (I.e., it was important for people to 
think that they had reasons to act as they morally ought, independently of their ends.) 
This evolutionary story, he argues, need nowhere presume that there is any irreducible 
normativity. Since we can (plausibly) explain all that needs to be explained without 
appealing to any such queer facts or relations, Olson thinks we should deny that any 
such facts or relations exist (2014, p.147).  
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It therefore seems to be considerations of explanatory irrelevance that move Ol-
son to endorse the following ontological claim: 
Olson’s ontological claim 
There are no irreducibly normative favouring relations. 
Given that (i) there are no irreducibly normative favouring relations, and (ii) moral 
facts entail that there are such queer relations, Olson denies that there are any moral 
facts; there are no facts about what is morally right or wrong, nor facts about what 
we morally ought or ought not to do.  
§1.3.4 The queerness of the queerness charge 
For the purposes of this thesis, I will be assuming what I take to be the most promis-
ing variety of moral error theory. To this end, I now want to distance myself from 
those canvassed above, which proceed by way of raising worries about metaphysical 
queerness. These arguments can be rather elusive; it is not always clear what exactly 
queerness consists in. On first appearances, talk of queerness seems to signal a dis-
tinct and interesting case against moral properties. On closer inspection, however, 
arguments from queerness seem to reduce to more familiar strands of philosophical 
argument, none of which are terribly convincing.41 
Mackie sometimes equates queerness with ‘non-naturalness’. He proposes, for ex-
ample, that the term ‘morally good’ “…is used as if it were the name of a supposed 
non-natural quality, where the description “non-natural” leaves room for the peculiar 
evaluative, prescriptive, intrinsically action-guiding aspects of this supposed quality” 
(p.32). So it is reasonable to take Mackie to be objecting to moral properties on ac-
count of the fact their non-naturalness. Given this, the queerness charge would seem 
to rest upon a general hostility to properties that are not amenable to empirical inves-
tigation. 
Yet it is not clear that any such hostility is warranted. Most philosophers are com-
fortable talking about beliefs as relations between a speaker and a proposition. But 
propositions aren’t obviously amenable to empirical investigation (though this will 
 
41 For paper-length treatments of this problem, see Shepski (2008), and Morton & Sampson 
(2014). 
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likely depend upon one’s metaphysics of propositions). Likewise, many are happy to 
countenance the existence of abstracta such as numbers, given that they are (arguably) 
indispensable to our best scientific theories (Quine 1951, 1976; Putnam 1979). In-
deed, we seem to be committed to the existence of numbers whether or not they are 
susceptible to empirical investigation. Given “…that we rest our empirical investiga-
tions on such mathematical facts” it may very well be “…a mistake to reject all facts 
not susceptible of empirical investigation” (Shepski 2008, p.380). 
Of course, it may be thought that in these latter cases, the relevant phenomena 
earn a place in our ontology in virtue of earning a place in (our best) explanations for 
various phenomena. It is debatable whether moral properties can earn their ontologi-
cal keep. Perhaps this is Mackie and Olson’s real worry; the queerness of moral 
properties concerns their ontological profligacy—there is no need to posit them in 
order to do any explanatory work.  
It’s not obvious, however, that explanatory indispensability is the only gateway into 
an ontology; moral properties may be indispensable in other respects. (See Enoch 
2011.42) It’s also debatable whether a failure to do explanatory work licenses disbelief 
in the relevant entities, as opposed to suspension of belief (Sinnott-Armstrong 2006, 
pp.44-5). These are, admittedly, contentious issues. But they do suggest that moral 
error theorists who levy the charge of ontological profligacy have their work cut out 
for them. Ultimately, the strength of such arguments is likely to depend upon the rel-
ative power of the arguments in favour of moral non-naturalism—or indeed, the ex-
istence of non-natural properties more generally.  
In summary, then, I think that there are a number of problems with queerness-
based arguments for moral error theory. Once these arguments are demystified, they 
seem to be nothing over and above more familiar arguments against non-natural 
properties. But none of these are especially convincing. I think we can do better. In 
what follows, I outline what I take to be the most plausible route to moral error the-
ory.  
 
42 I should note that it is in fact irreducibly normative truths that Enoch takes to be indispensable 
(to deliberation rather than explanation)—not moral truths in particular. But he does think that the 
latter are afforded entry into our ontology as well “on the wings of the indispensability argument” 
(2011, p.91). 
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§1.4 THE TROUBLE WITH CATEGORICAL REASONS 
I turn now to Richard Joyce’s development of Mackie’s moral error theory. Im-
portantly, Joyce doesn’t take the central issue with moral discourse to be the non-
naturalness of moral properties. His foremost concern is that moral requirements 
lack the special kind of normativity that they purport to have. (As we shall see, these 
two claims are in fact dissociable.) Before we can understand Joyce’s developments, 
though, we need to understand the particular account of normative reasons and ra-
tionality to which he subscribes. My first task will be to clarify Joyce’s views on this 
matter (§1.4.1). I will then explain the conceptual (§1.4.2) and ontological (§1.4.3) 
components of his moral error theory.  
§1.4.1 Reasons and rationality 
Joyce’s moral error theory is premised upon the understanding of normative reasons 
that he adopts. Joyce subscribes to reasons internalism, which we can formulate sche-
matically as follows: 
Reasons internalism 
An agent a has a normative reason r to φ only if r is meaningfully connected to cer-
tain kinds of motivational fact(s) m about a.43 
Reasons internalism comes in different varieties, and each differ in their finer details 
(Finlay & Schroeder 2015). One such detail concerns what sort of motivational fact m 
must be. Given the popular Humean understanding of desires as intrinsically motiva-
tional mental states, it is common to take m to be a fact about an agent’s desires—for 
example, the fact that she has certain desires that would be served by her φ-ing. In-
ternalists also disagree about whether m must be a motivational fact about a as she 
actually is, or something that would hold true of her under particular circumstances—
for example, under conditions of rationality (Smith 1994), in a state of reflective equi-
librium (Brandt 1979), or in awareness of all relevant contingencies (Darwall 1983).  
 
43 In Stephen Darwall’s (1992) terminology, reasons internalism is an ‘existence’ form of internal-
ism; it concerns what it takes for there to be a reason. It is to be distinguished from ‘judgment internal-
ism’, which concerns what it takes for an agent to be judging that she has a reason.  
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Joyce takes reasons internalism to be highly plausible (pp.109-12), appealing to the 
popular idea that normative reasons must be capable of explaining an agent’s actions. 
(See Davidson 1963, Williams 1981, Schroeder 2007b.) Assuming, as Joyce does, that 
intentional action requires the presence of a desire (assuming, that is, a Humean 
Theory of Motivation), this explanatory requirement speaks in favour of internalism. 
Given that the internalist ties normative reasons to an agent’s motivations, an agent’s 
normative reasons are capable of explaining her actions—they are reasons for which 
she could act.   
Joyce distinguishes two kinds of normative reasons. An agent has an objective reason 
to φ just in case φ-ing will satisfy her ends, and a subjective reason to φ just in case she is 
justified in believing that she has an objective reason to φ (p.53).44 (Joyce uses ‘ends’ 
as a catch-all phrase for desires and interests. I will adopt this convention in what fol-
lows.) Popeye, for example, may have a subjective reason to eat a bowl of spinach 
when he justifiably believes that doing so would satisfy his desire for food and cause 
him no harm. However, Popeye would have an objective reason not to eat the spin-
ach had it been poisoned by Bruno.   
Joyce also draws a connection between rationality and reasons, taking an agent to 
be practically rational to the extent that she is guided by her subjective reasons (p.54). 
On this view, an agent is practically rational to the extent that she takes what she jus-
tifiably believes to be the necessary means to her ends. Practical rationality therefore 
“yields only hypothetical imperatives” (p.51); what we are rationally required to do 
depends upon the ends that we have.45 It’s worth clarifying that it doesn’t follow 
from this that all practical reasons are ‘instrumental’, in one common sense of ‘in-
 
44 Following R.J. Wallace (2003), some may complain that this “multiplies reasons beyond necessi-
ty”. What Joyce calls ‘subjective reasons’ are perhaps “…not really reasons at all, but rather beliefs of 
agents about what they have reason to do.” I am inclined to regard this as a largely terminological 
quibble, and am happy for ‘subjective reasons’ to denote what agents justifiably believe their objective 
reasons to be.  
45 I should note that Joyce rejects a rudimentary, Humean form of instrumentalism, according to 
which these must be an agent’s actual ends, or her strongest desire at the moment of decision (p.69). 
He goes on to refine his account of subjective reasons, suggesting that a subject “…S has a subjective 
reason to φ if and only if she is justified in believing that S+ (S granted full information and idealized 
powers of reflection) would advise S to φ” (p.100). This qualification may, as Joyce suggests, make 
practical instrumentalism more plausible. But nothing that I have to say here hangs upon it. 
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strumental’ (Beardman 2007, pp.260-1). If I have the end of φ-ing and ψ-ing is a nec-
essary means for φ -ing, then I have an instrumental reason to ψ. But this is not to say 
that I have an instrumental reason to φ. One need not think, for example, that I have 
an instrumental reason to φ because I already have a reason to pursue my ends. (I will 
return to this issue in §2.1.2.) The instrumentalist can hold that reasons transmit 
from intrinsic ends or desires to means (where an intrinsic or non-instrumental desire 
is one that an agent does not merely have as a means of satisfying some other desire). 
Most sophisticated instrumentalists do (e.g., Hubin 2001).  
The connection that Joyce draws between subjective reasons and rationality is 
rooted in the thought that rationality attaches not to the content of a belief, desire, or 
choice, but to “the manner at which it is arrived” (pp.55-6)—rationality is a form of 
negligence rather than ignorance (see also Korsgaard 1996a). It is therefore prefera-
ble to take an agent’s acting in accordance with what she justifiably believes that she has 
reason to do determine her rationality. On this view, what it is rational for an agent 
to do and what she has an objective reason to do can come apart. Popeye’s decision 
to eat the poisoned spinach, for example, may be characterised as incorrect but perfectly 
rational (see Wedgwood 2003). 
On the flipside, an agent’s failure to act in accordance with her subjective reasons 
is thought to render her rationally criticisable. Given that rational criticism is presum-
ably only warranted if an agent fails to comply with her best reasons (one is not obvi-
ously rationally accountable for failing to act on any just any old pro tanto reason), 
Joyce understands an agent’s normative reasons to be what she has most or decisive rea-
son to do (pp.50-1).46 Practical rationality is therefore understood as a normative 
framework that tells us what our all-things-considered reasons for acting are. 
As I understand Joyce, he takes rationality rather than reasons to be the founda-
tional notion here. The litmus test for a normative or “real” reason is that it would be 
irrational to ignore it (p.41, p.51, pp.80-1). This is because an adequate theory of 
 
46 As I understand Joyce, he doesn’t take this to be true of all normative reasons—only those that 
are relevant to determining an agent’s rationality. He claims to be using ‘normative reason’ in “…a re-
stricted sense, to mean something that is justified according to practical rationality” (fn.21). So this 
view need not conflict with the common understanding of normative reasons as pro tanto reasons, the 
balance of which decides what an agent ought to do, all-things-considered (Broome 2004, Dancy 
2004).  
  
48 
normative reasons must “…make out reasons to be precisely those things that fore-
stall a ‘So what?’ response” (p.81). Joyce regards this condition as particularly im-
portant, for he thinks that practical rationality is immune to legitimate questioning: 
Can we imagine someone questioning practical rationality: “Yes, I recognize 
that there is a practical reason for me to φ, but what is that to me?...This, it 
seems to me, is incoherent ...Even to ask the question “Why should I be in-
terested in practical rationality?” is to ask for a reason. Thus even to ques-
tion practical rationality is to evince allegiance to it… (pp.49-50). 
Given that practical rationality itself is ‘un-so-what-able’, Joyce conjectures that an 
agent’s normative reasons, responsiveness to which determines her rationality, should 
similarly be un-so-what-able. And this result, he seems to think, is easy to secure if 
we respect the internalist constraint that normative reasons must be grounded in an 
agent’s motivations. Since a normative reason is a consideration to which an agent 
cannot rationally respond ‘so what?’, an agent’s normative reasons must be consider-
ations that are potentially engaging for her—considerations that could potentially 
motivate her, or could provide her with an adequate justification for an action by her 
own lights (p.108).47   
Loosely following Joyce, I will refer to this theory of reasons and rationality as 
“practical instrumentalism”. There are two features of this view that are worth not-
ing. First, the practical instrumentalist constructs a link—or as it is sometimes put, a 
“nexus” (Smith 2007)—between reasons and rationality. She is therefore to be dis-
tinguished from those who take rationality to be silent at the level of reasons (e.g., 
Broome 2005). Second, the practical instrumentalist does not take rationality to 
(merely) be a faculty of the mind. Rationality can involve doing something—not mere-
ly believing or intending something when one believes or intends something else. She 
therefore differs from those who take rationality to be a system of requirements that 
govern only relations among one’s psychological attitudes (e.g., Broome 2005, Ko-
lodny 2005, Southwood 2008). In what follows, I will sometimes refer to this as a 
 
47 For a complementary point, see Hubin (1999, p.39), who argues that on such views, the charge 
of irrationality is “unshruggable”. An irrational agent “…cannot avoid the motivational force of our 
judgment about him by pleading that he does not care about the ends in question”. 
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distinction between ‘act theories of rationality’ and ‘psychological theories of ration-
ality’ (loosely following Broome 2005, p.325). 
§1.4.2 Joyce’s conceptual claim  
Paraphrasing slightly, Joyce’s argument for moral error theory has the following 
structure (p.77): 
J1.  If a morally ought to φ, then a morally ought to φ regardless of what her 
ends are.48 
J2.  If a morally ought to φ, then a has a reason for φ-ing. 
J3.  Therefore, if a morally ought to φ, then a can have a reason for φ-ing re-
gardless of what her ends are. 
J4.  But there is no sense to be made of such reasons. 
J5.  Therefore, a is never under a moral obligation. 
The last two premises are Joyce’s ontological claim—I return to them later. The first 
three constitute his conceptual claim, and require some unpacking. J1 is inspired by 
the cornerstone of Mackie’s error theory. Joyce thinks that categorical imperatives are 
a necessary feature of a system of moral requirements (p.62). The guiding thought 
here is that morality is categorically applicable; someone can be morally required to φ 
even if φ-ing would not satisfy any of her ends (p.56). J1 is therefore a claim about 
the content of moral requirements; they are not restricted to actions that would serve 
an agent’s interests, or satisfy her desires.49  
However, Joyce recognises that the requirements of institutional systems of rules 
are also categorically applicable. Yet he does not take issue with them. What, then, 
distinguishes moral requirements from the requirements of (say) etiquette? J2 sug-
gests an answer. What sets moral requirements apart, Joyce claims, is their purporting 
to have a distinct kind of practical authority—an authority that consists in the provi-
sion of reasons (p.38). Though the requirements of morality and etiquette are both cate-
gorically applicable, only the former are categorically reason-giving; moral requirements 
purport to provide all agents with reasons to comply, and this is so independently of 
 
48 I use the amended version of J1 from Joyce (2016), rather than the original formulation in Joyce 
(2001).  
49 I follow Shafer-Landau (2005) in understanding J1 to be a claim about the content of moral re-
quirements, and J2 to be a claim about their normative import. 
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whether compliance would further their ends. J2 is therefore a claim about the norma-
tive import of moral requirements—they purport to carry reason-giving force (pp.39-
41).50   
The third premise (J3) is Joyce’s conceptual claim and follows from the two prem-
ises that precede it. J3 informs us that moral requirements purport to supply agents 
with categorical reasons for action—reasons that legitimately apply to them inde-
pendently of their ends. In Joyce’s view, then, categorical reasons are a core concep-
tual commitment of moral discourse. Any system of values that leaves them out 
“…simply does not count as a “morality” at all” (p.177). Thus, we have: 
Joyce’s conceptual claim  
Moral discourse is conceptually committed to the existence of categorical reasons. 
Joyce therefore holds that if moral discourse is to be vindicated, there must be cate-
gorical reasons. This means that there would need to be some actions for which a 
valid categorical imperative could be directed at any agent, where a valid categorical 
imperative is one for which a “real reason” could be given to any agent (in particular 
circumstances) to comply (p.44). In order to vindicate moral discourse, then, there 
would have to be a class of actions (that are properly called moral actions) that any 
agent would have a real reason to do when she finds herself in the relevant circum-
stances.  
As I noted in the introduction, my goal in this thesis is not to offer a sustained de-
fence of moral error theory. However, I also noted there that claims regarding the 
non-negotiable conceptual commitments of a discourse can be controversial. So it’s 
worth briefly rehearsing some of the considerations in favour of this one.  
To begin with, Joyce’s conceptual claim would seem to accord with our intuitive 
judgments. He appeals to the example of Plato’s Lydian shepherd, Gyges, who ac-
quires a ring of invisibility and uses it in morally heinous ways to further his ends. 
Gyges has no desires or interests that would be served by restraint. Nonetheless, it 
 
50 Another way to understand this idea is to invoke a well-known distinction between two kinds of 
normativity (Parfit 2011, pp.267-8). Both morality and etiquette are normative in a “rule-involving” 
sense—for both are constituted by requirements. But only moral requirements purport to be norma-
tive in a robust sense as well—to necessarily provide reasons to act as morality requires. On this point, 
see also Foot (1972, p.308), Railton (1986, p.165), and Dreier (1997, p.84). Joyce prefers to character-
ise the distinction as a distinction between “institutional reasons” and “real reasons” (pp.34-41). 
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seems highly intuitive to say “…both that Gyges ought not kill innocent people and 
that he has a reason not to kill innocent people” (p.41). It is, in other words, highly 
intuitive that Gyges has a normative reason to cease with his behaviour, quite inde-
pendently of what his ends happen to be.  
Though the appeal to intuition here is powerful, it may not be quite enough to 
motivate the claim that the existence of categorical reasons is a non-negotiable concep-
tual commitment of moral discourse. What distinguishes the negotiable from the 
non-negotiable? Joyce’s answer is that we need to examine how moral concepts are 
characteristically used (2006, pp.201-2; 2012, p.95). His suggestion, roughly, is that if a 
concept could not be used in the characteristic ways that moral concepts typically are, 
then it would not properly be called a moral concept. And in Joyce’s estimation, any 
concept of a moral requirement or obligation that did not entail categorical reasons 
could not perform the characteristic uses of moral concepts.  
One such characteristic use of moral concepts concerns evaluations of agents and 
actions. We take an evaluation of an action as right or wrong to have important im-
plications for how agents ought to behave. Joyce (2006) considers Jack, who wants to 
kill John and has no desire that would be served by sparing his life. Plausibly, we 
should want to say that Jack’s killing John would be morally wrong. But if we did not 
take the wrongness of Jack’s actions to entail categorical reasons for him to refrain, 
then it seems that we should rather be forced to say “From the moral point of view, 
killing John was unacceptable” and to add “but Jack had…no real reason to refrain’’ 
(Joyce 2006, p.204). As Andres Luco (2016, p.2516) observes, the latter concession 
seems to destabilise “an important use of moral concepts…It throws into doubt the 
conviction that knavish individuals ought to act in accordance with moral evalua-
tions”. 
Moral concepts are also characteristically used for the purposes of criticism. We 
typically criticise people for wrongful behaviour, and take ourselves to be justified in 
doing so. But it’s hard to see how we could be so justified if we did not take the per-
son criticised to have any real reason to act otherwise. In order to make sense of 
moral criticism, we must, it seems, suppose that wrongdoers have reasons not to act as 
they do. Eric Vogelstein has recently afforded this idea a paper-length treatment, ar-
guing that “…morally wrong action licenses a critical attitude towards the wrongdo-
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er—an attitude that, is justified only if the wrongdoer has failed to comply with her 
reasons” (2013, p.1084). 
I take the considerations above to lend quite a bit of plausibility to Joyce’s claim 
that moral discourse is conceptually committed to the existence of categorical rea-
sons. We do, it seems, ordinarily suppose that agents can have moral reasons to re-
frain from wrongful behaviour even when doing so would frustrate their ends. And 
characteristic uses of moral language—for the purposes of evaluation or criticism, for 
example—likewise seem to carry with them the presumption that wrongdoers have 
genuine reasons to fulfil their moral obligations, quite independently of what their 
ends happen to be. 
§1.4.3 Joyce’s ontological claim  
Joyce takes moral discourse to be conceptually committed to the existence of cate-
gorical reasons. J4, however, tells us that “there is no sense to be made of such rea-
sons”. As I understand Joyce, the relevant claim is not simply an epistemic one about 
our abilities to make sense of certain phenomena. (Physicists, for example, may have 
no problem countenancing the existence of particular kinds of subatomic particles, 
even if they often struggle unsuccessfully to make sense of them.) As we shall now 
see, his real contention is that the notion of a normative reason is itself fundamental-
ly at odds with the notion of a categorical reason. Given this, there simply cannot be 
any categorical reasons. Joyce’s ontological claim is therefore as follows: 
Joyce’s ontological claim 
There are no categorical reasons 
Recall that a valid categorical imperative is one from which we can extrapolate nor-
mative reasons. What Joyce’s ontological claim denies is that moral imperatives are 
valid imperatives—that all agents necessarily have normative reasons to act as morali-
ty requires independently of their ends. Shafer-Landau (2005, p.113) offers a helpful 
summary of the reasoning at play here: 
1. If there are categorical reasons, then, for any reasonable agent S, S might have 
reason to φ, but fail to be engaged by φ.  
2. Reasons cannot fail in this way.  
3. Therefore, there are no categorical reasons. 
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To demonstrate, recall the case of Gyges. We want to say that Gyges has a reason to 
stop killing innocent people. But Gyges lacks any desire or interest that speaks in fa-
vour of such restraint. The fact that killing innocent persons is morally wrong simply 
has no sway upon him. Thus, if agents like Gyges have categorical reasons to refrain 
in such cases, then agents can have normative reasons that fail to properly engage 
them. But given practical instrumentalism, normative reasons cannot fail in this way; 
for normative reasons are, by definition, the sorts of considerations that are capable 
of engaging the relevant agent. Thus, Joyce concludes that there are no categorical rea-
sons—a fortiori, there are no moral reasons. 
Before concluding, I should note that there is a common strategy for attempting 
to evade a moral error theory—one which consists in arguing that moral require-
ments are in fact requirements of practical rationality. A well-known proponent of 
this strategy is Michael Smith (1994).51 Smith agrees with Joyce that the reason-giving 
force of moral requirements does not depend upon any agent’s actual ends (i.e., that 
conceptually speaking, morality is categorically reason-giving). However, he claims 
that their reason-giving force can be vindicated by considering every agent’s counterfac-
tual ends—specifically, the ends that every agent would have if they were fully ration-
al.  
Smith takes our normative reasons to be determined by what our fully rational 
selves would desire for us to do in any particular circumstance c. He argues that our 
ideal selves would converge upon these desires, giving all agents the same normative 
reasons (in any circumstance c). Since moral reasons are a proper subset of these 
normative reasons, the account, if successful, vindicates the idea that all agents have 
normative reasons to act in accordance with moral requirements independently of 
what their ends happen to be. 
Joyce seems to concede that moral discourse could be vindicated if our ideally ra-
tional selves would converge upon their desires.52 But he denies that they would. This 
is because even on Smith’s analysis, there appears to be an important kind of path-
 
51 Another is Christine Korsgaard (1996b). 
52 This is suggested by his broader claim that “the only hope” for evading a moral error theory is 
“...to defend the thesis that practical rationality delivers categorical imperatives, and then to forge a 
connection between the imperatives of practical rationality and those of morality” (p.51). 
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dependency involved in what determines each agent’s normative reasons; what a’s ideal-
ly rational self wants her to do will always depend in some way upon what a actually 
desires. This makes it exceedingly unlikely that our ideal selves would converge upon 
their desires. Given that people vary immensely in their goals, beliefs, and ideologies, 
there is “every reason to think that” these differences will “transfer to their idealised 
versions” (Joyce, p.76; see also Sobel 1999, Bukoski 2016). Since we cannot expect all 
agents to converge upon their normative (and hence, moral) reasons, we cannot 
maintain that all agents have normative reasons to act in accordance with moral re-
quirements.53  
Joyce’s exchange with Smith brings out two interesting features of his moral error 
theory. First, it suggests that this error theory, if true, is necessarily true. In order to 
vindicate moral discourse, moral requirements must be necessarily reason-giving; all 
possible agents must have normative reasons to comply with them. Since moral re-
quirements are not necessarily reason-giving, our moral claims are, it seems, necessarily 
false. (This verdict is shared by Coons (2011, p.87); though see Brown (2013, p.631).)  
Second, Joyce is largely in agreement with Smith about the conceptual commit-
ments of moral discourse; both agree that there is a tight conceptual connection be-
tween what an agent is morally required to do and what she has normative reason to 
do. Yet Smith also defends a tight conceptual connection between moral require-
ments and rational motivation, suggesting that if an agent judges that she morally ought 
to φ, then she will, insofar as she is rational, be motivated to φ (1994, p.61). This is, 
of course, a variety of motivational internalism—albeit one that is considerably less 
strong than the Platonic idea (considered in §1.3.2) that moral judgment (or 
knowledge) induces overriding motivation. Smith’s variety of motivational internalism 
isn’t wholly implausible given his conceptual claim that moral requirements are re-
quirements of practical rationality; it requires only the (reasonable) bridging principle 
 
53 Both Smith and Joyce regard convergence as important. Smith takes normative reasons to be 
conceptually non-relative (i.e., he thinks it is a conceptual truth that all agents have the same reasons in 
any circumstance c). A divergence in agents’ normative reasons would therefore amount to an error 
theory about normative reasons on his view. Joyce takes moral reasons in particular to be conceptually 
non-relative (pp.95-99). Since divergence in agent’s normative—and hence, moral—reasons leads to 
moral relativism (not all agents would have the same moral reasons in any circumstance c), moral dis-
course is not vindicated.  
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that rational agents are motivated to do what they have all-things-considered reason 
to do. Given this, the moral error theorist’s conceptual claim is sometimes described 
as a claim about the connection between moral judgment and rational motivation.54 
(See for example, Braddon-Mitchell 2006, West 2010.)  
To my mind, Joyce’s reasons-based argument for moral error theory has a far 
greater measure of plausibility than the one rooted in queerness concerns. We could 
of course rephrase Joyce’s argument in terms of queerness as well if we so wished. 
(Joyce himself (pp.30-1) briefly suggests that the alleged queerness attaches to the no-
tion of “moral bindingness”; to the idea that someone is somehow normatively 
bound by moral demands independently of whether she cares about them.) What is 
important to appreciate is that the reasons-based argument seeks to establish only 
that moral requirements lack the distinct kind of normativity (or ‘reason-givingness’) 
that they purport to have. There is no need to take issue with anything’s being non-
natural, or ontologically profligate—the charge isn’t that moral properties would be 
creepy, kooky, mysterious, or spooky. 
Indeed, someone who endorses Joyce’s variety of moral error theory need not 
think that the existence of any non-natural properties is necessary in order rescue 
moral discourse from error. What is needed in order to vindicate moral discourse is 
for all agents to have normative reasons to act in accordance with moral require-
ments—a condition that could be satisfied if idealised agents were to converge upon 
their desires. Following Smith (2012), there doesn’t seem to be anything spooky or 
non-natural about the notion of convergence among idealised agents. 
Joyce’s error theory also seems to do away with the notion of mind-independence to 
which Mackie subscribed. Joyce seems happy to allow that moral claims have intersub-
jective truth-conditions; such claims would be true, he thinks, if all possible agents 
would converge upon their normative reasons.55 
 
54 Though Joyce himself is likely to resist this characterisation, since he denies that motivational in-
ternalism is a core conceptual commitment of moral discourse (pp.17-29), and explicitly rejects 
Smith’s variety of the view (pp.22-3, pp.64-67).  
55 That convergence-based error theories differ in important ways from those rooted in concerns 
having to do with non-naturalness has been noted by Lillehammer (2004, pp.97-100; though cf. 
Hussain 2004). 
  
56 
For the purposes of this thesis, I shall be assuming the success of the Joyce’s vari-
ety of moral error theory. When I speak of ‘moral error theory’ in what follows, then, 
this should be taken to refer to the reasons-based variety in particular, unless other-
wise indicated. 
§1.5 MORAL ERROR THEORY: SUMMING UP 
This thesis is not about the moral error theory per se, but about what comes after it. 
But before we can explore what comes after, we need to know what comes before; 
we need to understand what the moral error theory is. The primary goals of this 
chapter were to identify the background meta-ethical assumptions that underwrite 
the moral error theory, to explain the arguments available for it, and to specify which 
variety of the position will form my background assumption in this thesis. These 
tasks were useful for the purposes of getting clear on what the moral error is, and 
providing the reader with some of the necessary conceptual and terminological back-
ground for the remainder of the work. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 What is the ‘what next?’ question for moral 
discourse? 
In the last chapter, I explained what the moral error theory is, and the kinds of con-
siderations that might lead us to believe that it is true. For the remainder of this the-
sis, however, I want us to assume that the moral error theory is true and, moreover, 
that we believe that it is true. Our concern will be the question that follows this as-
sumption: what ought we to do next? 
WNQs are certainly not unique to meta-ethics; they currently occupy the minds of 
philosophers of mathematics, philosophers of mind, and even those who have em-
braced an error theory about colour. But I do not take the sole justification for ad-
dressing our WNQ to be an argument from precedent. There is more to be said to 
motivate the project, and saying more is the task of this chapter.  
I will begin by explaining what kind of question our WNQ is (§2.1). As I have 
characterised it, the question is a normative one—a question regarding what we ought 
to do if the moral error theory is true. However, it is not obvious that our WNQ can 
be a normative question. The arguments marshalled in support of moral error theory 
may support an error theory about all normative reasons—or so some philosophers 
have argued. If they are right, then we are to have no recourse to normative language. 
Others have claimed that the moral error theorist is committed to denying the exist-
ence of epistemic reasons, which (it is alleged) are also categorical in nature. If they 
are correct, then we cannot speak of reasons for belief. I will explore and defend 
what I take to be the best strategies for responding to these over-generalisation prob-
lems. Doing so can, I hope, earn me the right to speak of various kinds of (non-
moral) reasons for the remainder of the work. 
The tasks for §2.2 and §2.3 respectively will be to specify to whom our WNQ is 
addressed, and to motivate the project of providing an answer to it. I will then out-
line the different answers to the WNQ for moral discourse that have been proposed 
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in the current literature (§2.4). (All but one will be explored in the remainder of the 
thesis.) The chapter concludes by pointing towards the philosophical pay-offs of the 
project (§2.5). These dividends are not confined to moral error theorists. The project 
should also be of interest to those contemplating error theories in their own sectors 
of philosophy, and indeed, to meta-ethicists more generally.  
§2.1 CAN THE WNQ FOR MORAL DISCOURSE BE A NORMATIVE 
QUESTION? 
Our first order of business will be to explore whether the WNQ for moral discourse 
can be a normative question. It is not uncommon for philosophers to characterise 
the question in this way; as a question regarding what we should do, or ought to do, or 
have most reason to do with moral discourse, following the moral error theory (e.g., 
Joyce, p.177; Nolan, Restall & West 2005, p.310; Lutz 2014, p.352; Svoboda 2017, 
p.3). In doing so, they would appear to presume that the moral error theorist’s rejec-
tion of categorical reasons leaves many other, non-moral reasons intact.  
Yet it is not obvious that the moral error theorist’s arguments can be insulated in 
this way. Some think that she is committed to an error theory about epistemic rea-
sons as well (Cuneo 2007, Rowland 2013). Others argue that she is committed to an 
error theory about all normative reasons (Hampton 1995, Korsgaard 1997, Shafer-
Landau 2003, Raz 2005, Bedke 2010) These are, of course, over-generalisation wor-
ries; for an error theory about all normative reasons (or even just epistemic reasons) 
seems undesirable. And insofar as the moral error theory entails this more global the-
sis, so too, it seems, is moral error theory. These worries would also seem to be bad 
news for the project of answering our WNQ. If there are no reasons to do or to be-
lieve anything, then, a fortiori, there can be no reason to do anything with or believe 
anything about moral discourse going forward.  
My goal in this section will be to earn the right to normative language for the re-
mainder of the work. I shall argue that the moral error theorist is not committed to 
an error theory about epistemic reasons (§2.1.1), nor to a more thoroughgoing error 
theory about all normative reasons (§2.1.2). 
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§2.1.1 The over-generalisation problem for epistemic reasons 
I shall tackle the over-generalisation problem for epistemic reasons and the more 
global over-generalisation problem separately, beginning with the former.56 Some 
philosophers argue that the error theorist’s attack upon moral reasons is likewise an 
attack upon reasons for belief. Epistemic reasons, they hold, are similarly categorical; 
whether or not an agent has a reason to believe some proposition p does not depend 
upon whatever ends she happens to have (Cuneo 2007). Richard Rowland, for ex-
ample, writes that 
…our understanding of epistemic reasons and justification also entails that 
there are categorical reasons…it seems that there is reason for everyone to 
believe that dinosaurs once roamed the earth regardless of what they want 
to believe. (2013, p.4) 
I think that Christopher Cowie’s is the strongest response to this line of argument, 
and I will draw heavily upon his work in what follows, before adding some develop-
ments of my own. 
As Cowie (2014a, pp.117-8) notes, intuition-eliciting cases like Rowland’s do not 
make for a very dialectically effective response to the moral error theorist. She will 
simply deny that anyone has a categorical reason to believe that dinosaurs once 
roamed the earth. There is, of course, a claim in the vicinity that she will endorse; she 
will concede that the fossil record provides evidential support for the claim that dino-
saurs once roamed the earth. But this is just to say that the evidence supplied by the 
fossil record raises the probability that dinosaurs once roamed the earth. It is not to 
say that the evidential support relation supplies anyone with a categorical reason to be-
lieve that dinosaurs once roamed the earth.  
Jonas Olson enlists a similar strategy. As he observes, ‘epistemic reason’ is ambig-
uous between ‘evidence’ and ‘reason for belief’ (2014, p.158). The former notion is 
not itself normative, and, he suggests, it is enough to get us by; for evidence can still 
supply hypothetical reasons for belief—reasons that depend upon our having adopted 
 
56 There are good grounds for addressing the specific problem for epistemic reasons directly. The 
strategy of enlisting epistemic reasons as partners in guilt (or innocence) is well-known, and so, worthy 
of discussion in its own right. It will be also helpful to have in hand an account of epistemic reasons 
that is consistent with moral error theory. 
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the end of being evidence-responsive, for example.57 (I return to the latter idea be-
low.) 
At this stage, it is open to the moral error theorist’s opponent to maintain that ev-
idential support relations just are categorical reasons for belief. But it’s not obvious 
that this claim is plausible. To be sure, it might seem intuitive to say that the fact that 
some evidence e raises the probability of some hypothesis h is a reason to believe h. 
The crucial question, however, is whether this ‘reason’ is properly thought of as a 
normative reason.  
Cowie is sceptical that it is, and I share his scepticism. On the common view of 
things, a normative reason for believing some proposition p is evidence that one ought 
to believe it (Kearns & Star 2009), or an explanation as to why one ought to respond 
to this evidence in a particular way (Broome 2013). And it just does not seem true 
that evidence for some proposition p is always evidence that one ought to believe that 
p. Cowie makes the point by appealing to banal truths: 
… Suppose that I possess, and am aware of possessing, evidence e that 
bears on some proposition p. But suppose that I have no interest in arriving 
at a true or evidentially supported belief about that proposition. And sup-
pose that it would not serve any practical end for me to do so. If one never-
theless maintains that e is evidence that I ought to believe that p (and not 
merely that e is evidence for the truth of p), the burden is surely very much 
on them to explain why. (2014a, p.121) 
So the error theorist will concede to her opponent that the fossil record provides ev-
idential support for the proposition that dinosaurs roamed the earth. Likewise, she 
will concede that this evidential support relation is a reason to believe that dinosaurs 
roamed the earth in one sense of ‘reason’. But she will deny that we are speaking here 
of a normative reason. 
Just what are we speaking of, then? Cowie (2014a, pp.120-1) alludes to “institu-
tional reasons”, such as those supplied by the norms of etiquette. These norms may 
provide us with reasons to say, wear pants to dinner. But again, it does not necessari-
 
57 For similar suggestions, see Lenman (2008) and Heathwood (2009). 
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ly follow that anyone has a normative reason wear pants to dinner.58 Presumably, 
whether some individual has a normative reason to wear pants to dinner depends 
upon whether she has a normative reason to participate in the institution of etiquette in 
the first place. Cowie suggests that the same is true of epistemic reasons: if one is to 
have a normative reason to believe some proposition p, then one must “also require a 
reason to engage in the business of believing (the truth) with respect to that proposi-
tion” (2014a, p.121; see also Heathwood 2009, p.96; Olson 2014, pp.165-8). 
I think this idea is important, and worth developing. The basic thought, I take it, 
is that there is a kind of epistemic activity or institution that is in some sense norma-
tively optional for us. We may or may not have normative reasons to be in the business 
of responsible believing—to shape our beliefs in accordance with our evidence, and 
the like. 
Thankfully, it seems that many of us do in fact have such reasons; for many of us 
do have ends that are served by responsible believing—the end of believing truths, 
and the end of not believing falsehoods, say. Assuming that many of us do have such 
epistemic goals, many of us will have epistemic reasons to respond appropriately to 
our evidence. (Insofar as responding appropriately to one’s evidence is likely to be an 
effective means for arriving at truth, that is. I assume here that it will be—at least in 
typical circumstances.59) Moreover, even those who don’t value truth per se may have 
good instrumental reasons to be responsible believers. After all, most of us care 
about furthering our ends, and we’re generally better positioned to further those 
ends—whatever they may be—if we track truth effectively (Kornblith 1993, p.371; 
2001, pp.158-9). This way of seeing things dovetails nicely with the error theorist’s 
claim that all normative reasons are hypothetical—that is, contingent upon our (in-
trinsic) ends or desires.  
 
58 This assessment is not uncommon. It is, for example, plausible that undesirable social policies 
may supply legal reasons to harm others, without supplying any normative reasons to do so 
(Lillehammer 2002, pp.54-5; see also Joyce, pp.34-42). 
59 I do not assume that believing in accordance with one’s evidence will always result in the acquisi-
tion of true beliefs, nor that believing truly will always further one’s various goals—that would be too 
strong (see Stephens 2001). There are bound to be exceptions to such unqualified claims. But follow-
ing Cowie, these complications should not “…obscure the basic point that forming and revising be-
liefs on the basis of one’s evidence is of great practical utility” (2014b, p.4007; see also Wedgwood 
2002).  
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The approach is, of course, a variety of epistemic instrumentalism; the view that 
epistemic rationality is a species of instrumental rationality, or rationality in the pur-
suit of one’s goals. (I remain neutral here on the matter of whether these goals must 
be distinctively epistemic ones—the goals of believing truth and avoiding falsehoods, 
say.60) Loosely following Adam Leite (2007, p.456), we can characterise epistemic in-
strumentalism as follows:  
Epistemic instrumentalism 
A belief is epistemically rational when (and because) holding it is instrumentally ra-
tional given one’s goals, and one has an epistemic reason to believe some proposi-
tion p when (and because) doing so would be instrumentally rational given those 
goals.  
This view has an impressive fan base. (See, for example, Foley 1987; Kornblith 1993, 
2002; Laudan 1990, 1991; Maffie 1990; Papineau 1999). But I do not pretend that it 
is uncontroversial. (For criticism, see Kelly 2003, Lockard 2013.) There will be some 
who are not particularly taken with this account of epistemic reasons. But my ambi-
tions here are rather modest. I am only attempting to show that given epistemic in-
strumentalism, the error theorist has a reply to the over-generalisation worry for 
epistemic reasons, and there is a respectable notion of an epistemic reason to which 
she can appeal.61 Adopting this understanding can, I hope, earn me the right to speak 
of epistemic reasons for the remainder of this thesis. (The reader is therefore free to 
take my conclusions in what follows to be conditional on the truth of epistemic in-
strumentalism—a matter that I haven’t fully adjudicated here owing to considerations 
of space and priorities.)  
 
60 On this issue, see Lockard (2013), who distinguishes “intellectualist” varieties of epistemic in-
strumentalism, according to which epistemically rational beliefs are those which serve an agent’s cog-
nitive or epistemic goals, from “pragmatist” varieties, which do not require that the relevant goals be 
epistemic ones. 
61 It is no surprise that many moral error theorists (e.g., Joyce, pp.178-9; Olson 2014, pp.158-9) are 
(or very much seem to be) attracted to epistemic instrumentalism. The position is often hailed as a 
promising and respectable strategy for naturalising epistemic normativity, and shirking talk of categor-
ical reasons. But it is not the only such strategy. One could instead interpret claims about epistemic 
rationality as expressions of preferences or tastes (see Field (2000)). Indeed, Stephen Ingram (2017) 
has recently recommended that moral error theorists be epistemic expressivists. I put this possibility 
to the side here. 
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There is, however, still a problem in need of address. We have assumed that indi-
viduals typically have good hypothetical reasons to be responsible believers (e.g. to re-
spond appropriately to their evidence) because responsible believing is a means of 
realising certain (intrinsic) ends that they have. But perhaps these hypothetical rea-
sons simply cannot exist without categorical ones. It is to this latter complaint that I 
now turn. 
§2.1.2 The over-generalisation problem for all normative reasons 
The moral error theory, recall, is premised upon an instrumentalist conception of 
normative reasons and rationality: “practical instrumentalism”. On this view, an agent 
is practically rational to the extent that she takes what she justifiably believes to be 
the necessary means to her (intrinsic) ends. The practical instrumentalist also holds 
that there are only hypothetical reasons—specifically, reasons to adopt particular 
means when one has particular ends (Joyce, p.51).  
Yet quite a few have voiced the suspicion that there must be categorical reasons 
lurking in the background of these hypothetical ones. Here is the problem. Practical 
instrumentalism tells us something about the transmission of reasons: they are trans-
mitted from ends to means. But if reasons are to be transmitted, then there must be 
reasons to transmit. So—and here’s the rub—it seems that the instrumentalist re-
quires a categorical, non-instrumental principle as a foundation for hypothetical reasons; 
she must posit a categorical reason to have certain ends (e.g., the end of taking the 
necessary means to one’s ends) if there is to be anything to transmit in the first place 
(Hampton 1995, pp.70-71; Korsgaard 1997, p.223; Raz 2005, p.23).62 
Call this the grounding challenge; it is the challenge of saying just what (if anything) 
grounds or explains the normativity of hypothetical reasons, if not categorical rea-
sons. If the challenge cannot be met—if, that is, hypothetical reasons must presup-
 
62 There is a slightly different articulation of the charge that the moral error theorist is committed 
to an error theory about all normative reasons, according to which hypothetical reasons-relations are 
just as metaphysically queer as categorical reasons-relations (Shafer-Landau 2003, Bedke 2010). However, 
this challenge seems more pertinent to Olson’s variety of moral error theory (which appeals to queer-
ness concerns) than to that of Joyce (which does not). Since I am assuming the latter, I will not ad-
dress this variant of the objection. 
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pose the existence of categorical ones—then (insofar as she continues to deny that 
categorical reasons exist) the moral error theorist seems committed to an error theory 
about practical reasons as well. 
One tempting response to the grounding challenge is to dismiss any request for an 
explanation here as incoherent.63 Joyce seems to flirt with this possibility when he 
suggests that asking for a reason to be rational is utter nonsense (p.49).64 One is ef-
fectively demanding a practical reason to be guided by practical reasons (‘what reason 
do I have to do what I have reason to do?’) and so, one is presuming that there are 
practical reasons.  
Though tempting, this line of response is unlikely to be dialectically effective. 
Many philosophers agree that asking for a reason to take the means to one’s ends 
seems incoherent (e.g., Dreier 1997, p.95; Railton 2003, p.317). But they draw a ra-
ther different conclusion. The nonsense involved in challenging the claim that we 
have a reason to take the means to our ends is not that of asking for a justification for it. 
It is the nonsense of trying to use the claim that we have a reason to take the means 
to our ends to do the justificatory work! The nonsense evaporates as soon as we pos-
it a categorical reason to pursue our ends. (See Dreier 1997, p.96; Railton 2003, 
pp.318-9.)  
Here is what I take to be a more promising strategy. The instrumentalist’s adver-
sary assumes that she must offer a particular kind of explanation of an agent’s reasons: 
she assumes that the instrumentalist must explain why someone has a reason to per-
form some action by showing that performing that action is a means of doing some-
thing else that she has a reason to do (Schroeder 2007b, ch.3). Suppose, for example, that 
Luke desires coffee and desires to go to a nearby cafe because there is coffee there. 
 
63 Some have also objected to the grounding challenge on account of its failure to distinguish be-
tween the normativity of rationality and the normativity of reasons (e.g., Broome 1999, Pauer-Studer 
2009). However, I do not think that this move is open to our practical instrumentalist, who forges a 
connection between the two. 
64 This is not to say that generally speaking, the question ‘why be rational?’ is utter nonsense. It is on-
ly to say that it would seem to be nonsense given practical instrumentalism. If we understand rationali-
ty in terms of conforming with a set of requirements governing one’s psychological attitudes (i.e., if 
we adopt what I earlier called ‘the psychological understanding’), then the question certainly is coher-
ent; for it seems that we can sensibly ask why we should act in accordance with such requirements (as 
many have—see Broome 2005, 2007; Kolodny 2005; Southwood 2008). 
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The adversary assumes that the practical instrumentalist must explain Luke’s reason 
to go to the café as follows:  
Luke desires coffee. What explains why he has a reason to go to the nearby café is that 
doing so is a means for Luke to do something that there is already a reason for him to do: 
to pursue his desires.  
As should be clear, this explanation runs headfirst into the grounding challenge. The 
instrumentalist’s adversary will insist that any reason to pursue one’s desires must be 
a categorical one.  
But this is not the only explanation that the instrumentalist can offer. The practi-
cal instrumentalist is in the business of offering an analysis of the concept of having a 
reason. She is proposing that for all agents a, and all actions φ, a has a reason to φ iff 
a stands in the reasons-relation to φ. It is true that whether or not this reasons relation 
holds is not contingent upon an agent’s ends. But as Joyce points out, this 
…does not imply that he has a reason to perform an action whether he likes 
it or not. It means that whether he likes it or not, if he stands in a certain re-
lation to that action then he has a reason for performing it. (p.119) 
As I understand Joyce, the basic suggestion here is that the practical instrumentalist 
can offer a constitutive explanation as to why some individual has a reason to perform a 
particular action. She can, in other words, explain why some agent has a reason (or 
ought) to do something by appealing to what it is to have a reason (or for it to be the 
case that one ought) to do something (cf. Hubin 2001).  
Here, then, is our answer to the grounding challenge: we can explain why some-
one has a hypothetical reason to perform some action by appealing to what it is to 
have a reason. According to the practical instrumentalist, for some agent a to have a 
reason r to perform some action φ just is for her to have a particular (intrinsic) end e 
that would be served by her φ-ing.65 In order to explain a’s reason to φ in some cir-
cumstance c, we can simply claim that a is currently in conditions in which her having 
a reason to φ obtains. There is no need to claim that she has any further reason—let 
 
65 Some practical instrumentalists (e.g. Joyce 2001) may want to refine this claim by speaking of 
what an idealised version of a (a+) would desire that she do. But I will simplify matters here for ease 
of illustration; for even an unqualified form of instrumentalism seems capable of evading the ground-
ing challenge.  
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alone a categorical one—to further her ends. We can, for example, explain Luke’s 
reason as follows:  
Luke presently has the end of acquiring coffee, and there is coffee at a nearby café. What 
explains why Luke has a reason to go to a nearby café is that he is currently in conditions 
in which his having a reason to do so obtains; going to the nearby café is a means of satis-
fying his end of acquiring coffee.  
As Mark Schroeder (2007b, p.62) observes, such a constitutive explanation does not 
run into the same trouble as the initial explanation that the instrumentalist seemed 
forced to offer; for there is no need to appeal to any ‘further reason’ that Luke has to 
satisfy his desires. The practical instrumentalist can explain an agent’s reasons simply 
by telling us that particular conditions obtain—the conditions in which some r is a 
reason for some agent a to perform some action φ.  
I hasten to add that this is no philosophical magic trick; constitutive explanations 
are perfectly respectable. As Schroeder observes, it is perfectly respectable (and natu-
ral) to think that “…being three-sided makes a figure a triangle not because there is 
any further shape that all figures have, but because that is just what triangles are: 
three-sided figures” (2007b, p.62). 
§2.1.3 The WNQ: summing up 
I have argued that the moral error theorist is committed to neither an error theory 
about epistemic reasons, nor to a more global error theory about all normative rea-
sons. It’s worth noting, however, that even if these arguments were unsuccessful, not 
all would be lost for the project of answering the WNQ.  
Even if we were led into wholesale normative nihilism, we could still make sense 
of asking what we are now to believe or to do. Addressing this latter question would 
not require us to form any normative beliefs (e.g., the belief that we ought to be 
moral fictionalists.) We would only need to form an intention or reach a decision—
for example, to decide whether or not to be fictionalists.66 Though a normative nihil-
ist could not consistently ask what we ought to do with moral discourse going for-
 
66 This is not to be confused with the question as to whether or not we will be fictionalists. 
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ward, she could still ask what to do—whether or not to be an abolitionist, say (see 
Southwood 2016, pp.62-3).67 
One might object that we would have no reason to care about the answer to the 
question as to what we are to do going forward. Yet it seems that we can care about 
things without believing that we ought to care about them. Indeed, it is not at all im-
plausible that many of us do sometimes care about things without believing that we 
ought to care about them—perhaps even while believing that we shouldn’t. One 
might also worry that we would have no reason to believe any of the proposed solu-
tions to this question. Yet it’s not clear that this would prevent us from believing 
them (pace Streumer 2013). An inductive sceptic might think that there is no reason 
to believe that the sun will rise tomorrow. But it still seems that she could believe 
that the sun will rise tomorrow (Möller & Lillehammer 2015; see also Olson 2011d). 
Accordingly, it is not obvious to me that normative nihilism would be utterly dev-
astating for the project of answering the WNQ. In that case, we would simply devote 
our efforts to addressing the question as to what we are to do. However, my prefer-
ence here will be to provisionally assume that the grounding challenge can be met. 
Given the preceding discussion, I hope that the reader will not think this an assump-
tion made in bad faith.  
Making this assumption also carries some distinct advantages. For one thing, we 
need not scrap all mention of reasons for the remainder of this work. (I suspect that 
doing so would be rather difficult). Moreover (and as I have noted), few if any of 
those who are in the business of answering the WNQ for moral discourse think that 
the arguments for moral error theory support an error theory about all normative 
reasons. In the interest of engaging directly with their arguments, it would seem best 
to follow their lead here, and to understand the WNQ for moral discourse as a nor-
mative question.  
 
67 I thank Nic Southwood for helpful discussions on this point. 
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§2.2 TO WHOM IS THE WNQ FOR MORAL DISCOURSE 
ADDRESSED? 
As I shall now characterise it (and, I hope, am now permitted to characterise it), the 
WNQ is the question regarding what we ought to do with moral discourse if we be-
lieve the moral error theory. The ‘we’ here suggests that I am concerned with a hypo-
thetical situation in which we, as a linguistic community, have chosen to devise a 
collective solution to the WNQ. On this understanding of the problem, we’re in it 
together. 
But there is an alternative situation that could arise. We might unanimously be-
lieve the moral error theory, but choose to devise our answers to the WNQ inde-
pendently. On this understanding of the problem, it’s every moral every theorist for 
themselves. The WNQ instead asks us: what ought some individual to do if she believes 
the moral error theory?68 This latter question is likely to invite quite different answers 
to the first. Presumably, our answer to the first question would be informed by cer-
tain ends that we share to some degree. But any answer to the second question would 
be heavily dependent upon the ends of the relevant moral error theorist. 
 In this work, I confine myself to the collective question. Three considerations 
speak in favour of doing so. The first concerns the philosophical interest of the pro-
ject. In order to answer the question, ‘what ought some individual to do if she be-
lieves the moral error theory?’, we would need to identify some individual to whom 
our answer would be addressed. Yet whom would we choose? The most natural 
choice for me would of course be myself. But I expect that my readership would be 
rather limited (or, perhaps I should say, more limited) were this entire thesis intended 
as practical advice for me—as of course would the wider philosophical interest of the 
project.  
The second justification for framing the WNQ question as a collective question is 
a straightforward, dialectical one: the vast majority of philosophers who are in the 
business of addressing the WNQ for moral discourse interpret the question along 
 
68 We could also ask about a unilateral moral error theorist; what ought she to do, given that she 
alone is in the now? I put this possibility to the side for the purposes of my investigation, which as-
sumes that everyone is in the know about the moral error theory.  
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these lines (e.g., Nolan, Restall, and West 2005, Joyce 2005, Svoboda 2017). In the 
interest of properly engaging with their arguments, and comparing their proposals to 
my own, it seems best to follow their lead here.69 
This second consideration—that of engaging with others’ arguments on the same 
terms—speaks in favour of framing the WNQ as a collective question. But I admit 
that it is not a very principled justification for doing so. ‘Everyone else is doing it’ 
might pass as a justification for wearing flared jeans. But it won’t always pass as a jus-
tification in philosophy. My third justification for understanding the WNQ as a col-
lective question is a more principled one: many of the benefits of engaging in moral 
practice (on which more in §2.3.3) plausibly require some linguistic co-operation on 
our part. Moral discourse can, for example, be a useful resource in practical dis-
putes.70 Following Nolan, Restall, and West (2005, pp.212-3), talk of rights and duties 
forms part of a “well-established framework” of “tacit understandings”, and this 
framework can be helpful when we need to adjudicate competing interests, or to div-
vy up the relevant burdens in an acceptable way. Yet it is difficult to see how moral 
language could be useful in these contexts if we couldn’t take it for granted that our 
moral terms have something meaningfully in common; if we couldn’t take it for granted 
that we were using terms like ‘rights’ and ‘duties’ in a broadly similar way, or that we 
all took claims about rights and duties to have certain kinds of implications for our 
behaviour, say.  
This is just to say that some degree of linguistic co-operation is plausibly needed if 
we are to preserve the benefits of moral discourse going forward. Two moral error 
theorists who revise the meaning of their moral terms independently might come to 
 
69 This is not to say that there is no room to question the common assumption that this is a ques-
tion to be asked and answered collectively. An interesting and perhaps under-appreciated aspect of the 
issue is the extent to which this is true. In answering the collective question, it is also difficult to avoid 
making assumptions about what makes for good collective decision-making processes; for example, 
the assumption that there are many widely-shared preferences and/or desires, and the assumption that 
it is these which we ought to try to satisfy as best as possible for the majority of people. These are in-
teresting issues, but properly engaging with them is likely to take us too far afield (the literature on 
voting paradoxes comes to mind).  
70 Of course, some think that we’d be far more successful at resolving practical disputes without 
moral language (Hinckfuss 1987, §4.2; Garner 2007, pp.202-3; Ingram 2015, pp.240-1). I mention this 
view shortly, and address the arguments for it in chapter 3. 
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mean very different things when they declare an action ‘wrong’. And those who pur-
sue the fictionalist option independently might come to adopt moral fictions with 
radically different contents. If we devise independent answers to the WNQ, then it 
seems that there will be very little that we can take for granted in the moral (or 
schmoral, or pretence-driven) conversations of the future.71   
We should therefore want to ensure that morality (or its future stand-in) consti-
tutes a common currency (assuming for the moment that moral discourse is to be pre-
served in some form). We should want the moral (or schmoral, or pretence-driven) 
interlocutors of the future to be able to take certain things for granted in their moral 
conversations. Devising a collective solution to the WNQ helps us to achieve this. If, 
for example, we decide to collectively preserve moral discourse in the form of a use-
ful fiction, then the moral interlocutors of the future will take that fiction to be a 
common currency in their moral conversations.  
Moreover, even those who don’t think that moral discourse ought to be preserved 
in some form have good reason to seek a collective answer to the WNQ. Moral abo-
litionists argue that our moral practices are harmful on-balance, and recommend that 
we scrap them altogether. But even they think that the benefits of doing so depend 
upon collective action. A well-known abolitionist argument is that doing away with 
moral discourse would help us to resolve interpersonal conflicts (Hinckfuss 1987, 
§4.2; Garner 2007, pp.202-3; Ingram 2015, pp.240-1). But achieving this presumably 
depends upon all of us ceasing to speak in moral terms. Conflict resolution is unlikely 
to be any easier if some parties continue to stubbornly appeal to their moral beliefs.  
Of course, there is a potential difficulty with this collective policy-seeking. Some 
may fear that the question regarding what we ought to do with moral discourse is one 
that cannot be answered; for people surely have different interests that they want to 
further, and different desires that they want to satisfy. Why then, ought we to think 
that any answer to the WNQ will further each and every person’s ends? 
In response to this concern, we can point towards the various ends that many 
people do share. Presumably, most of us want to avoid an untimely demise, to see to 
 
71 This is not to say that moral communication would necessarily break down—a good conversa-
tional partner, after all, will often make her presuppositions explicit. But it does seem that moral dis-
course is less likely to play the same sort of positive social role(s) if it ceases to be a common currency. 
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it that our loved ones are well, and to live in a stable and co-operative society. Of 
course, not everyone has these ends. (Sensible knaves will remain.) But in order for an 
answer to the WNQ to be useful, it need not be useful for everyone. It need only be 
useful for most of us, who share a broad variety of interests and concerns.  
But can we be justified in casting some people and their deviant interests to the 
side when addressing the WNQ? I think that we can; for we want our answer to the 
WNQ to be useful. And it is unlikely to be very useful if its intended audience are 
those who do not care very much about their survival, wish only ill for those closest 
to them, and eagerly await the downfall of modern society. Our answer is likely to be 
more useful if is addressed to (what I expect and hope is) the majority of the linguis-
tic community. 
I suspect that something like this thought is what guides those in the business of 
addressing the WNQ for mathematical discourse: what ought we to do with mathe-
matical discourse if we believe that an error theory about numbers is true? Philoso-
phers of mathematics don’t pay attention to those with deviant interests when they 
attempt to answer this question. One finds little mention in such discussions of those 
who despise arithmetic, have little use for it, and would be very happy indeed if we 
dispensed with talk of numbers altogether.  
This, I take it, is presumably because philosophers of mathematics are concerned 
with the interests of the linguistic community on the whole when addressing the WNQ for 
mathematical discourse. And that concern seems legitimate, as does their assumption 
that most of us do benefit from speaking of numbers. If this is indeed the concern 
that drives philosophers of mathematics, then we are partners in innocence. Or per-
haps we are partners in guilt. Either way, I will follow their lead here. My WNQ will 
be the question regarding what is likely to be useful for most of us to do with moral 
discourse, following the moral error theory.  
§2.3 MOTIVATING THE PROJECT 
In what follows, I do some work to motivate the project of answering the WNQ for 
moral discourse. To this end, I will establish the initial plausibility of four claims that 
give rise to a tension. (These claims will also be useful for the purposes of taxono-
mising different answers to the WNQ in §2.4.) I begin by suggesting that (1) if we be-
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lieve that the moral error theory is true, then we no longer believe that anything is 
morally right or wrong (§2.2.1). This, I will suggest, is a devastating result because (2) 
our subjective concerns (and consequent motivations and behaviour) covary fairly 
closely with our moral beliefs (§2.2.2). Thus, a significant practical consequence of 
our believing the moral error theory would be the loss of particular motivations and 
behavioural dispositions. This, I argue, would very much be a loss; for (3) morality is 
useful, and moral beliefs are helpful to have around (§2.2.3). Our allegiance to moral 
error theory therefore incurs a steep practical cost. And (4) it is not obvious that we 
can respond to the problem by simply persisting with our false moral beliefs; for do-
ing so would seem ill-advised (§2.2.4).72 An answer to the WNQ is therefore needed 
if we are to resolve this tension between our epistemic values and our other, real-
world needs. 
§2.3.1 The devastating result of the moral error theory 
My goal in this section will be to argue that the moral error theory seems to carry 
worrying implications for first-order moral theorising; for if we believe the moral er-
ror theory, then we no longer believe that anything is morally right or wrong. This 
seems to be a devastating result. And I suspect many will think that such a result fol-
lows from the error theory quite straightforwardly (perhaps even rather obviously). 
We didn’t after all, continue to organise witch-burning ceremonies once we discov-
ered that there were no witches, or to seek out dragons to slay after we came to ap-
preciate that there were none around. 
However, this result is not as straightforward and obvious as it may initially seem. 
Precisely what sort of relationship holds between first and second-order ethics is a 
contentious issue. There is some debate as to whether there can be any traffic be-
tween these two ‘levels’ of ethical inquiry.73 Some think not (e.g. Rawls 1974-1975; 
 
72 Throughout this work, I will, for ease of exposition, often speak of ‘having false moral beliefs’ 
and ‘believing moral propositions’. What I really intend by this is false beliefs in positive, first-order, 
atomic, non-trivial, moral propositions such as ‘cheating is wrong’, and ‘tyranny is unjust’. 
73 There is also some debate as to whether there are two levels of inquiry here. Some (e.g., Black-
burn 1984, 1998; Dworkin 1996, 2011) think that all statements or questions about ethics are really 
statements or questions within ethics. I do not have space here to properly engage with their argu-
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Mackie, pp.16). But this is something of a minority position; the majority do allow 
for this possibility.74 (See for example, Dreier 2002, Enoch 2011). And they would 
seem right to do so. As Stephen Darwall (2006, pp.25-34) observes, first-order moral 
claims can sometimes rest upon meta-ethical ones. Deontologists, for example, 
would seem to presuppose a meta-ethical account of moral obligation according to 
which the right can come apart from the beneficial, and the wrong from the harmful. 
Likewise, our meta-ethical commitments can influence our choice of first-order mor-
al theories. It is no coincidence that meta-ethical naturalists are often attracted to 
consequentialism. These examples are hardly idiosyncratic. And they do, I believe, 
put quite a bit of pressure upon those who insist upon the strict independence of 
first and second-order moral theorising.  
It therefore seems plausible that what we say and do in the meta-ethics classroom 
can have implications for what we say and do in the normative ethics classroom, and 
vice versa. For my purposes here, it will not be necessary to sketch the precise condi-
tions under which this obtains.75 It will suffice to motivate the idea that as far as the 
moral error theory is concerned, these conditions plausibly do obtain. Many find this ver-
dict plausible (if not obvious). Russ Shafer-Landau, for instance, writes that  
If there are no truths within morality—only a truth about morality, namely, 
that its edicts are uniformly untrue—then the enterprise of normative ethics 
is philosophically bankrupt. Normative ethics is meant to identify the condi-
tions under which actions are morally right, and motives morally good or 
admirable. If nothing is ever morally right or good, then normative ethics 
loses its point. (2005, p.107) 
Crispin Wright echoes these sentiments when he remarks that 
… as soon as philosophy has taught us that the world is unsuited to confer 
truth on any of our claims about what is right, or wrong, or obligatory, etc., 
                                                                                                                                     
ments, and I do not have much criticism to add beyond what has already been said by Bloomfield 
(2009), Shafer-Landau (2010), and Enoch (2011, ch.5). (This is not to deny that these theorists are get-
ting at something. I will suggest that there is an important kernel of truth in what they say in §6.4.) In 
any event, I hope that the reader will not take my presuming that meta-ethics exists to be an illicit as-
sumption. 
74 Note that one can concede this possibility while maintaining that at least some meta-ethical claims 
are neutral at the level of first-order ethics. 
75 For systematic attempts to do so, see Dreier (2002) and Enoch (2011). 
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the reasonable response ought surely to be to forgo the right to making any 
such claims... If it is of the essence of moral judgement to aim at the truth, 
and if philosophy teaches us that there is no moral truth to hit, how are we 
supposed to take ourselves seriously in thinking the way we do about any is-
sue which we regard as of major moral importance? (1996, p.2) 
Following these theorists, it seems that a significant purpose of ethical theorising is 
to discover moral truths—truths about what is right or wrong, say. So long as we 
think that there are such truths, it seems that there could be some value in attempting 
to uncover them. But once we have come to believe that there is no moral truth to hit 
at, it would surely be incongruous (to say the least) for us to simply continue on as 
before.  
We might also think that moral discourse chiefly consists in invoking these truths 
in our moral conversations; we often appeal to moral considerations in our attempts 
to convince others to act accordingly. But appealing to moral considerations in eve-
ryday contexts likewise seems odd if we’re moral error theorists—what is the point 
of telling someone that they morally ought to φ if it is never the case that anyone 
morally ought to do anything?  
The truth of moral error theory therefore seems to carry worrying implications for 
first-order moral theorising. If we are moral error theorists, then, presumably, we do 
not believe that there are any moral truths to be discovered in ethical theorising, nor 
any truths about what we morally ought to do that can be invoked in everyday con-
texts. The following, then, is what I take to be the devastating result of our having 
come to believe the moral error theory: 
(1) Devastating result  
We no longer believe that anything is morally right or wrong. 
In chapters 6 and 7, I will argue that matters are in fact more complicated here than 
they first appear. But explaining why will take a good deal more work. At this stage, 
my purpose is to draw attention to what many theorists seem justified in assuming; 
that our believing the moral error theory is likely to have consequences for our ability 
to engage (or at least, engage seriously) in first-order moral theorising. 
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§2.3.2 Doom and gloom? 
I have suggested that it plausibly follows from our believing the moral error theory 
that we no longer believe that anything is morally right or wrong. What remains to be 
shown, however, is that this devastating result really is devastating. To this end, we 
must ask what is likely to happen if we believe that nothing is really right or wrong. If 
total anarchy would result, then we will urgently need to search for a remedy. But if 
barely anything would change, then addressing the WNQ for moral discourse would 
seem to be of comparatively little practical—and perhaps even philosophical—
importance. 
The anarchy hypothesis isn’t wholly unpopular; many have expressed despair at 
the idea that the moral error theory could be true. Joyce and Kirchin offer a nice re-
hearsal of the relevant concerns: 
Two thousand years ago, Aristocles of Messina asked “What evil deeds 
would he not dare, who held that nothing is really evil, or disgraceful, or just 
or unjust?” Paraphrasing Dostoyevsky, one might declare “If there is no 
moral truth, then everything is permitted.” And Dr Johnson memorably 
said of the moral skeptic: “If he does really think that there is no distinction 
between virtue and vice, why, sir, when he leaves our houses let us count 
our spoons” (2010, p.xiv). 
Yet such sentiments seem to express an unwarranted cynicism about human nature. 
If we believe the moral error theory, then it does seem to follow that we believe that 
nothing is really right or wrong. But are our moral beliefs all that stands between a 
Hobbesian war of all against all and civilised society as we know it? That seems im-
plausible. After all, many of our subjective concerns align closely with our moral 
goals; most of us have strong non-moral desires to help others, to tell the truth, and 
to foster worthwhile friendships.76  
 
76 By non-moral desires, I mean desires with non-moral content. Compare: (i) a desire to be a good 
person, and (ii) a desire to treat others with compassion and concern. Even if these desires turned out 
to be extensionally equivalent—if they were in the end, desires to do the very same thing—the former 
invokes moral concepts in a way in which the latter does not. In philosophical jargon, both might 
count as moral desires in virtue of their distinctive subject matter, but (i) is a de dicto moral desire, 
whereas (ii) is a de re moral desire (Smith 1994, pp.74-5). I return to this distinction in §2.3.3. 
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But rejecting the anarchy hypothesis seems to land us in a different sort of trou-
ble: perhaps none of these subjective concerns depend upon our moral beliefs at all. 
Perhaps we value helping others and telling the truth quite independently of whether 
we take such things to be morally good or required. If this were so, then our believ-
ing the moral error theory may seem to be of little practical significance. Perhaps we 
would continue to be caring and truth-telling people because these are the kinds of 
people that we want to be.   
To my mind, neither of these predictions survives closer scrutiny.77 It is clearly 
wise to steer clear of the slightly melodramatic sentiment that our believing the moral 
error theory would effect a radical upheaval of society as we know it. But we should 
also be cautious of maintaining that our believing the moral error theory would have 
no practical implications whatsoever—that our subjective concerns would remain 
wholly unaffected once we came to believe that nothing is morally right or wrong. 
Instead, we ought to occupy a plausible middle ground on this question: we should 
expect that our believing the moral error theory would have some practical implica-
tions. In support of that expectation, we can appeal to the following, plausible thesis: 
(2) Covariance thesis 
Our subjective concerns (and consequent motivations and behaviour) covary fairly 
closely with our moral beliefs, in the sense that these concerns, motivations, and 
behaviours are often influenced by our moral beliefs.78 
The covariance thesis should strike us as eminently plausible. After all, people usually 
do make some efforts to perform those actions that they take to be morally right, and 
try to refrain from those actions that they take to be morally wrong. This is not to 
deny that some people might knowingly engage in wrongful behaviour fairly often. 
Committed utilitarians, for instance, may think that they’re frequently failing in their 
duties to help the global poor. Nonetheless, they would still seem sufficiently sensi-
 
77 I appreciate that the question as to what would happen if we all believed the moral error theory 
is an empirical question—the answer is not one that ought to be “..pronounced upon with any confi-
dence from one’s armchair” (Joyce & Kirchin 2010, p.xv). Nonetheless, given what we do know about 
our own motivational dispositions and behaviour, I think we can with at least some confidence deny 
that either of the aforementioned predictions is plausible. 
78 I am grateful to Guy Kahane, who pointed me towards his parallel (2016) claim that our subjec-
tive concerns covary fairly closely with our evaluative and/or normative beliefs more generally.  
  
77 
tive to moral considerations, in the sense that that their behaviour tracks their moral 
beliefs fairly well—they’re not out stealing or stabbing, for instance.79   
Moreover, we usually expect a change in subjective concerns or motivation to ac-
company a change in moral beliefs—especially in decent, well-informed, and strong-
willed people (Smith 1994, pp.71-6). If I change my mind, and come to believe that 
voting for the liberals (rather than the conservatives) is the right thing to do, then we 
would, ceteris paribus, expect a change in my behaviour to follow suit. This phenome-
non need not be restricted to those who are morally perfect (as we would ordinarily 
say). Moral conviction can sometimes counteract even implicit and deeply en-
trenched biases (Paxton & Greene 2010).  
On the flipside, a denial of the covariance thesis should strike us as eminently im-
plausible. Moral beliefs certainly don’t seem epiphenomenal. It is odd to think that 
they have no causal impact whatsoever upon our subjective concerns and our ac-
tions.80 Moral beliefs do seem to figure in our explanations of other people’s behav-
iour. We often account for someone’s helpfulness by appealing to their belief that 
helping was morally required of them. And indeed, people themselves sometimes cite 
their moral beliefs to explain their own actions. (‘I thought it was the right thing to 
do’.) That moral beliefs figure in such explanations is decent evidence that they have 
causal effects upon the world—in particular, upon our motivations and behaviour.81 
Before concluding, I should note that the covariance thesis does not entail that 
there is any deep or tight conceptual connection between moral belief and motiva-
tion—that is to say, it doesn’t entail the truth of motivational internalism. Whether 
covariance is a contingent fact about human beings or a brute fact about agency is 
unimportant. For the purposes of establishing the claim that believing the moral er-
 
79 Thanks to Daniel Nolan for pointing this out. 
80 Some come close to supporting this suggestion. Jonathan Haidt (2001) argues that moral judg-
ments are the product of “intuitions” (roughly, emotionally-laden, gut responses), and that it is these 
intuitions (rather than our moral beliefs) that have the most significant effects upon our motivations 
and behaviour. Yet Haidt doesn’t claim that our moral beliefs have no influence whatsoever upon our be-
havioural or motivational dispositions. Not even he thinks that they are wholly epiphenomenal. 
81 Admittedly, such evidence is defeasible. But absent any reason to think otherwise, there seems 
to at least be some presumption here in favour of the commonsense claim that our moral beliefs do 
sometimes explain our motivations and our behaviour (when working in concert with particular de-
sires, of course). 
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ror theory would have some practical implications, it will suffice that there actually is 
some such covariance between our moral beliefs and our subjective concerns, moti-
vations, and behaviour. And that seems difficult to deny. 
§2.3.3 Morality (huh): what is it good for? 
So far, I have argued for the following two claims: (1) if we believe that the moral er-
ror theory is true, then we no longer believe that anything is morally right or wrong, 
and (2) our motivations and behaviour covary closely with our moral beliefs. This 
suggests that a significant practical consequence of our believing the moral error the-
ory would be the loss of particular motivational and behavioural dispositions. But 
would this really be a loss? I shall now argue that it would be. More specifically, I shall 
motivate the following two claims: 
U1: Acting in characteristically moral ways has many non-moral benefits at both 
the individual level and the social level. 
U2: Moral language and moral judgments are especially well-suited for disposing 
and/or prompting us to act in these beneficial ways. 
As I will now proceed to explain, characteristically moral behaviour tends to have 
positive social consequences (U1). A world in which people help one another and 
keep their promises is valuable to us in non-moral terms; we do better if we can rely 
upon others to help us and keep their word. Put differently, we do better to live in a 
society in which people are co-operative, and take the interests of others into account 
when deciding what to do.  
The idea that morality enhances social co-operation is not new.82 It is often argued 
that one important function of morality is that of “crowd control” (West 2010, 
p.184; see also Copp 2009, p.27); that of helping us to overcome inclinations that are 
likely to get in the way of prosocial behaviour. Few people are self-sufficient. Most 
stand to benefit from co-operating with others. But it is difficult to secure the bene-
fits of co-operation; for it can often be in an agent’s immediate, short-term interest to 
 
82 It is no mere matter of armchair conjecture either. According to a popular and well-respected 
empirical hypothesis, our capacity to make moral judgments was a biological adaptation that provided 
a much-needed boost to our co-operative dispositions (Ruse 1986, Joyce 2006, Kitcher 2011, Lahti & 
Weinstein 2005, Haidt 2012). 
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defect. Given that moral considerations are characteristically other-regarding, they 
tend to dissuade individuals from pursuing self-interest at the cost of the social good, 
serving as “checks on…natural inclinations or spontaneous tendencies” (Mackie, 
p.106).  
A related thought here—one owing to David Gauthier—is that moral require-
ments may be viewed as mutually beneficial constraints upon the pursuit of self-
interest in strategic interactions. On Gauthier’s way of seeing things, morality is “a 
system of principles such that it is advantageous for everyone if everyone accepts and 
acts on it” (1967, pp.461-2).83 Simply put, it to an individual’s overall rational ad-
vantage to comply with moral rules, provided that everyone else does so as well. 
(Though it might not be to her advantage in each and every instance; she will some-
times have to “perform disadvantageous acts”.84) 
Moreover, social-coordination is arguably easier to achieve with a currency of 
shared values in place. Such values can serve as a social adhesive, helping individuals 
to identify as a community, and cultivate common ends. Of course, it is debatable 
just how much overlap there is among individuals’ moral values. (There is certainly 
moral disagreement.) But even if the overlap here is not perfect, talk of rights and 
duties forms part of a “well-established framework” of “tacit understandings”—
something that can be helpful when we need to navigate our way through practical 
disputes (Nolan, Restall, and West, 2005, pp.312-3). 
Still, one might ask why morality in particular is important for the purposes of se-
curing co-operative behaviour. Why, that is, should we believe U2? I think we should 
 
83 Gauthier’s project bears some interesting similarities to Bernard Mandeville’s (1714) Fable of the 
Bees. For Mandeville, what appears to be virtuous and other-regarding conduct is often self-interested 
behaviour in disguise. 
84 When Gauthier claims that it is to one’s overall rational advantage to act in accordance with 
moral requirements, he is invoking a ‘constrained maximising’ conception of rationality rather than a 
‘straightforward maximising’ conception. The thought here is that it is rational for an agent to act up-
on a decision-making policy that disposes her to make the most advantageous choices overall, even if 
some token choices are disadvantageous (Gauthier 1986, pp.170-77). It is of course possible to take 
Gauthier’s view to be a vindication of the idea that we necessarily have reasons to act as morality re-
quires. But this would, I think, be the wrong inference to draw. If Gauthier is correct, then when par-
ticular circumstances obtain, we may often have normative reasons comply with moral rules. But what 
must be shown (if we are to vindicate morality) is that individuals necessarily have normative reasons to 
act as morality requires. On this point, see Sayre-McCord (1989). 
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concede that morality may not indispensable for these purposes. But there are good 
reasons to think that it is nonetheless especially helpful. For one thing, moral judg-
ments are arguably more effective elicitors of co-operative motivation than mere 
preferences or desires. Our resolve to be to help others is plausibly stronger when we 
not only desire to help them, but believe that we must or morally ought to help (Joyce 
2006, pp.110-1). My desire to keep my promises might be overridden by the benefits 
that defection offers. But if I am morally required to keep my word, then I take there 
to be a categorical demand upon me to do so—I don’t think that I can rid myself of any 
such obligation by citing an interest in defection.  
A related thought here is that moral judgments function as deliberation-stoppers; they 
prevent competing considerations that would interfere with prosocial motivation 
from entering into the deliberative sphere (Joyce 2006, p.111). When an agent judges 
that she morally ought to φ, she takes it to be the case that she ought to φ, period; her 
other desires and ends are sidelined in the decision-making process. Daniel Dennett 
(1986, p.123) pushes a similar line, suggesting that public moral judgments function 
as conversation-stoppers; they block any further negotiations from taking place when 
making interpersonal decisions—especially when time and resources are scarce. 
Moral practice also makes possible an array of powerful sanctions. Many of these 
are external.85 Moral misdemeanours invite criticism and reproach, and those who 
earn reputations as cruel or inconsiderate cads tend to have less social capital. Since 
very few of us wish to be on the receiving end of such hostility, we usually do our 
best to avoiding acting in ways that are likely to elicit it.  
Blame deserves special mention here; that is, the characteristic and forceful ways 
in which we negatively appraise others in response to perceived wrongdoing.86 Of 
course, blame does have a rather bad name (Fricker 2016, p.168). (And the ‘bad’ here 
 
85 There are internal sanctions as well, of course (see West 2010, p.189). I omit these purely for 
considerations of space. (I cannot hope to list all of the potential benefits of moral practice here.) 
86 I assume here that blame is an aspect of moral practice that we may risk losing if we believe the 
moral error theory. More specifically, I assume that blame entails judgments with moral content; that it 
involves a judgment of wrongness (Sher 2006), or a judgment that another’s “moral standing” has 
been diminished, for example (Zimmerman 1988, p.38). Not everyone thinks as much, of course (see 
Scanlon 2008). My suggestion here is merely that those of us who do take attributions of blame to 
have moral content should also regard blame as useful aspect of moral practice. 
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need not only allude to moral badness.) But it is my contention that blame is useful 
precisely on account of its distastefulness. Social interactions are underwritten by a 
common knowledge of our mutual susceptibility to evaluation—and that knowledge 
has motivational force. We care deeply about avoiding others’ reproach. Blame, being 
punitive and at times, uncompromising, is therefore a particularly effective mecha-
nism with which to keep one another in check.87 Our deep awareness of our moral 
exposure, together with our keen interest in avoiding blame, shapes our behaviour, 
moving us to treat others with due concern.  
Moreover, we have desires with moral content. Many of us desire to do what is 
right de dicto—to do what is right, whatever that may be. Admittedly, this motive has 
earned its fair share of bad press. Those motivated to do right de dicto have been 
branded “moral fetishists” (Smith 1994, pp.75-6). I am inclined to agree that desiring 
to do what is right de dicto is not a hallmark of the morally best sort of person. 
(Though qua error theorist, I must intend for this as a purely conceptual claim.) But I 
am also inclined to think this desire is particularly helpful to have around. 
Though we may have cause for worry if someone were only ever motivated to 
care for others by a de dicto desire to do what is right, I think we would also have 
cause for worry if she had no such desire. The desire to do what is right (de dicto) 
plays a valuable role in securing prosocial behaviour. Hallvard Lillehammer seems to 
be tracking the role I have in mind when he invites us to imagine a woman who 
…goes to a party during a phase when she is tired of her husband. At the 
party she meets a very charming person and is tempted to have an affair. 
She judges that it would be wrong to have an affair on account of her hus-
band’s feelings. But she is temporarily indifferent to her husband’s feelings. 
However, she has a standing de dicto desire to do what is right which, togeth-
er with her moral judgment, causes her to do the right thing, in spite of the 
absence of a de re desire to do the right thing and the presence of a de re de-
sire to do the wrong thing. (1997, p.192)  
The basic suggestion here is that de dicto moral desires can over-determine prosocial be-
haviour (e.g., spousal loyalty). These desires provide a motivational safety-net of 
 
87 I make no claim to originality here; it is commonly recognised that blame has the function of 
modifying future conduct. See McGeer (2013), and Pereboom (2013). 
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sorts—one that is especially helpful when our de re desires falter.88 Of course, one is 
tempted to reply to Lillehammer that it would be better if people’s desires not to 
cheat on their partners were more robust. But as a matter of fact, not everyone has 
such robust desires; a desire to be a loyal spouse can wax and wane as the terrain of a 
relationship changes. Given the way things actually are, we seem to do better if our 
desires to act in characteristically prosocial ways are over-determined—if we have de 
dicto moral desires that can pick up the motivational slack. 
In summary, there do seem to be a number of benefits to engaging in moral prac-
tice. Importantly, most if not all of these benefits of morality seem (i) to be linked to 
particular motivational and behavioural dispositions, and (ii) to be rooted in moral 
judgments (i.e., beliefs) and the language that gives expression to them. The consid-
erations above would therefore seem to speak in favour of the following claim: 
(3) Usefulness of morality   
Moral beliefs and the discourse that gives expression to them provide us with a 
number of desirable practical goods in virtue of the behaviour and motivations 
that they facilitate. 
In what follows, then, I will assume that our moral practices are useful to us. This is 
not to assume that they are on-balance useful to us. (That is a claim to be assessed in 
chapter 3.) An appeal to their prima facie usefulness will suffice for the time being. 
§2.3.4 The tension: why we need to answer the WNQ 
So far, we have the following package of claims: 
(1) Devastating result 
We no longer believe that anything is morally right or wrong. 
(2) Covariance thesis 
Our subjective concerns (and consequent motivations and behaviour) covary fairly 
closely with our moral beliefs, in the sense that these concerns, motivations, and 
behaviours are often influenced by our moral beliefs. 
 
88 It is admittedly an empirical question just how often these de re moral desires falter. But even if 
they only falter now and then, it would still seem useful to have some sort of safety-net in place, given 
that the stakes can often be high in interpersonal relationships. 
  
83 
(3) Usefulness of morality 
Moral beliefs and the discourse that gives expression to them provide us with a 
number of desirable practical goods in virtue of the behaviour and motivations 
that they facilitate. 
When these claims are put together, they carry a worrying implication. (3) tells us that 
morality is useful in virtue of the motivations and behaviour that it facilitates. But (2) 
suggests that these motivations and behaviour depend (to some degree) upon our 
moral beliefs—that is, upon our judging certain things to be right and wrong. The 
moral error theory therefore seems to endanger the desirable practical goods that our 
moral practices provide. For (1) reminds us that moral belief is no longer an option 
for us.  
Or is it? It might be thought that the correct answer to the WNQ ought to strike 
us as obvious; we should simply hold onto our false moral beliefs! (This is not to as-
sume any strong form of doxastic voluntarism. Even if we lack direct voluntary con-
trol over our beliefs, it is plausible that we have some measure of indirect control over 
what we believe. I discuss these issues at length in §7.4.) Of course, this strategy 
would involve holding onto beliefs that we take to be systematically false. But is there 
anything that counts significantly against our doing so? 
Indeed, there is. The practice of intentionally preserving false beliefs is arguably 
the cardinal sin of philosophical inquiry.89 As philosophers, we commit ourselves to 
maintaining a suitable level of epistemic hygiene. And philosophers are certainly not 
the only ones with truth-seeking goals; non-philosophers presumably have good rea-
sons for maintaining true beliefs as well. To persist with beliefs that we take to be 
false would be contrary to various epistemic values that we hold. 
Even those who do not value truth per se should be wary of being too epistemical-
ly cavalier. True beliefs are valuable resources. Typically, we’re more likely to be ef-
fective at satisfying our desires if we have a stock of true beliefs to act upon rather 
than a stock of false ones (Joyce, pp.178-9). So we should be wary of racking up too 
 
89 The ‘intentionally’ is important here. Philosophers would be engaging in pretty risky behaviour if 
holding onto false beliefs were the worst thing one could do, philosophically! Thanks to Daniel Nolan 
for pointing this out. 
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many false beliefs. It therefore seems that we need to add a fourth claim to the pack-
age above: 
(4) Epistemic values 
There is a presumption against having false beliefs. 
(4) clearly exacerbates the situation; for we can now see that our believing the moral 
error theory gives rise to a tension. On the one hand, epistemic considerations seem 
to speak in favour of doing away with our erroneous moral discourse; straightfor-
ward moral belief is no longer an option for us if we believe the moral error theory.90 
But purging ourselves of moral discourse does not seem all that appealing; we are 
likely to lose many of the benefits of moral practice should we do so. The project of 
answering the WNQ for moral discourse addresses this tension. In pursuing this pro-
ject, we are attempting to navigate a middle path between these two extremes—to 
identify a means by which we can reap (at least many of) the benefits of moral dis-
course without throwing all epistemic propriety out the window.  
So, what are our options? 
§2.4 ANSWERS TO THE WNQ FOR MORAL DISCOURSE 
We can distinguish different answers to the WNQ for moral discourse by how they 
respond to claims (1)-(4) above.91 Some resolve the tension by modifying or putting 
pressure upon one of these claims, whereas others dissolve the tension by rejecting 
one of them. In the remainder of the thesis, I will evaluate each of these suggestions 
in turn, and develop the proposal that (to my mind) has the greatest promise: conser-
vationism. Here, I will also mention and set to the side a propagandist option.  
 
90 This is not to suggest that the right answer to the WNQ cannot involve intentionally preserving 
false beliefs. It is only to suggest that someone who thinks that we should preserve false beliefs must 
motivate overriding the strong presumption against doing so.  
91 The taxonomy is not airtight, given that modifying or rejecting one of the four claims can have 
implications for how one understands the other claims. But I do think that the heart of each proposal 
is nicely captured by the claim to which it directs its focus. 
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§2.4.1 Abolitionism 
Moral abolitionists recommend that we do away with moral practice altogether; they 
advise us to cease using moral language, thinking moral thoughts, and invoking moral 
considerations when deliberating about what we ought to do.  
Some abolitionists appeal to the epistemic value of doing away with our erroneous 
moral beliefs when motivating their proposal (e.g., Garner 2007, p.500; Burgess 2007, 
p.438). For the most part, though, abolitionists tend to be motivated by (what they 
take to be) the significant harms of engaging in moral practice. According to them, 
moral conviction breeds and perpetuates interpersonal conflict, and moral language 
all too often lends a helping hand to war and violence.92 (See Hinckfuss 1987, §4.2; 
Greene 2002, pp.233-6 & pp.338-9; Garner 2007, pp.502-3; Ingram 2015, pp.240-1.)  
As should be clear, the abolitionist dissolves the tension by targeting (3). She will 
concede that there are some benefits to engaging in moral practice. But she denies that 
these practices are useful on-balance. Indeed, she thinks that we would be far better off 
without them. In her view, any tension between our epistemic values and our practi-
cal interests here is merely apparent.  
§2.4.2 Revisionism 
Revisionists advise us to modify moral discourse such that our engagement in moral 
practice no longer commits us to the existence of categorical reasons. There are dif-
ferent ways to go about this task. We might change the way that we use moral lan-
guage; moral utterances could come to express noncognitive attitudes (e.g., approval 
and disapproval) rather than beliefs (Köhler & Ridge 2013, Svoboda 2017). Since the 
resultant utterances wouldn’t be truth-apt, they wouldn’t be systematically false. Al-
ternatively, we might modify the conceptual commitments of moral discourse, re-
placing our error-ridden moral discourse with an error-free, schmoral one (Lutz 2014).  
Revisionists therefore propose to resolve the tension by directing their critical fo-
cus to (1). Some think that the moral error theorist can believe that some things are 
 
92 Given the nature of these latter concerns, abolitionism can be motivated quite independently of 
moral error theory—not all abolitionists are in the business of addressing our WNQ. But their argu-
ments will still be relevant to our investigation.  
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right and wrong, albeit in a qualified sense; she can believe that some things are 
right* and wrong*. Others claim that there is no great worry if the error theorist can-
not believe that some things are right and wrong; for she can simply replace these 
moral beliefs with non-cognitive attitudes.  
The revisionist’s guiding hope is that our beliefs about what is right* and wrong* 
(or the relevant non-cognitive attitudes) will influence our motivations and behaviour 
in the same (or at least in a very similar) way as our beliefs about what is right and 
wrong. It is this hope that grounds her expectation that schmoral discourse will de-
liver sufficiently similar practical goods to moral discourse. Revisionism would there-
fore seem to align with our practical needs. And since the revisionist does not ask us 
to hold onto our erroneous moral beliefs, her proposal would seem to align with our 
epistemic values as well.  
§2.4.3 Fictionalism 
The fictionalist’s pitch is similar to the revisionist’s in some respects; she too wishes 
to enjoy the benefits of moral discourse without incurring the relevant epistemic 
costs. The fictionalist proposes to do so by preserving moral discourse in the form of 
a useful fiction, replacing our moral beliefs with fictionalist attitudes (Nolan Restall, 
and West 2005, Joyce, ch.7 & ch.8). Unlike beliefs, these attitudes are not metaphysi-
cally committing.93 The moral fictionalist only believes (or make-believes) that there 
are moral truths within some moral fiction or other. This does not commit her to the 
claim that anything is wrong simpliciter.  
As I understand fictionalists, their strategy is to resolve the tension by putting 
pressure upon (2). According to the fictionalist, it is not only full-blooded moral be-
liefs that are capable of influencing our motivations and behaviour; our actions and 
our motives can be influenced by fictionalist attitudes as well—and in very similar 
ways. Given this, the moral fictionalist thinks that she can secure many of the bene-
fits associated with moral practice. 
 
93 Of course, fictional attitudes may be metaphysically committing in some respects. (Though just 
what they commit us to is likely to depend upon one’s metaphysics of fictions.) The point is that they 
are not metaphysically committing in the relevant respects; the fictionalist about morality, for example, 
is not committed to the literal existence of moral rightness or wrongness.  
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§2.4.4 Conservationism  
Conservationists take moral discourse to be incredibly useful. But they part ways 
from the fictionalist and the revisionist in recommending that we hold onto our false 
moral beliefs. Interestingly, conservationists think that we ought to continue to be-
lieve the moral error theory as well. They usually recommend that we attend to our 
belief that the moral error theory is true in some contexts, and attend to our beliefs 
that particular actions are right or wrong in others (Olson 2014, pp.190-6). 
Insofar as she thinks that the moral error theory merely prevents us from attend-
ing to our beliefs that some actions are right or wrong in particular contexts, the con-
servationist resists (1). But she is distinguished by how she responds to (4). Though 
the conservationist concedes that there is a presumption against having false beliefs, 
she argues that this presumption can be overridden in the event of a moral error the-
ory. Our practical interests win out against our epistemic values under such circum-
stances; for the conservationist strategy is the best—or better, the only—means of 
effectively serving our real-world interests here. Other proposals that are in alignment 
with our epistemic values simply don’t carry the same practical promise.  
§2.4.5 Why not propagandism? 
It might be thought that we philosophers would do best to keep uncomfortable 
truths hidden from non-philosophers or (as they are sometimes more affectionately 
known) ‘the folk’. And the moral error theory strikes one as a very uncomfortable 
truth indeed. Why, then, do we not simply keep this inconvenient truth to ourselves, 
and allow the folk to continue moralising as before? 
This suggestion often goes under the name ‘propagandism’.94 To my knowledge, it 
has received only one defence in the recent literature (that of Cuneo & Christy 2011). 
(Though this is not so much an outright defence as it is an argument to the effect 
that propagandism is superior to fictionalism in a number of respects.) Given consid-
 
94 Strictly speaking, propagandism is not a response to the WNQ as I have formulated it; for I 
have presumed that everyone is already in the know regarding the truth of moral error theory. Propagan-
dism would presumably do best if implemented before the truth of moral error theory had become 
well-known (though even then, its prospects would be uncertain). 
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erations of space, I shall not devote an entire chapter to assessing this proposal. In-
stead, I shall set propagandism to the side; for I do not regard it as a viable option. 
There are a number of issues regarding how we might best go about implement-
ing propagandism, and each of these, I believe, reveals a serious potential for instabil-
ity. To begin with, there is the question regarding just who is to safeguard the truth 
about morality. Presumably, we would want to minimise risk, and entrust this dan-
gerous secret to a small class of philosophers. To be on the safe side, we might even 
instruct them not to pass on this information to future generations. But even with 
these safeguards in place, propagandism still seems woefully unstable. After all, there 
is nothing to prevent contemporary philosophers not in the know (or those of the 
future) from discovering the truth about morality on their own accord. 
This invites a second question: to what lengths we are prepared to go to in order 
to protect the public? If we are seriously committed to keeping the truth well-hidden, 
then we should presumably remove all error-theoretic texts (as well as commentaries 
and associated discussions) from circulation. But would we really be willing to com-
mit the works of Mackie, Joyce, and Olson to the flames? I have argued that our be-
lieving the moral error theory has some potentially devastating consequences. But 
these consequences surely weren’t so dire as to warrant doing away with an entire 
body of philosophical research. The more propagandism approaches stability, the 
more it risks becoming hysterical. 
There are other reasons to be concerned about the stability of propagandism. As 
Köhler and Ridge (2013, p.438) point out, its success is likely to require “systematic 
intellectual dishonesty, deception and elitism” (see also Joyce, pp.214-5). And it 
seems unrealistic to expect that those in the know could keep up this ruse for very 
long. Moreover, doing so is likely to conflict with other values that they hold. The 
outright suppression of philosophical arguments (for fear of their dangerous conse-
quences) is not something that we typically want to encourage. 
Accordingly, I do not think that propagandism should even strike us as even ini-
tially appealing. The more we do to ensure its long-term stability, the more hysterical 
propagandism seems, and the more the proposal conflicts with too many of our oth-
er values. And the less we do to ensure its long-term stability, the more likely it is to 
leave us back where we started; everyone will be privy to the uncomfortable truth 
about morality, and we will still require an answer to our WNQ. 
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§2.4.6 Evaluating answers to the WNQ 
The proposals outlined above are not unique to the moral domain.  Fictionalism, for 
instance, has been developed in response to error theories about numbers (Field 
1980, Balaguer 2009, Leng 2010), and colours (Boghossian & Velleman 1989), as well 
as agnosticism about unobservables (van Fraassen 1980). The moral fictionalist 
thinks that we can apply the same solution to moral discourse. 
A recurring theme of this thesis will be that we must proceed with caution when 
importing such solutions. By this, I certainly don’t mean to suggest that moral fiction-
alists themselves have not given the relevant issues any thought. But I do worry that 
they (along with others) have neglected to pay sufficient attention to the distinctive 
features of a discourse in virtue of which it is apt for abolition, revision, fictionalisa-
tion, or conservation. 
As I will aim to show, particular solutions to WNQs are fitting for certain dis-
courses in virtue of the distinctive features of those discourses. We must attend to 
the distinctive features of moral discourse more closely before employing dialectical 
moves that have been made in other error-ridden discursive domains. Only by doing 
so can we determine whether philosophically rewarding moves can be made in the 
moral analogue.  
There are a number of qualities that will contribute to the attractiveness of any 
candidate proposal. I will argue that all else being equal, we ought to favour a solu-
tion to the WNQ for moral discourse insofar as it is (or can reasonably be expected 
to be) feasible, stable, in accordance with our epistemic values, and likely to preserve 
the desirable practical goods that our error-ridden moral discourse provides—or at 
least, a significant chunk of them. Different proposals may very well exhibit these 
virtues to different degrees; it is a comparative game that we are playing. 
A small caveat is in order before proceeding. The proposals canvassed above are 
to my mind the strongest (and to my knowledge, the only) contenders. However, it is 
possible that they do not exhaust the options that are available to us. (There is more 
in heaven and earth than is dreamt of in philosophy.) If they do not, then my rec-
ommended solution should be understood as a conditional claim: if these are the best 
proposals on offer, then we ought to opt for proposal x.  
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§2.5 PHILOSOPHICAL DIVIDENDS  
Providing an answer to the WNQ for moral discourse is valuable in a number of re-
spects. First, doing so responds to the worry that our believing the moral error theo-
ry endangers many of the desirable practical goods that our moral practices provide. 
Assuaging this concern may have implications for the acceptability of moral error 
theory as a meta-ethical position. It is not unlikely that at least some of the resistance 
to moral error theory is underwritten by a fear of the significant practical costs of 
embracing it. Indeed, some suspect that “…much of the opposition to the moral error 
theory is motivated by…an inchoate practical fear of what might happen should [it] 
be widely adopted” (Joyce & Kirchin 2010, p.xiv, emphasis added). Others have 
speculated that “…if a fully satisfying solution [to the WNQ] can be found, the error 
theory will become a more respectable position within metaethics” (Lutz 2014, 
p.370). By providing a principled and well worked-out answer to the WNQ, then, I 
hope to show that our believing the moral error theory need not entail the loss of 
many desirable practical goods; the position ought not be rejected on account of its 
feared practical consequences.  
Second, answering the WNQ for moral discourse can be useful even for those 
who are currently unpersuaded by the arguments for moral error theory. Perhaps 
there being a non-negligible chance that the moral error theory is true would suffice 
(Köhler and Ridge 2013, p.430). As things currently stand, we certainly can’t rule out 
the possibility that the moral error theory is true. So it may be wise to formulate a 
contingency plan. 
Third, we might be interested in what the effects of our moral practices are, and 
in what way(s) beliefs in moral truths or a commitment to moral realism contributes 
to them. Reflecting upon what might happen if people came to endorse the moral 
error theory might be illuminating in this respect.95 We might also wonder whether 
some abolitionists are correct in thinking that the costs of moral discourse—whether 
erroneous or not—are too high.96 Even a moral realist may be interested in these is-
sues. 
 
95 I thank Daniel Nolan for this suggestion. 
96 I thank Ben Fraser for this suggestion. 
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Fourth, providing an answer to the WNQ for moral discourse fills an important 
gap in the current philosophical literature. The issue concerning what to do when 
‘discourses go bad’ is a question currently occupying the minds of philosophers of 
mathematics, mind, and even those who have embraced an error theory about col-
our. Yet while many answers to the WNQ have been offered for these other error-
ridden discourses, few proposals have been properly developed in the moral case. 
The philosophy of mathematics, for example, offers a far richer and well worked-out 
array of answers to the WNQ that confronts mathematical discourse if there are no 
numbers. (See for example, Field 1980, Putnam 1967, Yablo 2001, and Balaguer 
2009.) When compared to their analogues in other philosophical domains, post-
moral-error-theory proposals are relatively unchartered philosophical territory. This is 
unfortunate. A world without moral goodness seems to me to be equally concerning 
(if not more) than one without the number seven. This research project goes some 
way towards filling that gap, and has the potential to enrich the dialectic within a me-
ta-ethical context.  
Finally, broader lessons can be drawn from my discussion of the conditions under 
which revisionism, abolitionism, fictionalism, and conservationism would be fitting 
solutions to the WNQ for moral discourse. A recurring theme of the discussion will 
be that different error-ridden discourses invite different solutions—and for princi-
pled reasons. By pointing towards such reasons, I hope to point towards some do-
main-general criteria for answering WNQs more broadly. The project therefore has 
implications for how we ought to answer the WNQ in other discursive domains as 
well. And as will become clear, this is a question that rears its head surprisingly often. 
§2.6 TAKE AWAY 
The purpose of this chapter was to clarify and motivate the project of answering the 
WNQ for moral discourse. I have specified that the WNQ is a collective, normative 
question; it is the question regarding what we, as a linguistic community (or, at least 
most of us with similar concerns), ought to do with our moral discourse if we believe 
the moral error theory.  
It was also important here to motivate the project of addressing the WNQ. To 
this end, I have suggested that the moral error theory gives rise to a tension between 
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various kinds of values and interests that most of us share. If we are to address this 
tension, then we must answer the WNQ. 
The purpose of these first two chapters has been to set up the remainder of the 
thesis, and to motivate the question that will form its central focus. I hope that these 
preliminaries have convinced the reader that moral error theory is a position to be 
taken seriously, and that the WNQ is worth addressing. With that background out of 
the way, we can now embark upon the project of answering the WNQ for moral dis-
course. Let’s get started. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 Moral Abolitionism 
Our first proposal to consider is moral abolitionism. Abolitionists advise us to cease 
using moral language, thinking moral thoughts, and invoking moral considerations 
when deliberating about what we ought to do. Initially, this may seem like peculiar 
advice; for (as was suggested in §2.3.3) our moral practices seem to provide us with a 
great number of desirable practical good. But abolitionists think that we have under-
estimated the harms of these practices. In their view, we’d be better off without them. 
The chapter begins by singling out the variety of moral abolitionism of interest 
(§3.1). Abolitionist proposals can differ along a number of dimensions, such as their 
intended scope. Abolitionists do, however, tend to be motivated by the same—if not 
very similar—concerns. The majority are motivated by considerations having to do 
with both (i) the practical costs of moral practice, and (ii) the epistemic disvalue of 
holding onto our false moral beliefs. For the most part, (i) seems to be load-bearing; 
quite a number of abolitionists think that the significant practical costs imposed upon 
us by moral practice are sufficient to justify doing away with it—that we have ample 
reason to do so quite independently of moral error theory. 
The critical discussion takes a closer look at the case for abolitionism. There are 
two arguments in particular that we shall consider. I will refer to these as The Argu-
ment from Conflict (§3.2), and The Argument from History (§3.3). Both are intended 
to support moral abolitionism and both, I believe, fail. What these arguments do es-
tablish is that morality can be of great benefit or great harm, depending upon the 
manner in which it is used. However, the right response to this problem isn’t neces-
sarily to do away with morality. A better response is to seek a means by which we can 
reap the relevant benefits while avoiding the associated costs. I will argue that there 
are promising means by which we could control for the costs that abolitionists bring 
to our attention. If I am right, then the abolitionist’s arguments do not so much sup-
port abolitionism as they support reform. 
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If my arguments in §3.2-§3.3 are successful, then abolitionism is radically under-
motivated. In §3.4, I will suggest that we also have good reason to worry about the 
feasibility of the proposal; ridding ourselves of morality may very well be something 
that we cannot do.  
As one can glean from the blueprint above, my considered verdict will be that 
abolitionism is the wrong response to the WNQ for moral discourse. The discussion 
concludes with a diagnosis of where abolitionism goes wrong (§3.5).  
§3.1 WHAT IS MORAL ABOLITIONISM? 
Abolitionist proposals differ along a number of dimensions, including the scope of 
their ban on moral vocabulary. And while they tend to differ less in their guiding mo-
tivations (most are driven by both epistemic and practical concerns), there is some 
disagreement as to how much weight each sort of motivation ought to carry. Since I 
will not be taking issue with every proposal in the abolitionist neighbourhood, an 
important task for §3.1 will be to distinguish the species under investigation from 
other varieties. 
§3.1.1 Motivation  
The majority of abolitionists are motivated by (what they take to be) the significant 
practical costs of engaging in moral practice. According to them, our moral systems 
breed and perpetuate interpersonal conflict, too often lend a helping hand to war and 
violence, and render our societies authoritarian and elitist. (See Hinckfuss 1987, §4.2; 
Greene 2002, pp.233-6 & pp.338-9; Garner 2007, pp.502-3; Ingram 2015, pp.240-1.) 
Of course, abolitionists don’t think that there are no benefits to engaging in moral 
practice. That morality can be useful is something they concede. (See for instance, 
Garner 2007, p.504.) But though it will be admitted that morality can be used for 
(non-morally) good purposes, abolitionists think that it can be used for (non-morally) 
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bad purposes as well.  And though the good here may be very good, the bad is espe-
cially horrid.97 
These practical concerns should give us pause even if we are not moral error the-
orists. Quite a number of abolitionists regard the truth or falsity of our moral judg-
ments as an orthogonal issue here; they think that the practical costs imposed upon 
us by moral discourse are sufficient to justify its elimination (Hinckfuss 1987, §1.5). 
Stephen Ingram has boldly suggested that even moral realists have good reason to do 
away with moral language (2015, pp.242-3). Many of the arguments that support abo-
litionism are therefore worthy of consideration quite independently of our metaethi-
cal tastes.  
That said, the truth of moral error theory may very well be further grist for the 
abolitionist’s mill. In the event that morality can boast neither truth nor usefulness, 
perhaps we would have doubly good reason to get rid of it. Indeed, abolitionists 
sometimes speak as though moral error theory and abolitionism is a package deal. 
Garner, for instance, describes the conversion to abolitionism as a two-stage pro-
cess—one that in the first instance requires the initiate to take her moral beliefs to be 
systematically false (2007, p.500; see also Burgess 2007, p.438).  
Historically, then, abolitionists have tended to disagree upon the role that error-
theoretic considerations play in motivating their proposal—some take it to be a nec-
essary first step, whereas others merely regard it as a helpful supplement. But the ma-
jority do seem to be moved by both practical and epistemic considerations, even if 
these considerations move them to different degrees. I shall therefore take both sorts 
of considerations to be important motivations for the proposal. (Though for reasons 
mentioned in §3.2, I will devote most of my critical focus to the former.) 
 
97 Of course, many abolitionists take issue with the fact that moral practice is often put to benefi-
cial use for a limited subset of the population; for the elite who want to preserve inequality, say. (See for 
example, Hinckfuss 1987, §§2.3-2.4.) I attend to these subtleties in §3.3. For the time being, ‘bad pur-
poses’ can be read as purposes that are harmful to most people. 
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 §3.1.2 Scope  
The species of moral abolitionism with which we shall be concerned is something of 
a minority view. However, more tempered varieties are not so uncommon. It has 
been suggested that we ought to eliminate the term ‘evil’ from our vocabulary on ac-
count of the social harms that it facilitates (Held 2001, p.107; Cole 2006, p.21). Oth-
ers have argued for the abolition of particular moral terms on largely error-theoretic 
grounds. Jeremy Bentham (1792/1843, p.501), for instance, was in favour of eradi-
cating talk of natural rights, which he regarded as “nonsense upon stilts”.  
Our abolitionist is different. She is not merely picking and choosing among bits of 
moral vocabulary. It is her contention that all of moral language ought to be con-
signed to the scrap heap.98 Indeed, the net that she casts is even wider still. Our aboli-
tionist recommends that we do away with moral practice in its entirety; she does not 
only advise us to cease using moral language, but also to stop thinking moral 
thoughts, using moral concepts, judging others along moral dimensions, and invok-
ing moral considerations when deliberating about what we ought to do (Ingram 
2015, p.231 & p.236; Garner 2007, p.500 & p.504; Fraser 2017, p.158). To be clear, 
the advice here is to do away with moral practices of any kind—revised, fictionalised, 
or otherwise.99 And it is advice for our moral practices in particular—not our norma-
tive practices more generally. Most if not all abolitionists think that we should and 
can in good conscience continue to speak of what we ought (non-morally) to do. 
(See for example, Hinckfuss 1987, §1.3.1; Ingram 2015, p.236.)  
§3.1.3 A new hope? 
It is no exaggeration to say that abolitionism fails to make a good first impression. 
That the proposal is prima facie unattractive is something even its supporters concede: 
 
98 Some abolitionists do express a particular distaste for deontological language (e.g., Greene 2002; 
Hinckfuss 1987, §4.6). However, none think that it follows from the fact that deontology makes for 
particularly good target practice that the rest of moral discourse is off the hook. It’s also worth noting 
that the abolitionist’s recommendation that we purge ourselves of ‘moral language’ is plausibly re-
stricted to moral language within the context of first-order moral practice. Moral abolitionists don’t 
necessarily think that we should stop using the terms ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ when doing meta-ethics. 
99 This advice is most explicit in Garner (2007) and Ingram (2015). Both are concerned to motivate 
abolitionism over rival solutions to the WNQ which involve preserving moral discourse in some form. 
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If someone told you that we should get rid of moral discourse and moral 
judgement, you’d probably raise an eyebrow or two…the idea that we 
should eliminate them seems strange. Indeed, it seems repugnant. What sort 
of person would want to eradicate the right and the good from their con-
ceptual repertoire? Not a very nice one, you might think. (Ingram 2015, 
pp.227-8) 
But perhaps our initial aversion to abolitionism rests upon a misunderstanding. We 
must take care not to conflate two senses of ‘moral’ (Greene 2002, pp.19-21): 
Moral1 
Of or relating to the facts concerning right and wrong, etc. 
Moral2 
Of or relating to serving (or refraining from undermining) the interests of others. 
As abolitionists are especially concerned to emphasise, their claim is that we ought to 
do away with morality1—to stop classifying certain actions or persons as morally 
good or bad, say. Their claim is not that we ought to do away with morality2—to 
cease caring about others or their interests. Abolitionists are strongly in favour of cul-
tivating morality2. Indeed, the cornerstone of their practical proposal is the idea that 
we’d have far more morality2 without morality1 (Garner 1994, p.3; Greene 2002, pp.47-
8; Marks 2013a, p.2). In their view, purging ourselves of morality may very well be 
“…an essential step in achieving many of the goals well-meaning moralists…have 
always cherished” (Garner 2007, p.51; see also Hinckfuss 1987, §5).  
§3.1.4 A caveat 
Most arguments for abolitionism are accompanied by an important concession: they 
are speculative. It seems that we simply “cannot know whether a thorough cost-
benefit analysis of moral discourse and judgement would favour…abolitionism” (In-
gram 2015, p.242). The question as to whether we would be better off without mo-
rality, is, after all, an empirical question—and perhaps “one to which we are not 
likely to find a definitive answer” (Garner 2007, p.506).100  
 
100 Indeed, Hans-Georg Moeller (2009) thinks that we ought to be agnostic as to whether morality 
does more harm than good, and recommends that we be more sparing with our use of moral language 
on account of this. 
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I attach a similar cautionary note to my critical discussion of abolitionism as aboli-
tionists do to their defence of the position; many of my arguments will be specula-
tive. That said, I am optimistic that we can get at least some traction on the relevant 
issues. Though the case may not be completely decisive either way, we do seem to 
have enough resources to make a principled assessment.  
It’s worth noting here that it is not merely the moral error theorist who may need 
to engage in such speculation. Some abolitionists, recall, think that the harms of 
moral practice are sufficient to justify its elimination. If they are right, then other me-
ta-ethicists may also need to ask themselves whether they’d be better off without mo-
rality. 
§3.2 THE ARGUMENT FROM CONFLICT  
We are now in a position to take a closer look at the case for moral abolitionism. Our 
focus will be restricted to the purely practical justification for the proposal. Moral 
abolitionism does of course have epistemic benefits as well—for enacting it involves 
doing away with our false moral beliefs. But it is the practical justification for aboli-
tionism that is typically thought to be load-bearing. Targeting that justification should 
therefore suffice to cast doubt upon its plausibility.  
The practical justification for abolitionism is premised upon the claim that our 
moral practices do more harm than good. Abolitionists have developed a number of 
arguments in support of this claim. But I shall pick my battles carefully here, restrict-
ing my focus to those arguments that strike me as most promising: The Argument 
from Conflict (AFC) and The Argument from History (AFH). (This section is devot-
ed to the former.)  
It’s worth clarifying my ambitions before proceeding. It will not be my intention 
to establish that the abolitionist is wholly off the mark. She is perfectly right in think-
ing that there are disadvantages to engaging in moral practice. (Though, as we shall 
see, she does have a slight penchant for exaggeration.) What I want to put pressure 
on is the move from these disadvantages to abolitionism. The move is slightly too 
swift; for there are conceivable means by which we could minimise these disad-
vantages. If I am right, then abolitionism does not seem to be the right response to 
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the problems that abolitionists raise. A better response would be to improve our-
selves as interlocutors, empathisers, and critical thinkers. 
§3.2.1 Morality and interpersonal conflict  
A popular argument in favour of abolishing morality appeals to the role that moral 
considerations play in exacerbating interpersonal conflict.101 This isn’t to say that we 
don’t butt heads over non-moral matters as well; we might disagree, for instance, 
over how to best divide an inheritance, or how to budget for an upcoming wedding. 
But at least in cases of conflicting preferences and interests, there seems to be a light 
at the end of the tunnel. In such cases, we can hope to meet one another half way. 
Compromise isn’t typically off the table. 
Matters seem different in cases of moral disagreement. If I think that we morally 
ought to refrain from genocide, and you think that we ought to go for it, then ought 
I to meet you half way by agreeing to wipe out just half of the relevant population? I 
don’t think so. It seems that we often feel entitled to stand our ground when we butt 
heads over moral issues. (See Enoch 2011, ch.2.) 
Yet it is precisely this feature of moral disagreement that abolitionists find prob-
lematic. Though compromise may not be either party’s preferred option in a practical 
dispute, it is often better than a long-standing impasse. But instead of compromising 
on moral issues, we often find ourselves locked into interminable debates. The rele-
vant worry isn’t merely that disagreements regarding abortion, parricide, and mar-
riage equality seem unlikely to be settled any time soon—it’s that they seem unlikely 
ever to be settled. When these practical disagreements (i.e., disagreements about what 
to do) become moral disagreements, they become frustratingly persistent, and no 
resolution seems forthcoming (Hinckfuss 1987, §4.3; Garner 2007, p.502; Marks 
2013b, p.446; Ingram 2015, p.240).  
It’s worth noting why this is a problem; for the persistence of a disagreement 
shouldn’t always trouble us. There may very well be no conceivable end to the debate 
 
101 For ease of expression, I will sometimes speak loosely of moral considerations being harmful, 
or helping along harmful agendas. What I really intend by this is the invocation of moral considerations in 
discourse and deliberation. 
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as to whether The Empire Strikes Back is the best movie in the Star Wars canon. But no 
one thinks that we ought to stop watching Star Wars on account of this. However, 
sometimes the persistence of a dispute is cause for concern. An unresolved disa-
greement can have far-reaching consequences upon people’s lives. It is yet to be de-
cided in some sectors of the world whether (certain forms of) assisted suicide should 
be legalised. The longer this dispute persists, the longer people may suffer unneces-
sarily. Generally speaking, unresolved disputes are undesirable, since we often stand 
to benefit from collective action. Longstanding disputes can also entrench existing 
social divides, making large-scale co-operation more difficult in the long-run.   
Abolitionists think that practical disagreements will be far easier to resolve follow-
ing a wholesale purge of moral language. They don’t of course think that this will 
solve all of our problems. Nonetheless, abolitionists do think that having stripped 
practical disagreements of their moral overlay, all that will remain are mere conflicts 
of interest—something that we (supposedly) have a far better shot at resolving (Gar-
ner 2007, p.502; Ingram 2015, p.241). 
Of course, qua moral error theorists we cannot understand moral disagreements 
or their resolution in the usual terms. We cannot, for instance, understand a moral 
disagreement as always revolving around a set of claims which are mutually exclusive 
and jointly exhaustive, where exactly one party to the dispute will be speaking the 
truth. We need to allow that there will be genuine moral disagreements even where 
no party’s position is correct. This should not strike us as that unusual. Atheists, for 
example, can plausibly make sense of two theists being engaged in a genuine disa-
greement (Sturgeon 1994, p.82).102   
Moreover, and for similar reasons, we cannot take the resolution of these disputes 
to involve convergence upon the moral truth. I therefore suggest that we take resolu-
tion to consist in all parties reaching a justified consensus by epistemically respectable 
 
102 Matters may be slightly complicated by our having taken the existence of moral facts to consti-
tute an impossibility. But I am inclined to regard this as a technical complication. The most plausible ac-
count of (im)possible world semantics should be able to make sense of reasoning about the 
consequences of views that are necessarily false. (Some metaphysical views currently on the market 
may turn out to be necessarily false, but we still seem capable of reasoning about what follows from 
them.) I leave it to the philosophers of language to do so. For a helpful discussion, see Nolan (1997). 
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means.103 (I assume here that justification is fallible; one can be justified in believing 
false propositions.) I attach the qualifications ‘justified’ and ‘by epistemically respect-
able means’ so as to rule out as cheap and uninteresting ways in which consensus 
could be achieved (brain-washing, intimidation, and what-have-you). What is ruled in 
is another matter. What I have in mind, broadly speaking, are epistemically respecta-
ble procedures; those that involve evaluating arguments, taking one’s evidence into 
account, trying to avoid inconsistency, and the like.  
§3.2.2 The argument from conflict: an assessment  
In order to properly assess the argument from conflict, we must ask why abolitionists 
think that the moral overlay makes practical disputes frustratingly persistent. Some 
(e.g., Burgess 2007) seem to put this down to the fact that moral disagreements are 
irresolvable in principle. Given this, the thought seems to be that a practical dispute 
whose resolution comes to depend upon the resolution of a moral dispute will like-
wise come to be irresolvable in principle. Others (e.g., Ingram 2015) think that moral 
disagreements are irresolvable in practice. Thus, as soon as the resolution of a practi-
cal dispute comes to hinge upon the resolution of a moral dispute, the practical dis-
pute comes to be irresolvable in practice as well. We will examine each of these ideas 
in turn. 
Before we do though, I should note from the outset that I am not going to try to 
settle here whether or not moral disagreements are resolvable in principle; whether 
they would persist even when all parties were free of “anything worth calling a cogni-
tive shortcoming” (Enoch 2011, p.209). What I want to do instead is emphasise that 
this is a highly contentious issue, and to point out that abolitionists have done very lit-
tle to motivate going one way or the other.   
People often disagree upon particular moral issues—upon whether “plants or an-
imals or zygotes have rights”, say (Burgess 2007, p.436). Burgess suggests that such 
disagreements are in principle irresolvable because their resolution would require an-
 
103 It seems possible for parties to reach a justified consensus by epistemically respectable means, 
even when they converge upon a falsehood. Members of The Vienna circle arguably did so when they 
came to agree upon the truth of logical positivism (a view which is today widely regarded as false). 
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tecedent agreement upon fundamental moral values or “general principles”. Given 
that there is substantial divergence among our fundamental moral values, we cannot—
according to this pessimistic line of thought—ever hope to achieve convergence on 
specific moral issues.  
But there is also the following, optimistic position: people do in fact share a com-
mon set of core moral values—moral disagreements are simply owing to differences 
in their non-moral beliefs (Rachels 2012, p.155). Generally, the optimist’s strategy 
consists in reducing putatively moral disagreements to non-moral disagreements. If 
we could only supply everyone with full empirical knowledge and equip them with 
the necessary powers of reasoning, then there’d be nothing left to quibble about. 
People wouldn’t continue to disagree upon whether zygotes had rights if they knew a 
little more about biology. Some are confident that this strategy can be applied to all 
(or almost all) instances of moral disagreement (e.g., Brink 1984, pp.116-7; Boyd 
1988, p.213). Others are more hesitant. They suggest that the general applicability of 
this strategy is questionable (Enoch 2011, p.191), or that we cannot make any rea-
sonable assessments of its promise without a good deal more empirical research 
(Loeb 1998, p.284).104   
Matters are more complicated still. Pace Burgess, it is not even clear that the reso-
lution of moral disputes would require antecedent agreement upon fundamental 
moral values. As Brink points out, this assumes “a one-way view of moral justifica-
tion and argument”, on which people’s core moral values are foundational, justifying 
“particular moral judgments but not vice versa” (1984, p.116). And this, of course, is 
something that coherentists about moral justification will deny. (Achieving coherence 
among moral commitments may sometimes require giving up general moral princi-
ples rather than specific moral beliefs.) But even given coherentism, it still seems to 
be an open question whether or not the relevant idealised agents would converge 
 
104 This is not to suggest that no empirical research has been brought to bear on the issue. Doris 
and Plakias (2008), for example, draw upon Nisbett and Cohen’s (1996) research on ‘cultures of hon-
our’ when discussing the prospects of resolving moral disagreements. It is only to suggest that there is 
arguably more work to be done. 
  
103 
upon the same set of moral commitments. It is difficult to know either way.105 Indeed, 
I am not even confident that the debate as to whether moral disagreements are re-
solvable in principle is itself resolvable in principle. (On this issue, see Shafer-Landau 
2003, p.223.)   
None of this is to suggest that moral disagreements are resolvable in principle. I 
have only suggested that we shouldn’t be at all confident either way. The matter rests 
upon highly contested claims regarding the nature of moral justification, and the out-
comes of hypothetical disputes among idealised agents. This does not establish that 
the abolitionist is wrong. But it is nonetheless an interesting result, and one that I be-
lieve counts against her. If the entire case for the AFC were to rest upon the in prin-
ciple irresolvability of moral disagreements, then the argument would be far from 
decisive.   
That said, the abolitionist may happily grant to us that ideal agents would reach a 
consensus on moral issues. She need only point out that we are not ideal agents. Giv-
en the way we are, and given the ways in which we are prone to use moral discourse, 
perhaps introducing morality into the equation does in fact prevent us from resolving 
practical disagreements. Perhaps these disputes are irresolvable in practice. 
At this stage, the abolitionist owes us an explanation as to why this is so. Stephen 
Ingram has risen to the occasion, emphasising the obstinance that moral conviction 
tends to encourage. This, he suggests, is owing to  
… the categorical authority of moral ascriptions. Although this authority 
might help combat weakness of will, it can also lead to opposing parties be-
coming entrenched in their positions, making it harder to bring conflicts to 
a satisfactory conclusion. (2015, p.239)  
If Ingram is correct, then the persistence of moralised disagreements is the result of 
people having become “entrenched in their positions”. Given the categorical authori-
ty of moral prescriptions, it is easy to become entrenched in one’s views regarding 
the moral permissibility of abortion—far easier than it would be to become en-
 
105 Indeed, criticisms of Smith’s (1994) claim that our ideal selves would converge upon their de-
sires suggests that it is very difficult to establish that norms of coherency will take rational agents from 
disparate starting points to full agreement. See Joyce (pp.75-7), Sobel (1999) and Bukoski (2016). 
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trenched in one’s views regarding the aesthetic permissibility of wearing socks with 
open-toed shoes. 
Interestingly, certain findings in moral psychology may back up what Ingram has 
to say here. It has been found that insofar as experimental subjects take moral truths 
to be objective (i.e., take their truth to be independent of any individual’s or group’s 
attitudes), they are prone to be intolerant of diversity and ineffective at dealing with 
conflict (Goodwin and Darley 2008, 2010, 2012; Wright et al. 2014).106 Of course, 
the notion of objectivity is distinct from that of categorical authority. But inasmuch 
as people objectify morality as well, these findings may be further grist for the aboli-
tionist’s mill (see Fraser 2017). 
That said, it shouldn’t be obvious to us that it is morality (or, at least, only morali-
ty) that breeds obstinance in such cases. We should be wary of inferring from the 
correlation between objectivist moral intuitions and inefficiency in conflict resolution 
that the moral overlay is the most important contributing factor in ongoing practical 
disputes. Goodwin and Darley (2010) also found that moral objectivists (as opposed 
to non-objectivists) tend (i) to have little interest in identifying or understanding the 
source of their disagreements—i.e., where the other person is coming from, and (ii) 
to perform worse on disjunctive reasoning tasks (which tests for abilities to entertain 
different possibilities, and approach problems from different perspectives). (See also 
Feltz & Cokely 2008.) It is not unlikely that the difficulty that moral objectivists have 
resolving moral conflicts is owing (or partly owing) to these factors. If someone is al-
ready unwilling or unable to understand others perspectives, then resolving disagree-
ments is likely to be difficult in any case. 
Thus, it seems to me that we can grant much of what Ingram has to say while re-
sisting the inference that moral disagreements are irresolvable in practice. We have 
good independent reasons to consider other perspectives, and to avoid becoming too 
deeply entrenched in our own views (moral or otherwise); for we often have good 
reasons to resolve interpersonal conflicts, and we are unlikely to do so if we are not 
sufficiently open-minded. The right response to the problem that Ingram raises 
 
106 I say ‘insofar as’ because Goodwin and Darley’s (2008, 2010, 2012) findings suggest that people 
differ in the extent to which they are objectivists about morality, and that some moral claims are more 
likely to be considered objective than others. (See also Wright et al. 2014; Sarkissian et al. 2011.) 
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would surely be to improve ourselves as interlocutors; to cultivate dispositions to be 
more open-minded, to be more friendly to the possibility that we could be mistaken, 
and to become more responsive to arguments for opposing views. Even if morality 
does make obstinance more common, it certainly doesn’t make it inevitable. (Not 
every moraliser is so stubborn.) There are conceivable ways in which we could con-
trol for it 
One might worry that I have conceded too much to the abolitionist in allowing 
that moral conviction can encourage obstinance. But it’s important to appreciate just 
how small of a concession this is. The abolitionist’s central claim is that our moral 
practices do more harm than good. From this, she quickly infers (far too quickly, I 
think) that we ought to do away with these practices. But there is another option 
here. We could make some efforts to minimise these harms instead. In doing so, we 
could preserve the benefits of moral practice while avoiding the potential costs.  
It therefore seems to me that the real issue here is not whether morality has asso-
ciated costs, (it surely does), but whether these are costs for which we could control. 
In the ensuing discussion, I will suggest that there are in fact a number of promising 
means by which we can minimise abuses of the moral overlay.  
§3.3 THE ARGUMENT FROM HISTORY  
Abolitionists are particularly fond of drawing attention to morality’s bad track record. 
Ian Hinckfuss points towards 
… the massacre of the moral Catholic highlanders by the moral Protestants 
at Culloden and its aftermath, the genocide of the peaceful and hospitable 
stone-age Tasmanians by people from moral Britain, the mutual slaughter of 
all those dutiful men on the Somme and on the Russian front in World War 
I, the morally sanctioned slaughter in World War II… all this among people 
the great majority of whom wanted above all to be good and who did not 
want to be bad. (1987, §2.2) 
Stephen Ingram pays special attention to the role that moral considerations have 
played in helping along social oppression: 
If your group is in the business of subjugating some other group, one effec-
tive way to help sustain that subjugation is to convince everyone that your 
group is more competent at moral judgement. …Plausibly, such methods 
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have been used throughout history to help sustain oppressive social hierar-
chies. (2015, pp.238-9) 
These are the sorts of claims that characterise The Argument from History (AFH). The 
purpose of drawing our attention to these historical samplings is to motivate the idea 
that our moral practices are on-balance harmful. Moral considerations are pliable, 
and so, they can be used to further harmful agendas as well as desirable ones. Social 
conflict and oppression are bad enough quite on their own; any mechanism that 
helps them along is surely (the thought goes) something we can do without. 
Unfortunately, abolitionists are seldom explicit regarding the finer details here. It 
isn’t clear, for example, who is included in the scope of this ‘we’; just whose interests 
are frustrated by these moralised agendas? Oppression and war are not certainly con-
trary to everyone’s interests; profiteers and warmongers, for instance, often stand to 
gain. I will assume in what follows that the ‘we’ here is intended to apply to most of 
us, who presumably want to avoid an untimely demise, see to it that others are well, 
and live in a stable and co-operative society. Not everyone has these ends, of course. 
But we need not require that abolitionism be sound advice for everyone. It need only 
be sound advice for most of us, who share a broad variety of interests and con-
cerns.107 
We have specified to whom abolitionism is addressed. But other questions re-
main. It’s not obvious what sort of role abolitionists take morality to have played in 
these samples from our history. Addressing this question will be helpful for the pur-
poses of distinguishing the more plausible varieties of the AFH from those that can 
be dispensed with rather quickly.  
 
107 I will also assume that the ‘we’ here is restricted to people of the present day. The AFH doesn’t 
necessarily appeal to human history in its entirety; abolitionists rarely discuss (what might be called) 
the distant past. They need not think that moral belief-systems were on-balance harmful for early hu-
mans. Indeed, it has been suggested that morality may very well have been on-balance useful in early 
human societies, but that it is more of a hindrance than a help to achieving our goals in the modern 
world (Fraser 2017). 
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§3.3.1 The role of morality 
I should like my critical discussion of the abolitionist’s arguments to be a discussion 
of her strongest arguments. So I will now proceed to single out what I take to be the 
most plausible variant of the AFH. Abolitionists argue that moral considerations 
have played an important role in their depressing sample of historical events. But 
there are a number of different roles that moral considerations may be thought to 
have played. One possibility is the following:  
Strong role 
Moral considerations were counterfactually responsible for these unfortunate 
events.  
On this reading of the AFH, the unfortunate events in question would not have 
come to pass had it not been for the moral justifications that were offered in support 
of them. Certain remarks from abolitionists suggest that they intend to put forward 
this strong claim. Joshua Greene (2002) seems to think that nations would not be ca-
pable of garnering the necessary support for aggressive foreign policies if they did 
not have moral language at their disposal: 
One might go so far as to say that nations require the language of moral real-
ism to marshal popular support for aggressive actions. Has a military aggres-
sor ever not claimed a moral right to carry out its plans? Has a nation ever 
been moved to war by leaders who said, “It would be good for us economi-
cally, and we can get away with it, so why not?” (2002, p.238, emphasis in 
original)   
I think that we can safely dispense with this strong variant of the AFH; for our an-
swer to Greene’s question ought to be a resounding yes. I take it that Genghis Khan 
did not have to tread carefully around his marauders’ moral sensibilities, ensuring 
that they felt morally justified in riding off to rape and pillage.108 Desires for glory and 
conquest appear to have been sufficiently strong motivators. Of course, identifying 
the full range of causal factors involved in any particular historical episode is difficult. 
But identifying unwelcome social agendas that succeed without morality is not. Wall 
Street profiteers do not seem to require any moral justification to advance their own 
 
108 I thank Ben Fraser for the example. 
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financial interests at others’ expense. Pace Greene, ‘we can get away with it, so why 
not?’ can sometimes suffice. 
Let us therefore set to the side the proposal that moral considerations were need-
ed for war efforts (etc.) to gain a foothold. This is not to deny that moral considera-
tions had any role to play. Perhaps their contribution is better characterised as 
follows: 
Moderate role 
Moral considerations were causally sufficient for these unfortunate events. 
One finds this suggestion in Hinckfuss (1987). In maintaining that moral societies 
(i.e., those that participate in the institution of morality) are “elitist, authoritarian” 
and “inefficient in the resolution of conflicts”, he does not intend to suggest that 
they would not be this way were they not moral societies. His claim is that that “the 
way morality perpetuates itself within a society is causally sufficient for the perpetuation 
and aggravation of these aspects of society” (1987, §2.2, emphasis added). 
As I understand Hinckfuss’s suggestion here, it is perfectly possible that an amoral 
society could be elitist and authoritarian; morality is certainly not necessary for things 
to go awry. This is plausible. But the flipside of the sufficiency claim is not. Hinck-
fuss seems to think that introducing moral practice into a peaceful and well-
functioning society would be enough to send it on the path to rack and ruin. And 
that seems false. Just how morality manifests itself within a society will presumably 
depend upon the nature of that society; its members, its social organisation, and the 
like. I defer further development of this idea to §3.3.3. If what I have to say there is 
right, then the moral overlay is certainly not enough to render a society conflict-
ridden, authoritarian, and elitist.  
But all is not lost for the AFH. Even if morality was neither necessary nor suffi-
cient for these atrocities, it is still possible that things would not have been nearly as 
bad were it not for moral considerations. The abolitionist may accord the following, 
weaker role to moral considerations:  
Weak role 
Moral considerations made things worse than they otherwise would have been. 
Many abolitionists seem to have this weaker role in mind. Ingram (2015, p.238) con-
cedes that moral considerations do not themselves generate social hierarchies, but ar-
gues that they help to perpetuate them. Richard Garner does not think that moral 
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conviction is what leads us to war. But he does think that moral considerations have 
often made things worse, since they “...can be used to justify inflicting any cruelty 
deemed necessary for victory” (2007, p.507). I take this weak variant of the AFH to 
be the most promising. It is not my intention here to attack straw dummies. So I will 
assume in what follows that it is this argument that must be reckoned with.  
§3.3.2 Other culprits 
According to abolitionists, moral considerations have played an important role in the 
massacres and oppressive social structures of history, making matters worse than 
they otherwise would have been. I should acknowledge from the outset that this 
claim is not easy to assess. We can speculate, of course. But it is incredibly difficult to 
state with any great confidence how history would look without talk of moral rights, 
duties, and obligations. In any event, it is certainly not something that we ought to be 
confident of coming to know merely as a result of armchair speculation. 
Let me be clear: I am no historian. My strategy will not be to tirelessly tease apart 
every potentially relevant causal factor at play, finally arriving at a principled conjec-
ture as to whether things would have been just as grim were it not for morality. In-
stead, I shall simply grant to the abolitionist that moral considerations exacerbated 
the atrocities that she invites us to consider.  
Even granting this, I think there is something to be gained from turning our atten-
tion to the many non-moral factors as play. As we shall see (§3.3.3), doing so helps us 
to appreciate that the harms associated with moral practice are not inevitable, and to 
identify some promising avenues for minimising the misuse of morality. I will also 
suggest that these non-moral factors may very well have been sufficient for war ef-
forts and subordination to gain a foothold. If I am right, then we should be especially 
thankful for the positive role that moral factors have played in helping us to counteract 
undesirable social agendas. 
Religion and Intolerance 
We can now devote some space to examining the non-moral factors that have plau-
sibly helped along war and oppressive social structures. Needless to say, religion has 
often been an important contributing factor. The Crusades in Jerusalem were driven 
by a Christian objective to reclaim the Holy Land from Muslims; the Thirty Years 
  
110 
War was spurred by Protestants’ refusal to comply with Ferdinand II’s attempt to 
impose Catholicism upon them; and The French Wars of Religion were, at least in 
great part, the result of Catholics’ intolerance towards Huguenots.  
As far as social subordination is concerned, the role of religion in facilitating op-
pression can hardly be overstated. The inferiority of women is enshrined in religious 
scripture—as is the validity of slavery. Religious teachings can also legitimise the sta-
tus quo in the minds of both oppressor and oppressed. Kevin Bales notes that for 
many slaves in Mauritania (which uses Sharia as its legal system), 
… freedom is a dismal prospect. Deeply believing that God wants and ex-
pects them to be loyal to their masters, they reject freedom as wrong, even 
traitorous. To struggle for liberty, in their view, is to upset God’s natural or-
der and puts one’s very soul at risk. (1999, p.108) 
I do not want to pretend here that morality is easily dissociable from religion. Reli-
gious teachings do, after all, prescribe and prohibit certain kinds of behaviour, and 
these directives are seldom free of moral language. Indeed, it is sometimes customary 
to interpret people of faith as (tacit) champions of a distinct kind of meta-ethical po-
sition, according to which moral obligations have their source in God’s will (see 
Anscombe 1958). Religious wars and oppression may very well have been fuelled by 
a sense of moral duty.  
That said, we shouldn’t be so quick to infer that a sense of moral duty is what’s 
doing the heavy lifting in these cases. Religious belief-systems tend to come pre-
packaged with threats to the non-compliant; a smite from above, for example—or an 
eternity of damnation, perhaps. And a fear of divine reprisal has motivational force. 
Whatever one’s considered moral judgment on the matter of war and oppression, the 
threat of fire and brimstone can surely suffice to motivate supporting the religious 
agendas of the day. The promise of avoiding divine reprisal was all the more tangible 
for those participating in The Crusades, who were promised absolution from their 
sins.  
Religious conviction also has the potential to breed intolerance. The religiously af-
filiated have been found to be more intolerant of ethnic minorities than the unaffili-
ated (Allport & Kramer 1946, Hall et. al 2010). Regular churchgoers also tend to be 
intolerant of nonconformists (Stouffer 1955). Religious fundamentalism in particular 
seems highly correlated with prejudicial attitudes (McFarland 1989, Altemeyer & 
  
111 
Hunsberger 1992, Kirkpatrick 1993, Hunsberger 1996).109 And intolerance can cer-
tainly help along social oppression. The intolerant feel no need to refrain from exer-
cising their power to interfere with others.110 Even if religions do prohibit and 
prescribe certain kinds of behaviour, then, it is far from obvious that a sense of mor-
al duty is the dominant force at play in the cases to which the AFH appeals. Many of 
these atrocities were likely helped along by prejudicial attitudes as well.  
Harmful ideologies 
The considerations above notwithstanding, we do need to be wary of using religion 
for target practice. The two world wars were not carried out in the name of faith. 
Nor has oppression always been rooted in religious belief-systems, for that matter; 
other sorts of ideologies can also help to sustain social hierarchies.  
That ideologies can breed contempt comes as no surprise—Nazism is a common-
ly cited example. Nazi ideology combined an especially toxic nationalism with an 
emphasis upon racial purity. Added into the mix was a deep-seated anti-Semitism; 
many of the country’s social and economic woes were (wrongly) put down to the 
scheming interference of German Jewry. Once again, the boundaries here can be 
murky; it is not unlikely that Nazi ideology may have been moralised along the way. 
Nonetheless, it seems implausible to claim that Nazism wouldn’t have gained any 
traction had it not been for moral considerations. The Nazis abhorred Jews, and re-
garded them as a threat to their nation’s prosperity. It is not obvious that they 
wouldn’t have done them any harm if they hadn’t taken it to be their moral obliga-
tion to do so. Many facets of Nazism can plausibly be taken to have represented 
people’s non-moral values and preferences: values attached to racial purity, ambitions 
for territorial expansion, and the like. 
 
109 Though, as Allport and Ross (1967) point out, the positive correlation between religious affilia-
tion and intolerance seems to be stronger for those with an “extrinsic religious orientation” (who use 
religion to further their other ends) than those with an “intrinsic religious orientation” (who internalise 
the values of their faith). Batson and Ventis (1982) propose that another orientation which involves 
searching for answers to existential questions—what they call “quest”—is associated with greater tol-
erance and sensitivity towards others. 
110 I draw upon Cohen’s (2004, p. 69) understanding of intolerance here. 
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Epistemic complacency 
The list above should not be surprising; religion, intolerance, and ideological factors 
are the usual suspects. But there is a further suggestion that I want to develop here. It 
seems to me that there is one explanatory factor in particular that we find in almost 
all of these cases. Aside from religious fervour, wayward ideologies, and intolerance, 
many historical atrocities seem to have been marked by a staggering sort of epistemic 
complacency; an utter failure to carefully reason through the relevant issues, or to ques-
tion and challenge the empirical beliefs of the day. Many of the beliefs that these 
people held—beliefs regarding the legitimacy of slavery, the inferiority of women, or 
the contribution of the Jewish people to Germany’s loss in the first world war—
were, by all appearances, simply taken for granted.111 
It is my contention that epistemic complacency has played a substantial role in 
these samples from our past. This is, of course, an empirical hypothesis—one that 
would require further research and reflection before it could be pronounced with any 
greater confidence. But the hypothesis seems to me to be eminently plausible; it is 
difficult to maintain that these undesirable social agendas would have been just as 
successful had the parties involved been epistemically vigilant. Showing that Nazism 
would have gained the traction that it did even if theories of racial purity and the 
stab-in-the-back-myth had been subjected to further scrutiny seems like a tall order.  
The epistemic complacency hypothesis certainly seems to have something going 
for it. However, let me say a little more to motivate it. It is important to appreciate 
that a culture’s (dominant) moral belief-systems are seldom—if ever—divorced from 
its stock of non-moral beliefs. So-called ‘caste societies’ attach moral significance to 
hierarchy and social order. But their moral systems have long been intertwined with 
mystical beliefs about purity and pollution (Stevenson 1954, Haidt 2012). For much 
of history, moral justifications were offered for the enslavement of people of colour. 
 
111 This is not to suggest that such matters were taken for granted by all. Coalitions of willing dis-
senters have certainly not been lost in the annals of history, and I shall have more to say about them in 
§3.3.3. What is important to appreciate is that these coalitions seldom seem to have constituted the 
majority of those involved. As Konrad Adenauer once observed, it is unlikely that Nazism could have 
gained the momentum that it did had it not “… found, in broad strata of the population, soil prepared 
for its sowing of poison…Broad strata of the people, of the peasants, middle classes, workers and in-
tellectuals did not have the right intellectual attitude”.  
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But again, we cannot ignore the influence of the non-moral beliefs held by the sub-
ordinators. They regarded the inferiority of their slaves as scientific fact; studies from 
phrenology, for instance, suggested to them that certain races were more ‘advanced’ 
than others (Hanlon 2003). The moral justifications that were offered in support of 
oppression may have made matters worse. Yet it’s difficult to shake the impression 
that people’s inaccurate non-moral beliefs were the primary source of harm.112 If they 
hadn’t held these false beliefs, then it is far less likely that they would have been in a 
position to offer a moral justification for their oppressive practices. 
None of this is to suppose that there was anything epistemically special about those 
involved. As Gideon Rosen points out when discussing the sexism of the 1950s, a 
failure to “…see through a pervasive and well-protected ideology need not be a sign 
of culpable negligence or recklessness…It might just be a sign of ordinariness” 
(2003, pp.67-8). Epistemic complacency isn’t merely a quality of the epistemically 
challenged; few wonder through life reflecting upon or questioning the presupposi-
tions of everyday thought.   
But ordinary or not, epistemic complacency very much seems to have played a key 
role in the cases under consideration. Members of oppressive groups don’t tend to 
be very open to the possibility that they might be mistaken about the legitimacy of 
their status; that women might have had equal intellectual potential to men is a con-
sideration that seems to have given pause to few who lived before the 20th century. 
But if that’s right, then the real root of the problem would appear to be bad reason-
ing, and false empirical beliefs. If the abolitionist is concerned to prevent war and 
oppression, then, it seems to me that she needs to be casting a much wider net; she 
ought to be taking issue with human stupidity as well. 
A lack of human feeling 
Though I regard epistemic complacency as an important contributing factor in many 
of the abolitionist’s examples, it would be naïve to think that cognitive shortcomings 
were the only culprit. Perhaps Khan’s marauders could have been more critical in 
 
112 To be clear, I am not here endorsing the claim that all moral disagreements come down to disa-
greements over non-moral matters. I am only endorsing the more modest claim that people’s moral 
beliefs plausibly covary to some degree with their non-moral beliefs. 
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thinking about whether they ought to have looted some nearby town. But I take it 
that this wouldn’t have been of much help. We may fault Khan and his posse for 
their lack of human feeling. But it is difficult to fault them with shoddy reasoning. It 
is unlikely that things would have been any better had Khan’s followers been para-
gons of epistemic rationality (indeed, they may have been far worse). 
It is therefore not merely epistemic complacency, but a lack of human feeling that 
can help along undesirable agendas. I intend to refer to something quite broad here; 
everything from shortcomings in empathy to unbridled selfishness and acute hatred. 
It is remarkable just how little thought Khan and his marauders seem to have given 
to the suffering of their victims. But, of course, it is not only them who exhibited 
such insensitivity. A strong willingness to be self-serving seems to have been a signif-
icant contributory factor in many of the abolitionist’s examples. It is not in the least 
bit surprising that the institution of slavery was favoured by those who stood to gain 
economically, nor that the elite had a penchant for social stratification.   
My tentative hypothesis, then, is that epistemic complacency and a lack of human 
feeling (especially when working in concert) were important and underappreciated 
contributory factors in the sorts of cases that the abolitionist brings to our attention. 
This is not to suggest that all warmongering and oppression can be put down to hu-
man stupidity and selfishness. But we should be careful not to underestimate the 
damage that ignorance and insensitivity can do. 
Moving forward 
The non-moral factors singled out for mention here are not exhaustive. But they will 
suffice for my purposes. When put together, these factors seem to form a large part 
of the explanation for the atrocities to which the abolitionist appeals. It is not im-
plausible that they sometimes would have been sufficient. If anything, our dark past 
would seem to be overdetermined. The case certainly isn’t knock-down; it’s difficult 
to tease apart the many causal factors at play here—be they moral, religious, or oth-
erwise. Nonetheless, we do seem to have good grounds for doubting that moral con-
siderations were the only—or the even most important—culprits.  
But just what is to be inferred from all of this? At this stage, not much. I have on-
ly suggested that many non-moral factors plausibly operate in tandem with the moral 
overlay in the cases that abolitionists invite us to consider. I have not denied that our 
moral practices play some role in generating harm. That said, emphasising the contri-
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bution of non-moral factors is important in our argumentative context. Doing so 
helps us to challenge the assumption that the relevant harms are unavoidable.  
§3.3.3 Minimising the misuse of morality 
I have suggested that abolitionists tend to significantly downplay the role that non-
moral factors have played in our dark past.113 But I have nowhere denied that moral 
considerations have played a role in helping along wars and oppressive social struc-
tures. I am certainly willing to grant to abolitionists that morality has something to 
answer for here. Perhaps moral justifications weren’t necessary for women’s subordi-
nation. But it seems difficult to deny that they helped.  
My arguments would therefore seem to leave the abolitionist in a very comforta-
ble position. It may very well be true that war and systematic oppression have largely 
resulted from a lack of human feeling, bad reasoning, and false empirical beliefs. But 
those who engage in faulty reasoning and disseminate false information do walk 
among us. So long as they do, it might be imprudent to hand them any tools that 
would serve to make the consequences of their behaviour even worse. 
What is important to appreciate at this stage, however, is that the abolitionist 
doesn’t think that morality can only be used for bad purposes. She concedes that 
morality can be and has been used for good purposes as well. What the AFH really 
shows, then, is that morality can be of great benefit or harm, depending upon the 
manner in which it is used. But it doesn’t follow (at least not straightforwardly) from 
this that we ought to do away with morality. The real question is whether or not we 
can reap the relevant benefits while avoiding the associated costs.  
If we could not reap the benefits of moral practice while avoiding the costs (costs 
of the kind that feature in the abolitionist’s historical examples), then the AFH may 
lend considerable support to abolitionism. Morality might be said to carry far too 
much baggage; we could not hope to enjoy the relevant benefits without opening the 
door to (or worsening) oppression and war. But suppose that we could reap the ben-
efits of moral practice while avoiding (or, at least, substantially minimising) the costs. 
 
113 One exception is Garner (1994), who emphasises the role of religion as well. 
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If this were so, then abolitionists wouldn’t so much have motivated abolitionism as 
they would have motivated the need for reform.114 
In what follows, I will argue not only that that there are tangible benefits of moral 
practice, but that we can conceivably reap these benefits while controlling for the 
costs. Simply put, there are means by which we can minimise the misuse of morality. I 
won’t, however, rely upon the abolitionist’s concession that morality can do some 
good to make my case. Instead, I shall introduce a new player into our dialectic—the 
moralist. The moralist thinks that our error-ridden moral practices are useful to us on-
balance. And she has an AFH of her own. 
According to the moralist, our moral systems have often been instrumental in 
overthrowing oppressive regimes, and have often helped us to put an end to war and 
violence. In support of this claim, she draws our attention to morality’s good track 
record: the role of moral values in the eradication of slavery, the importance of 
women’s rights discourse in their liberation from domestic servitude, and the like. 
The moralist does not pretend that moral considerations can only be used in service 
of these desirable ends; she acknowledges that they can be put to harmful use as well. 
Yet she insists that we have ample evidence that moral considerations can be put to 
very good use indeed. And though the bad here may be rather bad, the good is espe-
cially helpful.  
Moreover, and as the moralist is keen to emphasise, moral considerations offer us 
a particularly effective means of counteracting harmful uses of morality. Moral convic-
tion might reinforce oppressive social structures. But it is also of great help in over-
turning them. As Caroline West notes: 
Ideas such as that women have a moral right to be treated with equal con-
cern and respect, that current unequal social arrangements are unjust, that 
sexual discrimination is wrong, that men ought not be differentially advan-
taged, and so on, function as a check on the behavior of the powerful, pro-
tecting the comparatively powerless from suffering further at their hands. 
 
114 Lenman anticipates this line of reply when he writes that “…vile things are done in the name of 
moral ideals. But that is not a good objection to morality any more than the existence of bad music is 
a good reason to dislike music … Rather it is an objection to bad morals and to the stupid, twisted 
and pathological forms that moral motivation, like any kind of motivation, can sometimes take. It may 
sometimes favour reform but it hardly favours abolition” (2013, p.397). See also Joyce (p.181). 
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(2010, p.192, emphasis in original) 
Thus, morality doesn’t just get us into these unhappy situations—it’s also often what 
gets us out. Slavery in the US might have been maintained by twisted moral values, 
but the abolitionist movement was driven by moral conviction as well. On first ap-
pearances, this might not seem like much of a defence; for we presumably could have 
done without the years of systematic oppression in between. But recall the suggestion 
advanced in §3.3.2. If we are right in thinking that much of our dark past was overde-
termined—that religious differences or intolerance would, in many cases, have suf-
ficed—then we should count ourselves lucky that there were folk around whose 
moral convictions moved them to challenge the status quo. 
Of course, the moralist must say something more about the role that she takes 
moral considerations to have played. It is not completely implausible that moral con-
viction may have been necessary for the eradication of slavery and the enfranchise-
ment of women. But a weaker claim will serve her purposes here. She need only 
maintain that moral considerations played a key supporting role; that they amplified 
prosocial tendencies, and added momentum to campaigns for positive social change. 
Morality may not always be necessary for social progress. But it can often make pro-
gress easier to achieve.115  
Yet why is morality in particular useful for such purposes? The moralist’s answer 
is that moral demands have a distinct kind of practical import. When people judge 
that women have a moral right to be treated with equal concern, or consider their soci-
ety unjust, they take themselves to have a reason to work against these oppressive so-
cial structures. And they take themselves to have such a reason independently of 
whether these arrangements happen to be to their benefit. Moral requirements are 
invested with categorical authority; they present themselves as inescapable demands. 
One cannot evade their force by citing an immediate interest in non-compliance.  
Of course, the moralist is an error theorist, and so, regards the authority of moral-
ity as mere illusion; at the end of the day, there are no categorical reasons. What she 
 
115 As should be clear, the moralist does not claim that moral conviction is the only driver of posi-
tive social change. On this issue, see Sterelny (2012), who mounts a forceful attack against Kitcher’s 
(2011) proposed history of social progress, which puts moral cognition at the centre. As he notes, we 
shouldn’t discount the role of prosocial emotions, nor that of various circumstantial factors.  
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wishes to draw attention to is the instrumental value of a conceptual framework that 
presupposes their existence. When people conceive of oppressive social structures as 
the sorts of things that must be opposed independently of their ends, their motiva-
tion to work against them is likely to be stronger.116  
Admittedly, there is still the question as to whether morality will be capable of 
playing this role once it is seen for the farce that it is. This will depend upon whether 
a fictional, revised, or conserved moral discourse will be capable of recouping the 
benefits of its error-ridden predecessor. But absent any reason for thinking that none 
of these proposals are capable of delivering the goods, the moralist thinks that we 
have good reason to favour them over abolitionism. 
Having made her case, the moralist concludes that it’s not all doom and gloom 
when it comes to our moral past. She concedes that the abolitionist has identified a 
significant problem. But she regards that problem as surmountable; for there are 
ways to minimise the misuse of morality. At this stage, the moralist draws upon the 
considerations raised in §3.2.2. There, it was claimed that epistemic complacency and 
a lack of human feeling have played an important role in many unfortunate incidents 
of history. Bad reasoning, selfishness, and false empirical beliefs, though not the only 
culprits, have certainly helped along harmful ideologies and wayward social policies, 
allowing them to go about unchallenged.117 
The moralist takes these considerations to point towards a promising means by 
which we might minimise the misuse of morality. To begin with, we might cultivate 
people’s dispositions to seek further evidence for their beliefs, to challenge existing 
dogmas, to question the ideologies to which they are exposed, and to carefully reason 
through the arguments in favour of competing social policies. In short, we ought to 
furnish ordinary folk with a philosophical toolkit of sorts—one that nurtures and en-
courages epistemic vigilance.   
It’s worth clarifying what this epistemic vigilance entails. It is certainly not the 
moralist’s contention that oppression and violence can be curtailed by way of fur-
 
116 See Joyce (2001, 2006), for a number of convincing arguments in support of this claim. 
117 These were not the only factors singled out for mention. But it is not my business here to es-
tablish that we ought to do away with religion. That issue has received its fair share of attention al-
ready, so I shall restrict my focus to a more novel suggestion. 
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nishing ordinary folk with the resources to acquire true moral beliefs. (She is, recall, a 
moral error theorist.) Her foremost ambition is to ensure that morality is not put to 
harmful use. And she thinks that we might be able to circumvent this by preventing 
false empirical beliefs—beliefs in the inherent inferiority of other groups, say—from 
gaining a foothold. By encouraging people to challenge and to reflect upon the in-
formation that comes their way, we can hope to stop at least many harmful agendas 
in their tracks. 
The moralist acknowledges that epistemic vigilance is somewhat demanding. As 
things currently stand, it certainly doesn’t appear to be a standard at which ordinary 
agents aim. Following Gideon Rosen, we might suspect that a more plausible stand-
ard is one that places us “… under no obligation to rethink the uncontroversial nor-
mative principles that form the framework for social life” (2003, p.65). But if we 
want to enjoy the benefits of moral practice while minimising its misuse, then more 
stringent epistemic standards may very well be required. 
It should be noted that the case for epistemic vigilance doesn’t only rest upon our 
interest in securing these practical benefits. We have good independent reasons to 
challenge what we take to be uncontroversial. To borrow a phrase from Peter God-
frey-Smith (1998), true beliefs are “fuels for success”.  Playing fast and loose with our 
evidence is rarely a winning strategy. Most of us care about acting in a way that fur-
thers our ends, and we’re generally better positioned to further those ends—
whatever they may be—if we track truth effectively (Kornblith 1993, p.371; 2001, 
pp.158-9). Importantly, none of this suggests that obvious beliefs are fuels for success; 
for what strikes us as obvious may very well be false. We are not epistemically infalli-
ble, and so, we often have good reason to subject the obvious to further scrutiny if 
we want to discover the truth.118 The justification for epistemic vigilance is thus pure-
ly hypothetical; it is conditional upon our interest in securing the benefits of our 
moral practices while avoiding their potential misuse, together with our general inter-
est in acquiring a stock of true beliefs—interests which, I take it, the majority of us 
do hold. 
 
118 I borrow here from Mill’s justification for freedom of expression (1859/1977). 
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The moralist therefore concedes to the abolitionist that morality can be put to bad 
use. But she holds that the problem is surmountable. Though morality is pliable, we 
can, through encouraging epistemic vigilance, prevent moral considerations from be-
coming attached to harmful agendas—such agendas are less likely to gain a foothold 
if they have been subjected to further scrutiny. When our empirical beliefs fall in line 
with the facts—facts regarding the equal intellectual potential of other groups, say—
we are less likely to be a position to offer a moral justification for warmongering and 
oppression.  
But we are not done just yet. Though epistemic vigilance will be of considerable 
help, it is unlikely to put an end to all of our troubles. As was noted earlier, a few 
weeks in the epistemology classroom is unlikely to be an effective antidote to rape 
and pillaging. This becomes especially evident once we distinguish the participants 
from the promoters of conflict (e.g., the poor folk dying in the mud from those giv-
ing the orders). It may be in the interests of those in charge to encourage going to 
war (say). And they may be effective at manipulating others to do so (via skilful rhet-
oric or misinformation, perhaps) even with such epistemic safeguards in place.  
The problem is that we have restricted our attention to people’s beliefs (or belief-
forming methods). We have neglected to consider their desires; in particular, the de-
gree to which they care for others. So long as there are cruel and inconsiderate folk 
around, undesirable social agendas may gain a foothold. And when combined with a 
willingness to be self-serving, moral considerations may very well make matters 
worse.  
This suggests that better standards of evidence and critical thinking will need to 
be supplemented with particular emotional dispositions. We might, for instance, 
work to cultivate our capacities for empathy. In coming to empathise more with oth-
ers, we would be in a better position to understand and identify with their needs. 
This would by no means guarantee that we would quickly transition to a peaceful and 
loving society. But it could certainly encourage us to take others’ needs into account 
more often when deciding what to do.119 
 
119 The idea that empathy (or, at least, many of the empathetic emotions) encourages prosocial be-
haviour has decent empirical backing. For a review of the evidence, see Eisenberg (2014). 
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I hasten to add that we should not expect this strategy to be foolproof. I certainly 
do not mean to suggest that morality would never be put to harmful use if most of us 
grew to be more empathetic and epistemically responsible.120 But we do not require a 
foolproof strategy to justify preserving our moral practices (in some form or other); 
it is not necessary to establish that these practices have no costs. We need only pro-
vide grounds for thinking that the cost-benefit analysis favours their preservation. So 
long as our moral practices confer distinctive benefits, and the relevant costs can be 
minimised (to a suitable degree), we would seem to do better to hold onto them. 
It is admittedly difficult to know just how costly enacting these changes would be. But 
I have suggested that we have good independent reasons to improve ourselves in 
various respects—indeed, this is a point on which the abolitionist and I agree. Aboli-
tionists think that we must work to promote mutual trust (Hinckfuss 1987, §4.5), cul-
tivate tolerance (Greene 2002), and enhance empathy (Garner 2007, p.501) if we are 
to make do without morality. Either way, then, such changes will have to be made. 
But the costlier option is surely the one that combines these changes with the mam-
moth task of eradicating our moral practices, and deprives us of their many benefits 
in turn.  
In conclusion, then, I think that abolitionists have plausibly established that mo-
rality can support war as well as peace, breed fanaticism as well as fellow feeling, and 
drive violence as well as positive social change. But they have not thereby established 
abolitionism. These arguments merely suggest that morality is something to be used 
with greater caution—not that it is something that shouldn’t be used at all. 
§3.4 A FEASIBILITY WORRY  
When we object to an ideal on the grounds that it is infeasible, we are effectively ob-
jecting that it is not a state of affairs that we could plausibly bring about. This isn’t 
necessarily to say that the relevant end would be impossible to achieve (Gilabert & 
 
120 Indeed, empathy may not be quite enough to promote other-regarding attitudes towards every-
one; for the empathetic emotions are vulnerable to a number of well-known biases (Hoffman 2015, 
p.81 & p.94; Ugazio, Majdanžić & Lamm 2015, pp.169–170). This is precisely why I think that empa-
thy would function best when supplemented with moral judgments (along with reasonable empirical 
beliefs). 
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Lawford-Smith 2012). In requiring that a recommended course of action be feasible, 
we are, I take it, requiring that there be a reasonable probability of success, condi-
tional upon trying (Brennan & Southwood 2007). Presumably, we should want a so-
lution to our WNQ to be feasible. The abolitionist’s proposal would be terribly 
unhelpful were an amoral society something we couldn’t plausibly bring about.  
Yet it is not clear that the abolitionist’s proposal is feasible. It is commonly recog-
nised that purging ourselves of morality would be incredibly difficult. William Lycan 
suspects that “to produce a genuine freedom from moral intuitions…” one would 
need “…a steady diet of hard drugs, or some other very powerful alienating force” 
(1988, p.211, fn.10). Peter Singer goes so far as to say that we would “…find it im-
possible to prevent ourselves inwardly classifying actions as right or wrong” (2011, 
p.xv). Others have likened giving up moral talk to ceasing to speak of people having 
beliefs or desires; “…possible, perhaps, but not an easy thing to do” (Nolan Restall, 
and West 2005, p.311).  
These claims seem to me to be well-founded. Presumably, doing away with our 
moral practices wouldn’t be akin to putting an end to just any old habit—it wouldn’t 
for instance, be like quitting smoking, or cutting off contact with an ex-lover. Moral 
thinking is deeply entrenched in our ordinary patterns of deliberation and evaluation. 
Indeed, we often have very little control over whether or not we assess the world in 
moral terms; it is quite difficult not to think that child labour is morally bad when 
reading about corruption in the global clothing market.  
Moreover, many aspects of our environments prime us to think in moral terms—
from stories conveying the rewards of virtue to laws that are justified partly on moral 
grounds. As Sterelny puts it, “the narrative life of a community—the stock of stories, 
songs, myths and tales to which children are exposed—is full of information about 
the actions to be admired and to be deplored” (2010, p.289). Given this, we should 
expect that purging ourselves of any moral thoughts will be incredibly difficult. 
A common abolitionist rejoinder here is to point out that though eradicating 
widely held false beliefs can be difficult, doing so is not without precedent. Garner 
notes that we are better off for having abandoned beliefs in geocentrism, even 
though achieving this was somewhat difficult (2007, p.504). Yet to what extent are 
such cases analogous to the moral case? They seem utterly disanalogous to me. To 
the extent that getting rid of geocentrism was difficult, I suspect that it was difficult 
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for different reasons. (The fact that heliocentrism was thought to conflict with reli-
gious scripture, for instance, seems to have been one significant obstacle.) Generally 
speaking, scientists are capable of revising their beliefs without undergoing too much 
hardship. (In chapter 4, I will draw attention to just how often they do so.) As Nolan, 
Restall, and West note, eradicating our moral practices is not plausibly akin to eradi-
cating “…a relatively isolated and rarefied concept in a scientific theory” (2005, 
p.311). Consigning talk of lumineforous ether to the scrap heap may have taken 
some time. But it was surely not infeasible; there was no need to make sweeping 
changes to our cultures, or to override deeply entrenched patterns of thought. Mak-
ing moral judgments, by contrast, is something that laymen and moral philosophers 
alike do almost every day. And our environments are richly structured in a way that 
primes us to think in moral terms.  
An abolitionist might object that these considerations only speak against her pro-
posal when it is addressed to fully developed moralising agents (i.e., us); the same 
problems would not arise for an abolitionist proposal that was intended as advice for 
future generations. To some extent, this is true; a child raised in an amoral environ-
ment would not face the monumental task of ridding herself of any moral thoughts. 
But this response still seems to underestimate the large-scale changes that would 
have to be made. For one thing, we would still have to refrain from using moral lan-
guage while raising children. This, I submit, would be very difficult—and perhaps 
even unwise in the absence of a promising alternative strategy for encouraging pro-
social behaviour in young children.121 Raising amoral children would also require us 
to make significant changes to our environments. This is not a task to be taken light-
ly; everything from our popular culture to our legal systems is saturated with moral 
influence. It’s not clear what abolitionists would have us do with these moral arte-
facts. (Though images from Bradbury’s Fahrenheit 451 do spring to mind.) 
Either way, then, the eradication of our moral practices is likely to require large-
scale changes to our current ways of life. Thus, even if abolitionists were correct in 
 
121 Indeed, some abolitionists support continuing to instil moral concepts in children for this rea-
son. Greene argues that morality may be helpful for raising prosocial children, and permits the use of 
moral language “with those too young to handle the meta-ethical truth” (2002, p.266; see also pp.258-
9). 
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thinking that our moral practices are on-balance harmful, doing away with them alto-
gether might not be an option that is open to us. A more feasible remedy would be 
to change ourselves and/or our moral systems for the better—something which, I 
have suggested, we have good independent reasons to do. 
§3.5 WHERE DOES MORAL ABOLITIONISM GO WRONG?  
As should be clear, I don’t think that abolitionism is the right response to the WNQ 
for moral discourse. For one thing, the proposal doesn’t seem to present us with a 
feasible option going forward. It also strikes me as under-motivated. Abolitionists 
might have shown us that our moral practices incur some costs. But that doesn’t 
supply us with a sufficiently good reason to do away with them. There are ways in 
which we could control for these costs, while continuing to enjoy the benefits that 
these practices afford us.  
That said, abolitionism may very well be the right response to WNQs in other 
discursive domains. The preceding discussion has been instructive in suggesting to us 
the conditions under which it is likely to make for an appropriate policy. Abolition-
ism is likely to be a fitting response to a WNQ when: 
1. It is feasible.  
2. Preserving the discourse is likely to be on-balance costly. 
The feasibility condition does not require much in the way of elaboration; it is argua-
bly an important desideratum for any practical proposal (at least if it is to be useful). 
Regarding (2), I have claimed that preserving the discourse must (or be likely to) be on-
balance costly. Notice that this is distinct from the claim that currently employing the 
discourse must be on-balance costly. It may be possible for a discourse that is cur-
rently on-balance costly to become on-balance useful—if we make some changes to 
how the discourse is used, say. If the costs of enacting these changes are not too 
great, then preserving a hitherto on-balance costly discourse may be better (all-
things-considered, and in the long-run) than doing away with it. Appreciating this 
possibility was especially important in the preceding discussion. Even if the moral 
abolitionist were correct in thinking that morality does more harm than good (and 
here there is certainly room for doubt), she does little if anything to show us that 
moral practice cannot be modified so as to do more good than harm. Nor does she 
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provide any reason to think that enacting these changes would be infeasible or exces-
sively costly.  
Even if both conditions are not plausibly met in the moral case, they do seem to 
be met in others. Consider the example of phlogiston, a substance that was thought to 
be released during combustion. Scientists of the 16th and 17th centuries appealed to 
phlogiston to explain various phenomena. But in the 18th century, Lavoisier showed 
that such phenomena were instead (or better) explained by appealing to oxygen, a sub-
stance that was consumed during combustion. Perhaps ceasing to appeal to phlogiston 
was slightly difficult, and it may have taken some time; but doing so doesn’t seem to 
have been infeasible. There might also have been some practical costs associated with 
abolishing phlogiston-talk. But none of these were sufficient to justify continuing to 
speak of something that by all accounts wasn’t there. It arguably would have been 
worse for scientists in the long-run to have continued working with a faulty para-
digm. 
I have not established in this chapter that morality does more good than harm; as 
was noted at the outset, that is a difficult matter to adjudicate—especially from the 
armchair. But I have argued that even if it did, we could plausibly control for the as-
sociated costs. In the remainder of this work, then, I will assume that our best option 
going forward will be to preserve our moral practices in some form. Our WNQ 
therefore becomes a policy question: what is the likely to be the best means of doing 
so? 
  
  
126 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
Revisionism 
This chapter evaluates the revisionist option. In response to moral error theory, the 
revisionist suggests that we modify moral discourse such that our engagement in 
moral practice no longer commits us to the existence of categorical reasons. One 
means of doing so would be to change the way that we use moral language—by be-
coming expressivists, say. Another would involve changing the conceptual commitments 
of moral language, replacing our error-ridden moral discourse with an error-free, 
schmoral one. (The latter strategy will take centre stage in what follows.) The revi-
sionist assures us that schmorality will deliver very similar practical goods to morality. 
And since schmoral discourse is no moral discourse, she promises to rid us of our 
false moral beliefs as well.  
Getting clear on the recommendation to revise the conceptual commitments of 
moral discourse requires getting clear on what exactly we should take concepts to be. 
And so, the chapter begins with a discussion of concepts and conceptual change 
(§4.2). Clarifying these matters also helps us to distinguish our revisionist from a cer-
tain kind of success theorist: the reformist. As I shall explain when building a case for 
the revisionist’s proposal (§4.3), there are some important connections between these 
two projects. 
The critical discussion advances a number of arguments against revisionism, all of 
which are intended to show that schmorality is likely to be a rather poor stand-in for 
morality (§4.4). I begin by voicing some initial suspicions regarding the revisionist’s 
proposed schmoralities. These seem unlikely to be very useful to us. Following that, I 
suggest that there is a principled explanation as to why any candidate schmorality is 
likely to fall short of giving us what we want. The explanation that I shall develop is 
premised upon some important disanalogies between moral and scientific concepts. 
These disanalogies are significant in our argumentative context; for a common re-
formist move—one that is also available to the revisionist—consists in enlisting 
partners in innocence. Reformists are keen to point out that conceptual change and 
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reform are commonplace in science. Far from being a hindrance, changes to scien-
tific concepts are often changes for the better; for they help scientists to achieve their 
distinctive goals. On this basis, it is often suggested that modified moral concepts are 
also likely to play a similarly valuable role in our lives, even after having undergone 
some renovations. This move becomes far less plausible once we appreciate substan-
tial disanalogies between moral and scientific concepts. In my view, the latter are far 
more amenable to (fruitful) modification than the former, and this is owing to the 
distinctive functions of scientific discourse. I conclude the chapter by drawing atten-
tion to the implications of my arguments for revisionist projects in other discursive 
domains (§4.5).   
As should be obvious, this chapter raises a host of complicated issues. Prior to 
proceeding, then, let me include a few qualifications for the reader to keep in mind.  
§4.1 HOW I’M GOING TO GO ABOUT THINGS 
A proper assessment of revisionism requires precisifying the proposal. To this end, 
we must take a stand on some thorny philosophical questions regarding the nature of 
concepts. There is a slight difficulty here. On the one hand, paying attention to the 
relevant subtleties and surrounding issues is needed if we are to give revisionism a 
fair hearing. However, too much attention and this chapter would quickly transform 
into a defence of a systematic account of concepts and conceptual change—a Hercu-
lean task that I have no intention of undertaking. 
At times, then, I will need to gloss over some important controversies. There are 
three in particular that may sound some alarm bells, the first of which concerns the 
view of concepts that I shall be assuming. On the account for which I have the most 
sympathy, concepts are identified with A-intensions—functions from possible worlds 
to extensions. (I shall of course do quite a bit of work to spell out what this means in 
§4.2.) Some may worry that this account does not enjoy such widespread support 
outside the capital of Australia. It is of course no objection to a position that it is dis-
tinctively Canberran. Nonetheless, it may be objected that this position is not the or-
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thodoxy.122 To appease this worry, I will point towards some benefits of this Canber-
ran way of seeing things, and anticipate some potential concerns. That said, the read-
er should not anticipate anything approaching a wholesale defence. 
Secondly, I will be applying this broadly Canberran approach to scientific con-
cepts as well as moral ones. Unfortunately, discussions of scientific concepts are of-
ten slightly disconnected from scientific practice; such debates are often found in the 
philosophy of language rather than the philosophy of science. Some may worry that 
these discussions are radically—and to their detriment—divorced from the contexts 
in which scientific discourse takes place. (As do Brigandt (2013, p.72), and Stotz et. al 
(2014, p.648).) I take this concern to be well-founded, and so, I will not allow the 
discussion to be wholly disconnected from scientific practice. Still, I expect that it 
will be more disconnected than a philosopher of science should like. 
Thirdly, I will mostly operate upon the assumption of scientific realism. I have no 
intention of defending scientific realism here. (Though at least in this case, orthodoxy 
would seem to be on my side.) But it is not as though the entire discussion hangs upon 
realist assumptions. I will point out where I think others (e.g., a constructive empiri-
cist) could happily agree. 
To be clear: none of this is to suggest that I will be making assumptions that I do 
not think can be defended. (I think that what I have to say is right!) It is only to sug-
gest that I will be picking my battles carefully, so as not to take us too far afield. 
§4.2 CONCEPTS: WHAT THEY ARE AND HOW THEY CHANGE 
I begin this first portion of the chapter by saying a little more about what I take con-
cepts to be (§4.2.1). I will then proceed to discuss the ways in which they can change 
(§4.2.2), before adding some caveats and qualifications (§4.2.3). Having equipped my-
self with this philosophical toolkit, I put it to good use, distinguishing our revisionist 
from the reformist (§4.2.4).  
 
122 It may also be objected that I am an Australian who is quick to assume an Australian position. 
But I take it that insofar as this is a problem, it is not merely a problem for me. G.A. Cohen (2000) 
once observed that both himself and his contemporaries at Oxford had sympathy for the analytic–
synthetic distinction, whereas Harvard graduates did not. See also White (2010). 
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§4.2.1 Concepts 
There are different ways to approach the question as to what concepts are. It is per-
haps unsurprising that we see these differences across disciplines, which differ in 
their explanatory and investigative aims. But even within philosophy, it is not easy to 
identify anything close to a standard way of approaching the question. As Margolis & 
Laurence (2014) observe, “disputes about concepts often reflect deeply opposing ap-
proaches to the study of the mind, to language, and even to philosophy itself”. Given 
this inter- and intra-disciplinary diversity, it will be helpful to distinguish a distinctive-
ly philosophical understanding of concepts from the understanding most commonly 
adopted by psychologists, before introducing the specific philosophical account that 
we shall be working with.  
Concepts, as I will be understanding them, can be initially characterised as the 
constituents of propositions. We can call this the philosopher’s understanding of a con-
cept. I will make it more precise in a moment, but first it is worth distinguishing it 
from (what might reasonably be called) the psychologist’s understanding of a concept. 
On the latter understanding, a concept is an explanans in cognitive science that is in-
voked to explain certain kinds of higher cognitive processes—among them, categori-
sation and inductive reasoning (Machery 2009). It is natural to expect that there are 
important connections between philosophers’ concepts and psychologists’ concepts 
(see Weiskopf 2010, Lalumera 2014). But given widely recognised differences be-
tween the two, I do not assume as much here.123 I will restrict myself to the philo-
sophical understanding in what follows.    
There are many ways in which we might try to precisify the characterisation of 
concepts as the constituents of propositions—at least as many ways as there are the-
ories of propositions more generally. Much of what I have to say will be neutral with 
respect to the latter, but it will be helpful to have a concrete approach with which to 
frame the discussion. Hence, on the approach that I favour—that of Jackson 
(1998a)—concepts can be identified with so-called A-intensions. (Although this partic-
 
123 Among these widely recognised differences are: (i) philosophers, unlike psychologists, are con-
cerned with the semantics of concepts (Machery 2009), (ii) philosophers, but not psychologists, take 
concepts to determine their extensions (Margolis & Laurence 2007), and (iii) psychologists adopt a 
broader understanding of conceptual capacities than philosophers (Machery 2009). 
  
130 
ular way of spelling out the details is Jackson’s, the view that I am about to sketch 
(broadly construed) does have an impressive fan base, including Lewis (1981, 1994) 
Chalmers (1996), Pettit (2003), Braddon-Mitchell (2003), and Smith (2004).) 
An A-intension in general is a function from (centred) possible worlds to exten-
sions (in this case, either individuals or classes of individuals).124 We can distinguish 
between the A-intensions of singular terms and general terms. The A-intension of a 
singular term always picks out a unique individual at a world, if anything at all. For 
example, the A-intension of ‘Hume’ singles out whomever Hume is at a given world 
(if anyone is). For general terms, the A-intension singles out a class of individuals for 
each world. For example, the A-intension of ‘philosopher’ picks out the class of all 
philosophers at each world considered as actual.125 
According to Jackson, the A-intension that is associated with an expression is de-
termined by the categorisational dispositions of competent users of that expression—
specifically, by how they are disposed to respond when presented with hypothetical 
cases (1998a, pp.31-42). Jackson takes competent speakers to have a kind of discrim-
inating capacity: they can determine the extension of an expression in any fully-
described hypothetical scenario.126 If, for example, I am a competent speaker of Eng-
lish, and I possess the concept <water>, then I will be capable of picking out the ex-
tension of the term ‘water’ in any scenario that you present to me. More specifically, 
and in Jackson’s jargon, I will be capable of picking out the extension of ‘water’ at 
any world under the supposition that that world is actual. Were you to invite me to consider 
the hypothesis that a world just like our own is actual (i.e., to provide me with a 
 
124 The subtleties relating to centred (or de se) content will not play a role in what follows, so to 
simplify the discussion I will generally just speak of possible worlds rather than centred possible 
worlds. I have also neglected to say anything about Jackson’s C-intensions, and how they relate to his 
A-intensions. Within the pluralist framework that two-dimensionalists such as Jackson operate, it is 
natural to identify concepts with the epistemologically primary A-intensions: they come closer to rep-
resenting the cognitive significance that attaches to a concept. See also Chalmers (2002a).  
125 For sentences, the A-intension spits out a truth-value; the extension of ‘Hume is a fantastic phi-
losopher’, for example, is ‘true’ at all worlds where Hume is a fantastic philosopher—i.e., all words 
where Hume exists! My discussion will be restricted to singular and general terms. 
126 These claims come attached with some important caveats, of course. For one thing, we’re sup-
posing idealisations of the judger such that they can receive and comprehend a(n infinite number of) 
fully described possible world(s). For another, we’re supposing that the hypothetical scenario isn’t de-
scribed in such a way as to make the judgment trivial. 
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complete description of it) then I would be able to tell you, ‘if things are actually 
thus-and-so, then water is H2O’.  
The underlying idea here is that there must be something that guides our responses 
to possible cases.127 When someone asks us whether there is any water on Putnam’s 
Twin Earth (considered as a hypothesis about how the actual world is), we don’t just 
deliver a random guess. Our verdict is shaped by our (often tacit) assumptions as to 
which factors are relevant in determining whether or not something counts as water 
(Jackson 1998a, pp.29-42). We might like to think of these tacit assumptions as a 
kind of “implicit semantic rule” or “internal reference-fixing template…that guides [our] 
verdicts no matter what the actual world turns out to be like” (Schroeter 2012, em-
phasis in original). 
One concern with this approach is that different speakers might have different 
linguistic dispositions, and thus, different concepts. If that is so, then successful 
communication quickly becomes a difficulty. However, we have good grounds for 
taking members of a linguistic community to have incredibly similar linguistic dispo-
sitions to one another.128 If widespread similarities in our responses to thought exper-
iments are any indication, then we do seem to associate the same (if not remarkably 
similar) intensions with expressions like ‘water’ (Jackson 1998a, pp.38-9). Moreover, 
the hypothesis that speakers share these dispositions provides us with a powerful ex-
planation as to why linguistic communication is typically so successful (Jackson 
1998b). 
One might also worry that the approach quickly runs into epistemological trou-
bles. Jackson understands our concepts in terms of our linguistic dispositions. But we 
clearly lack the resources needed to present real agents with all scenarios that might 
be relevant for determining what their linguistic dispositions are. Can we ever be 
sure, then, that we have gotten a proper handle on our concepts? Perhaps not. But 
we can at least have a reasonably good stab at it. In particular, we can consider—and 
likewise invite others to consider—a range of possible cases, and take note of the 
 
127 This is not necessarily to revert to the psychologist’s understanding of a concept; we need not 
be committed to any claims regarding the underlying psychological processes and mechanisms.  
128 To be sure, we can allow for some variation—so long as it is not typically so great as to pose a 
threat to successful communication (Jackson 1998b, pp.214–5). 
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regularities (if any) that emerge from our investigation. Should we identify any such 
regularities, then we can hope to have gained some insight into which features are 
relevant for determining the extension of a candidate expression. 
Of course, we shouldn’t always expect our investigation to yield a neat and tidy 
description, or a list of necessary and sufficient conditions. The features in question 
may often be highly disjunctive, complex, and difficult to state explicitly (Jackson 
1998b, p.212; see also Chalmers 2012, ch.1). That being said, neat and tidy descrip-
tions can still be helpful for offering an approximate characterisation of our concepts 
(Chalmers 2008, p.593). For example, and given what we know about subjects’ re-
sponses to possible cases, we might say that the intension of ‘water’ is something 
close to “the watery stuff our acquaintance in [a] world” (Jackson 1998a, p.49). In 
putting forward this description, we offer a rough characterisation of the concept 
<water>—one that captures (as best we can) speakers’ dispositional patterns of re-
sponse to possible cases. 
In summary, then, we can say that to grasp the concept <water> is to grasp (at 
least tacitly) the criteria which determine, for any possible scenario, what the exten-
sion of ‘water’ is in that scenario. Since these criteria are identified by examining our 
linguistic dispositions, our justification for choosing some characterisations of the 
concept <water> (e.g., ‘the watery stuff’) over others will appeal to our responses to 
relevant possible cases. 
I have done my best to ward off some initial concerns with the approach that I 
will be assuming. But let me briefly rehearse some considerations in its favour as 
well. To begin with, Jackson’s account vindicates the importance of conceptual anal-
ysis and appeals to intuition—the bread and butter of philosophy (Jackson 1998a, 
Bealer 1998, Plunkett 2011, Margolis & Laurence 2014).129 Since concepts are some-
thing that can be investigated from the armchair, the account also sits well with the 
well-domesticated idea that philosophy is an a priori discipline (Jackson 1998a). 
Moreover, Jackson’s view vindicates the importance of the philosopher in constructing 
an account of the world, suggesting a division of labour between her and the scien-
tist. The philosopher is needed to “define the subject” (Jackson 1994)—to tell us 
 
129 This is not to suggest that conceptual analysis is only useful for determining what our concepts 
are. See Nolan (2009), who discusses a number of other benefits. 
  
133 
what (our concept of) beliefs, say, is—and hence to tell us whether empirical findings 
are findings having to do with beliefs or something else. The scientist’s task is to de-
liver these findings—to ascertain what the actual world is like (Chalmers & Jackson 
2001). Though the extent to which these advantages are advantages is something that 
is likely to differ with one’s philosophical tastes, I hope they will suffice to convince 
the reader that the approach I have chosen is well-motivated.  
§4.2.2 Conceptual change 
Let me demonstrate how I will be understanding conceptual change by way of example. 
Consider the concept <Santa>, which many children acquire early in life. Their par-
ents tell them that there is a jolly fat man living in the North Pole whose elves make 
presents that are distributed to nice children at Christmas time—naughty children re-
ceive coal. What might it mean to say that we could change these children’s concept 
<Santa>? Three possibilities come to mind. 
The first is renaming. We could simply change the meaning of the word ‘Santa’. 
That is to say, we could change the intension associated with this term. We might say 
to these children, 
From now on, the word ‘Santa’ refers to a miserable, old man who lives in Maine and 
hardly ever gives presents to anyone. 
Suppose that we held everything else fixed about these children. Would there be any sig-
nificant change to their behaviour? Probably not—not unless we were merely con-
cerned with their verbal behaviour. Their linguistic beliefs may have changed, but 
their other beliefs need not have; for all that we have said, they still believe that there 
is a jolly fat man living in the North Pole, who goes by another name. 
We can call the second possibility reforming. This involves changing the children’s 
beliefs about what Santa is like. We tell them,  
Just about everything that you believe about Santa is mistaken. Santa is not a jolly fat 
man who lives in the North Pole. Talk of ‘Santa’ originated with an old man, ‘Mont-
gomery Santa’, who lives in Maine and used to give presents to children at Christmas 
time, but no longer does. So when you talk about Santa, you’re actually talking about 
Montgomery, who never gives presents to anyone. 
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These children have now been told that the person whom their Santa thoughts are 
about has different properties—we have changed their beliefs about Santa. (We have 
not merely changed their linguistic beliefs regarding what refers to what.) Presuma-
bly, this will produce a change in their behaviour (and not merely their verbal behav-
iour). Perhaps they will no longer go to great efforts to be nice if there is no jolly fat 
man who only bestows gifts upon those who are well-behaved. Or perhaps they will 
start asking some questions about the origins of their presents. 
We can dub the final possibility revising. Here, we change the children’s beliefs re-
garding Santa’s very existence, but offer a substitute to play a similar role. We say to 
them,  
Santa does not exist. There is no jolly fat man who lives in the North Pole. This has al-
ways been a complete and utter lie. Your parents are the real Santas; it is they who buy 
you presents at Christmas time.  
Here again, we have changed these children’s beliefs, and we would expect a change 
in behaviour to follow suit. They would not, for example, continue to send their wish 
lists to the North Pole, but would simply hand them to their parents instead. 
Of our three phenomena, renaming seems the least interesting. It amounts to little 
more than terminological stipulation. I mention it largely to set it to the side. Our 
main focus in what follows will be reforming and revising. On my understanding, 
however, only the latter counts as genuine conceptual change. Let me explain why, 
proceeding, once again, by way example. 
Some time ago, we came to appreciate that there is no such thing as species in an 
Aristotelian, essentialist sense.130 That is to say, we came to discover that what we 
called ‘species’ did not have intrinsic biological traits that occur in all and only their 
members (Hull 1965, 1978).131 However, we also came to discover that there was an-
 
130 I thank Edward Elliott for the example. I should note that it is controversial whether Aristotle 
ever subscribed to the essentialist view that is so often attributed to him. See Wilkins (2013) for dis-
cussion.   
131 I should acknowledge that in principle, there could be traits like this. (We could perhaps ensure 
as much through genetic engineering.) But this does not, I take it, invalidate all post-Darwinian in-
sights about species. The point is that an essentialist trait such as this is not what makes a species a 
species (i.e., it is not the important unifying feature). I thank Ben Fraser for helpful discussions on this 
point. 
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other biological category—genealogical lineages—which overlapped quite a bit with 
what we thought species were, and validated a lot of the inferences that we were dis-
posed to make about them. Just as essentialists had thought, there were groups of 
creatures who tended to look rather similar, and produce fertile offspring. And so, 
we decided to use the term ‘species’ to refer to something slightly different—roughly, 
continuous genealogical entities on the tree of life.132 Though there were no Aristote-
lian species, there was something that came damn near close. And it seems that it was 
close enough.  
Has the concept <species> undergone genuine conceptual change? I myself am 
inclined to answer in the negative. Admittedly, this verdict is premised upon a partic-
ular way of understanding theoretical terms—one that has affinities (both historical 
and philosophical) with the Jacksonian view of concepts outlined above. But the ver-
dict is principled and well-supported. I will now proceed to explain why, leaning 
heavily upon the work of Lewis (1970) and Braddon-Mitchell (2005) while doing so.  
According to the approach for which I have the most sympathy, the meaning of a 
term like ‘species’ is intimately bound up with the postulates and presuppositions of 
the broader scientific theory in which it is embedded. Theoretical terms, as they are 
often called, get their meaning in virtue of the role that they play within the context 
of a theory (Ramsey 1931, Lewis 1970).  
However, and as many have argued, we should not understand the meaning of a 
term like ‘species’ (merely) in terms of the original theory T in which it first appears. 
There is an important sense in which the meaning of ‘species’ is (partly) deferential. 
The meaning of scientific terms such as these embody a deference to future scientific 
findings and developments.133 Their meaning is given by the “nearest near-realisation 
of T” (Lewis 1970, p.446). Braddon-Mitchell offers a helpful schematisation of this 
idea. Following his lead, we can say that what an initial theory T1 tells us is that ‘spe-
 
132 I speak here of how we chose to use the term species. But of course, matters are not so simple. 
Scientists are often engaged in different endeavours, and so, some may think of species differently 
than others. I will continue to speak of the species concept, (and in what follows the species-role) for 
the time being, returning to this complication in §4.2.3. 
133 There is, of course, another important sense in which scientific terms are commonly thought to 
be deferential; language users can defer to current experts on the correct application conditions for a 
particular scientific term (Putnam 1975a; cf. Burge 1979). I return to this idea in §4.4.2. 
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cies’ refers to whatever is described by a possibly unknown true theory TT that is a 
development or refinement of T1. More specifically, 
T1 contains a term P1 ([‘species’]) and a clause which associates with P1 
whatever properties are associated with the term Pt of some true theory TT 
that explains the nature of what plays the T1-role actually. (2005, p.160) 
Let’s apply this approach to <species>. Assuming (as I will) that Braddon-Mitchell’s 
proposal is roughly correct, what the Aristotelian theory T1 told us was that ‘species’ 
refers to whatever plays the species-role in another theory, TT, that is a development 
and refinement of T1. What is crucially important is this: the concept <species> ef-
fectively remains constant throughout. ‘Species’ always refers to whatever plays the 
species-role within a possibly unknown true theory that is a development of our orig-
inal one.  
Initially, this suggestion may come as a surprise. But it is a lot less surprising once 
we remind ourselves that it is speakers’ linguistic dispositions that are of primary im-
portance. Suppose that the essentialists were to have considered (as actual) a world in 
which scientists had concluded that there are no (i) groups of creatures (S1) with 
common essences that interbreed and produce fertile offspring, but there are (ii) 
groups of creatures (S2) that share a lineage and tend to (but do not always) have 
many traits in common, interbreed, and produce fertile offspring. Call this scenario 
W. How would we expect the essentialists to have answered the question: ‘If W is ac-
tual, then is S2 species?’ It is very plausible that they would answer ‘yes’; for it is very 
plausible that ordinary speakers are disposed to defer to scientists on such matters. 
But if that is correct, then their linguistic dispositions (and thus, their concept <spe-
cies>) are the same as our own. They simply had false beliefs about species.  
As I understand it, then, our species case is an instance of reforming. Upon coming 
to appreciate that the groups of organisms that we called ‘species’ did not have bio-
logical traits that occur in all and only their members, we did not throw our hands up 
in the air and declare that there were no species. Instead, we changed our beliefs 
about what species are like. But since we did not change the intension associated 
with the term, this was not an instance of genuine conceptual change.  
Yet there was indeed a change when we left the Aristotelian conception behind. If 
it was not conceptual change, then what was it? I suggest that we understand reform-
ing to involve a change in conception—that is, a change in our beliefs about the proper-
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ties had by the things that the concept picks out.134 This seems to be the right result. 
When we let go of Aristotelian species, we didn’t cease believing that species were 
whatever played the species-role in a future scientific theory. What we ceased to be-
lieve was that every member of a species had a certain sort of intrinsic essence com-
mon among all and only members of that species. Taking the Aristotelians to share 
our concept of <species> has an additional virtue; doing so allows us to straightfor-
wardly accommodate the intuition that they got things wrong. One is inclined to say 
that the Aristotelians had false views about species—not that they were perfectly cor-
rect about species*, and merely wrong as far as species is concerned.  
In summary, then, we can say that reforming only involves making some changes 
to our conception(s), whereas revising and renaming are instances of conceptual 
change; for both involve changing the intension associated with a term. Moreover, 
both revising and reforming differ from renaming in that they involve a non-trivial 
change in beliefs—the beliefs that change are not merely our linguistic beliefs about 
the application conditions of a term. 
§4.2.3 Some qualifications 
Before proceeding, it will be helpful to introduce some further subtleties to this 
broad brush-strokes picture of conceptual change.135 Firstly, I have not denied that 
concepts ever undergo change. I have only suggested that we should not be too quick 
to infer that they have. New discoveries often signal a need for conceptual reform 
rather than a need for radical changes to our concepts.  
Empirical discoveries can signal a need for conceptual refinement as well. There is 
often some indeterminacy in our concepts, and empirical findings may move us to 
precisify their application conditions.136 Consider the example of <rheumatism>. It is 
 
134 I borrow the concept–conception from John Rawls (1999). 
135 I thank Ben Fraser for pressing upon me the need to do so. 
136 Given such indeterminacy, there may be borderline cases as well. It may very well be indeter-
minate what ‘mass’ referred to before Newtonian mechanics was replaced by the theory of relativity, 
for example (see Field 1973). It is also not obvious what we would say when considering a scenario in 
which all of the creatures we call ‘cats’ turn out to be robots controlled by Martians (Putnam 1962). 
Would this amount to the discovery that there are no cats, or the discovery that cats are really robots? 
It’s not at all clear. In these case and others, our dispositional patterns of response may not be suffi-
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possible that its initial extension was indeterminate between applying to (i) the syn-
drome and (ii) the most common underlying disease (Chalmers and Jackson 2001, 
pp.344-5). But over time, the concept of <rheumatism> has been refined (it now ap-
plies to the syndrome), and its extension has become more determinate as a result. 
Secondly, in some cases it may be incredibly difficult to judge whether or not con-
ceptual change has taken place. Consider the concept <gene>. Talk of genes has var-
ied quite substantially alongside empirical developments. Griffiths and Stotz (2007) 
map this variation by distinguishing “the traditional gene”, from the “post-genomic 
molecular gene” and the “nominal gene”. As they note, these different senses of 
‘gene’ do come apart. But whether it follows from this that <gene> has undergone 
radical conceptual change over time is debatable. As Stotz et. al (2004, fn.2) observe, 
it is somewhat controversial to speak of different ‘gene concepts’, as opposed to dif-
ferent conceptions. 
The issue is further complicated by the fact that talk of genes also varies among 
scientists working in the same time period. Developments biologists, for instance, 
(predictably) emphasise the role of genes in developmental pathways, whereas evolu-
tionary biologists tend to concentrate more upon the effects of genes on particular 
phenotypes (Stotz & Griffiths 2004, p.16). Given these different understandings of 
‘gene’, some may be inclined to say that there has been a proliferation of different 
gene concepts. However, this is not obvious. The concept ‘gene’ may very well be 
disjunctive. This possibility comes close to a suggestion once made by the biologist 
Thomas Fogle (2000), who suggested that biologists use a “consensus gene” concept; 
something counts as a gene if it has enough of the features of a stereotypical gene—an 
RNA transcript, a TATA box, and so on. (Stotz & Griffiths (2004, p.16) note that 
this is consistent with their findings.) None of this is to deny that <gene> has under-
gone conceptual change. (It is a difficult case, and one on which I am hesitant to take 
a strong stand.) My goal here is merely to acknowledge that deciding these matters is 
not always straightforward. 
Finally, we should distinguish the goals of the folk from those of the scientist. 
Earlier, I claimed that we ceased to use the term ‘species’ to refer to groups of crea-
                                                                                                                                     
ciently determinate to fix the relevant A-intensions, and so, the A-intensions in question may be 
somewhat fuzzy. 
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tures who have common essences. Given some plausible assumptions about linguis-
tic deference (recall §4.2.2, and see §4.4.2), I stand by this claim. However, it’s worth 
clarifying that this is consistent with an essentialist conception of species being com-
monplace among non-experts, and sufficient for their goals; distinguishing edible 
from poisonous plants, and dangerous from benign snakes, for example. 
§4.2.4 Reformists and Revisionists  
I want to conclude this introductory portion of the chapter by distinguishing our re-
visionist from a particular sort of success theorist: the reformist. (These differences 
will become important in §4.3.) The revisionist and the reformist part ways on the 
matter of whether the existence of categorical reasons is a non-negotiable commitment 
of our moral concepts. The revisionist, qua error theorist, answers in the affirmative; 
to rid moral discourse of this commitment would amount to a change of subject. The 
reformist denies this. A world without categorical reasons may very well prompt us 
to transform our conception of rightness (and the like). But she thinks that our moral 
concepts would remain very much intact.  
(Much of) the disagreement between our revisionist and the reformist therefore 
takes place at the level of conceptual analysis. To be sure, the reformist need not de-
ny that there is something right about the error theorist’s analysis. Perhaps the best de-
server of ‘moral rightness’ would be a property which was such that if an action had 
that property, there would be a categorical reason to perform that action. But deserv-
ers need not be perfect. The reformist may argue that our moral concepts are consid-
erably more flexible and disjunctive than the error theorist assumes. Perhaps the 
property that she proposes to identify with ‘moral rightness’ isn’t as perfect a deserv-
er of the name—but it may be deserving enough.  
Of course, it is sometimes customary to interpret reformists as recommending 
that we revise our moral concepts. (See for example, Loeb 2008, p.377.) However, I 
would caution against this understanding (especially given the view of conceptual 
change that we are here assuming). This interpretation effectively takes reformists to 
be recommending that we change the subject. As such, it misconstrues their theoreti-
cal ambitions. Presumably, that ambition is vindication—not changing what it is that 
is to be vindicated. 
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Taking reformists to be recommending only changes to our conceptions would 
seem to cohere better with what they have to say. Railton, for example, emphasises 
that a reformist analysis, if it is to be “vindicatory”, must retain sufficiently many “es-
sentials” and secure an appropriate degree of fit with ordinary moral discourse—it 
cannot amount to a change of subject (1989, p.172). Indeed, Brandt’s (1979) reform-
ing project is sometimes criticised on the grounds that it does change the subject, and 
so, fails to vindicate morality rather than something else (Sturgeon 1982, p.418; see al-
so Velleman 1988; Loeb 2008). These remarks would be strange if it were fair game 
for the reformist to change our moral concepts. 
§4.3 THE CASE FOR REVISIONISM  
It is common for reformists to draw optimism from the enterprise of scientific theo-
rising. Reforming seem commonplace in science, and scientific discourses continue 
to serve their important functions in spite of (sometimes radical) changes to our con-
ceptions of scientific phenomena. This is often thought to justify a promising prog-
nosis for the reformist project in meta-ethics; we have good grounds for thinking 
that moral discourse will likewise continue to play a sufficiently similar and valuable 
role in our lives, even after our conceptions of moral phenomena have undergone 
some changes. (See Lewis 1989, Finlay 2008, Jackson 1998a.)  
Though the revisionist is not explicit in drawing optimism from scientific theoris-
ing, she shares the reformist’s confidence that significant changes to moral discourse 
would not prevent it from fulfilling its core functions. We might doubt that this is so. 
But a natural response for the revisionist is to invoke the reformist’s argument from 
precedent, drawing optimism from the enterprise of scientific theorising. Here, I ex-
amine this reformist strategy, and explore how the revisionist could enlist it in de-
fence of her own proposal.  
§4.3.1 The reformist strategy  
There is a long tradition of advancing a sort of ‘partners in innocence’ argument that 
likens reforming our conception of moral rightness (say) to reforming our concep-
tions of scientific phenomena. Many reformists who adopt this broad strategy con-
cede to the error theorist that strictly speaking, our moral terms fail to refer. But they 
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hold that some conceptual reform is all that is needed to resolve the issue. The re-
sultant departure from the ‘strictly speaking’ is often accompanied by a battery of 
apologies or excuses, and it is here that scientific analogues usually come into play. 
The reformist reminds us that we are perfectly content to allow our conceptions of 
scientific phenomena to undergo important changes. And she suggests that matters 
ought to be no different in the moral case. My goal in what follows will be to put 
pressure upon this move. But it will be helpful to consider some examples prior to 
doing so.137   
Our first case study is Stephen Finlay. Finlay (2008) agrees with the error theorist 
that there are no absolute moral values (that is, values that are not relative to particu-
lar human ends). But he thinks that she is mistaken in believing that there need be 
any in order for our moral terms to successfully refer. Our belief in the importance 
of absolute value is misguided; this is simply the wrong conception of moral value. 
The right conception, according to Finlay, is a relational one; in his view, moral con-
cepts have an inherent relativity—albeit one that “hides in plain sight” (2008, p.361). 
When we declare that something is morally wrong, what we are really declaring is 
that it is wrong relative to a particular evaluative standpoint. We fail to recognise 
this—and find the absolutist conception irresistible—because we very often find 
ourselves in societies that share a moral code. In these homogeneous environments, 
the relational character of moral value goes unnoticed.138  
Finlay’s suggestion that ordinary speakers’ conceptions mistake a relational phe-
nomenon for an absolute one might sound surprising, and perhaps even uncharita-
ble. But he thinks that a scientific analogue lends plausibility to his case: 
We find analogous tendencies to absolutism in people’s assumptions about 
 
137 I should note that the list to follow is far from exhaustive. Harman (Harman and Thompson 
1994, p.4) make a similar point to Finlay, and also draws upon the absolute–relative motion distinctive 
when doing so. (As does Dreier 2010, p.79.) Railton’s reformist project appeals to the example of wa-
ter, which is a compound according to our current conception, but was once believed to be an ele-
ment (1989, p.157). Sterelny and Fraser (2013) discuss ancient mariner’s astronomical judgments, 
which were partly correct. 
138 Interestingly, some empirical studies may partially support what Finlay has to say. Sarkissian et. 
al (2011) found that subjects have more ‘objectivist’ moral intuitions when assessing individuals from 
their own culture, and more ‘relativistic’ moral intuitions when assessing people from different cul-
tures. 
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motion... Motion, we now accept, is a relational matter: there can be motion 
only relative to a frame of reference. But this is something that needed dis-
covery: for most of history, motion has been taken to be absolute. (2008, 
p.361) 
Finlay claims that it would be “preposterous” to take the motion discourse of ancient 
mariners to have been infected with error (2008, p.362). We can certainly criticise 
their absolutist conception of motion. But since they make more or less the same mo-
tion judgments as the rest of us, we should take them to have been tracking the very 
same thing—what we now know is motion relative to a frame of reference. Finlay 
thinks that a similar diagnosis ought to be offered in the moral case. The absolutist’s 
conception of moral value is mistaken. But it need not follow that her (or our) moral 
concepts are riddled with error. Since she makes more or less the same moral judg-
ments as the rest of us, we should take her concept of moral value to be tracking the 
very same (instantiated) thing—actions that are morally right or wrong relative to a 
particular set of standards.139 
Lewis also enlists the analogy with the theory of relativity when defending his 
view that values are what we are ideally disposed to desire to desire. This proposal 
carries the unwelcome consequence that value is contingent: 
Our dispositions to value things might have been otherwise than they actu-
ally are. We might have been disposed, under ideal conditions, to value sea-
sickness and petty sleaze above all else. Does the dispositional theory imply 
that had we been thus disposed, those things would have been values? That 
seems wrong. (1989, p.132) 
Lewis considers what seems a promising fix: amending the proposal so that ‘value’ 
refers to whatever it is that we are necessarily disposed to desire to desire. Yet this fix 
leads to an even more unsettling consequence. Though ‘value’ in this latter sense 
“would fully deserve the name”, there is no such thing. “If a value, strictly speaking, 
must be something we are necessarily disposed to value, and if our dispositions to 
value are in fact contingent, then strictly speaking, there are no values” (1989, p.134). 
Lewis ultimately concedes that strictly-speaking there are no values; for there is noth-
 
139 For criticism of Finlay’s argument (and some complications and problems that arise from his 
invocation of the absolute–relative distinction), see Joyce (2011). 
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ing that perfectly earns the name. However, he maintains that loosely speaking, there 
are values; whatever we are ideally disposed to desire to desire is an imperfect deserv-
er of the term. 
It is here that we see the reformist strategy at work. Lewis likens his choice to set-
tle for an imperfect deserver of ‘value’ to our choice to settle for an imperfect de-
server of ‘simultaneity’. Strictly speaking, there is no such thing as absolute 
simultaneity—there is only simultaneity in the frame-dependent sense. But we do not 
swiftly infer that “Nobody ever whistled while he worked!” Instead, we adopt a 
“calm and conservative response”; we conclude that simultaneity is not quite what 
we thought it was. Lewis suggests that the same conclusion is fitting in the moral 
case: we ought to say that value (like simultaneity) is not quite as we thought (1989, 
p.137). 
Finlay and Lewis appeal to scientific concepts to motivate affording moral con-
cepts a similar treatment. But many reformists simply assume that the two are to be 
handled in the same way. Jackson (1998a) adopts much the same approach for moral 
discourse as he does for folk psychology.140 Regarding the latter, he proposes to find 
a home for the mental states that folk psychology posits (e.g., beliefs, desires) by first 
gathering a set of subject-determining platitudes. Doing so helps us to systematise 
what say, beliefs, are according to our ordinary conception. This systematisation pro-
vides us with a kind of job-description for belief; it tells us what sorts of things be-
liefs (if any there be) must be. Jackson does not think that something can stray too far 
from this job description if it is to deserve the name ‘belief’ (1998a, p.38). But he 
does think that developments in neuroscience could move us to slightly modify our 
understanding of what beliefs are like. In collaboration with Phillip Pettit, Jackson 
hedges his bets on a mature folk psychology that has been informed by future scien-
tific findings (1990, p.50). 
Jackson thinks that we should adopt more or less the same approach in the moral 
case. Again, we begin by gathering a set of subject-determining platitudes about (say) 
moral rightness, and use these to systematise what ‘moral rightness’ is according to 
our ordinary conception. And here again, rightness is whatever plays the rightness-
 
140 Braddon-Mitchell also treats the two cases in a similar manner. He develops a disjunctive (or 
conditional) analysis for both ‘qualia’ (2003) and ‘moral rightness’ (2006). 
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role in a mature folk morality—that is, “where folk morality [would] end up after it 
has been exposed to debate and critical reflection” (1998a, p.133). According to Jack-
son, then, we ought to go about finding a home for moral properties and mental en-
tities in much the same way; we formulate a job description, find something that 
comes close to satisfying it, and settle for an imperfect deserver if need be. 
The reformist strategy seems to me to be rather popular, though it manifests itself 
in different ways. Sometimes, scientific analogues are invoked to motivate the plausi-
bility of the claim that our conceptions of moral phenomena can be radically mistaken 
(as in Finlay 2008). Other-times, they are used to lend support to the idea that we 
should be content to make do with imperfect deservers of our moral terms (as in 
Lewis 1989). And some theorists seem to think that when hunting for moral proper-
ties, objects or relations, we should proceed just as we do in the hunt for mental 
states (Jackson 1998a). What unites these different manifestations of the reformist 
strategy is that they amount to treating moral concepts and scientific ones very simi-
larly—if not the same. 
It is certainly no coincidence that reformists tend to be naturalists. Many of these 
theorists are concerned to solve the ‘location problem’ for ethics; they wish to de-
termine where (if anywhere) moral properties might find a home in the natural world. 
Within this context, reforming our conceptions is near inevitable; for our beliefs 
about natural phenomena are very often mistaken. It is also not surprising that many 
reformists are champions of (or at least have very close ties with) the Canberra Plan-
ning approach to solving the location problem; systematising commonsense intui-
tions, building a job description of the phenomenon to be located, and hoping that 
something will satisfy it (or come close).  
Two things should be noted before proceeding. First, I do not think that reform-
ists are wrong to assume that some conceptual commitments of moral discourse are 
up for grabs. As Hussain (2004, p.160) observes, no complete meta-ethical theory 
can plausibly be expected to take no commitments of our current moral practices to 
be mistaken or confused. At least some conceptual tweaking seems inevitable. My 
goal will only be to suggest that we shouldn’t overestimate just how much is admissi-
ble. 
Second, I am in fact incredibly sympathetic to the Canberra Planning approach to 
solving location problems. (As one might have guessed from §4.2.) My arguments in 
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what follows are by no means intended to show that this approach is fundamentally 
flawed. The worry to which I will soon give voice is that we might have been slightly 
too cavalier about treating moral rightness so similarly to how we treat mental states 
and motion. 
§4.3.2 Grist for the revisionist’s mill 
There are different ways in which we might go about revising moral discourse. One 
option would be to follow the recommendation of ‘revolutionary expressivists’, who 
advise us to use moral discourse in an expressive manner if the moral error theory is 
true (Köhler & Ridge 2013, Svoboda 2017). Another would be to revise the concep-
tual commitments of moral language such that our talk of rightness and wrongness 
no longer commits us to the existence of categorical reasons (Lutz 2014). 
As I have noted, the revisionist’s project differs in important ways from that of 
the reformist. But reforming definitions can still be of use to the revisionist. Matt 
Lutz proposes that the revisionist can 
...adopt this basic move of the reforming-definition theorist—to reorient 
our moral thought and language toward the salvaged concept...The salvaged 
concept is different enough from our moral concept that following this sug-
gestion would not constitute a type of realism about morality. But it is simi-
lar enough that doing so looks like a promising way to capture enough of 
what we want... (2014, p.365) 
The revisionist can, in other words, take (something close to) what the reformist re-
gards as analyses as promising candidates for schmoralities. While these analyses were 
not quite enough to rescue moral discourse from an error theory, they may be 
enough to secure (many of) the benefits of moral practice. Just as the reformist is 
confident that a modified conception will get us what we want, so too is the revision-
ist confident that a modified concept will give us “…very good prospects of living a 
fulfilling normative life” (Lutz 2014, p.370). 
(I should qualify my use of ‘schmorality’ in this context (and at this stage). I do 
not necessarily intend for it to refer to something that is not worth caring about; for 
if the revisionist is correct, then schmorality could be immensely useful to us. By 
‘schmorality’, I intend to refer to something closer to what Joyce has in mind when 
he characterises a schmorality as “…something bearing a resemblance to a morali-
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ty—enough, perhaps to be mistaken for the real thing by the inattentive—but which 
falls short of really being so” (2008, p.65; cf. Dennett 2006).)  
We might be sceptical, however, that a useful moral practice could survive such 
radical conceptual change. A change of subject (accompanied by a relevant change in 
beliefs) seems bound to translate into a change in practice. And there is no guarantee 
that the resultant practice would be a desirable one. We should want some further 
grounds for placing our faith in the revisionist’s schmorality. 
A natural response for the revisionist at this juncture is to enlist the reformist 
strategy, gesturing towards the success of scientific theorising. Of course, the revi-
sionist would need to point towards examples of conceptual change, rather than 
changes to our conceptions. I have suggested that the latter are arguably more com-
mon, so the revisionist may not be on quite as strong ground as the reformist here. 
But it is not as though there are no case studies to which she could appeal. By draw-
ing our attention to these precedents, the revisionist could provide us with grounds 
for thinking that her proposed revisions to our moral concepts will not prevent them 
from serving their valuable functions. There have (let’s assume) been substantial 
changes to the concept <gene>. But far from preventing us from engaging in a use-
ful form of gene discourse, these modifications have been of considerable help in al-
lowing us to make empirically meaningful inferences and generalisations. The same 
may very well be true of moral discourse; far from being a hindrance to practical suc-
cess, conceptual change may be our best chance of securing it. 
So a natural move for the revisionist is to parasitise not only the reformist’s anal-
yses, but her argument from precedent as well. In doing so, she substantiates her 
claim that a schmorality will be capable of serving the important functions of morali-
ty. In what follows, however, I will argue that this hope is misplaced. The revision-
ist’s project is vulnerable to the very same (if not very similar) worries as the 
reformist project that it is parasitic upon. 
§4.4 AGAINST SCHMORALITY 
I will begin my criticism of revisionism by taking issue with some ostensibly promis-
ing candidates for schmoralities (§4.4.1). Here, I will rehearse some (all-too-familiar) 
concerns about the promises of naturalistic reductions in ethics, and use them to my 
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advantage. Following that, I suggest that these problems are in fact a symptom of a 
deeper issue: there is a principled explanation as to why any candidate schmorality is 
unlikely to get us what we want (§§4.4.2-3). Some may take the explanation on offer 
as further reason to doubt the prospects of reduction in ethics. Less ambitiously, it 
may provide us with a diagnosis as to why so many find these proposed reductions 
unsatisfying. 
§4.4.1 Against the letter of schmorality  
If we follow the revisionist’s recommendation to reservice reformists’ analyses, then 
our schmorality is very likely to be a naturalist one; we will identify moral properties 
like rightness (or, I should say, rightness*) with natural properties—increasing pleas-
ure, or being what we are ideally disposed to desire to desire, say. But there are 
grounds to be wary of naturalist schmoralities such as these, and it is the same 
grounds that are often thought to count against naturalist analyses. Naturalists take 
moral properties to be run-of-the-mill natural properties that bear no essential link to 
normative reasons (Brink 1989, ch.3; Sturgeon 2006, pp.110-12); whether or not we 
have any reason to act as morality requires ultimately depends upon whether or not 
we care about the moral good.  
Now, the error theorist agrees with the naturalist about the facts on the ground; 
she does not think that moral requirements do supply all agents with normative rea-
sons for action. But she also takes moral discourse to play a valuable role precisely on 
account of the presupposition that it does have these normative credentials. In chapter 
2, I appealed to the idea that moral judgments function as deliberation-stoppers; they 
prevent competing considerations that would interfere with prosocial motivation 
from entering into the deliberative sphere (following Joyce 2006, p.111). When an 
agent judges that she morally ought to φ, her other desires and ends are sidelined in 
the decision-making process. A related idea (one advanced by Dennett 1986, p.123) 
is that public moral judgments function as conversation-stoppers; they block any further 
negotiations from taking place when making interpersonal decisions.  
Yet moral judgments plausibly play these valuable roles because we tend to con-
ceive of our moral obligations as things that we ought to do, period. And it is precisely 
this problematic conceptual commitment that the revisionist wishes to purge. Were 
we to follow the revisionist and revise moral discourse such that it was an open ques-
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tion whether or not we ought to pursue the moral good—the answer to which depend-
ed upon our ends—then it not at all clear that these ends will continue to be sidelined 
or blocked in our decision-making processes. 
These worries for the revisionist are reminiscent of a well-known challenge to the 
reformist. You’ve heard it all before: reforming analyses seem unable to accommo-
date the distinct kind of practical authority with which we invest moral requirements. 
They cannot do justice to “the authority of reason” (Hampton 1998, ch.3). They 
“[drive] what to do out of ethics” (Gibbard 2003, p.13). The underlying and well-
trodden idea here is that descriptive properties do not seem capable of performing 
the action-guiding function that morality must plausibly fulfil if it is to be useful to 
us. As Hinckfuss puts it, 
Jiminy Cricket is not of much use to his Pinnochio, if he is able to say only 
after the behaviour in question, that he has perceived it to be good or bad. 
Moral knowledge is for…preventing sin, not simply describing it. (1987, 
§2.6) 
These old worries for the reformist transfer rather straightforwardly to the revision-
ist. The old worry is that an analysis that does away with practical authority is inten-
sionally inadequate; it fails to do justice to important moral platitudes. The new worry 
(for the revisionist) is that such analyses are also likely to be practically inadequate. In 
divesting moral discourse of a commitment to categorical reasons, the revisionist di-
vests it of its distinctive rhetorical and motivational force. 
(Indeed, one may think that there is a sense in which these two worries are two 
aspects of a single worry. It seems that our answers to metaphysical questions (e.g., 
‘what are x’s?) sometimes should be intimately tied to our answers to practical ones 
(e.g. what concept of x should govern our practices surrounding x’s?). As Caroline 
West (2008, p.58) points out when discussing the concept of personal identity, the 
answers to such metaphysical questions are at risk of being uninteresting if they 
merely describe a “theoretical epiphenomenon” that is fundamentally disconnected 
from our real-world interests and concerns.)  
Matters seem especially pressing for response-dependent schmoralities, which ren-
der moral judgments akin to judgments of taste. Lutz’s proposed schmorality, for ex-
ample, takes rightness* and wrongness* to be determined by an individual’s 
subjective patterns of approval and disapproval. And expressivist schmoralities (e.g., 
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those of Köhler &Ridge 2013; Svoboda 2017) refashion moral judgments such that 
they come to be expressions of non-cognitive attitudes. Insofar as these proposals 
forge a connection between our moral commitments and our preferences, they can 
secure a link between moral judgment and motivation. But they are likely to have 
trouble securing consensus and co-ordination of the right sort.  
As was suggested in §3.2.1, individuals are usually willing to compromise on their 
preferences. I don’t aesthetically approve of wearing red and green together, but I 
can bring myself do so if my friends want to dress up as Christmas elves come De-
cember. Generally speaking, some measure of compromise is taken to be appropriate 
when our (interpersonal) desires come into conflict (Enoch 2011). If you feel like or-
dering Vietnamese takeaway, and I had my hopes set on Indian, then it’s surely not 
appropriate for me to insist upon my preference. I should instead try to meet you 
half way, perhaps by settling for Thai—or by agreeing to do Indian tonight, and Vi-
etnamese next week.  
But sacrificing some of our wants spells trouble when it comes to our moral 
wants. If I think that we morally ought to refrain from genocide, and you think that 
we ought to go for it, am I now to meet you half way? Perhaps I should agree to 
wipe out just half of the relevant population—or to go ahead with the purge this 
time, but insist that we refrain on a future occasion. Yet that seems like the wrong 
result—that is to say, the practically wrong one.141 We surely do not all benefit from 
compromising upon undesirable social policies.142 But if our schmoral judgments are 
mere preferences, then it seems that this is precisely what we should do. If schmoral 
facts are merely facts about our subjective patterns of approval and disapproval, then 
 
141 Compare Enoch (2011, ch.2), who uses these considerations to mount a moral case against re-
sponse-dependent views 
142 Of course, losing half of the population would surely be better than losing it all. It would obvi-
ously be practically suboptimal to refrain from moral compromise when standing one’s ground would 
lead to far worse outcomes. My point is merely that it would be bad if the first port of call were always 
to compromise and meet others half way in such cases even when we didn’t have to—if we were or-
dinarily disposed to respond to the genocide case much as we were disposed to respond to the restau-
rant case. This isn’t to deny that we should be reasonable interlocutors who are open to opposing 
views—being inclined to stand our ground when we believe we are right is consistent with being will-
ing to hear out the opposing side.  
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the appropriate form of resolution would be to meet one another half way, as we do 
in other cases of conflicting tastes. 
Though I take the options canvassed here to be the most promising candidates 
for schmoralities, their sponsors encounter very similar problems to those who put 
them forward as reforming analyses. Of course, reformists do have responses to 
these challenges, and the revisionist could very well enlist these in defence of her 
own proposal. Lutz could, for instance, build some resistance to compromise into 
the notions of rightness* and wrongness*. And expressivists are experts in philo-
sophical jiu-jitsu, so we should expect that revolutionary expressivists will have more 
to say here as well. Whether such responses would be satisfactory is, of course, up 
for debate. But here is not the place to settle whether meta-ethical naturalism and 
expressivism do justice to moral practice. And picking off schmoralities one by one 
isn’t the most principled way to go about objecting to the revisionist’s project in any 
case. In what follows, I suggest that there is a deeper problem at hand. 
§4.4.2 Moral concepts and scientific concepts: some disanalogies 
The deeper problem in question is premised upon some important disanalogies be-
tween moral and scientific concepts. I will consider these in some detail before ex-
plaining why they spell trouble for the revisionist’s proposal. It should be 
acknowledged from the outset that the differences to which I will draw attention may 
turn out to be differences of degree rather than kind. Moreover, I will not infer from 
these differences that the revisionist’s project could not possibly be viable. I will only 
claim that they supply us with good reasons to doubt its prospects.  
The differences are three. To begin with, scientific concepts embody an element 
of linguistic deference that seems to be absent in moral concepts. There are two 
kinds of deference at play here. The first is what we can call horizontal deference. In his 
seminal discussion on the topic, Putnam explains the phenomenon in terms of a 
“linguistic division of labour” (1975a, pp.227-8).143 Only scientific experts can really 
 
143 It’s worth assuaging a potential concern here. Throughout this chapter, I’ve put quite a bit of 
emphasis upon (what may reasonably be thought of as) descriptivist or internalist approaches to un-
derstanding meaning and content. So the reader might be suspicious of my relying upon what Putnam 
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determine what sort of stuff is gold; for only they are sufficiently familiar with the 
relevant theory. But this does not prevent laymen from speaking meaningfully of 
gold. Insofar as the folk meaningfully apply the term ‘gold’, their doing so depends 
upon a kind of implicit deference to scientific experts; they can defer to these experts 
on the correct application conditions of the term.  
Moral concepts would seem to lack this feature of horizontal deference. When 
you ask me what I’m talking about when I speak of gold, I can say, ‘I’m talking about 
that expensive yellowish substance that has the underlying structure that has been ar-
ticulated by experts’. But it is difficult to say anything of the sort when you ask me 
what I’m talking about when I speak of moral goodness. For one thing, it seems 
strange to think that there is a unique, underlying microphysical structure at play 
here. The proposal that there are fundamental moral particles—“morons”, as 
Dworkin (2011) calls them—to which we purport to refer when we talk of rights or 
duties is, to put it bluntly, laughable.144  
For another, there don’t seem to be any moral experts to whom we could plausi-
bly defer. Moral philosophers or religious leaders might be prime candidates, but 
they’re certainly not an uncontroversially recognised group of experts in the way that, 
say, physicians or chemists are. No one questions that chemists claim expertise with 
respect to gold, and that it is appropriate to defer to them on the matter. By contrast, 
there are widespread suspicions about the appropriateness of moral deference. Wil-
liams is particularly dismissive   
There are, notoriously, no ethical experts...Anyone who is tempted to take 
up the idea of there being a theoretical science of ethics should be discour-
aged by reflecting on what would be involved in taking seriously the idea 
that there were experts in it. It would imply, for instance that a student who 
had not followed the professor’s reasoning but had understood his moral 
                                                                                                                                     
(an arch-externalist) has to say. However, the descriptivist-style approach that I have been assuming is 
sufficiently flexible to incorporate Putnam’s insights. Its sponsors can allow that some concepts are 
deferential; that their extension depends upon the way in which the relevant term is used within one’s 
linguistic community (Chalmers, 2002b, §6; Jackson 2004). We might articulate the general idea by say-
ing that the concept <gold> is captured by a description roughly (very roughly) of the form, ‘the actu-
al, valuable, yellowish substance of our acquaintance that is used to make jewellery, and which has the 
underlying microphysical structure that the experts say it has’. 
144 Finlay expresses a similar sentiment: “…it’s absurd to suggest that [moral goodness] might have a 
complex molecular structure” (2008, p.363). 
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conclusion might have some reason, on the strength of his professorial au-
thority, to accept it...These Platonic implications are presumably not accept-
ed by anyone. (1995, p.205) 
Following Williams, it is not even obvious that we have reasons to accept specific mor-
al verdicts on the basis of expertise. It should be less obvious still that the meaning 
of our moral terms depends upon the judgments of philosopher kings or some moral 
elite.  
Still, not everyone is as dismissive as Williams. Some have proposed that we can 
gain knowledge from moral deference, though not understanding—the latter being 
what explains the appearance that there is something untoward about deferring to 
others on moral matters (Hills 2009). Yet even so, a disanalogy remains; no one 
thinks that I have to understand how the speed of light is calculated, lest there be 
something untoward about deferring to scientists that E=MC2.  
Others have suggested that even if there are no moral experts tout court, people 
may still claim expertise with respect to a specific moral issue (Hopkins 2007, pp.623-
26). But it is one thing to concede that some people may be well-positioned to offer 
advice on particular moral issues. It is quite another to say that the meaning of our 
moral terms systematically depends upon what they have to say. That strikes me as a 
considerable leap. (At the very least, it is a new and interesting philosophical thesis in 
need of support.) I take the considerations above as decent (though no doubt defea-
sible) grounds for thinking that moral concepts are not plausibly akin to the “tech-
nical concepts” that one finds in science, which are partly “fixed by the usage of 
experts” (Finlay 2008, p.363).  
A second sort of deference is what I will call vertical deference. This phenomenon 
was discussed in §4.2.2, wherein I followed others in suggesting that scientific con-
cepts embody a deference to future empirical findings. Are moral concepts also ver-
tically deferential? Some philosophers seem to think so. Jackson, recall, passes the 
linguistic buck to “mature folk morality”. But it is far from clear that deferring to the 
future is appropriate in the moral case. As Stephen Yablo notes, it seems eminently 
possible that “… morality could take a direction that we would regard as quite mis-
guided”; “it is no part of current folk morality to defer to whatever comes along” 
(2002, p.16). 
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Of course, Jackson thinks that deference is to be paid to future populations who 
are reasonable, and have thought through moral matters carefully. ‘Rightness’ picks out 
whatever plays the rightness-role in a folk morality that “…has been exposed to de-
bate and critical reflection” (1998a, p.133). But one striking disanalogy between mor-
al and scientific discourse is that the latter is subject to explicit and rigorous scrutiny. 
Folk morality, by contrast, is implicit at best, and is quite possibly not fully coherent 
or determinate (Loeb 2008, Sinnott-Armstrong & Wheatley 2012). The caveat that 
mature folk morality “…has been exposed to debate and critical reflection”, renders 
the analogy with mature scientific theories easier, but at the cost of relevance to actu-
al moral practice. Scientific concepts can survive quite radical modifications while 
continuing to play their role in theory and practice. But scrutiny and revision is busi-
ness as usual in science. (I shall return to this point shortly.) It is far less clear that the 
moral folk are as sanguine about scrutinising and revising their theories. One worries 
that Jackson may be defining away an important difference between scientific theo-
rising and moral practice.145  
Yet another concern pertains to the sorts of justifications that we can offer for de-
ferring to the future. Scientific enquiry has a good track record. Controversies about 
replication aside, developments and improvements are more or less routine. So it 
seems reasonable for us to place our faith in the scientific method as a reliable recipe 
for progress, and peg the reference of scientific terms to future theories. Some might 
be optimistic about moral progress as well, of course.146 But it seems that whatever 
optimism we have here must be considerably more tempered. The method of careful 
reasoning is no guarantee that people won’t be led morally astray (see Williamson 
2001, p.630). Placing our faith in the future appears far more sensible and well-
motivated in the scientific case.  
(I do not want to pretend that matters are simple or uncontroversial here.147 It is 
not out of the question that future science could take a wrong turn—perhaps even 
 
145 I thank Ben Fraser for helpful discussion on this point. 
146 Qua moral error theorists, it is unclear what exactly we should take moral progress to be. (Clear-
ly, we cannot take it to consist in our beliefs more closely approximating the moral truths.) Perhaps 
moral progress might be said to involve developing moral (or schmoral or fictional) beliefs that better 
serve our common interests.  
147 I thank Ben Fraser and Daniel Nolan for pressing me on these points. 
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for similar corrupting reasons. It is also not obvious that scientific enquiry has a good 
track record of arriving at the truth. After all, we regard many scientific theories of the 
past as false. Perhaps future people will think the same of our own, and so, perhaps 
we should infer that our current theories are in fact false (Laudan 1981). I cannot 
hope to mount a systematic defence against such pessimistic meta-induction here. 
But the inference is certainly questionable. Since the best theories of the past plausi-
bly differ in important ways from the best theories of the present (e.g., the latter en-
joy greater success and are better supported by our evidence), an optimistic meta-
induction does not seem to me to be off the cards. (For arguments for optimistic 
meta-induction, see Fahrbach 2011, pp.153-4; Park 2011, pp.77-80.)) 
There is a further respect in which moral concepts seem to differ from scientific 
concepts. I will call this final distinguishing feature gross fallibility. To say that scientific 
concepts are grossly fallible is to say that we acknowledge that our conceptions of 
scientific phenomena could be radically mistaken. We acknowledge, for instance, the 
in principle possibility that a wide range of phenomena could play the germ-role; 
germs could be harmful micro-organisms (as they plausibly are), miasma, or imper-
ceptible demons who enjoy making life rather unpleasant for various organisms. If 
any one of these things were to the bill (that is, if further inquiry into the underlying 
causes of disease were to reveal as much) that then we’d be happy to call them 
germs. 
Moreover, we’re perfectly willing to allow that the role-realisers in such cases 
could surprise us. You might deny that the switch from absolute to relative motion 
revealed something deeply wrong with the concept <motion>. But you have to ad-
mit that there’s something strange about asking a fellow passenger when London 
stops at your train. However—and this is my point—you’re willing to shirk that dis-
comfort. Your folk intuitions surely don’t permit you to insist that Einstein got 
things wrong. 
This feature of gross fallibility does not seem to be present—at least not to nearly 
the same extent—in moral concepts. This is not to say that people do not 
acknowledge (implicitly or explicitly) that some of their moral views could be false. I 
expect most will readily admit that they could be mistaken in the content of (some of) 
their moral judgments (perhaps some people more readily than others). But it seems 
far more difficult to admit that one could be radically mistaken about what (broadly 
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speaking) grounds one’s moral judgments. It is difficult, for example, to be open to the 
possibility that what grounds the wrongness of child pornography is merely social 
mores.148  
Of course, we may acknowledge that our conception of moral goodness (say) 
could be somewhat mistaken. Yet it seems that it could not be radically mistaken. My 
folk intuitions don’t permit me to object to Einstein’s theory of relativity. But they 
surely do permit me to object to Stevenson (1937, p.14) when he suggests (albeit hu-
morously) that goodness is pink with yellow trimmings. These intuitions also permit 
us to object—as philosophers routinely have—to more serious naturalist proposals. 
If the utilitarian’s identification of goodness with increasing pleasure fails to comport 
with important moral platitudes, then, the thought goes, so much the worse for the 
utilitarian. 
Our resistance to such analyses suggests that we do not acknowledge the in princi-
ple possibility that a wide range of phenomena could play the goodness-role. Nor do 
we seem all that happy to allow that the role-realisers could surprise us. Even if there 
were some unique set of natural properties picked out by the term ‘good’, it would be 
difficult shirk our discomfort if those properties didn’t comport with our moral intui-
tions to a suitable degree.  
(I don’t wish to oversell the point. As Nolan points out, there are plausibly some 
platitudes about scientific phenomena that constrain our investigation; “… momen-
tum couldn’t have turned out to be a kind of cat, or be identical to the temperature 
24°C” (2009, p.286; see also Joyce, p.97). So the difference here may very well be one 
of degree; a difference in how fallible we take ourselves to (potentially) be, and the ex-
tent to which we take our folk intuitions to license us to have a say in such matters.) 
A complementary point here concerns the distinction between vindicating and 
tracking (Fraser 2014). To vindicate moral discourse, it does not seem sufficient to 
show that our talk of ‘moral goodness’ (say) tracks some property cluster p. What ra-
ther needs to be shown, it seems, is that our talk of goodness tracks some property 
cluster p that is suitably close to what competent speakers mean to attribute when they call 
 
148 See Southwood (2011), who suggests that moral judgments are distinguished from conventional 
ones by the grounds that one can offer for them.  
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something (morally) good. As far as moral discourse is concerned, a tracking explana-
tion is not necessarily a vindicating explanation. Fraser draws an analogy with the 
term ‘witch’: 
It may have been—suppose it was—true that medieval witch hunters’ 
judgments about who was and who was not a witch fit a particular pattern: 
all those judged to be witches were female, old, ugly, and outcasts. So, there 
was a property cluster shared by all the things judged to have the property 
of being a witch…. [but this] leaves untouched a further question: did those 
judged to be witches have the property (cluster) that the witch hunters 
meant to attribute? To answer that question, it is necessary to know what 
the witch hunters’ notion of a witch was…it is clear that it will involve some 
supernatural element (practicing magic, or making deals with demons, per-
haps). And, the tracking story made no mention of any such element. So, it 
is possible for a tracking story to be true of some class of judgments with-
out a vindicating story being true of them. (2014, pp.796-7) 
As Fraser suggests, the same lesson seems to apply to ‘moral goodness’. Even if 
our talk of moral goodness were to track some natural property p, showing that this 
were so would not suffice to vindicate moral discourse. Competent speakers could 
acknowledge the availability of such a tracking story while denying that there is any 
such thing as moral goodness; for the property tracked may not deserve the name (cf. 
Copp 1990).  
By way of contrast, we would expect tracking and vindicating to often run together 
in scientific theorising.149 As things have turned out, talk of ‘germs’ reliably tracks 
facts about harmful micro-organisms. But no one is inclined to object to the epide-
miologists that harmful micro-organisms are not properly deserving of the name. We 
laypersons presumably don’t have much ontological say on the underlying causes of 
disease. 
I suspect that the list above does not exhaust the disanalogies between moral and 
scientific concepts. But it will suffice for my purposes. In what follows, I shall argue 
 
149 My suggestion is not that tracking and vindicating always go together in scientific theorising—
only that they often do. Following Joyce (p.4), it would have been odd for the phlogiston theorist to 
have said “Well, this stuff that Lavoisier is calling ‘oxygen’ just is what I’ve been calling ‘phlogiston’ all 
along”.  
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these disanalogies put pressure upon the optimistic inference that the revisionist may 
wish to draw from conceptual change in scientific theorising. 
§4.4.3 Against the spirit of schmorality 
My intention in emphasising a number of disanalogies between scientific concepts 
and moral concepts has been to garner support for the following claim: the revision-
ist’s (and similarly, the reformist’s) import of optimism is unjustified. There is a prin-
cipled explanation as to why the valuable role of scientific concepts is not thrown 
into jeopardy by revision or reform, and such an explanation does not seem available 
in the moral case. The explanation, simply put, is that revision and reform coheres with 
the distinctive function(s) of scientific discourse.  
The idea that scientific discourse has ‘distinctive functions’ needs some spelling 
out. Let me briefly explain what I intend by this, prior to drawing some important 
connections with the discussion in §4.4.2. A discourse, recall (§I), is a domain of talk 
and thought that is structured around a particular set of concepts and associated be-
liefs. Santa discourse, for example, is structured around concepts such as <North 
Pole>, <elves>, <presents>, and <Christmas>. For children, this discourse also in-
volves a characteristic set of beliefs; the belief that Santa rides a sleigh, the belief that 
Santa gives presents to nice children, and the belief that he heroically delivers these 
presents to hundreds of millions of children within the space of a single night.  
Santa discourse, I want to propose, has a set of functions that explains why it is 
valuable to us. On the one hand, Santa discourse has what I will call a basic linguistic 
function (one that it shares with many other descriptive discourses): that of allowing us 
to denote certain kinds of things, and to assert particular kinds of propositions. But 
Santa discourse also has a number of what we can call proper functions—ones that 
some discourses have, but others lack.150 Among these functions is that of social en-
gineering; we introduce Santa discourse to children in order to encourage them to 
 
150 By ‘proper function’, I intend for something quite different from what teleosemanticists (e.g., 
Millikan 1989) discuss. In my usage, ‘proper function’ is not necessarily tied to evolutionary history, 
but concerns the distinctive practical purposes of the discourse beyond its basic linguistic functions. 
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behave well. If they don’t, then come Christmas time, their stockings will be filled 
with coal. (Or so they believe.)  
Like Santa discourse, species discourse plausibly has the basic linguistic function 
of allowing us to denote certain kinds of things, and to assert particular kinds of 
propositions. But unlike Santa discourse, the proper functions of species discourse 
aren’t best understood in terms of social engineering. We value species discourse be-
cause it helps us to achieve distinctively scientific ends; to make certain kinds of em-
pirical inferences and generalisations, for example. Talk of species helps us to pick 
out and examine things that exist, which have interesting and potentially regular con-
nections to other things that exist. We use such talk, for instance, to make interesting 
and theoretically well-motivated claims in evolution and ecology.151 
It’s worth emphasising this contrast between Santa discourse and species dis-
course. The purpose of Santa discourse is not that of helping us to make meaningful 
empirical claims or discoveries about things that exist. Of course, getting children to 
falsely believe that Santa exists is important for encouraging good behaviour. The point 
to appreciate is that in order for Santa discourse to serve its proper functions, there is 
no need for these beliefs to be true (or remotely close to the truth). Matters are quite 
different in the species case. In order for species discourse to serve its proper func-
tions, it is very important that scientist’s beliefs and assertions about species are (at 
least close to) correct. If they are not, then species discourse is unlikely to fulfil these 
functions. If our theories about species are not even remotely close to the truth, this 
would hamper our ability to gain a more accurate picture of the world through scien-
tific theorising. 
It is here that the discussion in §4.4.2 becomes important. There, I argued that 
our conceptions of scientific phenomena are always (at least tacitly) regarded as ne-
gotiable and fallible; this is suggested by the important kinds of deference that scien-
tific concepts embody, and our readiness to tolerate errors in our understanding. 
 
151 Once again, I am passing over some heated debates here. Following most scientific realists (e.g., 
Putnam 1975b, Boyd 1983), I assume that scientific theorising aims to supply true descriptions of the 
world, and that progress in science has consisted in further approximations to the truth. (Perhaps a 
constructive empiricist (e.g., van Fraassen 1980) could at least agree with this assumption as far as ob-
servable features of the world are concerned.) 
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What I now want to propose is that these dispositions to defer and tolerate error are 
closely tied to the proper functions of scientific discourses—for example, that of ena-
bling us to make meaningful discoveries about things that exist. If we are to make 
progress in biology or physics, then we simply must afford scientific enquiry a suitable 
degree of open-endedness; we must acknowledge that species or motion may not 
turn out to be quite what we thought they were.  
It is for this reason that I believe revising and reforming are often appropriate and 
helpful in scientific theorising; it is because they cohere with the proper functions of 
scientific discourse. But why does this spell trouble for the revisionist (or the reform-
ist)? Note, to begin with, that the explanation as to why conceptual revision and re-
form pose no threat to scientific practice does not seem available for moral practice; 
for there does not seem to be any heavy-duty deference or error-toleration built into 
moral practice. Whereas scientific concepts are structured in such a way as to make 
room for the possibility of substantial modifications (and for good reason), the same 
does not seem true of moral concepts. 
Indeed, I think that this points towards a further respect in which moral and sci-
entific concepts differ. Given that the proper function of scientific discourse (or, at 
least, one important proper function of scientific discourse) is to help us to achieve 
distinctively scientific ends (e.g., to make certain kinds of empirical inferences and 
generalisations), we are very often willing to sacrifice intensional adequacy. We are will-
ing to allow that the right account of species and motion might not cohere perfectly 
well with our essentialist or absolutist intuitions. Roughly put, we let the world have 
the final say. This is because extensional adequacy is typically of greater importance to 
us in scientific theorising; we want terms like ‘species’ to succeed in picking out em-
pirically meaningful categories.  
But as far as moral discourse is concerned, intensional adequacy seems just as im-
portant—if not more—than extensional adequacy. That is to say, having a theory 
that coheres sufficiently well with deeply held intuitions seems equally (if not more) 
important as having one that enables moral terms to refer, and moral predicates to be 
literally satisfied. Reformists will of course deny that this is true (or the whole truth) 
when it comes to philosophising about and understanding morality. But it certainly 
seems true as a practical matter—that is to say, as a matter of how well or poorly dif-
ferent revisionist schmoralities are likely to fare. To the extent that a moral system is 
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built on concepts alien to the folk who are to use it, and delivers verdicts at odds 
with their strong intuitions about the nature of moral phenomena, it seems doomed 
to be practically irrelevant at best.152 
To my mind, then, moral discourse is more like Santa discourse than species dis-
course. Like Santa discourse, the proper function of moral discourse is (at least in 
great part) action-guiding. Moral terms and predicates are not merely valuable to us be-
cause they allow us to assert particular kinds of propositions—they are valuable to us 
because they enable us to shape one another’s behaviour. Unlike species discourse, 
the proper functions of moral discourse are not tied to successfully picking out em-
pirical phenomena. Indeed, there is no need whatsoever for moral terms to success-
fully refer if moral discourse is to fulfil many of its proper functions. (If the error 
theorist is correct, then moral discourse has long fulfilled many of its proper func-
tions in spite of systematic referential failure.)  
The problem for the revisionist is that whether or not moral discourse can fulfil its 
distinctive action-guiding function(s) seems intimately tied to its commitment to cat-
egorical reasons. As was argued in §4.4.1, to divest moral discourse of a commitment 
to categorical reasons is to risk divesting it of its distinctive rhetorical and motiva-
tional force. Accordingly, it is highly doubtful that moral discourse could continue to 
serve its proper functions in the face of such radical changes. And it won’t do to ap-
peal to scientific theorising to convince us that it would. Whereas scientific concepts 
are structured in such a way as to make room for change, the same does not seem 
true of moral concepts. The proper function of moral discourse is not to pick out 
empirically interesting phenomena, whatever they may be, but to guide action in 
characteristic ways. And that proper function is thrown into jeopardy as soon as we 
propose to conceive of our moral duties as normatively optional, or dependent upon 
our ends. 
§4.5 REVISIONISM: GENERAL LESSONS 
The shortcomings of the revisionist’s proposal are, I think, owing to her failure to 
appreciate the sense in which the action-guiding function of morality is intimately 
 
152 I thank Ben Fraser for helpful discussions on this point. 
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tied to its problematic conceptual commitments. We cannot simply go about our 
lives schmoralising and expect to reap the very same (or even sufficiently similar) 
practical rewards as before. These practical advantages plausibly depend upon con-
ceiving of moral requirements in a particular sort of way, and holding a certain set of 
(at least tacit) beliefs about the nature of our moral obligations. In purging moral dis-
course of a commitment to categorical reasons, we rob it of its distinctive practical 
force. 
There are other cases in which the action-guiding function of a discourse seems 
intimately tied to particular conceptual commitments. Indeed, I suspect that this is 
true of a number of myths directed at young children. Talk of tooth fairies reduces 
the unpleasantness associated with losing a tooth. Talk of Santa encourages good be-
haviour (at least leading up to Christmas time). Clearly, these discourses are shot 
through with error—suppositions regarding fairies and magical elves are problematic 
conceptual commitments if any are. But it is difficult to imagine them fulfilling their 
proper functions (that of shaping children’s behaviour) without them. This, I suspect, 
is precisely why we continue to make use of these erroneous discourses. No one feels 
any need to revise our concepts of <tooth fairy> or <Santa> so as to make them 
successfully refer—and nor should they.  
The suggestion developed in this chapter is that matters are different for scientific 
discourse. Far from permitting the toleration of outlandish myths, scientific theoris-
ing is intended to help us to discover truths about the surrounding world. It would 
be antithetical to the proper functions of scientific discourse were the fate of its pos-
its to stand or fall with our folk intuitions. And clearly, they do not. We are perfectly 
prepared to allow that scientific discoveries may surprise us—to defer to the relevant 
experts, and to tolerate errors in our understanding. More often than not, reforming 
or revisionist proposals for scientific phenomena—germs, species, and what have 
you—are unlikely to come into conflict with the proper functions of scientific dis-
course. So it is here that they stand the greatest chance of success. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 Moral Fictionalism 
Moral fictionalists hold that moral discourse is worth preserving on account of its 
usefulness. But they do not advise us to preserve moral discourse as it stands. In-
stead, fictionalists recommend that we preserve moral discourse in the spirit of a use-
ful fiction. In doing so, we can to continue to reap the benefits of moral practice—
and we can do so without incurring the epistemic costs associated with preserving 
our false moral beliefs. 
This fictionalist manoeuvre is certainly not unique to the moral domain; it is a 
common, and increasingly popular response to many (allegedly) error-ridden dis-
courses. The chapter begins with an overview of this rich fictionalist research pro-
gram (§5.1). This will be helpful for the purposes of understanding the different ways 
in which fictionalism has been developed as a response to the WNQ for moral dis-
course. In §5.2, I consider two such developments—those of Richard Joyce (2001, 
2005), and Daniel Nolan, Greg Restall and Caroline West (hereafter, NRW) (2005).   
In §5.3, I assess a number of challenges that have been directed against moral fic-
tionalism. These challenges do not strike me as devastating. They do suggest that 
moral fictionalism needs to be further refined. But they should not suggest to us that 
it ought to be abandoned.  
§5.4 marks the end of my friendship with the fictionalist. Here, I shift my critical 
focus to the attitudes that the fictionalist intends to substitute for our (erroneous) 
moral beliefs. These attitudes, I will argue, are neither a stable enough nor a strong 
enough basis for securing the practical benefits of our error-ridden moral practices. I 
conclude with a diagnosis of where moral fictionalism goes wrong (§5.5).  
§5.1 FICTIONALISM: A GENERAL OVERVIEW  
I will begin this chapter with a general overview of fictionalism in philosophy. Fol-
lowing a condensed introduction (§5.1.1), I turn to some important distinctions in 
  
163 
the current literature. The first concerns which kinds of attitudes we are to adopt and 
which kinds of speech-acts we are to make when we take on a fictionalist stance to-
wards a particular subject matter (§5.1.2). The second distinction marks a divide be-
tween those who think that we already use a particular discourse D in a fictional spirit, 
and those who recommend that we become fictionalists with respect to D (§5.1.3).   
§5.1.1 What is fictionalism? 
Drawing inspiration from Chris Daly (2008, pp.425-6), we can formulate fictionalism 
about some discourse D, schematically, as follows: 
(1) The fictionalist does not believe or assert any of the propositions expressed by 
the sentences of D, but  
(2) She believes that partaking in discourse D is useful 
Regarding (1), the fictionalist takes the sentences of D at face value; like other cogni-
tivists, she holds that the relevant language has a representational semantics, and is in 
the market for truth and falsity (Friend 2008 p.14; Kroon 2011, p.791). However, the 
fictionalist parts ways from the success theorist—and sides with the error theorist—
in maintaining that all of these sentences are strictly-speaking false.153  
A fictionalist about some discourse D, then, does not believe any of the proposi-
tions expressed by the sentences of D—she adopts a different attitude towards them. 
I will use ‘felief’ (forgive me) as a placeholder for this characteristic attitude that a fic-
tionalist has towards these propositions, and will consider different candidates for 
such an attitude in §5.1.2.  
An important corollary here is that the fictionalist does not assert any of the prop-
ositions expressed by the sentences of D either. One who sincerely asserts that p typ-
ically has the communicative intention of conveying that she believes that p (Daly 
2008, p.426). But as far as D is concerned, our fictionalist lacks any such intention; 
for she believes no such thing. She asserts that p with the communicative intention of 
 
153 Following our earlier discussion (§I), we might want to restrict this claim to the D-sentences of D. 
Presumably, the fictionalist about Sherlock Holmes will want to say that the sentence ‘there was never 
really a famous detective named Sherlock Holmes who lived on Baker St’ is true. See Brocke (2002) for 
discussion. 
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conveying that she felieves that p. I will use ‘fassertion’ as a placeholder for the distinc-
tive kind of speech-act that a fictionalist makes when she asserts one of the proposi-
tions expressed by the sentences of D. The task of characterising this speech-act is, 
again, one that I defer to §5.1.2. 
It should be noted that not anything goes as far as these feliefs and fassertions are 
concerned. As well as characterising the distinctive kinds of attitudes and speech-acts 
that her approach entails, the fictionalist also needs to explain the appropriateness of 
particular feliefs and fassertions and the inappropriateness of others (Nolan 2005, 
p.205). The fictionalist about Sherlock Holmes, for example, must explain why it is 
appropriate to felieve that Sherlock Holmes is a clever detective, and inappropriate to 
felieve that he is a timid meter maid. The (in)appropriateness of feliefs and fasser-
tions might be explained by appeal to truth-conditions; feliefs and fassertions might 
be correct insofar as they are true, and incorrect insofar as they are false. Or they 
might instead be explained by appeal to assertability conditions. (The latter may be a 
fitting approach for those fictionalists who deny that feliefs and fassertions are bear-
ers of truth and falsity.) 
Regarding (2), the (alleged) usefulness of D will vary from discourse to discourse. 
Mathematical discourse might be strictly speaking false, but talk of numbers might 
nonetheless be useful in scientific theorising. And though there may be no such 
things as viruses, quarks, or electrons (suppose), talk of unobservable entities might 
be useful for the purposes of medical intervention, or progress in physics.  
An important task for any fictionalist, then, is to motivate the claim that her can-
didate discourse can continue to deliver the goods even when it is used as a fiction. 
To this end, she does well to tell us how her fictionalist discourse is to interact with 
the base discourse (Nolan 2005, p.211; NRW 2005, pp.309-10). The base discourse en-
compasses our literal commitments, and so, it will not contain any sentences that 
commit us to the existence of those properties, objects, or relations which we intend 
to be purely fictional. The base discourse for a moral fictionalist, for example, will be 
free of sentences like ‘x is morally wrong’. 
A common strategy for explaining the interaction between the base discourse and 
the fictional discourse is to devise bridge-laws: “statements that connect what is literally 
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true in the base discourse with what is true in the fiction and vice versa” (Nolan 
2005, p.211; see also Field 1989).154 These bridge laws allow us to infer certain literal 
truths from others, following a detour through the fiction. The bridge laws provided 
by a fictionalism about unobservables, for instance, could allow us to infer from a pa-
tient’s pasty complexion and exhaustion (a literal truth) that she has contracted some 
virus (a fictional truth), and to infer, in turn, that she is likely to experience nausea 
and dizziness (another literal truth). Some claims that are true in the fiction will, of 
course, be literally true as well (Nolan 2005, p.212). It is, for example, true in the fic-
tion of Sherlock Holmes that there is a bustling city in Europe called London. 
In addition, the fictionalist should want to convince us that the use of these bridge 
laws will not be contrary to the interests in question (NRW 2005, pp.322-3; Nolan 
2005, p.211; 2014, p.218). To demonstrate, consider one potential benefit of fiction-
alism about unobservables: its associated bridge laws enable us to infer certain literal 
truths (e.g., the optimal kind of medical intervention) from other literal truths (e.g., a 
patient experiencing nausea), following a detour through the relevant fiction (accord-
ing to which the patient has a particular virus). To make the case that her fiction will 
be useful, then, the fictionalist about unobservables needs to show us that an infer-
ence from one literal claim to another that takes a detour through her proposed fic-
tion will not lead us to endorse any falsehoods. The most effective way to achieve 
this is, perhaps, to provide evidence that the relevant fiction is a conservative extension 
of the base discourse, in which case the use of its associated bridge laws simply could 
not lead one from literal truths to literal falsehoods (Field 1980).155 But it is also open 
to the fictionalist to provide other sorts of grounds for thinking that her proposal 
will generally be reliable (Nolan 2005, p.212).  
 
154 Common, but by no means universal. Walton (1990, ch.4) argues that paradigmatic fictional 
truths are generated in “complex and unsystematic” ways. 
155 Field (1980) famously motivates mathematical fictionalism by arguing that our mathematical 
theories are a conservative extension of our scientific theories. That is to say, these mathematical theo-
ries, when combined with our scientific theories, do not produce empirical consequences that could 
not have been derived from the scientific theories alone. Field takes these mathematical theories to be 
false on account of their falsely presuming the existence of numbers. However, he argues that since 
they (i) help us to more easily make derivations when practising science, and (ii) are conservative, and 
thus, do not produce any new empirical information, we can justify preserving mathematics in the 
form of a useful fiction. 
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A small clarification is needed before proceeding. For the purposes of this thesis, 
I regard fictionalism as a potential response to the WNQ for an error-ridden dis-
course. This is not necessarily misleading; error theory and fictionalism is a very pop-
ular package. However, some fictionalists are agnostic; they refrain from taking any 
stance on whether the sentences of the relevant discourse are true (e.g., van Fraassen 
1980, Dorr & Rosen 2002). Agnosticism may be a sound motivation for fictionalism. 
But error theorists cum fictionalists will be our primary focus here. 
§5.1.2 Prefix fictionalism and preface fictionalism 
There is some disagreement regarding the characteristic attitude that a fictionalist has 
towards the sentences of D, together with the sorts of speech-acts that she makes 
when she utters one of these sentences. Getting clear on these details will be useful 
for the purposes of later discussion—specifically, for categorising different moral fic-
tionalist proposals, and understanding the distinct problems that arise for them.  
Fictionalists fall into two broad camps on the matter of how best to characterise 
feliefs and fassertions. According to prefix fictionalists, fassertions are assertions and 
feliefs are beliefs. On this view, an individual who utters some fictional sentence is 
indeed asserting something. However, she is asserting something other than its literal 
content through invoking (implicitly or explicitly) some kind of prefix (Eklund 2015). 
To borrow a well-rehearsed example, the person who utters the sentence  
SH1  Sherlock Holmes lives on Baker Street 
does not thereby assert that Sherlock Holmes lives on Baker St. Instead, she asserts 
that  
SH2  According to Arthur Conan Doyle’s fiction, Sherlock Holmes lives on Baker 
Street 
Simply put, to fassert SH1 is to assert SH2, and to felieve SH1 is to believe SH2. Given 
prefix fictionalism, fassertions and feliefs are apt for truth and falsity; a fassertion or 
felief that p is true just in case according to the relevant fiction, p. Prefix fictionalism 
is a popular approach to discourse about paradigmatically fictional characters like 
Sherlock Holmes (see Lewis 1978, Brocke 2002). It has also been developed for 
modal language (Rosen 1990; Brogaard 2006).  
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Preface fictionalists, by contrast, take fassertions to be pretend-assertions, and feliefs 
to be make-beliefs. Instead of a prefix, there is instead effectively thought to be a 
kind of “disowning preface” in place that one that “rob[s] all that comes after of as-
sertoric force”—for instance, ‘let’s make believe the Holmes stories are true, though 
they aren’t’ (Lewis 2005, p.315). The preface fictionalist who utters or thinks to her-
self ‘Sherlock Holmes lives on Baker St’, then, neither asserts nor believes anything. 
She simply pretends to assert and make-believes that Sherlock Holmes lives on Baker 
St. 
Given preface fictionalism, fassertions and feliefs are not in the market for truth. 
But there can still be (in)appropriateness conditions for these attitudes and speech-
acts. A preface moral fictionalist, for example, might specify through her bridge laws 
that it’s appropriate to make-believe or to pretend to assert that something morally 
bad is taking place just in case something of such-and-such a sort is occurring (the 
infliction of great harm, say).156  
Moreover, it is not only assertions (or something like assertions) that can be made 
in fictional contexts. Other speech-acts—for example, questions and commands—
can also be expected to make an appearance.157 A moral fictionalist would likely want 
to include questions regarding what is right and wrong and commands to do the right 
thing in her repertoire of fictional speech acts as well (amongst other things). 
§5.1.3 Hermeneutic fictionalism and revolutionary fictionalism 
Sometimes, fictionalism is intended as a descriptive claim—as an account of how a 
discourse is used. Other-times, fictionalism is a call for change; it is recommended 
that we modify our use of some discourse by using it in a fictive spirit. The former 
has been dubbed hermeneutic fictionalism, the latter, revolutionary fictionalism.158 
 
156 There are other candidates for feliefs and fassertions that do not fall neatly into either of the 
two categories discussed here. Some take fassertions to be assertions that that are made under particu-
lar presuppositions (Hinckfuss 1993), and feliefs to be attitudes of acceptance (van Fraassen 1980, Yablo 
2001). 
157 I thank Daniel Nolan for bringing this to my attention. 
158 The hermeneutic–revolutionary distinction originates (at least to my knowledge) with John 
Burgess (1983). The distinction is sometimes described as one between ‘descriptive’ and ‘prescriptive’ 
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The hermeneutic fictionalist claims that we are already fictionalists about some 
discourse D. This proposal is particularly plausible as an account of paradigmatically 
fictional discourse. Presumably, we are fictionalists about Sherlock Holmes, Pegasus, 
and Luke Skywalker. (Few believe that they are relaying historical events when they 
rehearse the plot of The Empire Strikes Back.) A fictionalist approach allows us to ex-
plain why people who partake in Star Wars discourse are not thereby committed to 
the existence of Darth Vader, The Millennium Falcon, or Wookiees. In partaking in 
that discourse, they merely felieve and fassert that there are such things.  
As one can likely surmise, hermeneutic fictionalism does not make for a particu-
larly fitting package with an error theory; it is difficult (though perhaps not impossi-
ble) to hold ordinary speakers guilty of an error if they aren’t committed to the 
existence of those properties, objects or relations over which their fictional discourse 
quantifies. Interestingly, hermeneutic fictionalism has been put forward as an account 
of our existing moral discourse. Mark Kalderon (2005) argues that our attitudes to-
wards moral propositions are closer to attitudes of make-belief than belief. A form of 
non-cognitivism, this view evades moral error theory by denying that moral judg-
ments are beliefs. (Kalderon motivates his proposal by arguing that moral judgments 
are not governed by the same epistemic norms as beliefs, and so, cannot be beliefs.)  
Revolutionary fictionalism, by contrast, often goes hand in hand with error theo-
ry. The revolutionary fictionalist traditionally takes the sentences of her target dis-
course at face value; she interprets them literally, but holds that when so interpreted, 
they are systematically false. What makes revolutionary fictionalism revolutionary is that 
it recommends a radical change in the way that a discourse is used. Its proponents 
advise us to cease believing or asserting the propositions expressed by the sentences 
of the relevant discourse (on account of their falsity), and recommend that we re-
place these beliefs and assertions with feliefs and fassertions of some kind (on ac-
count of their anticipated usefulness).  
                                                                                                                                     
varieties of fictionalism (e.g., Ingram 2015, p.232). But being a ‘prescriptive’ fictionalist seems to me to 
be consistent with being a ‘descriptive’ fictionalist; one might think both that a discourse is used in a 
fictive spirit and that we ought to continue using it in this way. Alternatively, one might think that it is 
indeterminate whether or not the discourse is used fictionally, but that it ought to be in any case (see 
NRW 2005, p.322). The label ‘revolutionary’ more faithfully signals that fictionalism is a call for change. 
I thank Matthew Hammerton for helpful discussions on this point. 
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Revolutionary fictionalism will take centre stage in what follows; I mention her-
meneutic fictionalism largely to set it to the side. Any subsequent talk of ‘moral fic-
tionalists’ should therefore be taken to refer only to fictionalists of the revolutionary 
variety, unless otherwise stated. 
§5.2 MORAL FICTIONALISM 
I will now consider two varieties of moral fictionalism; those of Joyce (2001, 2005), 
and Nolan, Restall, and West (2005). These proposals differ along a number of di-
mensions, including what they take the greatest benefits of employing a moral fiction 
to be, and the distinct kinds of feliefs and fassertions that they recommend. These 
details will be important later on when considering the objections that have been 
brought to bear against each variety. 
§5.2.1 Joyce’s moral fictionalism  
The motivations underlying Joyce’s moral fictionalism are two-fold. The first is epis-
temic; moral fictionalism is thought to be attractive in virtue of ridding us of our 
false moral beliefs (pp.178-9). The second motivation is practical; moral fictionalism 
is also expected to secure many of the desirable practical goods that we associate 
with moral practice (pp.206-21).159  
Among these practical goods is that of “combatting weakness of will” (p.228). 
Joyce regards moral commitments as especially effective mechanisms of self-control 
(p.181). Even if a course of action is in our practical interests, and even if we judge it 
to be so, that is no guarantee that we will pursue it; for we are frequently weak-willed, 
and fail to act in accordance with our considered judgments (p.211). We might, for 
instance, succumb to the temptation to go back on our word, or to pinch a few pen-
nies from an unsuspecting friend.  
 
159 Insofar as having false beliefs is practically disadvantageous, the first motivation is to some extent 
practical as well (see Joyce, pp.175-80). But it does not strike me as unintuitive or misleading to 
characterise the first motivation as epistemic, inasmuch as holding onto false beliefs will often conflict 
with our epistemic ends (see §2.1.1). 
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These lapses may sometimes go unnoticed or unpunished, and so, it may occa-
sionally be in our immediate interests to be unco-operative. Yet being unco-operative 
is likely to be contrary to our long-term interests—one seldom does well in life through 
coming to earn a reputation as untrustworthy.160 Generally speaking, it is plausibly in 
our long-term interests to co-operate with others, and moral commitment is helpful 
in that regard (p.210). An agent who takes promise-keeping to be morally required of 
her is likely to be someone with a stronger resolve to keep her promises (recall 
§2.3.3). Thus, morality is useful in functioning as a bulwark against weakness of will; 
when we enlist moral concepts in our deliberations, we are more likely to act in ac-
cordance with our (long-term) practical interests.161 
It is Joyce’s contention that we can continue to enjoy these benefits—without be-
lieving moral propositions—by preserving our moral practices as a useful fiction. 
More specifically, he recommends that we adopt attitudes of “make-believe” (p.197) 
towards moral propositions, and “pretend to assert” moral sentences (p.291). As I 
understand it, then, Joyce’s proposal is a variety of preface fictionalism; life as a fictional-
ist consists in acts of pretence, rather than believing that such-and-such is the case 
according to some moral story.  
According to Joyce, make-beliefs have a number of important properties which 
distinguish them from other sorts of fictionalist attitudes. For one thing, make-beliefs 
involve thoughts unaccompanied by belief: when an agent make-believes that p, she is 
thinking the proposition p without believing it (p.197). Make-believing that p is also 
said to involve a disposition to withhold assent from p in “critical contexts”; contexts 
wherein we “…investigate and challenge the presuppositions of” ordinary thought 
(p.192). A moral fictionalist, for example, is disposed to attend to and express her be-
 
160 Joyce acknowledges that it might be in an agent’s short-term interests to (e.g.) break a promise 
when there is no possibility of being caught or earning an unfavourable reputation. But given the very 
real danger of miscalculating the risks and the high costs of error, he argues that it is likely to be in an 
individual’s long-term interests to adopt a policy of keeping her promises. Though doing so may not 
benefit her on each and every occasion, it is likely to benefit her in the long run (pp.212-3).   
161 Joyce considers other potential benefits of our moral practices as well (though he does not em-
phasise them to the same degree). He suggests that thinking in moral terms might also provide “a 
strong foundation for “moralistic aggression” towards defectors”, and that shared moral values may 
help to build social cohesion (p.228). 
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lief that nothing is really morally right or wrong when she finds herself in a philoso-
phy classroom.162  
On the matter of what we are to make-believe, Joyce suggests that a moral fiction 
“need consist primarily of a few general existential claims”—for instance, “there are 
obligations and prohibitions”, and “people have character traits” (p.195). He adds 
some platitudinous claims (e.g., “torturing babies to pass the time is always wrong”) 
to partially constrain what these obligations and character traits could be. Thus, 
Joyce’s moral fiction is effectively “a conceptual framework”—one that leaves many 
first-order moral questions open. Two moral fictionalists could not come to agree 
upon “…whether a second-trimester abortion is permissible … simply by consulting 
the “story of morality,” in the way that two Holmes fans may consult the canonical 
texts in order to settle a dispute about Watson’s war wound” (p.195).  
§5.2.2 Nolan, Restall, and West’s moral fictionalism  
NRW (2005) argue that moral fictionalism fares better than rival solutions to the 
WNQ for moral discourse. Like Joyce, they understand moral fictionalism to be su-
perior to conservationism (i.e., preserving our false moral beliefs) on epistemic 
grounds (2005, p.314). Insofar as moral fictionalism promises to secure the desirable 
practical goods that we associate with moral practice, it is also said to be an attractive 
alternative to abolitionism (2005, p.307).  
According to NRW, moral discourse is useful on account of the valuable role that 
it plays in directing our social lives; in helping us to co-ordinate our attitudes and 
regulate interpersonal conflict, for example (2005, p.314).163 With moral considera-
tions in hand, we have an established framework—one of rights, duties, obligations, 
and the like—with which to navigate our way through practical disputes. 
Whereas Joyce recommends a relatively open moral story, NRW seem to have a 
much richer fiction in mind. They propose that a moral fiction can contain first-
 
162 For further discussion, see Cuneo and Christy (2011, pp.87-8), who characterise a critical context 
as one where there is a strong presumption of truth-telling. They draw a comparison with the court 
room, wherein one swears to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. 
163 Following Joyce, NRW acknowledge that moral discourse may also be useful for combatting 
weakness of will. The difference here is largely a difference in emphasis. 
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order moral claims, citing act-utilitarianism as an example (2002, p.15, emphasis in 
original): 
An agent ought to do x only if no better action incompatible with x is possible for 
that agent. 
This fiction of act-utilitarianism could be connected to the base discourse via the fol-
lowing bridge law: 
The action x is better than the action y if and only if the action x would cause great-
er overall happiness than y would. 
The latter would allow us to infer certain literal truths from others, following a de-
tour through the moral fiction. For instance, from the (literal) truth that donating to 
charity would cause greater overall happiness than purchasing an expensive car, one 
could infer the (fictional) claim that one morally ought to donate to charity. Assum-
ing that the fictionalist takes herself to have good (non-moral) reasons to act as her 
fiction prescribes, she could then infer that she (non-morally) ought to donate to 
charity (a literal truth). 
Though they do explore different options, NRW are more or less neutral regard-
ing what sorts of attitudes and speech-acts feliefs and fassertions are to be. This is 
understandable, given that their foremost intention is to provide a blueprint for 
would-be fictionalists (and to build a case for the position), rather than a fully devel-
oped proposal. For the sake of contrasting different species of moral fictionalism, 
however, my dialectical choice will be to associate NRW with prefix fictionalism in 
what follows. 
§5.3 THE CASE AGAINST MORAL FICTIONALISM  
There are a number of objections that have been raised against moral fictionalism. 
But it would be intellectually dishonest of me to use all of these to my advantage, 
since I do not regard all of them as especially worrying. I am inclined to view many 
such challenges as problems that can be solved with some fancy footwork in the phi-
losophy of language, rather than problems that go to the heart of the fictionalist’s 
proposal.  
Of course, it would also be intellectually dishonest of me to ignore these challeng-
es altogether. But since it is not ultimately my intention in this chapter to defend moral 
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fictionalism, I am not going to develop detailed responses to each of these challenges 
on the fictionalist’s behalf. Instead, I will explain why we have good reason to regard 
them as surmountable. 
§5.3.1 An acceptance-transfer problem  
A key selling point of fictionalism is its potential to secure many of the benefits of 
(our erroneous) moral discourse. Among these is the valuable role that moral dis-
course plays in “…inter- and intrapersonal reasoning and deliberation” (NRW 2005, 
p.307). Presumably, then, fictionalists should want to preserve our practices of put-
ting forward and evaluating moral arguments. However, some have argued that pref-
ace fictionalists are likely to have trouble doing so. Olson (2011c) and Lenman (2013) 
expect that the preface fictionalist will have difficulty licensing the rational transfer of 
acceptance from the premises of valid moral arguments to their conclusions.  
To appreciate the problem, we can begin by noting how acceptance-transfer usu-
ally works: since the conclusion of a valid modus ponens argument (say) is a conse-
quence of its premises, it seems that insofar as someone is rational, and they accept 
the premises, they have good reason to accept the conclusion.164 This is just to say 
that acceptance, like truth, usually transfers from the premises to the conclusion of a 
valid argument. 
Now, if moral acceptance is belief, we can offer a fairly straightforward explanation 
of this transfer of acceptance. The goal of truth-seeking is plausibly built into belief, 
and an individual with jointly inconsistent beliefs knows that they cannot all be true. 
Thus, someone who accepts the first two premises of a modus ponens argument will 
usually have a reason to believe the conclusion; she would be inconsistent not to do 
so. (See Oddie & Demetriou 2007, p.493.) 
Yet the preface moral fictionalist’s recommended attitudes towards moral propo-
sitions are attitudes of make-belief. These certainly don’t seem to aim at truth. It’s also 
not clear that make-believing incompatible propositions is inconsistent, nor that 
someone who make-believes the premises of a valid argument has a reason to make-
 
164 My characterisation of this problem borrows heavily from Oddie & Demetriou (2007). 
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believe its conclusion. Preface moral fictionalists would therefore seem to have diffi-
culty accommodating the inference-licensing properties of valid moral arguments. 
This challenge has been raised by James Lenman, who writes: 
If I believe that p and believe that if p then q, logic requires me to believe 
that q. But if I pretend that p and pretend that if p then q, logic doesn’t re-
quire me to do anything. (2013, p.406)  
The problem has also been noted by Jonas Olson, who claims that 
… pretending to believe the premises of a logically valid argument does not 
commit one to pretend to believe the conclusion. Acts of pretence and pre-
tence attitudes, I submit, are not subject to norms of consistency. (2011c, 
p.191) 
Yet the acceptance-transfer problem is not new—it has been brandished against non-
cognitivists for quite some time.165 So it would be surprising if there were no system-
atic attempts to address the problem. And there certainly have been such attempts. A 
wise move for the preface fictionalist would therefore be to turn to non-cognitivists 
for help; she might draw inspiration from their proposed solutions.  
There are countless options to choose from here. Among these is Simon Black-
burn’s (1984, pp.192-5) development of the idea that there can be consistency con-
straints among non-cognitive attitudes. There is admittedly a common worry for 
Blackburn’s proposal; many complain that the inferences that he licenses among 
moral judgments are not properly called logical inferences (Hale 1986, Schueler 1988, 
van Roojen 2005). What Blackburn rather shows is that someone must hold particu-
lar moral judgments if they hold others in order to be pragmatically consistent in their 
attitudes. (As Hale (1986, p.74) notes, “Don’t do what you boo!” very much seems to 
be a requirement of pragmatic rather than logical consistency.) Yet this problem for 
Blackburn is not necessarily a problem for the preface fictionalist (see Svoboda 2017, 
p.70). The name of the game for the non-cognitivist is to provide an adequate de-
scriptive account of moral practice. But the fictionalist’s task is only to preserve 
something that will do the pragmatic work, and Blackburn’s framework may very 
well suffice for these purposes. 
 
165 The locus classicus is Geach (1965). For more recent developments, see Dorr (2002) and 
Schroeder (2010). 
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Another option for the fictionalist would be to appeal to principles that seem to 
govern our engagement with fictions more generally.166 Kendall Walton’s (1990) ac-
count provides something in the way of guidance. Walton understands fictional 
truths (e.g., ‘it is fictional that p’) in terms of what a particular game of make-belief 
prescribes us to imagine. Within children’s games of make-belief, these prescriptions to 
imagine might be understood as stipulations—for example, ‘wherever there is a tree 
stump, imagine that there is a bear’ (1990, p.38). Building upon this, the preface fic-
tionalist could develop appropriateness conditions for moral make-belief—for ex-
ample, by claiming that it is appropriate to make-believe some moral proposition p iff 
p is authorised by the relevant moral fiction, and by specifying which imaginings the 
moral fiction prescribes. To cover all bases here, she might even prescribe that it is 
inappropriate to imagine anything that is logically incompatible with what is stipulat-
ed by the fiction.  
Admittedly, this is only a start.167 But it is not my intention here to provide a fully-
developed fictionalist proposal. My intention is only to give moral fictionalism a fair 
hearing, and I do not think those who raise worries regarding acceptance-transfer 
have done so. Though the fictionalist is perhaps not out of the woods just yet, she 
does have some promising strategies available to her.   
§5.3.2 A validity problem  
Joyce has suggested that prefix moral fictionalists will have difficulty accommodating 
the validity of moral arguments (2005, p.292).168 To demonstrate the worry, he invites 
us to consider a prefix fictionalist, David, who approves of a valid argument of the 
following sort: 
K1  If my cousin is an infant, then it is wrong to kill my cousin 
K2  My cousin is an infant 
K3  Therefore, it is wrong to kill my cousin.  
 
166 I thank Daniel Nolan for helpful discussions on this point. 
167 I acknowledge that further complications raised by Oddie and Demetriou (2007) would also 
need to be addressed. 
168 Joyce frames his discussion in terms of prefix colour fictionalism. But as I understand him, he 
takes the problem to generalise. So I will reframe things in terms of moral fictionalism here.  
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According to Joyce, David faces the following dilemma (2005, p.292). On the one 
hand, he might take only those sentences containing moral terminology (K1 and K3) 
to be prefixed by a fictional operator (e.g., ‘according to the moral fiction…’). The 
problem with this move is that the argument above (which is surely valid) is no long-
er valid—it is no longer an instance of modus ponens. Alternatively, David might prefix 
all three claims with a fictional operator. This move maintains validity, but Joyce com-
plains that it is utterly unmotivated; insofar as a moral fiction has any content at all, 
that content surely doesn’t include any claims about the age of David’s cousin.169 
It seems to me that the moral fictionalist should simply take the second horn, 
which pace Joyce, I don’t think is much of a horn. It is very common for some things 
that are true in fictions to be true in real life as well (Ryan 1980, Gendler 2000, 
Weatherson 2004, Nolan 2005). We often import truths about the actual world into 
fictional stories. We typically hold fixed, for example, the truths of logic and mathe-
matics, the laws of physics, and perhaps even general facts about human psychology 
(Gendler 2000, p.78). Fictions are also governed by rules of export. That we export 
some truths from fictions should come as no surprise—people often learn about the 
past from great works of literature. One might, for example, learn how women wore 
their hair in nineteenth-century France by reading a story that takes place during that 
period (Gendler 2000, p.76).170 It doesn’t seem to be particularly problematic for the 
moral fictionalist, then, if some things that are true in the moral fiction—the age of 
someone’s cousin, say—are true in real life as well. She simply needs to develop rules 
of import and export to account for this.  
Joyce (2005, p.293) suggests that this would give rise to confusion. If David im-
ports quite a number of literal truths into his moral fiction, then how shall we deter-
mine whether claims like ‘my cousin is an infant’ are intended as literal or fictional? 
 
169 It’s worth noting (again) that I’ve slightly modified Joyce’s original discussion of the colour 
fictionalist in order to explore the challenge as it applies to the prefix moral fictionalist. His original 
example is the following argument: (1) Fresh grass is green, (2) My lawn is made of fresh grass, (c) 
Therefore, my lawn is green. His complaint (which parallels the one above) is that “The fiction of a 
colored world, in so far as it has a determinate content at all, does not include claims about what 
anybody’s lawn is made of” (2005, p.292).  
170 Of course, it is certainly possible to make errors in exportation. (See Mag Uidhir 2013.) This is 
perhaps more easily avoided in “distorting fictions” (Gendler 2000, p.77), which wear their departure 
from actuality on their sleeve.  
  
177 
The answer, it seems to me, is that we are very often able to know whether literal 
claims that have been imported into fictions are intended as literal or fictional. We 
often have ample evidence with which to distinguish someone who is speaking of our 
London from someone who is speaking of the London imported into the world of 
Sherlock Holmes. For the most part, context tends to do a lot of the work here. We 
take someone who claims that Sherlock Holmes lives nearer to Paddington Station 
than to Waterloo to have imported facts about London’s geography into the story, 
and to be speaking of what is true of London within that story.171 But in a context 
free of any mention of Holmes, Watson, or Moriarty, there seems to be no reason to 
take someone who says ‘let’s walk to Paddington station from Baker St, seeing as it’s 
closer than Waterloo’ to be speaking of the London described by Arthur Conan 
Doyle. It is open to the prefix moral fictionalist to argue that the context of her ut-
terance will determine (or largely determine) whether or not a moral fictionalist is 
making a straightforward literal claim, or a literal claim that has been imported into 
the moral story.  
§5.3.3 A problem with preserving moral disagreement 
Fictionalists who takes moral discourse to be useful on account of its valuable role in 
coordinating interpersonal behaviour should want to make room for genuine moral 
disagreements. When we disagree over the moral permissibility of abortion, our 
claims seem to truly conflict with one another. Our impression that moral disagree-
ments are genuine explains (in part) why it is that we can often hope to co-ordinate 
our behaviour through moral dispute and reasoned argument. If ‘permissible’ meant 
something different in your mouth than it did in mine, then we couldn’t hope to co-
ordinate our behaviour through coming to a(n apparent) consensus; if you agree to 
act under the supposition that abortion is permissible, and I agree to act under the 
supposition that abortion is permissible*, then what’s to say that we’ve agreed to be-
have in the same way? 
Yet some have argued that prefix fictionalists will have difficulty preserving genu-
ine moral disagreement. Olson (2011c) makes the point by inviting us to imagine two 
 
171 The Paddington Station example is Lewis’s (1978, p.41) 
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moral fictionalists: Con, a consequentialist, and Don, a deontologist. Con and Don 
(seem to) disagree about the right response to the trolley problem. Con claims that 
‘according to the moral fiction, one is morally required to flip the switch’ (C), and 
Don claims that ‘according to the moral fiction, one is not morally required to flip the 
switch’ (D). On first appearances, C and D appear to be incompatible claims. But 
Olson argues that these claims are incompatible only if we take Con and Don to have 
subscribed to the same moral fiction. And he denies that the moral fictionalist is justi-
fied in assuming this: 
Since Con is, in the moral fictionalist discourse, a consequentialist, he is pre-
sumably referring to a fiction in which an action is morally required if and 
only if it maximizes happiness. And for parallel reasons, Don is, let’s as-
sume, referring to a fiction in which an action is morally impermissible if it 
treats a person as a mere means. (2011c, p.186) 
Yet this strikes me as unfair. It is up to the moral fictionalist to decide how determi-
nate the content of her fiction is to be. She could of course recommend a multitude 
of moral fictions, each of which specifies which actions (or kinds of actions) are 
morally right and wrong. But she might equally well recommend a single moral fic-
tion, and hold that all that is true according to that moral fiction is that there exist 
such things as categorical reasons, rights, and duties. (Recall that Joyce (p.195) takes a 
moral fiction to be a “conceptual framework”.) This more minimal fiction would not 
settle whether or not an action is morally required if and only if it maximises happi-
ness, or whether or not an action is morally impermissible if it treats a person as a 
mere means.172  
The latter option (adopting a more minimal moral fiction, that is) does not seem 
vulnerable to Olson’s objection. It is possible for Con and Don to subscribe to the 
same moral fiction—one according to which there exists such things as categorical 
reasons, rights, and duties—but to genuinely disagree upon what their moral duties 
 
172 There is a slight complication here. Since we are operating under the assumption that the moral 
error theory is necessarily true, the moral fiction may very well describe an impossibility. How exactly 
we can reason about or from impossibilities is a good question, but it is not one that I will attempt to 
answer here. For discussion, see Nolan (1997). See also NRW (2005, pp.325-7), who suggest some 
ways in which a moral fictionalist could hope to get by with impossible moral fictions.  
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are. So long as the moral fiction is sufficiently indeterminate, it will be possible for 
two parties to disagree about which actions it prescribes.173  
Of course, a moral fictionalist may want to avoid excessive indeterminacy. (If her 
fiction leaves everything open, then it may fail to be action-guiding.) But there are ways 
to constrain the content of a moral fiction. The platitudes that Joyce includes (“tor-
turing babies to pass the time is always wrong”) are not simply thrown in for good 
measure. They introduce conceptual constraints upon what sorts of things could be 
true according to the moral fiction. A moral fiction that included such platitudes 
wouldn’t permit us to identify something’s being morally good with its being a par-
ticular shade of blue.  
Other constraints might arise from our psychological limitations. There is a well-
known phenomenon of imaginative resistance. Though people can entertain many far-
fetched fictional scenarios with ease, they find it difficult to comply with prescrip-
tions to imagine deviant moral judgments— “in killing her baby, Giselda did the 
right thing; after all, it was a girl”, for example (Walton 1994, p.37).174 The moral fic-
tionalist might therefore require that any candidate moral fiction be user-friendly (i.e., 
that its content be possible to imagine). This would place further restrictions upon 
what its content could be. 
5.3.4 The case against moral fictionalism: summing up 
I have argued that many criticisms of moral fictionalism should not strike us as espe-
cially troubling. What these criticisms should suggest to us is that fictionalists have 
some more house-keeping to do. It was not my intention here to get all of that house 
work done. But I have made some suggestions as to how the fictionalist might get 
started.  
 
173 Another option for the moral fictionalist would be to recommend multiple, more substantive 
moral fictions, and to explain how we can hope to achieve co-ordination through fictional moral dis-
putes in the absence of genuine disagreement. To this end, she might borrow some resources from 
relativists (e.g., MacFarlane 2007). 
174 For discussion, see Walton (1994), Moran (1994), Gendler (2000), and Weatherson (2004). The 
phenomenon seems to apply to other sorts of deviant judgments as well—prescriptions to imagine 
mathematical falsehoods, for example.  
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§5.4 THE REAL CASE AGAINST MORAL FICTIONALISM  
I will now proceed to develop what I take to be the real case against moral fictional-
ism, using Olson’s (2014) critique of preface moral fictionalism as a launch-pad into 
the discussion. The moral fictionalist, recall, promises us the best of both worlds: she 
assures us that we can continue to enjoy the advantages of engaging in moral practice 
without holding onto our erroneous moral beliefs. According to Olson, there is a 
tension in this promise:  
One recommendation is to practice self-surveillance to make sure moral be-
lief is avoided. This seems to involve occasionally attending to the belief 
that morality is fiction. A second recommendation is to suppress or silence 
belief to the effect that morality is fiction. This leads to instability in that 
while ways of thought and behaviour likely to prompt moral belief are rec-
ommended, moral belief is to be avoided. (2014, p.190)  
Thus, the moral fictionalist seems to face the following dilemma. If she wants to 
make good on her epistemic promise, then she must avoid becoming too immersed 
in her moral pretence. Otherwise, she risks a slip into moral belief (horn one). To 
avoid this slip, she must exercise epistemic caution, regularly attending to her belief 
that morality is merely a fiction. Such caution is, however, in tension with her practi-
cal promise; reminding herself that morality is a fiction is likely to prevent her from 
taking the pretence suitably seriously (horn two).  
I think that the fictionalist can avoid impaling herself on Olson’s first horn; she is 
not plausibly guilty of any moral believing. In what follows, I will argue for this claim 
on the fictionalist’s behalf by drawing attention to important behavioural and psy-
chological differences between attitudes of belief and make-belief (§5.4.1).  
However, I also think that avoiding Olson’s first horn makes the second consid-
erably worse for the fictionalist. Once we appreciate these important differences be-
tween belief and make-belief, we see why it is that the fictionalist cannot plausibly 
make good on her practical promise. Certain characteristic features of make-belief 
suggest that it would be a rather poor substitute for moral belief (§5.4.2). In §5.4.3, I 
will argue that parallel problems apply to the fictional beliefs recommended by prefix 
fictionalists as well. Nothing I say should suggest to us that fictionalist attitudes 
would be utterly useless. But they should lead us to doubt the extent to which fictional-
ist attitudes are likely to be as useful as full-blooded moral beliefs. This insight is, in 
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large, part, what motivates the conservationist proposal developed in the following 
chapters. 
§5.4.1 Horn 1: the slip into belief 
Olson argues that the immersed moral fictionalist is very likely to slip back into mor-
al belief, reneging on her epistemic promise. Yet not much is said to motivate this 
claim. In its defence, Olson does little more than point out that moral make-believers 
would have to adopt incredibly similar behavioural and psychological dispositions as 
moral believers (with respect to moral propositions): 
… someone who takes up a fictionalist stance to morality adopts certain 
behavioural dispositions and backs them up by moralizing her thoughts, i.e. 
by thinking of certain actions as wrong, unfair, or undeserved, etc.… But 
given successful adoption of the relevant behavioural dispositions, it seems 
difficult in many cases to avoid believing the relevant moral propositions, as 
opposed to merely accepting them or thinking about them. (2014, p.189, em-
phasis in original) 
… acquiring physical and psychological dispositions to behave in accord-
ance with the fictional moral norms makes it all the more likely that one 
slips from moralized thought into moral belief.175 (2014, p.189) 
This at least gives us something to work with. In what follows, I will build a case for 
Olson’s first horn on his behalf, suggesting two ways in which it might be argued that 
the immersed moral fictionalist risks a slip into moral belief. Neither, I will argue, is 
promising.  
First, the idea that make-belief is likely to lead to genuine belief might be ad-
vanced as an empirical claim. Perhaps it is a psychological fact about ordinary agents 
that when immersed in a pretence, they usually find it difficult to avoid believing 
what they initially set out to merely pretend. Unfortunately, Olson doesn’t provide us 
with any evidence to support this claim. And there is evidence that speaks against it.  
 
175 Garner briefly voices a similar suspicion when he suggests that if the moral fictionalist 
“…begins to have moral feelings, moral outrage, moral guilt, and moral arguments, then we have eve-
ry reason to say that he has reverted to his former moral beliefs, and to the error he once identified 
and abandoned” (2007, p.509). 
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Experimental studies suggest that pretence-subserving representations are typical-
ly “quarantined” from representations of reality in games of make-belief (Leslie 
1987). A child may pretend that a banana is a telephone, but she never loses sight of 
the fact that it is a banana. The events that occur within a pretence are only taken to 
have effects within that circumscribed domain; when the child pretends to talk to her 
father on the banana/telephone, she does not afterwards believe that she ever really 
had that conversation (Nichols & Stich 2000, p.120). These events are not treated as 
relevant to guiding action in the outside world—if someone breaks a leg, no one uses 
a banana to call an ambulance. 
Acts of pretence might therefore be said involve a kind of dual-representation; the 
child simultaneously represents the banana as a banana, and as a telephone. What is 
important is that she never surrenders the capacity to distinguish what is real from 
what is imagined. Indeed, this distinguishing capacity is so commonplace that some 
have taken its absence as a sign of pathology; it has been suggested that some mental 
disorders might profitably be explained in terms of a failure to quarantine what is real 
from what is imagined. (See Currie 2000.) Absent any argument to the effect that 
immersed make-belief merits such a worrying prognosis, it seems uncharitable to de-
ny to the fictionalist a distinguishing capacity that is reliably present in young chil-
dren.  
We also seem to have decent anecdotal evidence that make-belief isn’t likely to 
lead to belief. Currie and Sterelny put the point particularly nicely:  
… the view that we believe in the fictions we encounter, even when we get 
deeply absorbed in those fictions, remains a non-starter. We do not rush on 
stage to Desdemona’s defence, or seek to intervene in even the most natu-
ralistically staged aggressions…If we say that those engaged by a fiction are 
limited believers of it, we are bound to say that being engaged by a fiction is 
an epistemic vice. If we say that those engaged by a murder on stage believe, 
to some degree, that a murder is about to be committed in front of them, 
we are bound to say that their unwillingness to intervene is a moral vice. But 
fictions are not entrapment tools, and responsiveness to fiction is an imagi-
native virtue, not a vice of any kind. (2000, pp.150-51) 
Following Currie and Sterelny, the claim that an immersed make-believer risks a slip 
into belief would seem to wholly mischaracterise our engagement with fiction. Worse 
still, it casts those who partake in pretence as moral villains or epistemic failures—
which is neither plausible, nor appealing. 
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As an empirical claim, the idea that make-belief is likely to lead to belief seems 
implausible. However, there is another kind of argument that could be developed on 
Olson’s behalf. Perhaps we have simply been operating upon a faulty understanding 
of belief. Given certain assumptions about the conditions under which an agent be-
lieves that p, perhaps immersed make-belief would (as a conceptual matter) properly be 
classified as genuine belief after all.  
Of course, this objection would require adopting a particular understanding of be-
lief. Given Olson’s remarks concerning the behavioural and psychological disposi-
tions of moral make-believers, a natural route (at least for the sake of exploring this 
option) would be to operate upon a dispositionalist account of belief, which I shall un-
derstand as follows: 
Dispositionalism 
Beliefs are to be characterised in terms of an agent’s dispositions.176 
The common thread that runs through different varieties of dispositionalism is the 
idea that beliefs can be characterised in terms of their functional roles. The relevant 
roles here, being dispositions, are ‘forward-looking’ in that they tell us what kinds of 
states a belief that p typically brings about (Stalnaker 1984). One who believes that p 
will, for instance, typically be disposed to assent to q if shown that p implies q, to ex-
press surprise upon hearing that not p, and so on. An agent who has these and other 
relevant psychological and behavioural dispositions can be said to believe that p. 
(These claims plausibly come attached with tacit ‘if’ clauses; an agent who believes 
that p will typically be disposed to assert that p if she has not decided to deceive oth-
ers about her beliefs, if she has not lost her voice, and so on. (See Schwitzgebel 2002, 
p.253.) I will return to this issue in §6.3, where drawing out some of the finer linea-
ments of dispositionalism will be needed. The basic idea should suffice for now.) 
Here, then, is how we might go about arguing for the conceptual claim that im-
mersed make-belief is properly classified as belief. We might begin with the idea that 
moral believers have particular dispositions in virtue of which they can be said to be-
 
176 I’ve intentionally offered a schematic characterisation here that is neutral between varieties of 
dispositionalism that identify beliefs with the mental states that typically cause particular dispositions, 
and those that identify beliefs with the dispositions themselves. My arguments do not rest upon going 
one way or the other. 
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lieve some moral proposition p. We might then point out that moral make-believers do 
not seem meaningfully different from moral believers at all with respect to these dis-
positions. Indeed, it would seem to be more or less business as usual for the convert 
to fictionalism; she is so immersed in her pretence that she scarcely pays any atten-
tion at all to the fact that it but a mere fiction. Her moral thoughts come to be “well-
rooted habits of thinking” (Joyce, pp.218-9). She continues to enter into moral dis-
putes, and to speak of “goodness and badness, rightness and wrongness, duties, jus-
tice, and obligations” (NRW 2005, pp.311-2). 
All in all, the psychological and behavioural dispositions of a make-believer seem 
to be incredibly similar to those of a moral believer. This charitable reconstruction is 
an alternative way to make sense of Olson’s claim that an immersed fictionalist is a 
run-of-the-mill believer. A make-belief walks like a belief, talks like a belief, and 
sounds like a belief. So the onus is upon the fictionalist to tell us why it isn’t a belief. 
(As Douglas Adams (2014, p.227) puts it, “If it looks like a duck, and quacks like a 
duck, we have at least to consider the possibility that we have a small aquatic bird of 
the family anatidae on our hands”.) 
This problem is not new. Distinguishing beliefs from fictionalist attitudes has long 
been a challenge for fictionalist proposals. Many suspect that the distinction here is 
bogus; that it is a “distinction without a difference” (Horwich 1991, p.3; see also 
O’Leary-Hawthorne 1997, Rosen & Burgess 2004). Since the psychological and be-
havioural profile of (certain) fictionalists attitudes seems indistinguishable from that 
of belief, it is tempting to think that there is no real difference between them. It is my 
contention that this burden can be discharged as far as make-beliefs are concerned. 
As I shall now argue, the fictionalist can meet the challenge by pointing towards im-
portant differences between believers and make-believers.177  
One possible difference between the dispositions of a believer and those of a 
make-believer was considered earlier (§5.2.1). Joyce, recall, distinguishes his moral 
fictionalist from a moral believer by appealing to her disposition to withhold assent from 
 
177 Since I am responding here on behalf of moral fictionalists who recommend attitudes of make-
belief, what I have to say may not double as a defence of the fictionalists targeted by Horwich (1991) 
and others, who recommend attitudes of acceptance. The slip-into-belief worry may very well be harder 
to avoid in this case. I will discuss acceptance in greater detail in §7.1.  
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positive, first-order moral claims in critical contexts. This suggests the following dif-
ference between belief and make-belief: 
BEL1  
One who believes that p will typically be disposed to assent to p in critical and 
non-critical contexts. 
M-BEL1  
One who make-believes that p will typically be disposed to assent to p in non-
critical contexts and to withhold assent from p in critical contexts. 
This distinction has some initial appeal. However, I worry that BEL1 is false. As 
Joyce characterises a critical context, it is one in which an agent “investigates and 
challenges the presuppositions of ordinary thinking”—the philosophy classroom be-
ing a prime example (pp.190-94). But it is far from obvious that we are disposed to 
assent even to very firmly held beliefs in critical contexts, so understood. Plausibly, 
the average student believes that she has hands, that there are numbers, and that the 
sun will rise tomorrow. But she may not be so willing to assent to such claims in the 
philosophy classroom. 
But no matter. There are other important differences between believers and 
make-believers. To begin with, make-beliefs can typically be resisted or acquired at 
will. Indeed, I would go so far as to say that it is constitutive of make-belief that it be 
tied to our will. We choose to participate in games of make-belief—we elect to imagine, 
and we decide to pretend. It seems close to being analytic that an individual could not 
pretend to do something that she did not set out to pretend. As Searle (1975, p.325) 
notes, ‘pretend’ is an intentional verb, one with the concept of intention built into it.  
Not only are make-beliefs the sorts of attitudes that we can choose to dispense 
with—they are also especially liable to being dispensed with when the practical stakes 
are high. Oddie and Demetriou offer a nice illustrative example: 
Suppose it is true in [a] play that two people are chatting comfortably on a 
couch in their home, and that their home is not on fire. As we get into the 
play, we make-believe that that is true. Now, if smoke starts seeping onto 
the stage from backstage but it is clearly true, in the play, that there is no 
smoke in the room, we tend in such circumstances to abandon the make-
belief (that there is no smoke in the room) and go with the belief (that there 
is smoke), and it is entirely reasonable to do so. (2007, p.487) 
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Following Oddie and Demetriou, make-beliefs are “highly overridable” attitudes 
(2007, p.487). When the practical stakes go up, we typically can and do dispense with 
them—and rightly so if they cease to be useful to us.  
In this respect, make-belief is markedly different from belief. Indeed, some claim 
that an attitude so intimately tied to one’s will could not possibly be a belief (e.g., 
Railton 2003). But a far weaker claim will serve the distinction that I am seeking to 
establish here. Whatever one has to say about the control that we may be able to ex-
ert over our beliefs, it certainly doesn’t seem constitutive of belief that it be tied to our 
will. There are attitudes that urge themselves upon us that are properly called beliefs. 
The clearest cases are perhaps the beliefs that we form on the basis of perception; 
our coming to believe that there is a house in front of us after having perceived a 
house, say. It’s hard to make the case that one has any real say on the matter here.178  
Moreover, one does not typically cease believing that p when that belief is contra-
ry to one’s practical interests.179 Suppose that I have excellent evidence that my part-
ner has cheated on me, and that this has a significant impact upon my daily 
functioning; I feel hurt and betrayed, and am consumed by a desire for revenge. It 
might be in my interests to dispense with my beliefs regarding their infidelity. (Doing 
so might help us to go back to the way things were.) But it seems implausible to say 
that someone in my situation would typically be capable of doing so.  
What I am proposing, then, is that we have comparatively little control over our be-
liefs. Make-beliefs are easily overridden—and rightly so when the pretence ceases to 
be useful to us. But we neither do nor can typically dispense with a belief that p after 
 
178 I am not claiming that we always acquire perceptual beliefs simply in virtue of seeing the world. 
We might, for instance, have independent evidence that what we are seeing is an illusion. I only claim 
that when one sees that the world is thus-and-so, one also typically believes that the world is thus-and-
so. If one sees a certain object as a tree, then, absent any countervailing considerations, it is typically 
difficult not to believe that there is indeed a tree there. For further discussion of belief being the “de-
fault state”, see Egan (2008, pp.55-8). 
179 There might be exceptional cases of, course. Under threat of torture, Winston (of Orwell’s 
1984) comes to believe that 2+2=5. But such exceptional shouldn’t pose too great a threat to the gen-
eral claim that beliefs do not typically fall by the wayside when the practical stakes go up. 
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having come to appreciate that such a belief is contrary to our practical interests.180 
This suggests the following difference between belief and make-belief: 
BEL2   
One who believes that p will typically persist with that belief even when the stakes 
are suitably high so as to render that belief contrary to her practical interests.  
M-BEL2  
One who make-believes that p will not typically persist with that make-belief when 
the stakes are suitably high so as to render that make-belief contrary to her practi-
cal interests.   
BEL2 dovetails nicely with the well-known idea that beliefs aim at truth (Williams 
1973, Velleman 2000, Wedgwood 2002, Boghossian 2003, Shah 2003).181 To maintain 
that we are typically capable of believing whatever we like at will would be to suggest 
that we can typically believe propositions without any regard whatever as to wheth-
er they are true (Williams 1973, Velleman 2000). Yet that seems to run contrary to 
the popular idea that part of what it is to believe that p is to hold that belief that ac-
countable to truth. Perhaps this is why it strikes many as odd to think we can choose 
beliefs at our fancy.  
Yet another difference between belief and make-belief concerns the distinctive 
ways in which these attitudes integrate with the rest of our psychology and our be-
haviour. I will here focus upon the different ways in which belief, as opposed to 
make-belief, elicits particular emotional responses. As Shaun Nichols points out, our 
affective responses to fictions can differ strikingly from our responses to belief: 
At the end of Dr. Strangelove, we imagine that all human life is about to be 
destroyed, and we find this amusing in the context of the film. Presumably 
this is not how we would react if we had the real belief that all human life is 
about to be destroyed. Perhaps if we really believed that all human life was 
about to be destroyed, we could find some humor in the situation, but sure-
 
180 Doxastic voluntarists might beg to differ, of course. But doxastic voluntarism is not especially 
popular, nor appealing—at least not in its most philosophically interesting manifestations. (More on 
this in §7.4.)  
181 I acknowledge that claims regarding the truth-directedness of belief are open to a number of 
different interpretations; such claims may be claims regarding what is conceptually constitutive of belief 
(as in Boghossian 2003) or what is constitutive of the essence of belief (as in Velleman 2000, Wedgwood 
2002), or something else still. Since the basic point here does not rest heavily upon any single precisifi-
cation, I will leave the matter open. 
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ly this would not be the predominant emotional response. (2006, p.464) 
We shouldn’t oversell the point here. Our affective responses to fictions don’t always 
differ strikingly from our responses to belief. (Few feel warm and fuzzy inside when 
watching man-eating spiders on their television.) Nonetheless, these affective re-
sponses can be expected to differ in a number of important respects. One who be-
lieves that there is a huntsman spider lurking beneath their bed (a reasonable belief to 
have when one lives in Australia), is apt to feel a very real kind of fear—a fear that 
someone who make-believes that a rock is a spider is unlikely to experience. 
This is not to deny that our engagement with fictions can prompt emotional re-
sponse.182 Nor is it to deny that these responses can prompt similar kinds of behav-
iour. As Nichols and Stich note when reporting the results of a study: 
… in our burglar in the basement scenario, one subject picked up the phone 
that was available and dialed 9-1-1. However, she took precautions to en-
sure that the call did not really go through. She didn’t want her behavior to 
be that similar…she wanted to be sure that the police didn’t really come. 
(2000, p.129) 
The important point to appreciate is that whatever affective responses make-beliefs 
are capable of eliciting, these can be expected to integrate with the rest of our psy-
chology and our behaviour in importantly different ways than the affective responses 
triggered by belief. Someone who believes that Freddie Kruger exists is likely to fear 
encountering him in her dreams, and to take steps to ensure her safety; she might 
sleep less often, or bring a crucifix to bed. One who merely make-believes that Fred-
die Kruger exists while watching A Nightmare on Elm St is unlikely to take such steps 
to avoid him. (Though she may have more trouble than usual falling asleep.) This 
suggests another important difference between attitudes of belief and make-belief: 
BEL3   
One who believes that p will typically be disposed to experience the emotions ste-
reotypically associated with believing that p, and to engage in the behaviour stereo-
typically associated with believing that p. 
 
182 Though some (e.g. Walton 1990, ch.7) do come close to denying this.  
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M-BEL3   
One who make-believes that p will not typically be disposed to experience the 
emotions stereotypically associated with believing that p, or to engage in the be-
haviour stereotypically associated with believing that p. 
Three quick caveats here. First, although talk of stereotypical emotions and be-
haviour seems sensible enough, we may sometimes want to relativise stereotypical re-
sponses to a particular individual. Second, and as I have suggested, it is consistent 
with M-BEL3 that make-belief can prompt somewhat similar emotions and behaviour 
to belief. Finally, although I have used fear as a demonstrative example, it is not at all 
implausible that the same holds true for other kind of affective response. One who 
loves their neighbour will be motivated to seek him out and win his affections, but 
someone who feels for Emily Brontë’s Heathcliff will make no attempts to get in 
touch. One who loses a pet one will mourn their death and experience grief. But no 
one holds a funeral for Lassie.  
Let’s take stock. We began with Olson’s suspicion that an immersed moral make-
believer is at risk of relapsing into moral belief. I made two attempts to put some 
flesh on the bones of this suspicion. The first attempt was to construe the claim as an 
empirical one—an unpromising move, I argued. The second was to understand Ol-
son’s suspicion as stemming from particular conceptual presuppositions regarding 
the conditions under which an agent believes that p. In order to address the latter 
concern, the moral fictionalist needed to make the case for a meaningful distinction 
between make-believers and believers. I have argued that she is up to the task; atti-
tudes of make-belief are importantly different from beliefs. So the fictionalist evades 
Olson’s first horn—she is no moral believer. However, and as I will now argue, these 
insights only serve to sharpen the second horn; make-belief may very well be too dif-
ferent from belief to sustain a useful kind of moral practice. 
§5.4.2 Horn 2: the shortcomings of moral make-belief 
My objection to the fictionalist in what follows is similar to Olson’s in spirit, but dif-
fers in its letter. Olson, recall, thinks that a moral make-believer must constantly re-
mind herself that morality is a fiction in order to avoid becoming a moral believer. 
According to him, however, this act of constantly reminding herself that morality is 
merely a fiction will undo the practical benefits that the moral pretence promises to 
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supply. I have rejected Olson’s claim that the fictionalist must regularly attend to her 
belief that morality is a fiction in order to avoid a slip into belief.  The important dif-
ferences between these attitudes are sufficient to absolve her of the charge that she is 
guilty of any moral believing. Thus, there is no danger of such frequent reminders 
impacting upon the practical effects of the pretence. 
However, there is a more fundamental worry in the vicinity here. Even if make-
belief is not liable to slip into belief, the nature of make-belief itself is at odds with a 
firm enough commitment to moral practice that would be required to secure the 
practical benefits of moral behaviour. The differences between make-belief and belief 
that I have emphasised suggest that moral practice would be far less useful if it were 
preserved as a fiction. The problem isn’t merely that make-beliefs wouldn’t play the 
same role as beliefs—that is to be expected, after all. The criticism that I will now 
proceed to develop is that moral make-beliefs are unfit to play a suitably similar role. 
My first concern pertains to the stability of the pretence. Consider Joyce’s portrait 
of the fictionalist; one who assents to moral claims in non-critical contexts, only to 
withhold assent from them in critical contexts. The potential for such epistemic see-
sawing seems likely to undermine the practical efficacy of the moral fiction; what’s to 
stop a moral fictionalist from entering into a critical context whenever doing so is 
useful for her—when faced with the choice of breaking an inconvenient promise, 
say?  Joyce anticipates this concern. He is at great pains to emphasise that  
…the decision to adopt morality as a fiction is not an ongoing calculation 
that one makes over and over…the resolution to accept the moral point of 
view is something that occurred in the person’s past…–it is what Jon Elster 
calls a “precommitment.” Its role is that when entering a shop the possibil-
ity of stealing doesn’t even enter one’s mind. (pp.223-4) 
Joyce likens the fictionalist’s precommitment to that of Odysseus, who ties himself to 
the mast of his ship to avoid the temptation of the sirens (p.224). The idea here is, I 
take it, that we are often capable of doing things psychologically that have similar ef-
fects to objective constraints (e.g., Odysseus’s mast). Someone who would be fine 
having one drink might commit herself to not drinking at all because she knows that 
one drink leads to more. Or, to borrow another example from Joyce, someone who 
might remain fit even if she took the odd day off exercise might commit herself to 
doing exactly fifty sit-ups every day in order to avoid a “slippery slope to inactivity” 
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(p.215.) A would-be moral fictionalist could, the thought seems to be, commit herself 
to keeping up the pretence in much the same way.183 
Yet this seems to weaken the justification for becoming a moral fictionalist to 
begin with. Joyce doesn’t want to over-emphasise the extent to which we are already 
capable of doing things psychologically that have a similar effect to objective con-
straints. Otherwise it is no longer clear that we really need a moral fiction to secure 
co-operative behaviour. Joyce suggests that we can effectively commit ourselves to 
doing fifty sit-ups a day by thinking that we must (non-morally) do so no matter what 
if we are to become fit. Why, then, are we not similarly capable of carrying out a 
commitment to be co-operative by thinking that we must (non-morally) do so no 
matter what in order to secure the goods of co-operative behaviour? Nadeem 
Hussain touches upon this concern: 
Surely by Joyce’s own lights, a thought that I ought to do fifty sit-ups plays a 
very similar role to the thought that I morally ought not to steal. Such 
thoughts are instrumentally effective in helping me pursue my long-term 
self-interest. (2004, p.168) 
As does Lenman when he writes, 
…it’s hard to see how [the pretence] will help us much when the stakes are 
at all high except insofar as we remind ourselves of the urgency of the rea-
sons we had to adopt it. And then, as with the exercise case, it all starts to 
look rather unnecessary. (2013, pp.405-6) 
If we are already capable of doing things psychologically that have similar effects to 
objective constraints, then it’s not clear how much there is to be gained from enlist-
ing a moral fiction. Why won’t it do to commit myself to co-operative behaviour by 
thinking that I must (non-morally) co-operate come what may if I am to further my 
long-term interests? This problem may not be insurmountable. But it does alert us to 
some tensions in the motivations for going fictionalist. 
A second worry pertains to Joyce’s way of carving up the contexts in which we are 
to engage in moral make-belief and those in which we are not. When we find our-
selves in critical contexts, the belief in moral error theory enters into the equation. In 
 
183 I thank Daniel Nolan for helpful discussions on this point. 
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everyday, humdrum contexts, moral make-beliefs make an appearance. But moral 
make-beliefs may very well be needed in critical contexts. Consider a meta-ethics semi-
nar in which a speaker’s talk is inexcusably sexist. We should want make-beliefs re-
garding the wrongness of sexism to be available here.184 But we are to have no 
recourse to these make-beliefs in the meta-ethics seminar. This is an undesirable re-
sult. If we are going to adopt fictionalist attitudes, then we should want to be able to 
put them to use when we need them. 
A third concern is that make-beliefs don’t seem like a strong enough basis for se-
curing the practical benefits that the fictionalist promises to deliver. By way of con-
trast, we can begin by reflecting upon the nature of moral beliefs. Consider someone 
in dire financial straits who is tempted to siphon some funds from an unsuspecting 
friend. She believes that doing so would be morally wrong, and so, she is ultimately 
motivated to refrain. Joyce, recall, thinks that it is precisely this feature of moral be-
liefs that explains their usefulness; they prompt us to behave in ways that are in our 
long-term interests (p.181). True, a cash injection might further an agent’s immediate 
interests. But stealing from her friends is also likely to be contrary to her long-term 
interests, insofar as friendship and a trustworthy reputation are the sorts of things 
that benefit her in the long run.  
Now, moral beliefs are beliefs, and so, they plausibly have the following feature 
which, I have argued, is characteristic of belief: they persist even when the stakes are 
suitably high so as to render them contrary to our practical interests. And this is, in 
large part, what accounts for their usefulness. Just imagine what would follow if mor-
al beliefs were apt to disappear whenever convenient. Suppose that we were accus-
tomed to cease believing in the cruelty of the animal fur industry whenever we eyed 
an attractive pair of leather boots, or to cease believing that stealing from a friend 
was morally wrong whenever we were short on funds.185 It is doubtful that moral be-
 
184 We should also presumably want some recourse to the sanctioning resources of moral language. 
It would be preferable to call the sexist an inconsiderate cad; declaring that we don’t like him very 
much doesn’t quite get at the itch that we want to scratch. 
185 Of course, people do sometimes act contrary to their moral beliefs, and they often have creative 
ways of justifying these transgressions to themselves. But moral beliefs don’t typically disappear when-
ever convenient. In this respect, they seem to me to be more reliable than make-beliefs. 
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liefs would play the same role if they were apt to disappear when they were most 
needed to stave off temptation.  
Yet make-beliefs have precisely this feature; they are highly overridable, and they 
typically are overridden when the practical stakes are high (Oddie & Demetriou 2007, 
p.487). And the practical stakes can be incredibly high in moral decision-making. As 
Lillehammer points out, morality “frequently prescribes costly sacrifices, such as the 
abandonment of basic personal projects…” (2004, p.103; see also Cuneo & Christy 
2011, p.99). Whatever long-term gains the fiction affords us, then, it is doubtful that 
these will be sufficient to motivate persisting with the pretence when our important 
personal interests are at stake. The situations in which we would most want moral 
make-beliefs to work for us are precisely those situations in which they are apt to let 
us down.  
A final concern for the preface fictionalist concerns the ways in which make-
beliefs are likely to integrate with our psychology and behaviour. Most of us are emo-
tionally invested in moral issues. We are often outraged when we believe that some-
one has committed a serious moral wrong, and feel guilty upon coming to believe 
that we ourselves have engaged in moral wrongdoing. Moreover, these affective ex-
periences typically motivate distinct sorts of behaviour; moral transgressions are usu-
ally met with punishment (Boyd et. al 2003), and guilt usually prompts us to make 
amends (Wicker et. al 1983; Ferguson et. al 1991; Tangney et. al 2013). All in all, our 
moral beliefs tend to integrate with our behaviour (and the rest of our psychology) in 
fairly predictable and distinctive ways.  
An important question for the moral fictionalist is whether make-belief is likely to 
integrate with our behaviour and our psychology in a suitably similar way; is make-
believe capable of eliciting these powerful emotions and the behaviours that they 
usually motivate? This is far from obvious. If a spider the size of Tolkien’s Shelob 
appeared at my window (and if I believed it was there), I would experience a very real 
kind of fear—something I plausibly don’t experience when I watch Shelob pursuing 
Frodo Baggins. In the former case, I would surely be motivated to barricade the win-
dows, and to seek out help. When watching Frodo flee, I merely avert my eyes in 
horror. 
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Yet moral fictionalists are confident that moral make-beliefs would be capable of 
eliciting the affective responses typically prompted by moral beliefs. Joyce proposes 
that fictive thoughts  
… can engage our emotions. If one sits vividly thinking about one’s house 
burning down and all one’s worldly belongings with it—not believing it, nor 
even believing it particularly likely—that may be sufficient to prompt anxie-
ty or fear. This, I take it, is what happens when we engage emotionally with 
fiction–when we feel fear at horror movies or sadness at novels. (p.197; see 
also Joyce 2006, p.99) 
As I understand Joyce, the basic idea here is that a lack of belief doesn’t necessarily 
imply a lack of emotion. We very often do seem to be emotionally responsive to fic-
tion. So perhaps beliefs have limited penetration into emotion; even when we don’t 
believe that the objects of our fear are instantiated, we are still apt to feel (at least 
something meaningfully like) fear. And perhaps this lesson applies to moral fictions; 
these may engage us emotionally, even if we don’t believe that there is any such thing 
as moral wrongness.  
Yet the analogy with paradigmatic fictions here will only get the moral fictionalist 
so far. In order for the moral fictionalist to establish that a moral fiction is likely to 
engage us emotionally, it won’t suffice to point out that fictions are generally capable 
of prompting emotion. She must make the case that a moral fiction will be so capable. 
This is difficult to establish—especially once we reflect upon why it is that fictions 
often elicit affective responses. There is overwhelming empirical evidence that our 
emotional engagement with fictions is very often the result of our having identified 
with the characters that are portrayed. People usually adopt the standpoint of the pro-
tagonist (Rinck & Bower 1995), and process the emotional implications of the fic-
tion’s events from their perspective (Gernsbacher et. al, 1992). For this reason, 
empathetic perspective-taking is increasingly thought to be “a standard part of… en-
gagement with fictional narratives” (Coplan 2004, p.143; see also Harris, 2000, pp. 
70-78; Bourg 1996, pp. 246-257; Rall & Harris 2000, pp. 206-207). It is plausibly be-
cause of this identification with fictional characters that we often feel on behalf of 
them; we share in Captain Kirk’s sadness when Spock sacrifices himself for the needs 
of the many. (And we share in his apathy when those unfortunate enough to be 
wearing red shirts suffer an untimely demise.) 
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Yet in what way are such cases analogous to the case of a moral fiction? They 
seem to be to me rather disanalogous. The features in virtue of which we are emo-
tionally ‘taken in’ by fictions would seem to be absent in moral fictions. There are no 
protagonists to be found in this moral story. There may be a few abstract entities 
floating around, of course (rights, duties, obligations, and what-have-you). But these 
presumably aren’t the sorts of characters with whom we are likely to engage.  
I am not arguing here that a moral fiction could not engage us emotionally. What 
I am rather arguing is that pointing towards our engagement with paradigmatic fic-
tions does not seem to provide us with strong evidence that it could. The issue is 
that the fictionalist is using our emotional engagement with paradigmatic fictions as 
evidence for her claim that a moral fiction can be expected to engage us emotionally. 
Yet the features which explain our emotional engagement with paradigmatic fictions 
seem absent in moral fictions. 
Even granting that the moral fiction would engage us emotionally, there is a fur-
ther problem for the moral fictionalist. It is not merely that moral judgments prompt 
emotions; these emotions also tend to motivate distinct kinds of behaviour—
punishment, reparations, and the like. Even if moral make-believe could elicit bona 
fide emotions, then, we would still be left with the following question: are these emo-
tions likely to motivate useful sorts of behaviour? 
It is not unlikely that the emotions prompted by make-belief can motivate 
somewhat similar sorts of behaviour as those prompted by belief—especially within 
the confines of the pretence. One plausible understanding of participation in 
make-belief takes it to be driven by a desire to behave in a similar way to how one 
would behave were the pretence a reality (Nichols & Stich 2000, p.128). But there 
are important limits, especially when behaving in too similar a way would carry real 
life costs. Someone pretending that there is a burglar in her house is careful not to 
actually call 9-1-1.  
This suggests a worry for the moral fictionalist. Even if moral make-belief 
prompted certain emotions, it is debatable whether these would motivate the co-
operative behaviours that we tend to associate with them. Agents who participate in 
moral make-believe may very well desire to behave in a somewhat similar manner to 
how they would were the moral fiction reality. Yet they are likely to stop short of be-
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having in the same manner when that behaviour is sufficiently costly—as punishment 
and making amends can often be. 
Let’s summarise. In §5.4.1, I argued that the preface moral fictionalist can plausi-
bly make good on her epistemic promise. However, I have now suggested (in §5.4.2) 
that she is likely to have trouble keeping up the practical end of the bargain. Moral 
make-belief seems to be neither a stable enough nor a strong enough basis for secur-
ing the practical benefits that the fictionalist promises us.  
Yet it might be thought that these problems do not apply to the prefix fictionalist, 
who shirks make-belief in favour of beliefs (beliefs about what is true according to 
some moral fiction). As I will now proceed to argue, however, a parallel challenge 
can be raised against the prefix fictionalist as well. 
§5.4.3 The shortcomings of fictional belief 
In order to properly understand why the prefix fictionalist cannot deliver the practi-
cal goods, I want to begin, once again, by comparing her to our moral believer. The 
prefix fictionalist differs from the moral believer not in virtue of holding a distinct 
sort of attitude towards moral propositions, but in what the content of her attitudes 
are. Whereas the moral believer believes some moral proposition p (e.g., ‘gratuitous 
killing is wrong’), the prefix fictionalist believes that p*: that ‘according to the moral 
fiction, p’. (Hereafter, I shall use ‘p’ to refer to a proposition lacking a fictional opera-
tor and ‘p*’ to refer to its fictional counterpart, ‘according to the fiction, p’.) 
This difference in the content of the fictionalist’s beliefs can be expected to carry 
important implications for her behaviour. This should come as no surprise. The 
claim that beliefs with different contents generate distinct behavioural dispositions is 
so obvious as to be almost unworthy of mention.186 It is for this reason that a belief 
that has the content p* can be expected to have very different implications for behav-
 
186 Of course, beliefs don’t generate behavioural dispositions all by themselves; desires (and down-
stream, intentions) also have a role to play. The point is simply that two agents with the same desires 
but very different beliefs about the world are likely to have different behavioural dispositions. There 
are tricky cases here, of course—indexicals, and differences in wide content among them. I put these 
to the side for the purposes of the discussion.  
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iour compared to a belief with the content p. Indeed, it is my suspicion that a belief 
that p* will have very similar properties to a make-belief that p. 
Like a make-belief that p, a belief that p* seems liable to being overridden when 
the practical stakes are high. I hasten to add, however, that this isn’t overridability of 
the kind that spelled trouble for make-belief. The overridability of make-belief was 
explained by its being constitutively tied to our will—by its being an attitude that can 
typically be dispensed with at our choosing. A belief that p* isn’t overridable in this sense. 
(It is still a belief, after all.) Nonetheless, a belief that p* does seem overridable in a 
slightly different sense.  
Let me explain. Suppose that you are a fan of Arthur Conan Doyle, and believe 
that according to Doyle’s fiction, Holmes lives on Baker St. You very much desire to 
see Holmes’s place of residence, and so, you elect to pay Baker St a visit. Imagine 
that before setting off, you are informed (and comes to believe) that Baker St has re-
cently become infested with pick-pocketers. You now believe that d: ‘Baker St is an 
especially dangerous part of town’. But of course, you also believe that ¬d*: ‘accord-
ing to Doyle’s fiction, Baker St is not an especially dangerous part of town’. (Baker 
St’s crime rate is no part of the stories, let’s suppose.)   
What would you to do in such circumstances? Would you simply disregard your 
belief that d, allowing your belief that ¬d* to guide your behaviour instead? One 
should hope not. Under such circumstances, I should expect that you would cast to 
the side your belief that ¬d*, and act on your belief that d instead, steering clear of 
Baker St as best you can. Given that your personal interests are at stake, you would 
seem to do better to attend to your beliefs concerning the real Baker St rather than 
the purely fictional one.   
Here, then, is my conjecture: a belief that p*, though not dispensable, is nonethe-
less something that is apt to be cast to the side when the practical stakes go up. It is 
something to which we will choose not to attend—something from we will shift our 
attention.187 Not only that, but a belief that p* is especially liable to being cast to the 
 
187 It is a separate question just what is going on in our minds when we cast a belief to the side. 
Perhaps it is put back into storage in one’s ‘belief box’. I have not much to say on this, and I suspect 
that having more to say would require a foray into the metaphysics of mind—something well beyond 
the scope of this thesis.   
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side when the practical stakes go up. Under such circumstances, a belief that p* inevi-
tability gives way to beliefs about reality.  
There is a natural explanation as to why this is so. On the usual view of things, a 
belief is an attitude with a world-to-mind direction of fit. (See Anscombe 1957.) The 
job of beliefs is to represent the world—they provide us with a kind of ‘map’ with 
which to steer our way around (Ramsey 1931). Now, there is clearly a sense in which 
a belief that p* is doing its job; it is representing the world to be a certain way—
namely, as containing a fiction with a distinct sort of content. But care needs to be 
taken in how we allow that belief to navigate our actions. You (a Holmes fan, we are 
supposing) would be ill-advised to permit the belief that ¬d* to guide your behaviour 
when you consider paying Baker St a visit. When the practical stakes go up, we turn 
to our beliefs about reality to successfully navigate our way around. Under such cir-
cumstances, affording our fictional beliefs an important role in deliberation is likely 
to be an impediment to achieving our ends.   
What does all of this mean for the prefix moral fictionalist, though? Well, like a 
moral make-belief that p, a belief that p* seems liable to be overridden (albeit in a dis-
tinct sense) when our important personal interests are at stake. When faced with the 
prospect of great sacrifice for the sake of the moral good, our beliefs regarding what 
is the case according to the moral fiction are likely to strike us as rather poor candi-
dates for guiding action. ‘Well, according to the moral fiction, I ought to φ’, one 
might say, ‘but the moral fiction is a bunch of baloney! I need not act as it prescribes 
when my important personal projects are thrown into jeopardy’. It is very easy (and 
often wise) not to care about one’s fictional beliefs, and not to afford them any role 
in deliberation when the practical stakes are high. Again, a belief that p* is not some-
thing that we are apt to dispense with at our choosing. But it is nonetheless something 
that we are apt to cast to the side when our interests would be better served by allow-
ing our beliefs about reality to guide our behaviour.  
There is a worry that needs to be addressed before proceeding. One might think 
that my arguments here contain the seeds of their own undermining. Earlier, I 
claimed that unlike a make-belief that p, a belief that p is not typically dispensed with 
when the practical stakes are high. In the preceding discussion, I have argued that a 
belief that p* is typically cast to the side when the practical stakes are high. This sug-
gests that beliefs, though not dispensable, are nonetheless cast-to-the-side-able. But if 
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beliefs are cast-to-the-side-able, then what practical advantage can our error-ridden 
moral beliefs possibly claim over make-beliefs? This worry is to be anticipated. How-
ever, it misconstrues the ambitions of my argument. My intention has been to argue 
that a belief that p* will typically be cast to the side when the practical stakes go up. 
The claim is not that beliefs are typically cast to the side under such circumstances.  
Yet what explains this difference? Does a belief that p* constitute a distinct and 
special kind of belief? That seems unlikely. What is more likely is that a belief that p* 
has a distinct and special kind of content—it is a belief about the content of a fiction. 
The reason that a belief that p* will typically be cast to the side when the practical 
stakes go up, then, is not because it is a belief, and that beliefs generally have this 
property. The cast-to-the-side-ability of a belief that p* is rather explained by the fact 
that it is a belief about the content of a fiction. Since acting upon fictional beliefs is 
unlikely to be in our interests when the practical stakes are high, we tend in such cir-
cumstances to act upon our beliefs about reality instead.  
There is a second problem that I now want to raise for fictional beliefs. Like a 
make-belief that p, a belief that p* also seems likely to integrate with our behaviour 
and the rest of our psychology in different ways than a belief that p. Compare the be-
lief that the surrounding woods are inhabited by hungry grizzly bears (b) with the be-
lief that according to the fiction, the surrounding woods are inhabited by hungry grizzly 
bears (b*). These beliefs would no doubt prompt distinct emotional responses and 
behaviour. One who believes that b would fear the bears nearby, make a run for the 
hills, and call out for help. One who believes that b* is unlikely to fear any nearby 
bears, and would be careful not to alarm any strangers in the vicinity. 
The integration problem for the preface fictionalist would therefore seem to apply 
to the prefix fictionalist as well. The belief that an individual acted wrongly in breaking 
their promise is likely to inspire indignation and reproach. It is far from obvious that 
the same could be expected of a belief that according to the moral fiction, an individual 
acted wrongly in breaking their promise. This is not to deny that our beliefs about 
what is true according to a fiction can prompt somewhat similar emotional responses 
and behaviour as our beliefs about reality. After coming to believe that according to 
Shakespeare’s Hamlet, Claudius betrays his brother, I may be angered by his callous-
ness, and resolve to treat my own family better in future. But that is a far cry from 
beliefs that p* prompting the same, or very similar kinds of behaviour as beliefs that p. 
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No one goes looking for Claudius to mete out punishment, or makes any efforts to 
tarnish his reputation. 
NRW anticipate quite a few of these challenges. “Why”, they ask, “might people 
change their preferences about how to act on the grounds of what is true in a story?” 
(2005, p.313). One solution that they offer is to recommend that the fictionalist 
… connect nonmoral preferences and what is true in the fiction via internal-
ist bridge laws (though care must be taken in stating these). If the fiction is 
set up in such a way that it is guaranteed by the rules about the fiction’s con-
tent that something is counted as good in the story only if, in fact, people 
have the appropriate non-cognitive attitudes towards it, then coming to real-
ize that some course of action does have certain moral properties according 
to the story should prompt the realization that the action is one that the 
agent has certain attitudes towards. (2005, p.313) 
These internalist bridge laws answer to the integration problem; for they construct a 
link between the moral fiction and motivation.188 They also go some way towards ad-
dressing the overridability problem. If my fictional moral obligations track what I am 
already motivated to do, then it’s easy to see how I might tend to aim for things that I 
believe are (fictionally) good and avoid things I believe are (fictionally) bad, even 
when the stakes are high; if I hate violence, I’m likely to avoid it even when violence 
pays. 
But these internalist bridge laws also seem antithetical to the purpose of the moral 
fiction. According to NRW, the moral fiction earns its practical keep by providing a 
shared framework with which to reason our way through practical disputes, and co-
ordinate our behaviour. But if the content of the moral fiction is determined by in-
ternalist bridge laws, then that content will surely differ from person to person, dif-
ferent people approving of different things. The moral fiction (or, perhaps we should 
say, moral fictions), so understood, becomes little more than a guise for personal inter-
est—it is far from representing the more familiar, impartial moral framework that 
serves as a backdrop to reasoned discussion and compromise.  
 
188 The resultant fictionalist proposal therefore comes to resemble (to some degree) a revolutionary 
variety of Kalderon’s (2005) hermeneutic moral fictionalism, which takes fictionalist attitudes to be more 
desire-like than belief-like. 
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There may also be conceptual obstacles here. The internalist bridge laws allow the 
content of the moral fiction to be determined by each individual’s non-cognitive atti-
tudes; something is morally right for a just in case a approves of it, wrong just in case 
she disapproves. Yet people can lend their seal of approval to all sorts of things, 
many of which we would be loath to label ‘morally right’. The phenomenon of imag-
inative resistance suggests that we would find it difficult to comply with prescriptions 
to imagine such deviant moral judgments. (Perhaps it is something like this problem 
that NRW have in mind when they note that “care must be taken” in stating the rele-
vant internalist bridge laws.) Unless more is said to constrain the sorts of connections 
that can be drawn between each individual’s patterns of (dis)approval and what is 
morally wrong or right, a moral fiction constructed with internalist bridge laws may 
not be user-friendly.  
It therefore seems to me that prefix fictionalists are not completely immune from 
the worries that spelled trouble for their preface counterparts. Both are likely to have 
trouble making good on their practical promise. Fictionalist attitudes do not seem 
like the right sorts of attitudes to underwrite a useful moral practice. 
§5.5 MORAL FICTIONALISM: VERDICT AND LESSONS 
On the face of it, moral fictionalism seems like a promising option. But I have sug-
gested that the proposal has less going for it than first appearances suggest. At this 
stage, I would not go so far as to say that moral fictionalism is the wrong answer to 
the WNQ for moral discourse. That would be premature. I have shown that moral 
fictionalism has some shortcomings. Yet it may be that a fictional moral discourse is 
the best that we error theorists can hope for. Since abolitionism and revisionism 
don’t inspire much confidence, perhaps fictionalism is our best bet, and we must re-
sign ourselves to the fact that we can no longer enjoy many of the practical benefits 
of our error-ridden moral practices.  
But we need not adopt this bleak perspective just yet. As I will argue in the fol-
lowing chapter, the conservationist option is very promising, and is capable of re-
couping many of the fictionalist’s losses. Before proceeding to evaluate and defend 
conservationism, though, it will be useful to reflect upon the implications of what has 
been said this chapter.  
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Why should fictionalism strike us an unsatisfying response to the WNQ for moral 
discourse? A large part of the answer, I think, pertains to the important connection 
between moral judgment and action. Morality is not merely a theoretical enterprise; 
we take our moral judgments to have important implications for what we do, and this 
is, in large part, why moral practice is so useful to us. As was noted early on (§2.3.2), 
our subjective concerns and consequent motivations and behaviour co-vary fairly 
closely with our moral beliefs. In this chapter, I have elaborated upon this basic idea 
by suggesting that our moral beliefs integrate with our behaviour and the rest of our 
psychology in fairly reliable and characteristic ways. Since fictionalist attitudes have a 
very different psychological and behavioural profile to belief, they are likely to inte-
grate very differently with our behaviour and the rest of our psychology. It was for this 
reason that substituting fictionalist attitudes for moral beliefs risked severing the im-
portant ties between moral judgments and behaviour. 
This suggests that some fictionalist projects will fare better than others. None of 
what has been said should suggest to us that mathematical fictionalism is unpromis-
ing. Mathematical discourse is not tied to action (at least not to nearly the same ex-
tent) as moral discourse is.189 However, my arguments here do suggest a rather grim 
prognosis for other fictionalist proposals. Some have suggested that an atheist can 
enjoy the benefits of religious belief by preserving religious discourse in the spirit of a 
useful fiction (see Eshleman 2005). But the considerations raised in this chapter 
should suggest to us that religious fictionalists will have trouble making good on this 
practical promise. This is because religious discourse is intimately tied to action; reli-
gious practices structure people’s relationships to one another, and shape how they 
choose to lead their lives. Religious beliefs are also associated with a number of psy-
chological and behavioural dispositions—the disposition to make costly sacrifices in 
the form of abstinence or chastity, for example. But these dispositions are likely to 
differ when an agent’s attitudes towards the relevant propositions are fictional ones; 
calls to abstinence or chastity are apt to be overridden when they conflict with the 
 
189 There may be some exceptions, of course. Those who regard 13 as an unlucky number may 
avoid renting a house numbered 13. And the Pythagoreans acted in peculiar ways on account of their 
mathematical beliefs. But I feel that these exceptions are sufficiently rare so as not to render the gen-
eral claim above implausible.  
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religious fictionalist’s other interests. Given this, fictionalists attitudes may very well 
be unfitting attitudes to take towards religious belief systems as well. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
Conservationism: Offense 
None of the proposals canvassed so far provide us with an entirely satisfying answer 
to our WNQ. But, worry not: I have saved the best for last. I shall argue that conser-
vationism is our most promising option. Like fictionalists and revisionists, conserva-
tionists take our error-ridden moral discourse to be incredibly useful. But they part 
ways from their rivals in recommending that we hold onto our false moral beliefs.  
The case for conservationism will be developed across two chapters. My aims in 
this chapter are largely offensive. Here, I will put the conservationist’s best foot for-
ward, developing what I take to be the most promising variant of the proposal. Re-
sponding to challenges and appeasing potential concerns with the view are defensive 
tasks that I defer to chapter 7. 
I will begin by saying more about what conservationism involves and what moti-
vates it (§6.1). I will then assess the most developed variety of conservationism—that 
of Olson (2014). Though promising, Olson’s conservationism has a number of 
shortcomings. It is not obvious that we could believe both (first-order) moral propo-
sitions and the moral error theory, still less how we could keep this up for very long. 
Yet Olson does not do very much to address these problems. And to my mind, he 
does not do quite enough to quell the concerns that the conservationist’s doxastic 
policy (that of intentionally preserving false beliefs) is apt to raise either.  
In §6.2, I take these lessons on board and propose some desiderata for a workable 
conservationist proposal. The goal in the remainder of the chapter will then be to 
develop my own brand of conservationism, which preserves the benefits of Olson’s 
approach while avoiding its associated problems. I first do some work to make sense 
of the idea that we could believe both moral propositions and the moral error theory 
(§6.3). Building upon some recent work in the philosophy of mind, I then explain 
why we should expect beliefs in moral propositions to be active in some contexts, 
and the belief in moral error theory to be active in others (§6.4). Finally, I argue that 
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the intentional cultivation of false beliefs, though not generally advisable, can be jus-
tified in this particular case (§6.5).  
§6.1 WHAT IS CONSERVATIONISM? 
Mackie’s Ethics makes for a rather peculiar narrative. The argument for moral error 
theory occupies only the first portion of the work. For the remainder of the text, 
Mackie can be found making quite a number of first-order moral claims. Understanda-
bly, this move strikes many as strange; “it is…”, James Lenman remarks, “…as if 
someone were to write a book where, in Part I, she argued that astrology is all the 
rankest, most hopeless nonsense, only to go on, in Part II, to argue that you can nev-
er trust Librans” (2013, p.399). But perhaps Mackie just thought that he could have 
his cake and eat it too; that he could believe his moral error theory while continuing 
to use moral discourse in much the same way as before. Perhaps he was a conservation-
ist.190 
The conservationist recommends the preservation of ordinary (error-ridden) mor-
al discourse. But she does not merely advise us to believe and assert moral proposi-
tions. The conservationist wishes for us to preserve moral practice in its entirety. She 
advises us to continue to make moral judgments about the behaviour and character 
of others, to promote certain social policies on moral grounds, to dole out praise and 
blame, and to invoke moral considerations when deliberating about what we ought to 
do. In effect, the conservationist recommends a ‘business as usual’ approach to life 
after moral error theory; we are to go about our days more or less as we did before. 
I say more or less as we did before; for none of this involves conveniently forgetting 
or wilfully suppressing the reality of moral error theory. The conservationist advises 
us to believe the error theory as well. The relevant advice is not necessarily to believe 
the moral error theory and (first-order) moral propositions simultaneously. (Doing so 
 
190 This diagnosis is suggested by Oddie and Demetriou (2007, p.486), and West (2010, p.184). 
Others interpret Mackie as a fictionalist (Garner 1993, p.87; Joyce 2005, pp.296-8; Kroon 2011, p.790) 
or a revisionisist (Blackburn 1993, p.150; Schroeder 2007b, fn.24; Lenman 2013, p.399; Lutz 2014, 
p.354). 
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may very well be impossible for creatures like us.191) To borrow a phrase from West 
(2010, p.195) the conservationist might “distinguish between belief in theory and be-
lief in practice”, and argue that the belief in the moral error theory will be guide some 
aspects of life, but not others.  
Note that conservationists need not assume that we have direct voluntary control 
over what we believe. They usually recommend indirect methods for cultivating moral 
beliefs. In this respect, conservationism is somewhat reminiscent of Pascal’s (1660) 
approach to religious faith (Olson 2014, p.191). Though Pascal took belief in God to 
be justified on pragmatic grounds, he did not assume that people could simply inject 
that belief into their mental economy. Instead, he advised taking steps that were like-
ly to lead to the acquisition of religious belief—prayer or attending church, for ex-
ample.192 (Another potential parallel is Kant (1781), who thought that we could have 
no knowledge of phenomena outside our experience, but took belief in an afterlife to 
be a demand of practical reason.) 
If workable, conservationism seems likely to be far more effective than its rivals at 
securing the practical goods of moral practice. Moral beliefs plausibly have a better 
chance of preserving these practical goods than the feeble attitudes that the fictional-
ist recommends, or the revisionist’s schmoral beliefs. Presumably, the best way to se-
cure the benefits of moral belief is to be a moral believer. Holding onto our false 
moral beliefs might also be easier than keeping up a pretence or eliminating them al-
together. If this is right, then conservationism might present us with a more feasible 
and stable option going forward than its rivals.  
 
191 Some caution is warranted here. It seems perfectly conceivable that an agent could simultane-
ously believe both that (i) f is an elliptical equation, and (ii) that f is not correlated with modular form, 
even though this would be inconsistent. (It took Andrew Wiles quite a bit of work to discover this in-
consistency, after all.) And dialethiests think we are capable of believing contradictions (see Priest 
1985-6). Such cases notwithstanding, it does seem that simultaneously believing that p and that ¬p will 
often be rather difficult; it is not obviously possible that an agent could simultaneously believe both 
that there is and that there is not a table in front of her, for example. (See Alston 1989, p.122; Pettit 
and Smith 1996, p.448.) 
192 There are disanalogies here as well, of course. Whereas Pascal sought to justify believing a 
proposition that he took to be insufficiently supported by our evidence, our conservationist seeks to 
justify believing propositions that we take to be false.  
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Admittedly, there is one respect in which conservationism loses out against all of 
its rivals: it recommends false belief! Not only that, but it recommends inconsistent be-
liefs. The conservationist certainly goes against the philosophical grain in advising us 
to hold onto beliefs that we know to be false. The advice to believe both that p and 
that ¬p is apt to strike us as more bizarre still. As I have noted (§2.2.4), there is plau-
sibly a presumption against having false beliefs. If the conservationist’s proposal is to 
be attractive, then she must do some work to motivate overriding it. 
In what follows, I consider Olson’s (2014) variety of conservationism (§6.1.1), and 
draw attention to where I feel there is room for improvement (§6.1.2). As we shall 
see, these challenges are only challenges for Olson’s implementation. They need not 
spell trouble for conservationism more generally. The task for the remainder of the 
chapter will be to develop a debugged conservationism—one that is designed to 
avoid these problems. 
§6.1.1 Olson’s conservationism 
As we saw in chapter 5, Olson is not optimistic about the prospects of moral fiction-
alism. He regards conservationism as a more fitting solution to the WNQ for moral 
discourse. The distinctive benefits of moral discourse—enabling us to “coexist 
peacefully, to prevent conflicts, to regulate and co-ordinate behaviour, and to coun-
teract limited sympathies” (2014, p.197)—are, he thinks, better secured by preserving 
false beliefs in moral propositions.  
Indeed, Olson advises the error theorist to believe both the error theory and moral 
propositions. More specifically, he “…recommends moral belief in morally engaged 
and everyday contexts and reserves attendance to the belief that moral error theory is 
true to detached and critical contexts” (2014, p.192). In this respect, Olson’s conser-
vationism is structurally similar to Joyce’s fictionalism, which also recommends at-
tending to the belief that the moral error theory is true in critical contexts (p.191).193 
 
193 Olson’s conservationist might therefore seem vulnerable to the very same instability worries 
that plagued the fictionalist; she could simply raise the epistemic stakes whenever doing so were to her 
immediate benefit. I will not pursue this objection here. But I will explain why my conservationist is 
less vulnerable to this problem (§7.5). 
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Olson does some work to make sense of this inconsistent believing, arguing that it 
is quite common for agents to occurrently believe that p in certain contexts even 
when they are generally disposed to believe that ¬p. This seems plausible. A doting 
parent will often declare that their child is the sweetest or cleverest of all children. 
And they’re not necessary being deceitful when they do so. But when confronted in a 
serious tone with the question, ‘do you really believe that Jimmy is the smartest kid in 
the school, the country, the world?’, they will often disavow their earlier claims (‘of 
course not!’). Still, it seems wrong to say that they don’t believe that their child is the 
greatest in the former context. Such examples are by no means hard to come by. As 
Olson notes,  
… it is a psychologically familiar fact that we sometimes temporarily believe 
things we, in more reflective and detached contexts, are disposed to disbe-
lieve. In such cases, the more reflective beliefs are suppressed or not attend-
ed to, due to e.g. emotional engagement, affection, peer pressure, or a 
combination of these factors. For instance, someone might say truly the fol-
lowing about a cunning politician: ‘I knew she was lying, but hearing her 
speech and the audience’s reaction last week, I really believed what she said’. 
(2014, p.192) 
This is thought to suggest a promising prognosis for conservationism. Just as we can 
be seduced into (occurrently) believing the false claims of charismatic politicians, so 
too (perhaps) can we be sucked into believing that certain actions are right and 
wrong—especially when these actions engage our emotions, as they are wont to do. 
Olson predicts that these affective responses will do some work in helping to silence 
the belief that the moral error theory is true in non-critical contexts.  
Olson also makes some effort to motivate committing the cardinal sin of inten-
tionally preserving false beliefs. As he notes, there is experimental evidence that cer-
tain kinds of false beliefs are essential to everyday functioning. Psychologists have 
proposed that “overly positive self-evaluations, exaggerated perceptions of controls 
and mastery, and unrealistic optimism” are not only typical, but important for pro-
moting mental health, feelings of contentment, and creativity (Taylor & Brown 1988, 
p.193 in Olson 2014, p.185). Given that there are many examples of false but instru-
mentally valuable non-moral beliefs, Olson thinks “… it is highly plausible that there 
are false, but instrumentally valuable, moral beliefs too” (2014, p.185). 
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§6.1.2 Some gaps in Olson’s proposal 
Though Olson’s conservationism has much to recommend it, I feel that there is 
much more work to be done. We can do more, for example, to motivate the supposi-
tion that the conservationist’s attitudes towards moral propositions would be beliefs. 
One could simply stipulate this away, of course. But that would be to secure the ben-
efits of theft over honest toil. Though agents can no doubt have inconsistent beliefs, 
a principled case needs to be offered for thinking that a moral error theorist could 
believe moral propositions. Unless more is said, one may suspect that she is only ac-
cepting them, or pretending to believe them—in which case conservationism is in danger 
of representing a mere terminological variant of fictionalism (see Jaquet & Naar 
2016). 
Moreover, Olson doesn’t do quite enough to motivate the supposition that the 
moral error theorist will attend to her moral beliefs in “…morally engaged and eve-
ryday contexts” and only attend “to the belief that moral error theory is true to de-
tached and critical contexts” (2014, pp.192-3). To be sure, he does suggest that 
affective attitudes will “silence” the belief that the moral error theory is true in moral-
ly engaged contexts. Yet this seems a dangerous path to steer. Theoretical debates in 
applied ethics aren’t always marked by heated emotion. But we shouldn’t want the 
belief that the moral error theory is true to make an appearance in these contexts ei-
ther. So it seems that more work needs to be done on this front; further reasons 
must be provided for expecting that we are likely to attend to our moral beliefs in 
some contexts, and to our belief that the moral error theory is true in others. (This 
isn’t to deny that affective responses will be a large part of the story—I will have 
more to say about them in §7.4. My point is merely that they shouldn’t be the only 
part of the story.) 
A related worry is that it’s not clear how the conservationist’s inconsistent beliefs 
could play the roles that beliefs usually play in guiding our behaviour. We usually act 
in ways that would satisfy our desires if our beliefs were true. It seems that it would 
be rather difficult to navigate a happy path through life believing both that p and that 
¬p. (How should you act to satisfy your desires if you believe both that cheating at 
cards is wrong and that it isn’t?) Given this, one might expect that consistency will, as 
a matter of practical necessity, eventually be restored. 
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Finally, Olson doesn’t do quite enough to justify preserving our false moral be-
liefs. Though he does gesture towards some cases in which the preservation of false 
beliefs can be defended, this does not seem quite enough to defend the preservation 
of false beliefs in this case. Without these details filled in, one may worry that the con-
servationist’s recommendation emanates from an awfully fickle doxastic policy; one 
which permits us to cultivate whatever beliefs are to our fancy. Such a policy is un-
likely to arouse much enthusiasm.  
§6.2 A NEW CONSERVATIONISM 
The preceding discussion has been instructive. We are now in a position to identify 
some important desiderata for a workable conservationist proposal. If her proposal is 
to be attractive, then the conservationist must: 
D1. Motivate the claim that the moral error theorist is properly characterised as be-
lieving both moral propositions and the moral error theory. 
D2. Motivate the expectation that the moral error theorist will attend to her be-
liefs in moral propositions in some contexts and to her belief that the moral error 
theory is true in others. 
D3. Explain how the moral error theorist’s inconsistent beliefs could play the roles 
that beliefs typically play in guiding behaviour. 
D4. Offer a suitable justification for overriding the presumption against intention-
ally preserving false beliefs. 
D1 requires that the conservationist offer a principled basis for taking the moral error 
theorist’s attitudes towards both (first-order) moral propositions and the moral error 
theory to be beliefs. Doing so will be my first task in what follows. In §6.3, I will ar-
gue that the moral error theorist could plausibly be said to believe moral propositions 
if she reliably matched the dispositional stereotype for belief with respect to those propo-
sitions in certain contexts.  
Even if the conservationist convinces us that a moral error theorist could have 
these inconsistent beliefs, she still owes as an explanation of the unusual doxastic 
back-and-forth that is to be expected of her. D2 invites the conservationist to explain 
in virtue of what the moral error theorist could be expected to attend to her beliefs in 
moral propositions in some contexts, and to her belief that the moral error theory is 
true in others. Providing such an explanation will be my goal in §6.4. Here, I will 
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begin by arguing that in general, only some of an agent’s total set of beliefs are active 
(i.e., available for use in reasoning and causally efficacious qua guides of behaviour) at 
any moment. (This idea also helps us to satisfy D3; as I shall explain, it suggests that 
we should take agents to act in ways that would satisfy their active desires if their active 
beliefs were true.) I will then propose that belief activation is determined, in large 
part, by the sorts of information that is salient to an agent in a particular context. 
Given that (i) very different sorts of information is salient in more critical contexts, as 
opposed to contexts where we debate first-order moral issues, and (ii) the infor-
mation that is salient in the latter context is unlikely to ‘activate’ the belief in moral 
error theory, we should not expect the conservationist’s belief that the moral error 
theory is true to be active in morally engaged contexts. 
Finally, the conservationist does better if her proposal appeals to our special inter-
est in preserving our false moral beliefs, rather than the general truism that false be-
liefs can sometimes be instrumentally valuable (D4). The task for §6.5 will therefore 
be to develop a case for preserving false moral beliefs in particular. I shall argue that 
we have a special interest in holding onto these beliefs on account of their being of 
paramount importance to interpersonal co-operation. 
The positive case to be sketched in the remainder of chapter 6 will leave some 
questions unanswered. I will provide a principled basis for taking the conservation-
ist’s attitudes towards both the moral error theory and first-order moral propositions 
to be beliefs in §6.3. But a full defence of that claim would also involve ruling out 
other contenders, and explaining how this picture is consistent with important prop-
erties commonly associated with belief. In §6.4, I will motivate the claim that the 
conservationist could be expected to attend to her belief in the moral error theory 
only in certain contexts. But developing a more convincing case for this claim would 
require saying more about the extent to which we have control over what we believe. 
A justification for preserving our false moral beliefs will be offered in §6.5. But a 
complete justification would consider the potential costs of enacting conservation-
ism—not only the benefits. Rest assured, these gaps will be filled in chapter 7, in the 
course of defending conservationism against some important challenges. It will be 
helpful to have a positive view on the table before switching to the defensive. 
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§6.3 BELIEVING THAT P AND THAT ¬P  
My goal in this section will be to make sense of the idea that a moral error theorist 
could believe moral propositions as well as the moral error theory. I will begin by 
sketching the conditions under which an agent can plausibly be taken to hold incon-
sistent beliefs. I will then argue that these conditions could conceivably obtain for a 
moral error theorist. Keep in mind that the task here is purely offensive; my goal is to 
provide a principled case for understanding the moral error theorist’s attitudes to-
wards both moral propositions and the moral error theory to be beliefs. Ruling out 
other contenders and appeasing some concerns with this claim are defensive tasks 
that I defer to §7.1. 
If we are to make the case that the conservationist’s recommended attitudes are 
beliefs, then there is a question that cannot be avoided: what is it to believe that p? 
Answering this question is a delicate matter. It would seem wise to be as non-
committal as the argumentative strategy allows. (I do not wish to expose my conser-
vationist to the charge that her recommended attitudes only count as beliefs given a 
manifestly implausible account of belief.) However, taking a stand will be essential if I 
am to make my case. 
Let me begin by declaring my own allegiances: it strikes me as highly plausible that 
some form of functionalism about belief is correct. Whatever beliefs are, they can 
plausibly be characterised in terms of their functional roles. Unfortunately, this is not 
yet of much help; for what kind of functionalism are we to assume? I suspect that 
behaviourism can swiftly be ruled out without any tears. But this still leaves us with a 
number of contenders; psycho-functionalism, analytic functionalism, dispositional-
ism, interpretivism, and what have you.194 
Much of what I have to say will be consistent with analytic functionalism, disposi-
tionalism, and interpretivism; the arguments in what follows could assume any one of 
them. But given that dispositionalism is already well-domesticated within this thesis 
 
194 ‘Interpretivism’ is a label associated with a number of different views. I have in mind here the 
view according to which facts about belief are just facts about idealised interpretation; for an agent to 
believe that p just is for the best (i.e., most charitable and rationalising) interpretation of her to attrib-
ute the belief that p to her. Interpretivism (so construed) and analytic functionalism are not mutually 
exclusive. Lewis (1966, 1974) was arguably a supporter of both views.  
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(recall chapter 5), and strikes me as independently plausible, my dialectical choice will 
be to use a dispositionalist account of belief as a concrete approach with which to 
frame the discussion. 
As we learned in §5.4.1, dispositionalists are functionalists in that they propose to 
characterise beliefs in terms of their functional roles. The relevant roles here, being 
dispositions, are forward-looking in that they tell us what kinds of states a belief that 
p typically brings about. Ryle, an early dispositionalist, offers the example of believing 
that ice is dangerously thin. To believe this is  
… to be unhesitant in telling oneself and others that it is thin, in acquiescing 
in other people’s assertions to that effect, in objecting to statements to the 
contrary, in drawing consequences from the original proposition, and so 
forth. But it is also to be prone to skate warily, to shudder, to dwell in imag-
ination on possible disasters and to warn other skaters. It is a propensity not 
only to make certain theoretical moves but also to make certain executive 
and imaginative moves as well as to have certain feelings. (1949, pp.134-5) 
Following Eric Schwitzgebel (2001, p.81), we can say of an agent who has such dis-
positions that she matches the “dispositional stereotype” for the belief in question 
(i.e., the belief that ice is dangerously thin); the relevant dispositions have the unique 
“cluster of properties” that we associate with belief. One who believes that p will, for 
instance, typically be disposed to assent to q if shown that p implies q, to express sur-
prise upon hearing that not p, and so on. An agent who has these and other relevant 
psychological and behavioural dispositions can be said to believe that p.  
An important caveat is needed here. Psychological and behavioural dispositions 
by themselves will not suffice for a complete specification of the conditions under 
which an agent believes that p. Someone who believes that p won’t be disposed to 
express surprise upon hearing that ¬p if she strongly desires to avoid any outward 
expressions of emotion. (See Chisholm 1957.) Schwitzgebel (2002) suggests that the 
dispositionalist can circumvent such problems by (i) associating beliefs with particu-
lar cognitive and phenomenal dispositions as well as behavioural dispositions, and (ii) 
specifying that the dispositions alluded to in the stereotype come attached with a 
ceteribus paribus clause. He proposes to understand 
…the dispositional characterisations as loaded with tacit “if” clauses. Not 
literally all else must be equal—but certain conditions must hold. Joe [who 
believes that there is beer in his fridge] is disposed to assent to assent to ut-
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terances meaning that there is beer in his fridge if he hears the utterance, if 
he has decided not to lie about or evade the matter, if he understands the 
language in which the utterances take place, if he has the physical capacity to 
indicate assent, and so forth. (2002, p.253)  
Given this, my discussion of the dispositional stereotypes associated with moral 
beliefs in what follows should be understood as containing tacit ‘if’ clauses. Someone 
who believes that the animal fur industry is wrong, for example, will be disposed to 
assert that the animal fur industry is wrong if she has not decided to deceive others 
on the matter, if she has the physical capacities needed to express herself vocally, and 
so on.  
As is to be expected in philosophy, not all will be particularly taken with this ac-
count of belief. Some may think that these claims about the states that a belief that p 
typically brings about are true enough, but only contingently so—such claims are not 
claims upon which we ought to rest an analysis or definition. To the extent that a 
person who believes that p will typically be disposed to assent to a sentence that 
means that p, this is because people typically have total sets of beliefs and desires 
such that, in typical circumstances, it is optimal for them to assent to many of the 
things that they believe.195  
I cannot hope to mount a sustained defence of dispositionalism here. (Picking 
one’s battles is a necessity in any work of limited length.)  But the reader is of course 
free to take my conclusions in what follows to be conditional upon its truth. (Or, 
better: upon the truth of dispositionalism or some other varieties of functionalism; as 
I have noted, my arguments in what follows could also proceed by assuming the 
truth of other functionalist views.) Alternatively, a reader may wish to take my claims 
about agents matching particular dispositional stereotypes as evidential claims. Even if 
someone’s matching the dispositional stereotype for belief with respect to some 
proposition p does not make it analytically true that she believes that p, it may none-
theless provide us very good evidence that that she believes that p. 
With those qualifications in mind, we can now proceed to make sense of a moral 
error theorist believing moral propositions as well as the moral error theory. Disposi-
tionalism suggests a natural strategy for doing so: we can say that the moral error 
 
195 I am grateful to Edward Elliott for helpful discussions on this point. 
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theorist could match the dispositional stereotype for belief with respect to moral 
propositions in some contexts, but not others. Here’s the general idea. In one set of 
contexts C1, the error theorist will match the dispositional stereotype for belief with 
respect to some moral proposition p—say, ‘cheating is wrong’. She will, for instance, 
be disposed to assent to the proposition ‘attempted cheating is wrong’, if shown that 
‘cheating is wrong’ implies that ‘attempted cheating is wrong’, to express surprise up-
on hearing that it is not the case that cheating is wrong, to oppose cheating, and so 
on. In another set of contexts C2, however, she will match the dispositional stereo-
type for belief with respect to the proposition that ¬p. She will, for example, be dis-
posed to deny that cheating really is wrong, to express no surprise whatsoever upon 
hearing that it is not the case that cheating is wrong, and so on.196  
Admittedly, there is room for dissent here. One might insist that only reflective 
and critical contexts matter for the purposes of determining what an agent really be-
lieves. Joyce proposes that if an agent has at some point “adopted a critical perspec-
tive and therein sincerely denied T, and remains disposed to deny T were he again to 
adopt that perspective”, then “…he disbelieves T, regardless of how he may think, 
act, and speak in less critical perspectives” (p.193).  
However, I see no strong justification for always privileging this particular disposi-
tion—the disposition to assert that p in critical contexts—over all others. There is no 
one disposition to rule them all. Beliefs plausibly supervene upon a wide range of 
dispositions—not just the disposition to affirm that such-and-such is the case in the 
philosophy seminar (Braddon-Mitchell 2006, p.850). If an agent reliably matches the 
dispositional stereotype for belief that p in C1, and reliably matches the dispositional 
stereotype for belief that ¬p in C2, then it seems much more natural to say of her that 
she believes both that p and that ¬p. 
 
196 As I have suggested, this argumentative strategy may be compatible with other varieties of 
functionalism as well. An interpretivist could claim that the best interpretation of the error theorist’s 
behaviour would attribute these inconsistent beliefs to her. Likewise, an analytic functionalist could 
argue that the attitudes in question play the belief-role. Admittedly, enlisting these views would require 
us to say something more about how such attitudes could conceivably play the backward-looking roles 
of belief; for example, how they could exhibit an appropriate responsiveness to one’s history of evi-
dence. I do so later on when defending the claim that an error theorist’s beliefs in moral propositions 
would be responsive to a selective history of evidence (§7.1). 
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Indeed, such inconsistency does not seem at all uncommon. The attribution of in-
consistent beliefs should sometimes strike us as appropriate. Schwitzgebel offers the 
example of an inconsistent atheist: 
In certain moods and in certain contexts, Antonio feels quite sure that the 
universe is guided by a benevolent deity. In other moods and contexts, he 
finds himself inclined to think of talk about God as ‘a beautiful metaphor’ 
or even, sometimes, ‘a crock of hooey’. When his atheistic buddies at work 
mock religious belief, he does not join in, but neither does he feel an im-
pulse to defend belief in God; at such moments, especially if it is mid-week, 
the whole God business seems rather silly. When Antonio goes to church 
with his wife, he is not inclined to believe everything the pastor says, but, 
particularly if the pastor waxes poetic about the magnificence of creation, he 
may feel that there must be a divine force guiding the world. At the birth of 
a child or the death of a friend, he feels certain God is involved… (2001, 
p.78) 
It may be tempting to insist that Antonio doesn’t really believe that God exists (or 
that he isn’t really an atheist). But neither answer seems to do complete justice to An-
tonio’s psychological and behavioural dispositions. Given that Antonio has the dis-
positions described above, it is very plausible to say that he believes both that there is 
a God and that there isn’t.197 
Accordingly, it seems to me that we sometimes have good grounds for attributing 
to an agent inconsistent beliefs; we have decent grounds to do so when she reliably 
matches the dispositional stereotype for belief with respect to p in some contexts, 
and reliably matches the dispositional stereotype for belief with respect to ¬p in oth-
ers. I am yet to specify what these contexts are (that is a task for the following sec-
tion). Likewise, I have not yet ruled out other candidates for the psychological 
attitudes in question (that is a job for §7.1). The present task is purely offensive. My 
claim is that if a moral error theorist satisfied these conditions (as the conservationist 
 
197 This is not quite the conclusion that Schwitzgebel himself reaches. He prefers to think of these 
cases as instances in which an agent is in-between believing that p and that ¬p. But for my part, I don’t 
think that this is the best way to make sense of the phenomenon to which he draws attention. The 
phenomenon seems to me to involve genuine beliefs—albeit ones that are only active in certain con-
texts. I will motivate this way of seeing things in §6.4. This is not to say that I don’t think there can be 
cases of in-between believing. As Schwitzgebel notes elsewhere (2012), delusions may be one such 
case. 
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predicts she will—more on this to follow) then there is a principled case to be made 
for taking her to believe both moral propositions and the moral error theory. 
§6.4 BELIEFS AND CONTEXTS  
I have argued that an agent can plausibly be said to believe both that p and that ¬p if 
she reliably matches the dispositional stereotype for believing that p in context C1, 
and reliably matches the dispositional stereotype for believing that ¬p in context C2. 
But it still not clear why we should expect an agent to attend to these beliefs only in 
certain contexts, nor how she could be expected to keep up such inconsistency over 
time. How could a mind divided against itself continue to stand? Quite easily, I think. 
Indeed, I will now argue that we are already living with divided minds. My case is 
premised upon the following, plausible idea: 
The Activated Belief Hypothesis (ABH) 
 If T = {B1, B2, B3, …} is a person’s total set of beliefs at a time, then in many 
cases, only a subset of those beliefs will be “activated”; that is, available for rea-
soning and causally efficacious qua guide of behaviour.  
My goal in the remainder of §6.4 will be to motivate the ABH, and to explain how it 
helps the conservationist to satisfy both D2 and D3. 
The ABH does run contrary to the idea that our total set of beliefs guides our ac-
tions all of the time. But this idea seems to conflict with what we observe in any case. 
As Andy Egan notes, “…actual people have inconsistent beliefs, display failures of 
closure, and often fail to bring to bear some of the things that they believe on partic-
ular decisions” (2008, p.48). It is precisely these phenomena that motivate the 
ABH.198 
 
198 Egan in fact appeals to these phenomena in service of the hypothesis that our beliefs are 
fragmented; it is his contention that “…we have a number of distinct, compartmentalized systems of 
belief, different ones of which drive different aspects of our behavior in different contexts” (2008, 
p.48). However, the term ‘fragmentation’ is traditionally associated with a response given by Lewis 
(1982) and Stalnaker (1984) to the problem of logical omniscience as it arises for their very specific on 
the nature of belief and mental content. My arguments here do not rest upon the truth of the Lewis-
Stalnaker view of belief, nor upon the idea that individual fragments of belief systems are closed under 
logical implication. So I will frame things slightly differently to Egan. 
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Let me briefly attend to some of these motivations in more detail before proceed-
ing to explain how the ABH accounts for inconsistent believing, which interests me 
most. First, people often exhibit failures of closure; they seem to (i) believe that p, (ii) 
believe that if p then q, but (iii) don’t seem to believe that q. I may, for example, (i) 
believe that today is Tuesday, (ii) believe that if today is Tuesday, then I ought to take 
out the rubbish, but (iii) fail to believe that I ought to take out the rubbish today. 
This is nicely accounted for by the ABH. Sometimes (on a Tuesday, one would 
hope), my belief that ‘today is Tuesday’ is activated. Other-times, my belief that ‘if 
today is Tuesday, then I ought to take out the rubbish’ is activated. But both may not 
be activated at the same time. (Hence the humorous cliché of a frazzled person chas-
ing the rubbish collection truck down the road in her dressing gown.) 
Second, we already recognise a distinction between recognition and recall, and a 
distinction between ignorance and a failure to bring particular information to bear 
upon a particular task. Adam Elga and Agustín Rayo consider the familiar titbit of 
forgetting a neighbour’s name: 
Jack has a neighbor he sees only infrequently. The neighbor’s name is “Be-
atrice Ogden”, and she lives in apartment 23-H. If asked “What is the name 
of the person in 23-H?” Jack is disposed to groan, scratch his head, mutter 
“I know this, don’t tell me...” but be unable to answer. But if instead asked 
“How do you know Beatrice Ogden?”, Jack is disposed to immediately re-
ply, “She’s the person in 23-H. (2015, p.3) 
The ABH nicely explains this phenomenon as well. If different beliefs are activated 
and guide our behaviours in different contexts, then they will be available for use in 
some contexts but not others.  
We can now proceed to consider how the ABH makes sense of inconsistent believing. 
Recall Schwitzgebel’s (2001) inconsistent atheist. We should want to say of Antonio 
that his beliefs play the following, action-guiding role; he is disposed to act in ways 
that would bring about his desires if his beliefs were true. (Such a claim is surely plati-
tudinous of belief). We should also want to say that insight into Antonio’s beliefs 
(and desires), would enable us to make more or less reliable predictions about his be-
haviour. But it’s difficult to say either of these things if we assume that Antonio is al-
ways guided by his total set of beliefs, which includes both the belief that God exists 
and the belief that God does not exist. A perplexed Egan asks, 
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Which of the actions available to me are the ones that would (tend to) bring 
about the satisfaction of my desires if P and not-P?... This sort of question 
is unlikely to lead to answers that will be of any help to us in attributing be-
liefs to one another. (2008, p.50) 
If we are to preserve the idea that beliefs play an important role in guiding action, 
along with the idea that they enable reliable predictions of behaviour, then it helps to 
assume that not all of an agent’s beliefs are activated at a particular time.199 It helps to 
take Antonio, for example, to have inconsistent beliefs (the belief that God exists, 
and the belief that God does not exist) that are activated in different contexts.   
Whereas a more unified picture of belief takes agents to be disposed to act in ways 
that would satisfy their desires if their beliefs were true, the ABH takes agents to be 
disposed to act in ways that would satisfy their active desires if their active beliefs were 
true (Egan 2008, p.52). In certain contexts, Antonio is disposed to act in ways that 
would bring about his desires if God existed (e.g., he attends church in a bid to avoid 
eternal damnation), and we would have a better shot at predicting his behaviour if we 
took him to be a religious believer. In other contexts, he is disposed to act in ways 
that would bring about his desires if God did not exist (e.g., he declares that religion 
is a “crock of hooey”). In these latter cases, taking him to be an atheist would help us 
to predict his behaviour more effectively.  
An interesting question here concerns belief-activation; in virtue of what are some 
beliefs activated in certain contexts, but not others? Following Elga and Rayo (2015), 
(at least a large part of) the answer seems to concern both the information that is sa-
lient to an agent and the task(s) to which she is attending. When in church, the 
“magnificence of creation” is salient to Antonio, and he wants to feel part of some-
thing bigger than himself. So his belief that God exists is likely to be activated. When 
in the company of his atheist colleagues, however, the silliness of religious faith be-
comes especially salient to him, and he wants to join in on the fun. So his belief that 
God does not exist is more likely to be activated. 
Let’s take stock. When an agent is disposed to act in some contexts in ways that 
would be advisable (assuming certain facts about her desires) if p, and to act in other 
 
199 Parallel claims would of course need to be made about desires as well, but I will restrict my fo-
cus to beliefs here.  
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contexts in ways that would be advisable (assuming certain facts about her desires) if 
¬p, we seem justified in attributing to her inconsistent beliefs. But if we are to pre-
serve the plausible idea that beliefs play an important role in guiding-action and ena-
bling predictions of behaviour, then it is useful to take such beliefs to be activated in 
different contexts. In what follows, I will suggest that this way of seeing things is of 
considerable help to the conservationist. 
Before I do though, let me make a few quick clarifications. First, the ABH is not a 
story about the semantics of belief-attribution. The proposal is therefore to be distin-
guished from contextualist views, according to which the truth of belief-attribution 
sentences depends upon contexts of utterance. Given the ABH, the context-
dependence of belief is a dependence of which beliefs are active upon an agent’s con-
text of action. 
Second, nothing I have said should suggest to us that this is our only option for 
making sense of inconsistent believing. I have chosen the ABH, in large part, because 
I take it to be independently well-motivated—it can account for other phenomena as 
well. Given this, one should not think that the conservationist’s way of making sense 
of inconsistent believing is unmotivated or objectionably ad hoc.  
Finally, one may worry that we are, in attributing inconsistent beliefs to an agent, 
taking her to be mistaken about what she believes, or guilty of an objectionable spe-
cies of incoherency—which seems woefully uncharitable. However, sometimes the 
attribution of inconsistent beliefs is the most charitable option available. It would, for 
example, arguably be more charitable to take Antonio to believe both that God exists 
and that God does not exist than to take him to believe that ‘God’ sometimes refers 
to a divine, all-powerful being and other-times refers to a planet between Earth and 
Mars. Insisting that he does not really believe that God exists may also amount to tak-
ing him to be grossly mistaken about what he believes; for example, when he is in at-
tending church and is quite adamant that he is a bona fide believer. 
Importantly for the conservationist, the ABH should suggest to us that it is not 
implausible that an agent could go about life holding inconsistent beliefs. If the ABH 
is true, then these inconsistent beliefs could be activated in different circumstances. 
Accordingly, it does not seem so far-fetched to think that we could be disposed to 
act in some contexts in ways that would satisfy our active desires were our active be-
  
221 
lief that (say) cheating is wrong true, and disposed to act in ways that would satisfy 
our active desires were our active belief in the moral error theory true in others.  
But of course, we cannot simply assume that the chips will fall where the conserva-
tionist wants them to. We must motivate the idea that our beliefs in moral proposi-
tions would be disconnected from our meta-ethical beliefs—that they would be active 
in different contexts. (And it will be preferable to do so without falling back upon 
our affective experiences.) To some extent, this claim is already endorsed by a grow-
ing number of meta-ethicists. Quite a few have proposed that meta-ethical claims 
have no bearing whatsoever upon questions that arise in first-order ethics (Blackburn 
1998; Dworkin 1996, 2011; Scanlon 2014).200  
Dworkin offers a particularly vivid illustration of this line of thought, boldly de-
claring that “Value judgments are true, when they are true, not in virtue of any 
matching [of some metaphysical reality] but in virtue of the substantive case that can 
be made for them” (2011, p.11). This claim is rooted in the broader idea that we can-
not occupy an external standpoint or “Archimedean position” with respect to ethics. 
In Dworkin’s view, one cannot comment upon the status of moral propositions—
declaring that they are objectively true, say—without committing oneself to a first-
order moral position in turn. Indeed, Dworkin thinks that we can plausibly relegate all 
putatively meta-ethical statements to the status of first-order moral statements (1996, 
p.97; cf. Blackburn 1998, Fantl 2006). In effect, then, Dworkin’s contention isn’t 
merely that meta-ethics doesn’t matter—it’s that it doesn’t exist (Bloomfield 2009).  
I certainly do not endorse all of these claims. For one thing, I am inclined to think 
that meta-ethics exists, and that meta-ethical questions (qua second-order questions) 
make sense.201 It does not seem confused to inquire into the nature of moral proper-
ties, nor incoherent to ask whether moral judgments are intrinsically motivating. 
 
200 The motivations for this claim are admittedly diverse. What is common to all of these theorists 
is that they deny (in some way or other) the existence or intelligibility of second-order questions. 
Scanlon (2014) thinks that all that is needed in order for reasons (and other posits of first-order nor-
mative discourse) to exist is (roughly) for talk of them to be licensed by standards internal to the nor-
mative domain. (He thinks the same is true for other domains as well, such as mathematics.) There is 
no further meta-normative or metaphysical question to be answered. Blackburn (1998, p.295) argues 
that putatively meta-ethical claims are best understood as first-order ethical ones.  
201 The points I raise here have been developed in detail by Bloomfield (2009), Shafer-Landau 
(2010), and Enoch (2011, ch.5). 
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These questions are not plausibly construed as questions about substantive moral is-
sues. Nonetheless, they are obviously intelligible. Adopting an Archimedean vantage 
point therefore seems to me to be eminently possible. When we’re ‘looking down’ 
(so to speak) from the meta-ethics classroom at the applied ethics classroom, we error 
theorists are perfectly entitled to believe that those engaged in first-order disputes are 
exchanging systematic falsehoods.  
But here is where I agree with Dworkin and other anti-Archimedeans (as they are 
sometimes called): we rarely if ever do (or need to) look up from the applied ethics 
classroom at the meta-ethics classroom. There is rarely if ever any need to attend to 
moral linguistics or metaphysics in order to address pressing moral issues.202 Ques-
tions having to do with the pragmatics of moral judgments or the multiple realisabil-
ity of moral properties do not seem at all pertinent to the question regarding whether 
Euthanasia ought to be legalised.  
There is something importantly right about the thought that day to day moralising 
typically proceeds without raising any questions about underlying metaphysical 
truths. We do not need to get on the phone to the meta-ethicists every time we want 
to address a pressing moral issue. If I am concerned to determine whether it is wrong 
to break an inconvenient promise, then we would expect my beliefs about the per-
missibility of betraying a friend to come to the fore—not my ontological beliefs 
about the property of permissibility. As Dworkin puts it, “The moral realm is the 
realm of argument not brute, raw fact” (2011, p.11). Within the context of everyday 
moral theorising, we tend to focus upon considerations that are pertinent to first-
order moral disputes.203   
 
202 Admittedly, meta-ethics may be more easily disconnected from applied ethics than normative eth-
ics, since debates in normative ethics may sometimes trade upon meta-ethical assumptions—the as-
sumption that wrongness implies blameworthiness, say. But not all meta-ethical information is likely 
to be relevant in the normative ethics classroom. Facts about blameworthiness, for example, seem 
more likely to be pertinent than facts about moral metaphysics or categorical reasons. 
203 In §2.3.1, I claimed that I would ultimately resist the idea that the moral error theory carries 
worrying implications for first-order moral theorising. We can now see why: if our meta-ethical beliefs 
are activated in different contexts from our first-order moral beliefs, then the latter enjoy some degree 
of protection. But this claim is far from obvious—we had to earn the right to say as much. We couldn’t 
simply take the ABH for granted at the outset.  
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(Of course, all of this is just to say that we don’t ordinarily take claims about moral 
metaphysics to be relevant to settling first-order moral issues. It is a separate question 
whether it is epistemically improper for us do so (see Lang, 2011, p.22). Later (§7.1), 
I will tentatively suggest that contrastivist conceptions of justification may help the 
conservationist to restore epistemic propriety. But unfortunately, there won’t be 
space to develop a systematic conservationist epistemology. In any event, we should 
not expect conservationism to cohere with all of our epistemic values (it recom-
mends false beliefs, after all). The real question is the extent to which it does, and to 
what extent we should be willing to trade them in.) 
In any event, the considerations above suggest to me that the chips have already 
fallen more or less where the conservationist wants them to: our meta-ethical beliefs 
and our first-order moral beliefs tend to be active in different contexts. We should 
expect our beliefs in moral propositions to be active when we are debating the moral 
permissibility of a particular social policy. But we should expect our belief that the 
moral error theory is true to be active when we are comparing different accounts of 
moral metaphysics.   
To summarise, I have in §6.4 enlisted the ABH as a way to explain how an agent 
could go about life holding inconsistent beliefs. These inconsistent beliefs could be 
expected to play the roles that beliefs typically play in guiding behaviour insofar as 
they are activated in different contexts. I have also proposed that belief activation is 
determined, in large part, by the sorts of information that is salient to us in a particular 
context, and have suggested that very different information is salient to us in meta-
ethical contexts, as opposed to morally engaged ones. We therefore have good 
grounds for the expectation that beliefs in moral propositions and the belief that the 
moral error theory is true will be active in different contexts. 
Before moving on, it’s worth emphasising that my central claim here is that differ-
ent beliefs can be active in different contexts. (This is, to my mind, the best way to 
expand upon Olson’s talk of “attending” to different beliefs in different contexts.) It 
is important to note that this is distinct from the claim that whether or not an agent 
believes that p depends upon the context in which she finds herself. My conserva-
tionist always believes both the moral error theory and moral propositions; it’s just 
that these beliefs are not (or are very unlikely to be) activated at the same time. 
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§6.5 A JUSTIFICATION FOR PRESERVING OUR FALSE MORAL 
BELIEFS 
The intentional cultivation of false beliefs is arguably the cardinal sin of philosophical 
inquiry. It also seems unwise. Generally speaking, we seem to do better to have a 
stock of true beliefs, and we seem to do worse if we rack up too many false ones. 
The conservationist therefore owes us a decent justification for preserving our false 
moral beliefs. Moreover, that justification had better not be premised upon a doxas-
tic policy which sanctions choosing beliefs at our fancy. If the conservationist is too 
epistemically cavalier, then she is unlikely to find many willing partners. 
I will now proceed to develop such a justification. My arguments will draw heavily 
upon Crispin Wright’s (2004) notion of an entitlement to cognitive project. So it will be 
helpful to familiarise ourselves with his work before proceeding. Wright’s concern is 
with so-called “cornerstone” propositions, which are central to a domain of thought 
in that a lack of warrant for them can deprive us of any warrant for other beliefs in 
that domain (2004, pp.167-8). He offers the example of the cornerstone proposition 
targeted by the Cartesian sceptic—that we are not now in a dream. We should want 
some warrant for believing that we are not in the midst of a dream if we are to be 
warranted in believing a range of empirical propositions. But the sceptic claims that 
no such warrant can be found.  
Wright’s response to the sceptic involves positing a form of warrant for a propo-
sition which is “beyond rational reproach even though [one] can point to no cogni-
tive accomplishment ... whose upshot could reasonably be contended to be that [one] 
had come to know p, or had succeeded in getting evidence justifying p” (2004, pp. 
174-5). According to Wright, agents can have an entitlement of cognitive project with re-
gard to cornerstone propositions: when a cornerstone proposition constitutes the 
founding presuppositions for particular cognitive project, one can have a warrant for 
believing it—for to doubt it would be to threaten the project itself. Importantly, the 
entitlement in question does not apply to just any old cognitive project. The project 
in question must either be “indispensable”, or else so significant that its “failure 
would at least be no worse than the costs of not executing it, and its success would 
be better” (2004, p.192). 
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Now, I am not so much concerned with how (or indeed, whether) this strategy 
helps Wright to respond to the sceptic. I only include these details so as to avoid tak-
ing his proposal out of context. The strategy that I will pursue in what follows differs 
in some important respects from Wright’s (though the parallels should be clear). For 
one thing, it is not especially important to me that the moral error theorist have a dis-
tinctively epistemic warrant for believing particular propositions. I am quite happy for 
the warrant to be a practical one.204 Indeed, I expect that Wright himself would balk 
at the suggestion that a moral error theorist could be epistemically entitled to believe 
moral propositions. (The epistemic entitlements with which he is concerned only 
kick in when we lack sufficient evidence for thinking that the relevant cornerstone 
propositions are false.) Moreover, (and as I will clarify further in §7.3), my justifica-
tion is best thought of as a justification for the general policy of cultivating beliefs in 
moral propositions, rather than a justification for believing any particular moral 
proposition at any particular time. What I wish to borrow from Wright, then, is the 
following, basic idea: we may sometimes be entitled to believe propositions on ac-
count of their being indispensable or else immensely important to projects of great 
significance.  
Following Wright, it is plausible to think that there are some projects that are suf-
ficiently important to us that their failure would at least be no worse than the costs of 
not executing them, and their success would be far better. But such projects need not 
be cognitive; they may very well be practical in character. Among these practical pro-
jects is, I think, the distinctively social project of interpersonal co-operation. In order 
to successfully partake in this social project, humans must, generally speaking, be ca-
pable of co-ordinating their actions, behaving in a prosocial manner, and shaping one 
another’s conduct so as to achieve these ends. It is not implausible to suppose that 
this project is of immense importance to us; for our social context is not one from 
which we can readily escape. Social creatures that we are, it is imperative that we co-
operate with one another as best we can. 
 
204 Some (e.g. Jenkins 2007) have raised the worry that Wright doesn’t actually succeed in supply-
ing us with an epistemic (as opposed to pragmatic) warrant for believing cornerstone propositions. 
But doing so is his ambition. 
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Here is the suggestion that I want to develop: we may be said to have an entitle-
ment of social project with regard to moral propositions. This is not to suggest that 
we have such an entitlement with regard to just any old moral proposition. The basic 
idea is that given this social project, we may be entitled to adopt a policy of believing 
that some things really are right or wrong. (We might therefore want to limit the enti-
tlement to existential statements and moral platitudes from which more substantive 
moral claims could be derived—for example, ‘some things are morally right or 
wrong’, ‘we have moral duties to other people’, and ‘we have moral reasons to treat 
others fairly’.) Moral propositions are immensely important presuppositions for the 
project of social co-operation in that to doubt them would be to threaten the project 
itself. I take this suggestion to be strongly supported by the arguments developed and 
surveyed in the previous chapters. Let me rehearse them briefly. 
First, moral discourse plays a valuable role in co-ordinating our attitudes and regu-
lating interpersonal conflict (NRW 2005). With moral considerations in hand, we 
have an established framework—one of rights, duties, obligations, and the like—with 
which to navigate our way through practical disputes. Second, moral judgments (i.e., 
beliefs) are especially effective deliberation-stoppers; they prevent competing consid-
erations that would interfere with prosocial motivation from entering into the delib-
erative sphere (Joyce 2006, p.111). Third, public moral judgments function as 
conversation-stoppers; they block any further negotiations from taking place when 
making interpersonal decisions (Dennett 1986, p.123). Finally, deliverances of blame 
serve as important checks and balances upon one another’s behaviour (Recall that I 
assumed in §2.2.3 an account of blame according to which it involves a judgment of 
wrongdoing.)  
Importantly, moral beliefs plausibly play these valuable roles because we tend to 
conceive of our moral obligations as practically authoritative—as things that we ought to 
do, period. As was argued in chapter 4, the commitment to categorical reasons is ar-
guably of great importance if moral discourse is to serve these practical purposes. 
This suggests that the social project of interpersonal co-operation would have a far 
lesser chance of success if we were to merely believe schmoral propositions. Moreover, 
moral beliefs—as opposed to fictionalist attitudes—integrate with our behaviour and 
the rest of our psychology in fairly reliable and characteristic ways. So it is also 
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doubtful that we could succeed in this social project were we to merely pretend to be-
lieve moral propositions. 
Given these distinctive social benefits that come with having (false) moral beliefs 
in particular, there is a case to be made for our having an entitlement of social project 
with regard to moral propositions. To doubt these propositions would be to threaten 
the social project of interpersonal co-operation. This is not to say that our erroneous 
moral beliefs are indispensable to this social project. It is only to suggest that that pro-
ject has a far better chance of success if we are afforded access to those beliefs.205  
Thus, provided that we take the social project of interpersonal co-operation to be 
of paramount importance, and provided that we take (false) moral beliefs to be very 
important for this project to succeed, I think that we have in hand a powerful justifi-
cation for working to preserve our false moral beliefs. Importantly, this justification 
nowhere appeals to a promiscuous doxastic policy that would let a thousand beliefs 
bloom. My conservationist need not think that in general, agents are free to pick and 
choose beliefs at their fancy. Quite the contrary; she sets the bar rather high. The de-
fence that she offers for these beliefs appeals to a fundamentally important human 
project—one that we should want to succeed. 
Two important clarifications should be made before concluding chapter 6. First, 
my justification should not be mistaken for a transcendental argument intended to 
license ontological commitment. I have not proposed, for example, that the existence 
of moral properties is indispensable to a rationally non-optional project (cf. Enoch 
2011, ch.3). That would steer us dangerously close to a vindication of moral dis-
course—something which, we are assuming, is no longer on the cards. Second, what 
I have offered is best thought of an initial justification—one that appeals to what we 
stand to gain. A complete justification would require considering what we stand to 
lose as well. An important task for chapter 7 will be to consider some potential costs 
of conservationism. 
 
205 Note that Wright does not take indispensability to be necessary either; he thinks the relevant 
project must be “indispensable, or anyway sufficiently valuable to us” (2004, p.192). 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Conservationism: Defence 
I have argued that conservationism is a promising option for the moral error theorist. 
But I do not anticipate that everyone will share in my optimism, at least not yet. 
There are some important challenges to which we must attend.  
For one thing, some may want to put pressure upon the claim that the attitudes 
that conservationism recommends are beliefs (Suikkanen 2013). Since these attitudes 
are taken towards propositions that are taken to be false, they would seem to be in-
sensitive to one’s evidence. But a sensitivity to evidence is commonly thought to be 
an important (if not constitutive) property of belief. In response, I shall argue that 
the conservationist’s attitudes satisfy this requirement inasmuch as they are sensitive 
to a restricted body of her evidence (§7.1). I will also explain why such attitudes are 
not better characterised as attitudes of acceptance. 
Even if the attitudes that conservationism recommends are properly called beliefs, 
one might worry that there are significant costs associated with cultivating false beliefs 
(Garner 1993, Joyce, ch.7)—far too many costs for doing so to be worth our while. 
Though intentionally holding onto false beliefs may sometimes be unwise, I will sug-
gest that we shouldn’t expect the cultivation of false moral beliefs to pose a significant 
threat to our interests or epistemic well-being (§7.2). 
Yet another concern attaches to the kind of justification that the conservationist of-
fers for continuing to believe moral propositions. This justification is pragmatic, ap-
pealing to our strong interest in the social project of interpersonal co-operation. Yet 
some philosophers deny that there can be pragmatic reasons for belief (e.g., Clifford 
1877, Kelly 2002, Shah 2006, Whiting 2014). Thankfully, the conservationist need 
not take a stand on this issue. To see why, it is important to distinguish the justifica-
tion that the conservationist offers for the policy of having moral beliefs (rather than 
no moral beliefs at all) from the justification that she offers for holding any particular 
moral belief at a particular time—as I shall do in §7.3.  
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A further problem is that it is not obvious that we have sufficient control over our 
beliefs to get conservationism going; if we do not, then the proposal may very well 
be infeasible. In response to this worry, I will explain why conservationism need not 
rest upon any strong or controversial species of doxastic voluntarism (§7.4). Indeed, 
there is a sense in which the difficulty we have believing propositions at will is congen-
ial to the conservationist. It might very well be far easier to continue to believe moral 
propositions that to disbelieve them—or so I will argue.  
One might also wonder whether conservationism is likely to be any more stable 
than fictionalism. Perhaps the conservationist is also in danger of ceasing to believe 
that some things are really right or wrong when the practical stakes are high. I will 
propose that to the extent that the conservationist is vulnerable to instability worries, 
she is far less vulnerable to them than the fictionalist (§7.5). After summarising the 
case for conservationism (§7.6), I conclude by seeing how well the proposal stacks up 
against its rivals (§7.7) 
§7.1 SOME PUZZLES ABOUT BELIEF 
I have serviced both a dispositionalist account of belief and the ABH in motivating 
the claim that the conservationist could believe both moral propositions and the moral 
error theory. But some may think that these attitudes towards moral propositions are 
better classified as attitudes of acceptance. Others may claim that whatever these atti-
tudes are, they couldn’t possibly be beliefs, since they seem wholly insensitive to evi-
dence. This is concerning; if the conservationist cannot in the end recommend moral 
beliefs, then she may be forced to recommend rather feeble attitudes in their place—
ones that are just as undesirable as those recommended by the fictionalist.  
I begin with the first concern, according to which a more plausible contender for 
the attitude that the conservationist advises us to hold towards moral propositions is 
acceptance. As is the case with belief, acceptance of a proposition principally consists in 
as acting as though that proposition is true. But acceptance is commonly thought to 
differ from belief along a number of dimensions (Cohen 1989, Bratman 1992). For 
example, 
Control 
Unlike believing that p, accepting that p is usually within an agent’s direct control. 
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Pragmatic justification 
Unlike beliefs, which are justified by our evidence, acceptance is usually justified 
by some practical purpose that we wish to serve. 
Context-dependence 
Usually an agent either believes that p or she does not, regardless of the context in 
which she finds herself. Whether or not one accepts that p, by contrast, will be 
heavily dependent upon one’s context. 
On first blush, the conservationist’s recommended attitude towards moral proposi-
tions would seem to bear all the hallmarks of acceptance. The justification for adopt-
ing this attitude seems to be pragmatic rather than epistemic, doing so is (it seems) 
assumed to be within an agent’s control, and the attitude is only active in certain con-
texts.   
It is debatable just how much of a problem this poses for the conservationist; for 
it is debatable just how much (if at all) acceptance really differs from belief. Horwich 
(1991), recall, thinks that acceptance just is belief. I am inclined to agree with Horwich 
that the distinction is overblown. But I hesitate to declare, as he does, that it is a “dis-
tinction without a difference” (1991, p.3). There do seem to be intuitive cases of be-
lieving a proposition without accepting it. One may sincerely believe that a ladder is 
stable, but refuse to accept that this is so before checking it more carefully (Bratman 
1992, p.7). And if van Fraassen (1980) is right, then there can be cases of acceptance 
without belief. A scientist may not believe that her theory is the literal truth, because 
the evidence in its favour is not sufficiently decisive. But she may still choose to accept 
the theory—that is, to cease to inquire into its truth, and assume it as a basis for fur-
ther research. 
So I think we ought to concede that there are differences between belief and ac-
ceptance, even if they are not in the end very great differences. Accepting that p 
seems to involve the in principle possibility of acting as if p is true while being dis-
posed to deny that one truly believes that p (Daly 2008). And unlike belief, ac-
ceptance is an attitude that is typically within an agent’s direct (as opposed to merely 
  
231 
indirect) control.206 Let us assume, then, that there is a meaningful distinction to be 
drawn between acceptance and belief.  
To begin with, I want to note that I don’t think it would be utterly devastating for 
the conservationist if she were in the end forced to recommend attitudes of ac-
ceptance towards moral propositions. At the very least, acceptance would seem to be 
an improvement upon make-beliefs, which seemed unable to secure sufficiently simi-
lar behaviour and psychological responses to belief. One would expect accepting that 
p to have remarkably similar psychological and behavioural implications as believing 
that p does.207 
Nonetheless, I want to resist the claim that the conservationist’s recommended at-
titude towards moral propositions is more plausibly classified as acceptance. Presum-
ably, we would expect an agent who accepted but did not believe that p to act as if p 
while being disposed to declare that she does not really believe that p. And this is cer-
tainly not what the conservationist recommends. She does not advise us to act in cer-
tain contexts as if moral propositions are true while being disposed to deny in those 
contexts that we believe them. (She does, of course, advise us to act in certain con-
texts as if moral propositions are true while being disposed to deny in other contexts 
that we believe them. But that is a different matter altogether.) If we take the conser-
vationist’s advice, then, in certain contexts, we will match the dispositional stereotype 
for belief with respect to moral propositions—something which plausibly involves a 
disposition to declare that we believe them.  
 
206 Cohen suggests that a belief that p is also distinguished by the disposition to feel that p is true 
(1989, p.368). But worries about the phenomenology of belief aside, this is far from clear. Does van 
Fraassen’s scientist never feel, in the course of her daily experiments, that her theory is true? It’s not 
clear to me that this is so. On these and related issues, see Church (2002). 
207 This issue is complicated by some murky boundaries. It is not uncommon to interpret van 
Fraassen’s (1980) epistemic instrumentalism (which recommends attitudes of acceptance) as a form of 
fictionalism. So it is possible to understand acceptance as the kind of attitude that a moral fictionalist 
could recommend. But I suspect that a moral fictionalist who took this route would be especially vul-
nerable to the first horn of Olson’s dilemma. Whereas a make-believer seems sufficiently different 
from a believer, acceptance may very well become suspiciously belief-y over time. (See Cohen 1992.) 
This is of course no worry for the conservationist. She has no qualms about slipping into false moral 
beliefs. 
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Moreover, and as I have noted (and will elaborate in §7.4) conservationists tradi-
tionally recommend indirect methods for cultivating the attitude in question. This 
would be odd advice coming from someone who was recommending attitudes of ac-
ceptance, which seem perfectly amenable to direct control. The conservationist’s moral 
attitudes are also to some extent justified by her evidence—a claim that I will sub-
stantiate shortly (as well as in §7.3). 
Let me now move on to address our second challenge, according to which the 
conservationist’s attitude towards moral propositions would lack an important (if not 
constitutive) property of belief. It is common to think that beliefs are characteristical-
ly judgment-sensitive attitudes; that they are constitutively sensitive to an agent’s 
thoughts about her evidence (e.g., Scanlon 1998, p.19, McDowell 1994, p.60). Yet the 
conservationist claims to believe moral propositions in spite of taking herself to have 
sufficient evidence for their falsehood. Given this, Jussi Suikkanen (2013) has argued 
that whatever attitudes a moral error theorist has towards moral propositions, they 
could not be beliefs.   
There are a number of ways that we could go about responding to this challenge. 
One option would be to resist the claim that beliefs are constitutively responsive to 
evidence. Perhaps this claim is only true of good beliefs, rather than beliefs more gen-
erally (Huddleston 2012, p.214). Indeed, Andrew Huddleston (2012) has argued for 
the possibility of naughty beliefs, which are so-called because they persist in spite of the 
balance of one’s evidence. A potential response for the conservationist would there-
fore be to characterise our beliefs in moral propositions as recalcitrant ones. 
But I think we can do better than recommend naughty moral beliefs. Instead, I 
think the conservationist should claim that there is a sense in which the moral error 
theorist’s attitudes towards moral propositions are responsive to her evidence. These 
beliefs do not, after all, float free of any considerations regarding the information 
that comes her way, or license outlandish inferences. We can expect them to play 
many of the roles that beliefs typically play in inferences and reasoning. To demon-
strate, recall Schwitzgebel’s inconsistent atheist. In certain contexts, Antonio is dis-
posed to infer from the “magnificence of creation” that there is a “divine guiding 
force in the world”, and to reason from significant life events that God has some role 
to play. Though Antonio’s inferences are far from fantastic, they are certainly not out-
landish. (He does not infer from the magnificence of creation that everything super-
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venes upon a turtle.) These attitudes certainly seem responsive to his evidence. It’s 
just that in these contexts, only a restricted body of evidence is salient to him.  
Parallel lessons apply to the conservationist. As I am imagining them, the conser-
vationist’s moral beliefs are not an epistemic free for all. They still exhibit good dox-
astic behaviour in those contexts where they make an appearance. Insofar as these 
attitudes match the dispositional stereotype of belief, they can be expected to play (at 
least many of) the relevant inferential roles. The conservationist who believes that 
murder is wrong, for example, is disposed to infer from the fact that ‘murder is 
wrong’ entails ‘attempted murder is wrong’ that attempted murder is wrong. Like-
wise, should she (within this context) come to discover that she also believes that 
‘murder is right’, she will be disposed to dispense with one of these beliefs. 
The conservationist’s moral beliefs therefore seem to be sensitive to a restricted body 
of evidence that is pertinent in certain contexts. More specifically, they are responsive to ev-
idence that we take to bear directly upon matters of first-order or applied ethics—her 
moral intuitions, and the cogency of first-order moral arguments, for example. The 
evidence to which these beliefs are not responsive (e.g., the evidence in favour of 
moral error theory) is not at all salient in these contexts. When deliberating about 
what to do when Philippa Foot’s (1967) trolley is barrelling down the tracks, we rare-
ly find ourselves asking questions about moral metaphysics.208   
One might object that in order to be a belief, an attitude must be sensitive to all of 
an agent’s evidence. But this seems false. The inconsistent atheist’s beliefs aren’t 
plausibly responsive to all of his evidence—but there are still good grounds for tak-
ing these attitudes to be beliefs.209  
 
208 Suikkanen (2013) worries that if one’s beliefs are sensitive to only a restricted body of evidence, 
then there is nothing to distinguish them from make-beliefs. This strikes me as false, given that there 
are quite a number of features that distinguish beliefs from make-beliefs (recall §5.4.1). 
209 What of the related idea (mentioned in §5.4.1) that beliefs characteristically aim at truth? There 
are many ways to unpack this claim, and I cannot hope to devote space to all of them here. One 
plausible view takes this aim to be realised in truth-conducive processes (e.g., processes that are 
responsive to evidence) and requires that an attitude be formed and regulated by such processes if it is 
to count as a belief. (See Steglich-Petersen 2006, p.502.) If I am right that the conservationist’s moral 
beliefs are responsive to (a restricted body of) her evidence, then they may at least be said to aim at 
truth in this sense. 
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It is a separate question whether or not the moral error theorist’s moral beliefs 
could be justified by her evidence. (Even assuming that justification is fallible; that one 
can be justified in believing false propositions.) Establishing as much would require 
engaging in some heavy-duty epistemology—which would take us to far afield. But 
let me make a brief suggestion. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2006) has persuasively ar-
gued that our moral beliefs can be justified even if we cannot rule out the truth of 
moral error theory. His case is premised upon contrastivism about justified belief, ac-
cording to which beliefs are only ever justified relative to a relevant contrast class. He pro-
poses that 
Moral beliefs are modestly justified if they are justified with respect to a 
contrast class that by definition does not include moral nihilism or any other 
extreme alternative that would not be taken seriously in everyday moral de-
liberation. Hence, there is no need to rule out any extreme alternative like 
moral nihilism in order for a moral belief to be modestly justified. (Sinnott-
Armstrong 2006, p.131) 
The basic idea here is that a moral belief—say, the belief that one is morally re-
quired to give 10% of one’s income to charity (p)—can be modestly justified; justified 
relative to a modest contrast class that includes ‘one is morally required to give 99% 
of one’s income to charity’ (q) and ‘one is morally required to give 0% of one’s in-
come to charity’ (r). (Roughly, one can be justified in believing that p rather than that q 
or that r.) This is so even if the relevant moral belief is not extremely justified; justified 
relative to an extreme contrast class that includes ‘one is not really morally required 
to do anything’.210 More work would no doubt need to be done to explain how the 
conservationist could enlist this framework to make sense of justified moral beliefs. 
But it seems to me that a contrastivist epistemology (or perhaps even a contextualist 
one) would be the place to turn. 
 
210 Sinnott-Armstrong (2006, ch.6) does not think that any moral beliefs are justified without 
qualification; that is, justified out of the relevant contrast class—for he argues that we should suspend 
judgment upon which contrast class is the relevant one. The resultant position is what he terms 
‘Pyrrhonean Moral Skepticism’. 
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§7.2 THE PERILS OF FALSE BELIEF 
According to the conservationist, the error theorist would do best to hold onto her 
false moral beliefs. However, it must be admitted that there are significant worries 
with holding onto false beliefs. As Joyce notes, true beliefs tend to be instrumentally 
valuable, and false beliefs, instrumentally disvaluable. Agents typically act in ways that 
would satisfy their desires if their beliefs were true, and we would expect that  
In the vast majority of cases having a true belief to act upon is more likely 
to bring satisfaction of desire than having a false belief on the matter… giv-
en that we don’t know in advance how and when we are going to employ a 
particular belief, the safest bet is to have the true one over the false one. 
(Joyce, p.179) 
There is something importantly right about this thought. We (tend to) act in such a 
way as to best satisfy our desires given the way we take the world to be. If all else is 
held equal, having a more accurate picture of the world will lead to actions more like-
ly to satisfy our desires. But it does not follow from this that the best strategy for im-
proving the likely outcomes of our choices will always be to rack up more true beliefs. 
After all, the world may be set up in such a way as to punish having more true beliefs. 
An agent with a more accurate picture of the world will make better decisions given 
the options available to her and her assessment of their potential outcomes. But hav-
ing a more accurate picture of the world might also change her circumstances such 
that the options available to her are, on the whole, worse.  
To take an extreme case, imagine an evil demon who hates know-it-alls, and con-
sequently limits the options of the person with more knowledge to only the most 
undesirable ones. In this kind of case, the person who knows all of the truths will 
make the best decisions available to them, but all of their options will be worse than 
if they’d known nothing at all! Or, as a less fanciful example that’s closer to home in 
the present debate, it may be the case that learning the truth of the world causes one 
to evaluate every outcome as worse than they considered it before they knew the 
truth. Where before learning the truth of the moral error theory one might have got-
ten a lot of pleasure out of doing ‘the right thing’, post-error theory one could see all 
of their options as bleak and meaningless. 
It is the conservationist’s contention that the world is set up in such a way so as to 
systematically punish (always having active) true beliefs about the status of moral 
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propositions (i.e., that they are systematically false). Lacking false moral beliefs might 
result in a more unified and accurate picture of the world. But it would also foreclose 
valuable certain opportunities; in surrendering our false moral beliefs, we are likely to 
lose many desirable practical goods.211 
Joyce also takes issue with a general doxastic policy that would permit us to hold onto 
false beliefs whenever it suited our fancy. “The policy of aiming for truth”, is, he 
maintains, “the best doxastic policy around” (p.179). However, and as I have empha-
sised, conservationism need not be premised upon any sort of objectionable doxastic 
policy. My own conservationist insists that we must clear a high bar before we can be 
justified in making an exception to our truth-seeking policies. This isn’t to say that 
one couldn’t take issue with the proposed justification. But it would be unfair to 
charge her with unbounded epistemic promiscuity.  
Nonetheless, Joyce is reluctant to permit such exceptions. Citing C.S. Peirce, he 
warns that doing so may lead to “a rapid deterioration of intellectual vigor” (p.179). 
Once we admit too many false beliefs, we could very well be led down a slippery 
slope into epistemic chaos. But I do not think that the slope here is quite so slippery; 
for we are perfectly capable of being discriminatory in our cognitive policies. To pre-
serve false beliefs in one domain on pragmatic grounds is not necessarily to threaten 
stringent truth-seeking policies in other domains. Following Olson, it seems implau-
sible to expect that one who “adopts a pragmatic policy regarding beliefs about liber-
tarian free will to be less committed to a truth-seeking policy in mathematics” (2014, 
p.186). 
Still, there is a concern in the vicinity of Joyce’s worry. Garner (1993) has forceful-
ly argued that the propagation of false beliefs can be psychologically harmful.212 Pla-
to’s so-called “noble lies” are a case in point. The citizens of Plato’s envisioned 
society are to be told that they were created by a God who made rulers from gold, 
auxiliaries from silver, and artisans from iron and brass. Garner predicts that 
 
211 I am grateful to Edward Elliott for helpful discussions on this point. 
212 Joyce briefly touches upon this worry as well when he claims that “A seemingly useful false be-
lief… will require all manner of compensating false beliefs to make it fit with what else one knows…” 
(p.179). But Garner does more to elaborate these concerns, and so, I focus upon his developments 
here.  
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… a massive fabrication like the “myth of the metals” would do serious 
damage if injected into a person’s or a society’s cognitive system and ac-
cepted as true. We never believe single, isolated facts; rather we subscribe to 
complex, interrelated networks of mutually supporting beliefs. In order to 
sustain the belief [in Plato’s myth], we would have to find some way to neu-
tralize the many facts that don’t fit with that fanciful claim. … the result 
would be a very confused group of people, unsure of what to believe, and 
unable to trust their normal belief-producing mechanisms. (1993, p.96) 
Thus, injecting false moral beliefs into a society may pose a certain kind of risk. In 
doing so, we run the risk of reducing its members to “epistemological wrecks” who 
struggle to integrate these false beliefs with everything else that they know.  
Though what Garner says about Plato’s noble lies may very well be true, it is not 
clear to me that believing even preposterous things is generally likely to a render us 
epistemological wrecks. Many do go about life believing what others regard as absurd. 
Rumpologists believe that the shape of our derrières provides insight into our fu-
tures. Members of flat earth societies believe that the world is flat—and that the sun 
is a mere five thousand kilometres away! Quite a number of us are inclined to regard 
these claims as no less fanciful than the myth of the metals. But whatever one has to 
say about these people, they don’t see to go about life suffering, confused, and una-
ble to trust their belief-forming mechanisms.  
Thus, believing falsehoods—even fanciful falsehoods—does not always lead to 
epistemological turmoil. Even if it sometimes can, though I don’t think that this 
makes for a very plausible prognosis for our false moral beliefs. Given the absurdity 
of the myth of the metals, a belief that that myth is true will be difficult to square 
with a lot of the information that comes our way. We very often come across evi-
dence that we were not fashioned from scraps of metal (e.g., we see pregnant wom-
en, and check our weight on the scales). Holding onto this myth is likely to require a 
radical reinterpretation of such evidence. Our false moral beliefs, by contrast, have 
peacefully co-existed with our true non-moral beliefs for quite some time. And the 
evidence for moral error theory is not something that many people are likely to come 
across in day to day life. 
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§7.3 NO PRAGMATIC REASONS FOR BELIEF 
I have argued that we are justified in holding onto our false moral beliefs on account 
of their pragmatic benefits—specifically, on account of their being of paramount im-
portance to the social project of interpersonal co-operation. But it is controversial 
whether beliefs are amenable to pragmatic justification. A distinguished line of phi-
losophers has answered in the negative (Clifford 1877, Kelly 2002, Shah 2006, Whit-
ing 2014). One may have thought that this was demonstrably false. Presumably, I 
could hold a gun to your head and threaten to pull the trigger unless you believe that 
your mother is a vampire. Hey presto! You have a pragmatic reason for belief!  
Quod erat demonstrandum? Not quite. Opponents of pragmatically justified belief 
would insist that I have merely supplied you with an ulterior motive for believing that 
your mother is a vampire—I have not given you any real reason for believing that 
this is so.213 The specific opponent I have in mind here is the evidentialist. In her view, 
only facts about one’s evidence can constitute reasons for belief. Within evidentialist 
circles, believing a proposition for pragmatic reasons is regarded as a form of intel-
lectual dishonesty, self-deception, or “wishful thinking” (Bratman 1992, p.3).  
One might suspect that evidentialism has already been ruled out on account of 
our having assumed epistemic instrumentalism (in §2.1.1); the view according to 
which an agent has an epistemic reason to believe some proposition p when (and be-
cause) doing so would be instrumentally rational given her goals. But as Cowie 
(2014b) notes, the instrumentalism–intrinsicalism debate is somewhat orthogonal to 
the evidentialism–pragmatism debate. Instrumentalists are committed to the claim 
that “the practical utility of evidentially supported belief is the explanatory grounds of 
the normativity of evidence for belief” (Cowie 2014b, p.4005, emphasis added). (In 
this respect, they differ from intrinsicalists, who instead appeal to a brute, normative 
truth.) But instrumentalists are not thereby committed to the claim that pragmatic 
 
213 I borrow the phrase from van Fraassen (2002, p.89), who distinguishes between an epistemic 
reason for a belief (something which makes it more likely that the belief is true) from an ulterior mo-
tive for a belief (which does not make it more likely that the belief is true). 
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considerations are themselves reasons for belief.214 Even if it is the practical utility of ev-
identially supported belief that grounds our reasons to believe in accordance with our 
evidence, it is still an open question whether or not only evidential considerations con-
stitute reasons for belief. 
Now, I am inclined to think that pragmatic considerations can constitute reasons 
for belief. Indeed, I suspect that they may sometimes give us reasons to believe con-
trary to our evidence.215 But this is not the line that I am going to pursue here. In-
stead, I want to show why, despite first appearances, much of what the 
conservationist has to say is perfectly consistent with evidentialism. If I am right, 
then conservationism need not be rejected by those who deny that pragmatic consid-
erations can be reasons for belief. 
To show why, it will be helpful to build upon a suggestion made by Berislav 
Marušić (2011, p.36). As Marušić notes, there are two sorts of questions that we 
could be asking when we ask what an agent has reason to believe. We may be asking 
(i) the synchronic question as to what she should believe at any particular moment, or 
(ii) the diachronic question as to what she should get herself to believe over time. 
Marušić suggests that evidentialists are chiefly concerned with the former question. 
He cites Richard Feldman, who is explicit about the restricted scope of the eviden-
tialist’s ambitions:  
Evidentialism is best seen as a theory about synchronic rationality. It holds 
that the epistemically rational thing to do at any moment is to follow the ev-
idence you have at that moment. It doesn’t address questions of how to 
conduct inquiry over periods of time. Thus, it does not address questions 
about how to gather evidence, when one ought to seek additional evidence, 
and so on. In my view, these diachronic questions are moral or prudential 
questions rather than epistemic questions. (2000, p.689) 
 
214 This is not to deny that many instrumentalists do think that pragmatic considerations can con-
stitute reasons for belief. Following Cowie, this may even be seen as “a natural extension of the in-
strumentalist view” (2014b, p.4005). But it is not a necessary one. 
215 Pace cites the example of the addict who “…chooses the road to recovery—believing that this 
time he can change—because he recognizes that not to believe would almost certainly make recovery 
impossible, causing harm to himself and those he loves” (2011, pp.240-1; see also Marušić 2011, Leary 
2016). 
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What is true of Feldman may not be true of evidentialists more generally. But 
Marušić is surely correct that the diachronic and synchronic questions are dissociable. 
Distinguishing the two can, I think, help us to appreciate the sense in which conser-
vationism is consistent with evidentialism.  
To this end, let us distinguish a particular sort of diachronic project from a partic-
ular sort of synchronic one. In particular, let us distinguish (a) the project of justify-
ing the policy of holding beliefs in some domain from (b) the project of justifying 
holding any one belief in that domain at any particular moment. The conservation-
ist’s venture is one of the former kind; her goal is to offer a diachronic justification 
for the policy of holding onto moral beliefs. This policy involves taking steps to make moral 
belief-formation more likely; exposing ourselves to particular sorts of evidence, and 
placing ourselves in certain kinds of situations, for example. (More on this in §7.4.) 
The justification that the conservationist offers for this policy is pragmatic, appealing 
to our strong interest in the social project of interpersonal co-operation. 
However—and importantly—the conservationist’s justification for holding any 
particular moral belief at any particular time is not pragmatic.216 The considerations 
that justify her believing some moral proposition p at some time t are evidentialist in 
character. She will, for example, take herself to be justified in believing that p because 
her moral intuitions afford her strong evidence for believing that p, or because p fol-
lows from what she takes to be the best moral theory. Thus, whereas the conserva-
tionist’s justification for having moral beliefs (rather than no moral beliefs at all) is 
pragmatic, her justification for having any particular moral belief (e.g., for believing that p 
rather than that ¬p) is an epistemic one. 
As I have repeatedly insisted, the conservationist’s moral beliefs do not float free 
of her evidence. In contexts where these beliefs make an appearance, there is a selec-
tive body of evidence to which they remain responsive—that which we take to bear 
upon first-order moral issues. When considering the merits of utilitarianism, the con-
servationist will draw upon the sorts of considerations that an evidentialist would en-
 
216 Given epistemic instrumentalism, there will always be a sense in which any justification ‘bot-
toms out’ in pragmatic factors; an agent’s goals will still serve as the explanatory grounds for her rea-
sons for belief. But again, they need not constitute her reasons for belief. 
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dorse; that it is a unified and simple theory, that it coheres (or conflicts) with many of 
her intuitions, and the like.  
§7.4 A FEASIBILITY WORRY 
The conservationist advises us to believe both the error theory and moral proposi-
tions. But one may worry that we often have very little (if any) voluntary control over 
what we believe. Alston asks, 
Can you, at this moment, start to believe that the United States is still a col-
ony of Great Britain, just by deciding to do so? … suppose that someone 
offers you $500,000,000 to believe it, and you are much more interested in 
the money that in believing the truth. Could you do what it takes to get that 
reward? [. . .] Can you switch propositional attitudes toward that proposition 
just by deciding to do so? It seems clear to me that I have no such power 
(1989, p.122). 
Heil similarly notes that the phenomenology of forming a belief is not that of having 
reached a decision: 
When we attend to the matter, beliefs seem most often to come to us, un-
sought and unbidden, on the heels of thought and investigation. The notion 
that one might come to believe something simply by willing it has, if not ex-
actly an air of contradiction, at least a strong whiff of implausibility. (1984, 
p.59) 
These remarks are but a few samples. But in my experience, they are representative 
ones. The idea that agents typically have voluntary control over their beliefs is often 
regarded as a non-starter. Or, at least, it is generally viewed with suspicion.  
Before proceeding to examine such suspicions, it will be helpful to clarify what is 
meant by ‘voluntary control’. For my purposes here, I shall follow Alston in suppos-
ing that to have voluntary control over a belief that p is to have the “power to carry 
out an intention to” believe that p (1989, p.136). As Chuard and Southwood (2009, 
p.603) elaborate, Alston’s notion of “carrying out an intention” to believe that p plau-
sibly requires that the intention to believe that p be causally efficacious (in the right 
way—no deviant causal chains permitted) in bringing about the belief that p. Further, 
it seems that the control in question must be direct. Alston and others do not deny 
that we can have indirect control or voluntary influence over what we believe. The whiff of 
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implausibility attaches to the idea that we typically have direct voluntary control over 
beliefs themselves; that we can effectively choose whether to believe some proposi-
tion p right here and now. 
Corresponding to this latter distinction between indirect and direct control is a 
distinction between two species of doxastic voluntarism (Vitz 2009). Proponents of 
direct doxastic voluntarism take agents to have direct voluntary control over (at least 
some of) their beliefs. In their view, an agent can choose to believe that p right here 
and now, much like she can choose to think about her favourite colour. Sponsors of 
indirect doxastic voluntarism, by contrast, take agents to have only indirect voluntary 
control over (at least some) of their beliefs; an agent can, for instance, control what 
she believes by way of gathering further evidence, or changing the world in some 
way.  
As should be clear, Alston’s and Heil’s remarks are targeted at direct doxastic vol-
untarism. Very few (if any) deny that agents can have indirect control over what they 
believe. An agent can plausibly have indirect voluntary control over whether she be-
lieves that p when she has control over whether p is true. One can, for example, have 
indirect voluntary control over whether they will believe the proposition ‘the light in 
this room is off’ by having control of the light switch (Feldman 2000, pp.671-2). Al-
ternatively, an agent may have indirect voluntary control over whether she believes 
that p by having control over whether she will seek out the evidence in its favour or 
disfavour (Vitz 2009).  
It is therefore relatively uncontroversial that agents can have indirect control over 
what they believe. A natural strategy for the conservationist, then, is to recommend 
indirect methods for cultivating moral beliefs. To this end, she may follow what Gale 
(1999, p.87) terms the “acting-as-if-you-believe recipe for self-inducing belief”. Much 
like Pascal advised acting like a sincere religious believer in order to acquire belief in 
God, the conservationist can recommend that we go about our days acting just as 
moral believers do: assessing others in moral terms, promoting certain social policies 
on moral grounds, invoking moral considerations when deliberating about what to 
do, and so on.  
More specifically, the conservationist can recommend continuing to place our-
selves in contexts where moral beliefs are likely to be activated: the first-order ethics 
classroom, political protests, and the like. Doing so would make certain kinds of in-
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formation especially salient to us. When debating the merits of Donald Trump’s lat-
est executive order, the sort of evidence that will be relevant will presumably be how 
that order is likely to impact upon people’s lives, the ulterior motives of Trump’s ad-
visors, and the like. Upon being faced with this evidence, it will be difficult not to be-
lieve that the executive order is morally reprehensible, or indeed, downright wrong. 
Of course, this sort of information won’t be salient in all contexts. When discussing 
meta-ethics over a coffee, the evidence in favour of moral error theory is likely to be 
salient to us. In the latter context, we may continue to find the case for moral error 
theory incredibly convincing, and so, it may be quite easy to for us to believe that 
nothing is right or wrong. 
It seems to me very plausible that we can in some contexts take the arguments in 
favour of a proposition p to be overwhelmingly convincing—so convincing that we 
find ourselves believing that p—and in other contexts, take believing that ¬p to be 
irresistible. Indeed, I think this is an experience with which many philosophers 
should be familiar. At was noted at the very beginning, not everyone has taken Lew-
is’s maxim of honesty to heart (“never put forward a…theory that you yourself can-
not believe in your least philosophical and most commonsensical moments”). Peter 
Unger (1979) believes there are no people. And Caspar Hare (2009) believes that 
there is just one (himself). Indeed, I suspect that Hare may find it rather easy to be-
lieve as much when caught in the throes of solipsistic reasoning.217 But I strongly 
suspect that he finds it rather difficult not to believe that other people exist when he 
is buying groceries or out to dinner with friends. This is precisely my prognosis for 
our moral beliefs. Though believing moral propositions is likely to be rather difficult 
in the meta-ethics seminar, it is likely to be rather easy when discussing the behaviour 
of tyrannical world leaders or ruthless businessmen. 
Some may be inclined deny that the solipsist every really believes that she is the 
only person who exists. Yet this diagnosis is far from obvious, and I think we should 
be reluctant to offer it in all such cases. But perhaps more needs to be said to ac-
 
217 Hare defends solipsism in his aptly titled On Myself, and Other, Less Important Subjects (2009). I 
should note that he in fact defends a rather sophisticated form of solipsism, according to which other 
people exist, but their experiences are not present. I think what I say above applies with appropriate 
transformations to this variety of solipsism as well, but will simplify Hare’s view for ease of illustra-
tion. 
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count for this phenomenon of being a solipsist who sometimes believes there are 
other people, and being a moral error theorist who sometimes believes that cheating 
is wrong. Doing so will help to support my contention that conservationism is likely 
to make for a feasible option going forward. 
To begin with, I think this phenomenon should be relatively unsurprising when 
some of the beliefs in question are perceptual beliefs. Our perceptual belief-forming 
mechanisms are, for the most part, automatic. Experimental studies suggest that 
evaluation (and rejection) of what is perceived requires additional processing (e.g., 
Gilbert et. al 1993). Given this, we should expect that it will typically be very easy to 
believe that one’s perceptual-forming mechanisms are reliable while in the throes of 
perception—that is to say, it will often be easy to believe our eyes.218 But there could 
very well be other contexts where one is not attending to what one perceives, and is 
overwhelmed by the evidence in favour of the unreliability of one’s perceptual capac-
ities. In the latter contexts, it may be very difficult to believe any of the past deliveranc-
es of one’s perceptual system.  
Though it would be implausible to claim that everything that is true of perceptual 
cognition is also true of moral cognition, there are some interesting analogies 
(Sterelny 2010). Vision presents us with a particular picture of the world; one which 
we usually believe, but can overrule—especially at a later time. Similarly, it seems that 
we often make quick intuitive judgments about the moral status of particular actions 
that we may later overrule following further reflection. As Sterelny notes, many of 
our moral assessments are “…fast and automatic. We do not have to decide whether 
to evaluate a situation normatively when we read of the abduction of a three-year old 
girl” (2010, p.287).  
A complementary idea here is Haidt’s (2001) hypothesis that moral judgments are 
typically the products of “intuitions”—roughly, emotionally-laden, gut responses. He 
proposes that moral reasoning has very little causal influence upon our moral judg-
ments. In Haidt’s view, much of moral reasoning merely amounts to a post hoc ration-
alisation for these deeply held moral intuitions. Indeed, some of Haidt’s studies 
 
218 Granted, there may be exceptions. If I know that the Müller-Lyer illusion is an illusion, then I 
might be able to resist believing my eyes. My suggestion here is merely that belief is plausibly the de-
fault.  
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suggest that these affect-laden moral assessments can persist even when no reasons 
can readily be offered in support of them—a phenomenon that has been referred to 
as “moral dumbfounding”. (See for example, Haidt 2001, Cushman et. al 2006, 
Hauser et. al 2007.) I think the automaticity with which we often make moral judg-
ments is an important point to appreciate in the context of the motivating the feasi-
bility of error theorists continuing to believe moral propositions. But some 
clarifications are needed before we can draw conclusions from it. 
 To begin with, we need to appreciate that there are disanalogies here as well.219 
Our visual systems process information quickly and automatically, which makes 
sense given that the sort of informational currency in which they trade is often going 
to be most useful in the here and now. As Sterelny observes, moral cognition doesn’t 
always have this element of urgency. Much of moral thinking takes place offline; we 
can and often do assess moral issues slowly and carefully (2010, pp.286-7).  
Indeed, Haidt’s view seems to have difficulty capturing the ways in which a care-
ful consideration of moral issues can plausibly shape our moral judgments.220 Some 
theorists have attempted to do so by developing “dual process” models of moral 
cognition, according to which moral judgments can issue from two different sorts of 
processes.221 One sort of process is automatic, associative, emotionally-laden and typ-
ically takes place with little to no conscious effort. These are the kinds of processes 
that seem to be at work when we read of the abduction of a three-year old girl, and 
arrive at a moral assessment of the situation quickly and effortlessly. The other sort 
 
219 Indeed, part of Sterelny’s (2010) project is to argue that moral cognition, unlike vision, is not 
plausibly modular. He explains the appearance of moral modularity by appealing to pattern recogni-
tion, which is often automatic and effortless. 
220 For developments of this criticism, see Fine (2006) and Paxton and Greene (2010). In fairness 
to Haidt, he does attribute some causal power to moral reasoning—he suggests that the “sheer force of 
logic” can give rise to moral judgments (2001, p.819). But not nearly enough, it seems; for such cases 
are hypothesised to be rare.  
221 It’s worth noting that dual-process theorists are not committed to associating these processes 
with different brain regions, even though some (e.g. Greene et. al 2004) seem to do so. For reasons 
given by Klein (2011), great caution should be exercised here.  
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of process is slow, rule-based, and deliberative, and is at work when we’re faced with 
moral decisions that require careful consideration and difficult trade-offs.222 
Importantly, each of these processes can shape the deliverances of the other. On 
the one hand, our considered moral judgments can (at least over time) shape the 
kinds of quick, associative moral judgments we are disposed to make (Fine 2006, 
Paxton & Greene 2010). For example, studies suggest that our explicit moral values 
have the potential to counteract implicit moral attitudes, such as racist biases (Mon-
teith et. al 1998, Moskowitz et al. 1999). On the flipside, our moral intuitions are im-
portant inputs into moral reasoning. When I sit down and think long and hard about 
the prospects of utilitarianism, I take it to count against the position (at least some-
what) if it goes against my intuitive judgments—the strong aversion I have to causing 
harm, say. Moral intuitions can therefore play an important role in guiding the acqui-
sition and rejection of moral beliefs even in more engaged contexts when there is ad-
equate time for deliberation. 
Having made these clarifications, I am finally in a position to offer a conjecture. 
Just as it would be difficult for a solipsist not to believe there are other people while 
he is perceiving his dinner guests, we should expect that it will be difficult for a con-
servationist not to believe moral propositions when she is presented with the sorts of 
stimuli that prompt quick moral assessments. Moral intuitions and implicit moral atti-
tudes play an important role in shaping our moral judgments, and they would plausi-
bly help to reinforce and sustain the conservationist’s moral beliefs. When we 
observe some children setting fire to a cat, it will be hard not to believe that they are 
doing something wrong. Importantly, these sorts of assessments can also be expected 
to make an appearance in contexts where we attend to moral issues slowly and care-
fully—as they plausibly do when we engage our imaginative capacities and think of 
the harmful consequences of utilitarianism.  
 
222 Uriah Kriegel (2012) has suggested that we should take the products of the automatic, associa-
tive processes to be moral aliefs (of the kind described by Gendler (2008)) and those of the slower, 
rule-based system to be moral beliefs. But I don’t that we should be so quick to do so. Dual-process 
theorists more generally tend to count the outputs of associative processes as beliefs, and Kriegel 
doesn’t provide any reason for thinking that matters ought to be any different in the moral case. The 
alief–belief distinction does not seem to me to map neatly onto the dual-process distinction (Kriegel 
may of course be right in thinking that aliefs are the product of associative processes. My claim is that 
we shouldn’t think that it is only aliefs that can result from these processes.) 
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Accordingly, I think there is a sense in which the implausibility of direct doxastic 
voluntarism is congenial to conservationism. At first, the conservationist seemed to 
face the problem of explaining how we could conceivably get ourselves to believe 
moral propositions. But given the considerations above, we should expect that it will 
be rather easy to believe moral propositions in certain contexts where particular in-
formation is salient to us.223 Of course, such information won’t be salient in all con-
texts. When we are in a detached context doing moral metaphysics, the evidence for 
moral error theory is what will be salient to us. In the latter situation, it is may very 
well be easy to believe that nothing is really right or wrong. 
§7.5 A STABILITY WORRY 
I want to consider now some worries one may have regarding the stability of conser-
vationism. Consider the following scenario:224  
Jane is a conservationist. She works for a company doing something seri-
ously morally wrong (as we would ordinarily say, anyway), and she is con-
sidering whether to become a whistle-blower. She knows that by doing so 
she will incur a great risk to her career, perhaps endanger friendships she 
has in the company, and it has an uncertain chance of success. Still, she be-
lieves that what the company is doing is very wrong, and believes she has a 
moral obligation to try to stop it. Jane begins to deliberate whether to be-
come a whistle-blower. While deliberating, she considers a wide range of her 
beliefs: beliefs about what it is that the company is doing, whether publicity 
is likely to change its behaviour, how risky exposing them would be to her 
current job, whether she can get another job in the industry with a reputa-
tion as a trouble-maker, whether the company will try any dirty tricks 
against her, and so on.  
One might worry that it would be hard for Jane to avoid attending to the fact that 
what the company is doing is not really wrong (since nothing is wrong). This is, after 
all, something that she believes, and it seems relevant to whether she should do 
 
223 In this respect, a moral error theorist may be akin to Hume’s Pyrrhonian sceptic, who cannot 
take on her scepticism in everyday life because “nature [is] too strong for it” (1740/1978, p.657).  
224 I am grateful to Daniel Nolan for suggesting this case to me. 
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something that is supposed to have the benefit of being the right thing to do even at 
the cost of wrecking a lot of other things in her life that she cares about.  
Now, it’s not obvious to me that the truth of moral error theory really would occur 
to Jane in the course of her deliberations, even if the stakes are high and there is ade-
quate time to think things over. Getting the numbers right on one’s tax return is im-
portant, and there is often plenty of time to get things sorted. But I don’t think that 
nominalists are likely to attend to their belief that there are no numbers when filling 
out their tax returns. Having registered these doubts, let me grant for the sake of ar-
gument that Jane might consider the truth of moral error theory while deliberating. 
This suggests two problems. Firstly, it seems that Jane would be less likely to follow 
through on her moral beliefs than a moral realist analogue of Jane might, since that 
analogue wouldn’t bring into deliberation the belief that there is no moral value to be 
gained by stopping the company. This invites the question as to why a conservation-
ist shouldn’t favour self-expunging error theory.225 Secondly, it seems that conserva-
tionism, like fictionalism, has the potential for instability—at least when the stakes 
are high, and there is adequate time for deliberation. 
Regarding the first problem, I think the conservationist should be willing to con-
cede that Jane might not be as reliable as her realist analogue. But I also think that 
the conservationist should hold onto the moral error theory for the reasons that I 
cautioned against propagandism (§2.3.5). Even if she did manage to conveniently 
suppress the reality of moral error theory, there is no guarantee that the evidence in 
its favour won’t come her way some time in the future. So there would always be a 
risk of relapse. She could, of course, try to introduce some safeguards, perhaps 
avoiding philosophical discussions at all costs or leading a movement to remove all 
error-theoretic texts (as well as commentaries and any associated discussions) from 
circulation. But this seems highly undesirable. The outright suppression of philo-
sophical discussion and arguments (for fear of their dangerous consequences) is not 
something that we typically want to encourage. 
 
225 Put differently, one might ask why a conservationist does not favour what Cuneo and Christy 
(2011, p.93) call intransigentism, which involves a refusal to ever “…entertain seriously any evidence 
that contradicts the claims made in moral discourse”. 
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As far as the second problem is concerned, I think the conservationist is at least 
far less vulnerable to instability worries than the fictionalist. Fictionalist attitudes are 
highly overridable. But moral beliefs are not so easily overridden—especially in con-
texts where particular information is salient to us. It is difficult not to believe that the 
child pornography industry is morally heinous when hearing about the harm that it is 
doing to young children. 
Moreover, even if the truth of moral error theory did occur to Jane in the course 
of her deliberations, I think it is at the very least debatable how deeply she could be-
lieve it in a context where other sorts of evidence is salient to her. If her company is 
testing on animals, for example, and she is strongly averse to causing animals pain, 
then I expect it will be difficult for the belief that testing on animals is not really 
wrong to approach anything close to a deep conviction. (Notice that the fictionalist 
can’t enlist this reply; she doesn’t want to rely upon the ease with which we can believe 
that some things really are right or wrong.) 
Talk of depth (as opposed to strength) of beliefs might seem mysterious at first. 
But as Jennifer Church (2002) has suggested, we seem to be tracking something close 
to this idea when we speak of taking something to heart. Church distinguishes a jury 
member who confidently arrives at a guilty verdict but remains on some deeper level 
unconvinced from one for whom this guilty verdict has really sunk in. For the latter 
person, the guilty verdict is not merely a “phrase on a page or in someone’s mouth”, 
but something that integrates with her thoughts, feelings, and actions; she finds her-
self making negative assessments of the defendant’s character, and feeling anger to-
wards him, for example (2002, pp.366-7).226  
At the very least, then, I think it would be difficult for the truth of moral error 
theory to sink in when Jane is in the course of deliberating about how much these an-
imals are suffering—for that belief to integrate smoothly with her other thoughts, her 
feelings, and her actions. It is difficult to imagine that Jane will cease to think that the 
CEO of her company is a bad person, or to feel morally outraged at the company’s 
actions because there is no such thing as badness, and no moral outrage to be had.  
 
226 See also Buckwalter, Rose and Turri (2015), who make a similar distinction between ‘thin’ and 
‘thick’ belief, and draw attention to its explanatory serviceability.  
  
250 
§7.6 THE CASE FOR CONSERVATIONISM: A SUMMARY 
Chapters 6 and 7 have quite a number of moving parts. It will be helpful to take 
stock. I began by pointing towards some gaps in Olson’s conservationism (§6.1), and 
used these to develop four desiderata for a workable conservationist proposal (§6.2). 
I claimed that if the conservationist’s proposal is to be attractive, then she must mo-
tivate taking the moral error theorist’s attitudes towards moral propositions to be be-
liefs (D1), motivate the supposition that the moral error theorist would attend to her 
beliefs in moral propositions in some contexts and to her belief that the moral error 
theory is true in others (D2), explain how these inconsistent beliefs could be ex-
pected to play the roles that beliefs typically play in guiding behaviour (D3), and justi-
fy overriding the presumption against intentionally cultivating false beliefs (D4).  
The remainder of chapter 6 was devoted to satisfying these desiderata. In §6.3, I 
argued that the conservationist would be properly characterised as believing both the 
moral error theory (e) and moral propositions (m) insofar as she reliably matched the 
dispositional stereotype for belief with respect to e in certain contexts, and the dispo-
sitional stereotype for belief with respect to m in others. The goal for §6.4 was to mo-
tivate the idea that this doxastic behaviour could plausibly be expected of her. Here, I 
argued for the ABH, according to which not all of an agent’s beliefs are activated at a 
particular time. I also proposed that the information that is salient to an agent plays 
an important role in determining which of her beliefs are activated. In addition, I 
suggested that very different information is likely to activate moral beliefs, as op-
posed to the belief in the moral error theory. In §6.5, I offered a justification for pre-
serving our false moral beliefs—one that did not simply appeal to the general truism 
that false beliefs can sometimes be instrumentally valuable. I argued that we have 
good reason to hold onto false moral beliefs in particular on account of their centrali-
ty to the social project of interpersonal co-operation. 
The task for chapter 7 was to address some niggling worries. The first of these 
had to do with my characterising the conservationist’s attitudes towards moral prop-
ositions as beliefs (§7.1). Here, I explained that these attitudes would have a number 
of important properties that we commonly associate with belief; they would at least 
be responsive to a select body of evidence, and they could be expected to play many of 
the roles that beliefs typically play in inferences and reasoning. I further argued that 
such attitudes were not better characterised as attitudes of acceptance. 
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A second worry was that conservationism might give rise to a kind of epistemic 
turmoil. Though some false beliefs may have the potential to do so, I argued that we 
shouldn’t expect the same of false moral beliefs (§7.2). Another apparent problem for 
the conservationist’s doxastic practices concerned her having offered a pragmatic justi-
fication for believing moral propositions (§7.3). Given this, it seemed that the con-
servationist was committed to the controversial claim that pragmatic considerations 
can constitute reasons for belief. In response, I clarified that the conservationist’s 
pragmatic justification is restricted to the general policy of believing moral propositions. 
Yet another worry was that the feasibility of conservationism may rest upon an 
overly strong and implausible variety of doxastic voluntarism (§7.4). As we have seen, 
the conservationist need only assume (plausibly) that we have some measure of indi-
rect control over what we believe. Indeed, the implausibility of direct doxastic volunta-
rism is somewhat congenial to conservationism; it is likely to be incredibly difficult 
for us not to believe moral propositions—especially if we continue to place ourselves 
in contexts that are likely to ‘activate’ moral beliefs. In addition, I have argued that 
we should not expect conservationism to be unstable in the long run (§7.5). At the 
very least, it is likely to be a more stable option than fictionalism. 
I hope my arguments have at the very least convinced the reader that conserva-
tionism is a proposal to be taken seriously. Whereas other proposed answers to our 
WNQ have notable shortcomings, conservationism promises to deliver (just about) 
everything we could ask for. I will now proceed to emphasise its advantages over ri-
val proposals. 
§7.7 A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT 
My final task in this chapter will be to examine how well conservationism stacks up 
against its rivals. We can begin by comparing the proposal with the abolitionist’s ad-
vice for life after moral error theory. Pace the abolitionist, I argued that we would 
seem to do better to hold onto our moral practices (in some form). Conservationism 
thus has a straightforward advantage over abolitionism; it is better placed to preserve 
the benefits of engaging in moral practice. Conservationism would also seem to fare 
better than abolitionism in terms of its feasibility. I have suggested that holding onto 
our false moral beliefs would not be nearly as difficult as we might expect. Certainly, 
it would be far less difficult than a wholesale purge of moral language.  
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The conservationist would also seem to do better than the revisionist in recom-
mending that we hold onto moral discourse in its current, error-ridden form. The re-
visionist advises against taking moral requirements to have categorical authority. 
Given this, her schmoral discourse seemed unlikely to preserve many of the benefits 
of moral discourse. The conservationist is not vulnerable to this worry; for she rec-
ommends the preservation of moral discourse as it stands (categorical reasons, warts 
and all).  
To my mind, the conservationist’s strongest rival is the fictionalist, who is also 
well-placed to preserve talk of categorical reasons. However, the conservationist 
would seem to do better than the fictionalist in recommending that we continue to 
believe moral propositions. In contrast to the full-blooded moral beliefs that conserva-
tionism recommends, fictionalist attitudes didn’t seem to be a stable enough or a 
strong enough basis for securing the benefits of moral practice. Our moral beliefs 
tend to integrate in fairly reliable and characteristic ways with our behaviour and the 
rest of our psychology—and these, I argued, are connections that we should want to 
preserve. Given that fictionalist attitudes can often have very different implications for 
our motivations and our behaviour, they seemed unlikely to secure the right sorts of 
ties between moral judgment and action.  
Conservationism also seems likely to be a more stable option than fictionalism. 
Sustaining a pretence requires cognitive effort, especially when the suspension of 
make-belief would carry an immediate advantage. Holding onto deeply ingrained, and 
pervasive beliefs is not quite so mentally taxing—indeed, I have argued that it may 
very well to be rather easy in this case. 
Admittedly, conservationism has one significant shortcoming: it recommends 
false beliefs. Not only that, but it recommends inconsistent beliefs. There is a strong 
presumption against believing that p when p is known to be false, and there is per-
haps a stronger presumption still against believing both that p and that ¬p. However, I 
have argued that there is a powerful case in favour of overriding these presumptions 
in the event of a moral error theory—especially once we appreciate that the alterna-
tives available leave much to be desired.  
That said, it may be difficult to develop a powerful case for conservationism in 
other error-ridden discursive domains. When fictionalist attitudes do not introduce 
significant practical obstacles, it will often be preferable to engage in pretence rather 
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than commit the cardinal sin of intentionally believing falsehoods. Generally speak-
ing, it will always be wise to exercise some degree of epistemic caution; the relevant 
pragmatic justification for preserving false beliefs must be suitably strong, lest we risk 
becoming too epistemically promiscuous.  
Moreover, maintaining inconsistent beliefs may sometimes be harmful. While I 
have suggested that holding onto our false moral beliefs is unlikely to render us epis-
temological wrecks, the same may not be true of Plato’s noble lies. Preposterous false 
beliefs will sometimes be unstable in the long-run, and more likely to impact upon 
our epistemic well-being. Conservationism will not be a very promising option under 
such circumstances. 
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CONCLUSION 
Life after moral error theory 
My aim in this thesis was to determine what we ought to do with our moral discourse 
(and our moral practices more generally) in light of the moral error theory. I began in 
the introduction by familiarising the reader with error theories and the solutions that 
are often proposed in response to the WNQs that accompany them. The task for 
Chapter 1 was to identify the background meta-ethical assumptions that underwrite 
the moral error theory, to explain the arguments available for it, and to specify which 
variety of the position would form my background assumption in the remainder of 
the thesis. Here, I aligned myself with Joyce’s (2001) development of Mackie’s error 
theory, which derives from concerns having to do with the special kind of reasons 
that morality purports to supply. 
The goal of Chapter 2 was to (i) clarify and (ii) motivate the project of addressing 
the WNQ for moral discourse. Regarding (i), I specified that the WNQ is a collec-
tive, normative question; it is the question regarding what we, as a linguistic commu-
nity (or, at least most of us with similar concerns), ought to do with our moral 
discourse if we believe that the moral error theory is true. It was also necessary here 
to address an important challenge, according to which moral error theorists are 
committed to error theories about other sectors of normative discourse as well. Do-
ing so was needed to earn the right to normative language for the remainder of the 
work. Regarding (ii), I argued that our believing the moral error theory gives rise to a 
tension between various kinds of values and interests that most of us share. In order 
to address this tension, we needed to answer the WNQ. 
The remainder of the thesis was devoted to finding an appropriate solution to the 
WNQ for moral discourse. An additional goal was to identify the features in virtue of 
which those proposals that came up short were unfitting solutions to our WNQ, and 
to explore what implications (if any) this may have for analogous WNQs in other 
discursive domains. 
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In chapter 3, I argued that moral abolitionism was the wrong response to our 
WNQ; for it involved surrendering many of the desirable practical goods that our 
moral practices provide. Pace the abolitionist, the harms of engaging in moral practice 
do not plausibly outweigh the benefits. But even if they did, these harms are certainly 
not unavoidable. Though morality can no doubt be put to bad use, we can work to 
circumvent this by improving ourselves as critical thinkers, interlocutors, and empa-
thisers. Abolitionism also seemed likely to be an infeasible option going forward; rid-
ding ourselves of our moral practices may very well be something that we cannot do. 
Given these shortcomings of moral abolitionism, I proposed that generally speaking, 
abolitionism is likely to make for a fitting solution to a WNQ when it is feasible, and 
preserving the discourse is likely to be on-balance costly. These conditions are plau-
sibly met in the case of phlogiston discourse and talk of witches.  
In chapter 4, I argued that revisionism was also an unfitting solution to our 
WNQ. The revisionist’s schmoralities seemed to make for rather poor stand-ins for 
morality. This is because the action-guiding function of morality seems intimately 
tied to its problematic conceptual commitments; in purging moral discourse of a 
commitment to categorical reasons, we rob it of its distinctive practical force. In ad-
dition, I suggested that there was a deeper explanation as to why moral revisionism 
was an unfitting solution to our WNQ: morality (unlike science) is not plausibly a 
domain in which concepts can be substantially modified and continue to be put to 
good use. Scientific concepts are far more amenable to (fruitful) modification than 
moral ones, and this, I argued, is owing to the distinctive functions of scientific dis-
course. In light of this, I suggested that in general, revisionist proposals are more 
likely to be fitting in the scientific domain (e.g., species discourse) than in domains 
where problematic conceptual commitments are needed for a discourse to serve its 
core (or ‘proper’) functions (e.g., Santa discourse). 
In chapter 5, I argued that moral fictionalism, though more promising than aboli-
tionism and revisionism, was not an entirely satisfactory solution either. The central 
issue here concerned the attitudes that the fictionalist intended to substitute for our 
moral beliefs. Beliefs integrate with our behaviour and the rest of our psychology in 
distinctive ways; unlike make-beliefs, they are not highly overridable, and they tend to 
give rise to particular sorts of emotions and behaviour. It is in virtue of this that moral 
beliefs play a valuable role in guiding our actions. The central problem for the fic-
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tionalist’s proposal was that it carried the risk of surrendering the distinctive benefits 
associated with moral beliefs. I concluded chapter 5 by suggesting that fictionalist 
proposals are likely to be more appropriate for discursive domains that are not inti-
mately tied to guiding action and shaping behaviour. This prognosis did not cast 
doubt upon the prospects of mathematical fictionalism, but it did suggest that reli-
gious fictionalism may not be viable. 
In chapters 6 and 7, I argued that conservationism is the most fitting solution to 
the WNQ for moral discourse. Though this proposal involves intentionally cultivat-
ing false beliefs, it is my contention that the presumption against doing so can be 
overridden in the event of a moral error theory—especially given that the alternatives 
available to us don’t carry the same practical promise. Conservationism is not vulner-
able to the most pressing problems for its rivals. Since the conservationist proposes 
to retain our moral practices, she does not risk surrendering the many desirable prac-
tical goods that they provide. She also resists purging moral discourse of its problem-
atic conceptual commitments. Thus, there is no risk of losing the distinctive benefits 
associated with conceiving of moral requirements as categorically authoritative. And 
since she recommends believing moral propositions, there is no risk of losing the dis-
tinctive benefits associated with moral beliefs either.  
If we are conservationists, then life after moral error theory will not be all that 
bad. Indeed, life will go on much the same as before. Life will not go on exactly the 
same as before, perhaps. But did we ever really expect it to? 
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